

ENGLISH LANGUAGE & LOGICAL REASONING

PASSAGE - I

“A resilience test” — Sajid Z Chinoy, The Indian Express (03 June 2025)

HOW SHOULD ONE make sense of India’s recent growth trajectory? Growth in the fourth quarter surged to 7.4 percent. Two quarters earlier, it had slowed to 5.6 percent. But two quarters before that, it was at 8.4 per cent.

What’s going on? It’s tempting to believe India saw a sharp and organic private-sector slowdown and is now seeing a commensurately sharp recovery. Inevitable questions will follow: What caused the slowdown? What’s driving the rebound?

As tempting as that narrative is, it’s not borne out in the data. A closer read reveals a more mundane explanation of the growth gyrations in recent quarters: sharp swings in the intra-year fiscal impulse in an election year and the resurgence of agriculture due to a strong monsoon. Indeed, the entire difference between softer GDP growth of 6 per cent in the first half and stronger growth (around 7 per cent) in the second half of the year can be explained by these factors.

First, government spending was heavily backloaded in an election year. Non-interest general government spending grew at just 2 per cent in the first half of the year but then surged to 15 per cent in the second half as the Centre and states rushed to meet budget targets. Second, subsidies were frontloaded, depressing net indirect taxes — and, with it, GDP growth — in the first half but then dramatically boosting both in the last quarter.

Third, agricultural growth clocked less than 3 per cent in the first half but more than doubled to 6 per cent in the second half. Once you adjust for these “exogenous” factors, underlying growth is much more stable at about 6.5 per cent — which is where full-year GDP growth landed.

To ask what caused the slowdown and now the recovery is, therefore, to ask the wrong question. Instead, the question to be asked is what it will take to first stabilise growth at current levels amidst the ongoing global storm and then to accelerate it to fulfil the demographic opportunity and challenge that confronts India.

The task will not be trivial. Heightened levels of global uncertainty are likely to persist for the foreseeable future, creating headwinds. It’s bad enough that economic agents around the world don’t know what levels of tariffs will confront them when the 90-day

From a policy perspective, near-term objectives should be obvious. The trade deal with the UK sends a powerful signal of openness.

Now, India must quickly try to conclude a US trade deal to reduce at least one source of external uncertainty.

Simultaneously, it must hasten the EU trade deal. If these deals are expeditiously concluded, it would send an unmistakable signal of openness that increases India’s attractiveness as a “China+1” destination.

Liberation Day pause ends? Recent legal events in the US have only compounded the uncertainty. Does the US President even have the legal authority to impose broad-based reciprocal tariffs in the first place? If he cannot use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose tariffs, to what extent can he compensate under different sections of the statute (Section 301, 232, 122, 201, 338) — all of which come with their own riders?

What does it even mean to negotiate with the US under this uncertainty? Who around the world is going to invest in the tradable sector amidst this policy chaos?

The impending uncertainty-induced global slowdown will inevitably put near-term pressure on exports across the globe, including India. India’s outlook over the next year therefore depends crucially on how domestic demand evolves and on how two crucial rotations in the domestic economy pan out — from investment to consumption and from urban to rural.

Recall, investment has been key to India's post-pandemic recovery, as the government's capex push has been complemented by a real-estate cycle. But the public investment impulse has peaked and there are signs that real estate may have also peaked. As both these pillars of investment provide less support, can the slack be shouldered by the third pillar: corporate investment? While corporate India will undoubtedly benefit from lower interest rates and energy prices, it confronts three sources of external uncertainty. First, can India escape reciprocal tariffs? Second, to what extent will the global economy slow? Third, if China is hit with high tariffs, will increasing amounts of excess capacity be redirected to India? Given these multiple and overlapping sources of uncertainty, it's unrealistic to expect a corporate investment surge this year.

The implication is that the heavy lifting on growth will have to transition from investment to private consumption. There were tantalising signs of this last year, but for it to sustain, much will depend on the second rotation, between urban and rural. Thus far, the urban economy has been consumption's mainstay, reflected in strong four-wheeler sales, high-end services and premium products in recent years. But those impulses are unmistakably slowing as underlying supports — pandemic-era excess savings, formal-sector wages and unsecured lending — have faded. For consumption to sustain, urban slowing will have to be offset by rural firming. The signs are encouraging across MGNREGA, tractor sales and FMCG products. But will it be sufficient to offset urban slowing? Therein lies the key to whether consumption can accelerate from current levels and offset the potential investment slowdown. Consumption will have several catalysts this year: softening inflation that boosts purchasing power, lower interest rates, income tax cuts and hopefully a strong monsoon. But will this be enough to offset heightened global uncertainty and fiscal tightening? Therein lies the rub.

From a policy perspective, near-term objectives should be obvious. The trade deal with the UK sends a powerful signal of openness. Now, India must quickly try to conclude a US trade deal to reduce at least one source of external uncertainty.

Simultaneously, it must hasten the EU trade deal. If these deals are expeditiously concluded, it would send an unmistakable signal of openness that increases India's attractiveness as a "China+1" destination.

Domestically, the focus must be on boosting monetary policy transmission, ensuring fiscal capex targets are hit and implementing the four labour codes so that labour-intensive sectors can exploit the trade-diversion opportunities from Southeast Asia, whose proximity to China will make US trade deals very challenging.

Clocking 6.5 per cent growth in 2024-25 amidst all the global uncertainties is creditable and encouraging. But the resilience of India's economy will be tested in the coming year. As long-serving growth drivers (public capex and urban consumption) step back, can new ones take on the mantle?

What can policy do to facilitate this rotation? And how do we position ourselves for even higher growth, which our demographic transition will demand? The answers to these questions will determine how well India will be able to swim against the rising global tide.

The writer is head of Asia economics at J.P. Morgan. All views are personal.

Source: *The Indian Express* — epaper.indianexpress.com/c/77484699

1. According to the author, which factor MOST explains the sharp GDP rebound to 7.4% in the latest quarter?

- | | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| A. A revival in private investment | B. Heavy back-loaded government spending and agricultural rebound |
| C. Recovery in global exports | D. A surge in urban discretionary consumption |

2. The author uses the term "exogenous factors" to refer to:

- | | |
|---|--------------------------------------|
| A. Global trade imbalances | B. Domestic structural reforms |
| C. Election-year spending and monsoon effects | D. Persistent inflationary pressures |

3. What does the author imply about India's previous growth drivers?

- A. They remain strong and sustainable
- B. They have largely faded and cannot drive future growth
- C. They will revive automatically as global inflation moderates
- D. They are dependent solely on US monetary policy

4. According to the passage, which part of the Indian economy is currently showing positive signs?

- A. Large-ticket urban consumption
- B. Merchandise exports
- C. Rural demand
- D. Private investment cycles

5. The author's overall tone toward India's growth outlook is best described as:

- A. Uncritically optimistic
- B. Dismissive of concerns
- C. Cautiously analytical
- D. Alarmist about recession

6. Which of the following can be MOST reasonably inferred from the author's argument about global trade uncertainty?

- A. India is fully insulated from US-China tariff tensions
- B. India may face downside risks if global demand weakens further
- C. High tariffs on Chinese goods will benefit Indian exporters
- D. The US President lacks all legal authority to impose trade restrictions

7. Which of the following, if true, would MOST strengthen the author's concern about cheap Chinese imports entering India?

- A. China signs a new FTA with European nations
- B. The US delays tariff increases on Chinese goods
- C. China increases its domestic demand sharply
- D. China experiences a further rise in industrial overcapacity

8. The author suggests that India must accelerate FTAs. Which assumption underlies this recommendation?

- A. FTAs automatically increase agricultural output
- B. Greater trade openness will improve investment sentiment
- C. FTAs reduce the need for domestic reforms
- D. Protectionism is the best way to sustain manufacturing

9. Which of the following best expresses the flaw in relying on election-year spending as a growth engine?

- A. It increases private investment
- B. It distorts GDP numbers without creating sustainable momentum
- C. It boosts global demand
- D. It permanently raises consumer sentiment

10. If private investment does not revive, which scenario would MOST logically follow from the author's reasoning?

- A. India's GDP may settle closer to its underlying 6–6.5% trend
- B. Government spending will automatically compensate
- C. International trade tensions will disappear
- D. Services exports will fully offset all domestic weaknesses

LEGAL REASONING

PASSAGE - I

In the wake of the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, there was migration of people from India to Pakistan. Under the Defence of India Rules framed under The Defence of India Act, 1962, the Government of India took over the properties and companies of those who took Pakistani nationality. These “enemy properties” were vested by the central government in the Custodian of Enemy Property for India. The same was done for property left behind by those who went to China after the 1962 Sino-Indian war. The Tashkent Declaration of January 10, 1966 included a clause that said India and Pakistan would discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict. However, the Government of Pakistan disposed of all such properties in their country in the year 1971 itself.

The Enemy Property Act, enacted in 1968, provided for the continuous vesting of enemy property in the Custodian of Enemy Property for India. The central government, through the Custodian, is in possession of enemy properties spread across many states in the country.

Some movable properties too, are categorised as enemy properties. In 2017, Parliament passed amended Act expanding the definition of the term “enemy subject”, and “enemy firm” to include the legal heir and successor of an enemy, whether a citizen of India or a citizen of a country which is not an enemy; and the succeeding firm of an enemy firm, irrespective of the nationality of its members or partners.

The amended law provided that enemy property shall continue to vest in the Custodian even if the enemy or enemy subject or enemy firm ceases to be an enemy due to death, extinction, winding up of business or change of nationality, or that the legal heir or successor is a citizen of India or a citizen of a country which is not an enemy. The Custodian, with prior approval of the central government, may dispose of enemy properties vested in him in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and the government may issue directions to the Custodian for this purpose.

The thrust of the amendments was to guard against claims of succession or transfer of properties left by people who migrated to Pakistan and China after the wars. The statement of objects and reasons in the Bill said: “Of late, there have been various judgments by various courts that have adversely affected the powers of the Custodian and the Government of India as provided under the Enemy Property Act, 1968. In view of such interpretation by various courts, the Custodian is finding it difficult to sustain his actions under the Enemy Property Act, 1968.”

The government under the new law restrained courts from ordering the government to divest enemy properties from the Custodian.

11. The erstwhile Raja of Mahmudabad, who owned several large properties in Hazratganj, Sitapur and Nainital. Following Partition, the Raja left for Iraq and stayed there for some years before settling in London. His wife and son Mohammed Amir Mohammad Khan, however, stayed behind in India as Indian citizens and were active in local politics. After The Enemy Property Act was enacted in the year 1968 by the Government of India, Raja's estate was declared enemy property. When Raja died, his son staked claim to the properties by going to court. Based on the description of the rule of precedent set out in the given passage, which of the following is likely to be a result of the application of the rule?

- (a) The son would succeed as the court can check whether the government can declare any property as enemy property or not.
- (b) The new law bars courts from interfering in the matters concerning enemy property.
- (c) The court for the sake of justice can decide to give the property to their son.
- (d) The court's intervention is allowed under the new law.

12. In case if the definition of enemy estate does not extend to the legal heir of the enemy property, if they are Indian citizens. Would your answer in the above question change?

- (a) Yes, the answer would change because how can India take away anything from its own citizens.
- (b) Yes, because the property would no more be an enemy estate as the son claiming the property is Indian citizen.
- (c) No, the government should not trust anyone.
- (d) No, Government needs this property more than anyone else.

13. Which of the following can be presumed to be concerns of the government behind amending the law related to enemy estate?

- (a) If the "Enemy" dies, then the property will be transferred through succession and it will no longer be enemy property, if the successor is a citizen of India.
- (b) The Custodian will not be having any right, interest, and title in the property, only the enemy will be entitled to it.
- (c) The Law of Succession will be applied to the legal heirs of the enemy subject.
- (d) All of the above

14. X has majority shareholding in a company declared as enemy property. Will X's shares also fall under the category of enemy property?

- (a) Yes, it is kind of immovable property.
- (b) No, it is kind of an intangible property.
- (c) Yes, it is a kind of movable property.
- (d) No, it is intangible property.

15. Assume the law states that the government can only take over and sell the enemy property if it is for public benefit. General public benefit is defined as a "material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, as assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a benefit corporation." Which of the following would be true in the light of given principle?

- (a) This is just a tool for "dispossessing the poor to elevate the rich"
- (b) It is a public benefit if the government opens a public hospital after taking over the enemy property.
- (c) It is a public benefit if a real estate dealer then buys the enemy property from the government to develop flats there for the public to buy.
- (d) Govt sells the property to an industry which gives employment to many people around, is public benefit.

Passage-II

IPC Sec 124A: Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards, the Government established by law in India, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which may extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine.

The insidiously developing use of technology by the government to create a surveillance security regime to monitor and track communication in India has a dangerous relationship with the retention of statutory offences criminalising political speech. In that, their object is the same – of imposing fundamental restrictions to constitutional freedoms.

The explosion of instances in the recent past has gained "a special degree of notoriety" with the othering of human rights activists, university teachers and students and journalists as 'anti-nationals'. They have been charged with and arrested for the offence of sedition for simply speaking against or criticising governmental action.

This has led to the creation of a state-sanctioned chilling effect on free speech and has sharply re-introduced serious concerns about the political use of the law in clamping down on an individual's human rights – foremost among them of the right to freedom of speech and expression, encompassing the right to rebel and protest against the government and the policy of the state. The same right(s), which in its broadest formulation remain unquestionably vital for sustaining a resilient and vibrant democratic political process.

In this context, despite its apparent initial disposition to broadly interpreting constitutional protections to free speech, the SC in Kedar Nath vs State of Bihar (where the constitutionality of sedition was challenged) on the first part, did re-state the test of 'incitement to violence'.

However, at the same time – and more importantly – the court also ignored a direct precedent that was laid down in Superintendent, Central Prison, Fategarh vs Ram Manohar Lohia, wherein it had formulated a strict test of proximity between speech and consequence to instead harshly reaffirm the speech restrictive standard of mere 'intention or tendency' to public disorder for prohibiting speech alleged to be 'seditious'. The decisions of the SC in Arup Bhuyan vs State of Assam and Shreya Singhal vs Union of India, progress towards establishing a similar test of 'imminent incitement to lawless action' for deciding protectable speech, as evolved by the Supreme Court of the United States in Brandenburg vs Ohio.

16. You are concerned about the government's unregulated use of Sedition to law to curb dissent. To expand your knowledge, you begin reading about the same. Based on the reading of this passage, what test did the SC adopt from the case of *Brandenburg v Ohio* in relation to protection of speech?

- (a) The speech should be against the government policy of the day.
- (b) The speech should lead to immediate incitement of violence in society.
- (c) The speech should lead to disagreement on issues against fellow citizens.
- (d) None of the above.

17. You are concerned about the government's unregulated use of Sedition to law to curb dissent. To expand your knowledge, you begin reading about the same. Based on the reading of this passage, the SC in the case of *Kedar Nath v UOI* read down the section to the discerned principle of?

- (a) Speech which is capable of causing a critical image of the government.
- (b) Speech which is capable of Incitement to violence.
- (c) Speech which is capable of causing emotional pain.
- (d) None of the above.

18. Kamal uploaded a TikTok video in which an army officer is beating two women for not listening to him. Under the video, the caption reads, "#statesponsoredviolence. Godi is a political supporter of the current government, he is enraged by seeing the video. He filed an FIR against Kamal under 124A of IPC. Relying on SC rulings, Decide.

- (a) No case of sedition as Kamal is using a smartphone to express.
- (b) Prima facie case for sedition, Kamal is an anti-national by defaming the armed forces of our country.
- (c) Prima facie case for sedition, Godi getting enraged shows the anti-national nature of Kamal's speech.
- (d) No case of sedition as Kamal is not invoking or causing any violence against the state.

19. The author is calling for removal of a section which the SC has upheld to be constitutional. Can the author be tried for Sedition for advocating views against the law of the land? Decide.

- (a) The author's speech is protected under the constitution of India.
- (b) The author's speech is a reasonable criticism of government policy therefore protected.
- (c) Both (A) and (B).
- (d) None of the above.

20. Azhar is a kashmiri student living in Gujarat. Rajesh and Manto always bully him by calling him out as a terrorist sympathizer. One day out of frustration and anger he prints a Pakistani flag and puts it out on the house of Rajesh and Manto. Jyoti sees a Pakistani flag outside their house and informs the police. Can Rajesh and Manto be tried for Sedition. Decide.

- (a) Yes, irrespective who flew the flag, a Pakistani flag on an Indian house is an act of sedition.
- (b) No, Azhar should be tried for sedition and not Rajesh and Manto.
- (c) No, merely flying a flag doesn't amount to sedition as both Rajesh and Manto had no intention to incite violence.
- (d) Yes, Rajesh and Manto are anti-nationals for bullying their fellow citizens.

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GENERAL KNOWLEDGE

Passage-I

The Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade (IFCCT) is an emerging global platform created to address the rising intersection between international trade regulation and climate action. With climate policies increasingly influencing global markets—through carbon border adjustments, green-subsidy regimes, climate-linked tariffs, and sustainability standards—the IFCCT seeks to ensure that climate measures support, rather than distort, trade flows, and that developing economies are not disproportionately disadvantaged.

The IFCCT was conceptualized to bring together governments, multilateral institutions, private sector actors, and academic bodies under a single umbrella to harmonize climate-trade norms. It emphasises that trade rules must align with the Paris Agreement, sustainable development commitments, and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). As climate transitions reshape global value chains, the forum argues for cooperative mechanisms to prevent unilateral trade restrictions from becoming disguised protectionism.

A core focus of the IFCCT is the examination of carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) and similar climate-linked tariffs that some advanced economies are adopting. The forum encourages transparent methodologies for calculating embedded carbon, while warning that such measures must not penalize economies with historically low emissions but lower financial capacity for green technology shifts. IFCCT promotes a multidimensional approach that integrates climate financing, technology access, and trade facilitation frameworks to ensure equitable climate transitions.

Another component of the IFCCT's mandate is developing unified green standards for trade, including standards for sustainable supply chains, low-carbon manufacturing, renewable-energy-based exports, and green certification systems. It recognises that multiple, conflicting national standards increase transaction costs for exporters, especially SMEs in the Global South. Harmonisation would help integrate developing countries into green global value chains.

The IFCCT also addresses the need for climate-resilient infrastructure for trade—green ports, low-emission logistics, digital trade platforms, and climate-proofed transport corridors. It proposes joint investment mechanisms and blended-finance models to support infrastructure upgrades across vulnerable regions.

Importantly, the forum aims to create a dispute-resolution mechanism for climate-trade conflicts, ensuring that disputes involving carbon standards, green-subsidy competitiveness, or cross-border environmental impacts are resolved through dialogue rather than protectionist escalation. Although not legally binding, IFCCT recommendations are increasingly influencing climate-related chapters in contemporary free-trade agreements.

In terms of governance, the IFCCT operates as a voluntary, consensus-based forum supported by a secretariat and regional hubs. It partners with the WTO, UNFCCC bodies, and national trade ministries to streamline reporting frameworks. It also facilitates capacity-building for developing countries to help them comply with evolving climate-trade requirements.

The IFCCT represents a shift toward recognizing climate change as a structural factor shaping global trade architecture. Its long-term vision is to institutionalize climate considerations in global economic governance, ensuring a just, predictable, and cooperative framework for the low-carbon transition.

21. With reference to climate–trade interactions, consider the following:

1. Carbon Border Adjustment Measures (CBAMs) are compatible with WTO norms only if they satisfy the principle of non-discrimination.
2. CBAMs can be challenged before the WTO dispute settlement body.
3. CBAMs apply uniformly to all trading partners irrespective of their development status.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

- A. 1 and 2 only B. 2 and 3 only C. 1 and 3 only D. 1, 2 and 3

22. Which of the following is the *primary concern* developing countries raise regarding climate-linked trade rules?

- A. They reduce maritime trade competitiveness
- B. They may create additional compliance burdens
- C. They force countries to ban fossil fuels immediately
- D. They restrict food imports from developing economies

23. Which of the following bodies plays the most significant role in determining global “trade and environment” disputes?

- A. UNFCCC Secretariat
- B. IMF Dispute Panel
- C. International Court of Justice
- D. WTO Appellate Body

24. Article 6 of Paris Agreement — International Carbon Markets

- 1. TBT Agreement — Regulation of subsidies for carbon reduction
- 2. SCM Agreement — Disciplines on trade-distorting subsidies

Which of the above pairs is/are correctly matched?

- A. 1 only
- B. 1 and 2 only
- C. 1 and 3 only
- D. 2 and 3 only

25. “Green Trade Facilitation” includes which of the following?

- 1. Digitised customs procedures
- 2. Supply-chain emission monitoring
- 3. Zero-carbon port operations

- A. 1 only
- B. 1, 2 and 3
- C. 2 and 3 only
- D. 1 and 3 only

26. Which of the following initiatives globally work on integrating climate and trade?

- 1. OECD Trade and Environment Working Group
- 2. UNCTAD BioTrade Initiative
- 3. WTO Committee on Trade and Environment

- A. 1 only
- B. 1 and 2 only
- C. 1 and 3 only
- D. 2 and 3 only

27. Which of the following are considered *green subsidies*?

- 1. Incentives for renewable energy production
- 2. Subsidies for coal gasification
- 3. Funding for electric vehicle manufacturing

- A. 1 only
- B. 1 and 3 only
- C. 2 and 3 only
- D. 1, 2 and 3

28. Climate-resilient trade infrastructure includes:

- 1. Climate-proofed logistics corridors
- 2. Port electrification systems
- 3. AI-based customs automation

- A. 1 only
C. 1 and 2 only
- B. 2 and 3 only
D. 1, 2 and 3

29. Which of the following are considered risks of uncoordinated climate-trade actions?

1. Carbon leakage
2. Green protectionism
3. Fragmented climate standards

- A. 1 only
B. 2 only
C. 1 and 3 only
D. 1, 2 and 3

30. Which of the following most accurately describes "climate clubs"?

- A. Coalitions enabling harmonised climate standards across members
B. Mandatory alliances under WTO norms
C. Regional trade groups for emission trading only
D. Bilateral agreements to promote fossil fuels

PASSAGE - II

The State of Food and Agriculture (SOFA) 2025 is expected to deliver one of the most comprehensive assessments of global agri-food system resilience at a time when climate stress, geopolitical fragmentation, and supply-chain volatility are redefining food security priorities. While the FAO's core analytical framework remains unchanged—evaluating production, productivity, environmental stress, and socioeconomic linkages—SOFA 2025 is anticipated to sharpen its focus on adaptation finance, climate-smart agriculture uptake, and the integration of digital public infrastructure (DPI) in agriculture across developing economies.

Building on recent FAO findings that nearly 735 million people faced chronic hunger globally in 2023, the upcoming report is expected to emphasize the widening gap in food affordability, with low-income countries disproportionately affected by energy price fluctuations and extreme weather. For India, FAO analyses highlight structural progress through extensive digitalisation—such as the Agristack initiative, soil health digitisation, and crop insurance expansion—but warn of persistent vulnerabilities in smallholder resilience, especially in semi-arid regions.

A central theme of SOFA 2025 will likely be the role of climate-induced hydrological disruptions. FAO has repeatedly documented how erratic monsoon behaviour, drought-flood cycles, and glacier retreat directly impact agricultural output in South Asia. The report is also expected to highlight the complex interaction between global trade restrictions, fertilizer shortages, and supply chain chokepoints—issues that gained prominence after recurring disruptions in the Black Sea and Red Sea routes.

Another expected pillar of SOFA 2025 is food loss and waste reduction, aligned with SDG 12.3. FAO's 2024 work suggests that developing countries lose up to 40% of food before it reaches markets due to storage, transport, and processing constraints. SOFA 2025 may prioritise low-carbon cold chain systems, sustainable packaging, and cooperative-led logistics models as scalable interventions.

The report will likely expand FAO's advocacy for climate-smart agriculture, particularly precision irrigation, nutrient use optimisation, resilient seed varieties, and nature-positive farming. Discussions may include carbon-sequestering practices such as agroforestry and regenerative agriculture, especially for nations like India which have strong commitments under the Paris Agreement.

Finally, SOFA 2025 is expected to highlight the structural challenge of global fertiliser dependency, urging diversification, biofertiliser innovation, and circular nutrient management. India's efforts—such as nano-urea rollout, biofertiliser missions, and the renewed focus on localised production—could be showcased as case studies. While the full dataset of SOFA 2025 is yet to be released, its thematic priorities align with FAO's growing emphasis on a resilient, green, and digitally empowered global food system.

31. Which of the following BEST reflects a theme expected in SOFA 2025?

1. Integration of digital public infrastructure in agriculture
2. Expansion of global biofuel subsidies
3. Promotion of agro-ecological zoning
4. Universal prohibition on fertiliser subsidies

A. 1 and 3 only B. 1 and 4 only C. 2 and 3 only D. 1, 2, and 4 only

32. SOFA 2025 is likely to highlight hydrological disruptions due to:

1. Monsoon variability
2. Glacier retreat
3. Desertification trends in Europe
4. Flood-drought cycles

A. 1, 2, and 4 only B. 1 and 3 only C. 2 and 3 only D. 1, 2, 3, and 4

33. Which challenge is FAO expected to emphasize regarding global food affordability?

1. Energy price fluctuations
2. Declining agricultural R&D in Asia
3. Extreme weather events
4. Increasing capital inflows into agri-tech

A. 1 and 4 only B. 1 and 3 only C. 2 and 4 only D. 1, 2, and 3 only

34. Which statement about India's agricultural transition is supported by the passage?

1. Digitisation initiatives like Agristack strengthen structural resilience.
2. Soil health digitisation is part of India's transformation.
3. India faces no major vulnerability in semi-arid zones.
4. Crop insurance expansion is aligned with FAO concerns.

A. 1, 2, and 4 only B. 1 and 3 only C. 2 and 3 only D. 1, 2, 3, and 4

35. According to SOFA-linked FAO assessments, food loss in developing nations is primarily due to:

1. Poor storage systems
2. Transport bottlenecks
3. Market fragmentation
4. Excessive on-farm mechanisation

A. 1, 2, and 3 only B. 1 and 4 only C. 2 and 4 only D. 1, 2, 3, and 4

36. Which of the following is highlighted as an emerging structural challenge?

1. Global fertiliser dependency
2. Overproduction of biofertilisers
3. Inefficiency of nano-urea
4. Carbon-positive agriculture

- A. 1 only
- B. 1 and 3 only
- C. 2 and 4 only
- D. 1 and 4 only

37. Which of the following practices are aligned with FAO's climate-smart agriculture recommendations?

- 1. Precision irrigation
- 2. Regenerative agriculture
- 3. Expansion of monoculture systems
- 4. Resilient seed varieties

- A. 1, 2, and 4 only
- B. 1 and 3 only
- C. 2 and 3 only
- D. 1, 2, 3, and 4

38. Which supply-chain concerns gained prominence according to FAO?

- 1. Black Sea route disruptions
- 2. Red Sea route disruptions
- 3. South China Sea restrictions
- 4. Fertiliser import shortages

- A. 1, 2, and 4 only
- B. 3 and 4 only
- C. 1 and 3 only
- D. 1, 2, 3, and 4

39. Which of the following institutions publishes the SOFA Report?

- A. FAO
- B. WFP
- C. UNDP
- D. IFAD

40. Which of the following is NOT a core component of FAO's agri-food systems analysis?

- A. Biodiversity metrics
- B. Military expenditure pattern
- C. Water-use efficiency
- D. Land productivity

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Quantitative Technique

Passage-I

In school A, total students are 400, out of which 70% are in class 12th, rest in class 10th. In school B total number of students is $\frac{3}{4}$ th of the students at A. At B, 40% is in class 12th. Total students in school C is 20 less than the number of 12th class students in school A. In school C, number of students in 10th class is equal to the number of students in 10th class in school B. In school D, total students in class 10th is 60 which is 30% of total students.

41. What is the difference between total students in 12th class of school A and B together and total students in class 10th of school C and D together?

- (A)140 (B)160 (C)100 (D)120

42. In school D 30% students in class 12th are girls and 40% in class 10th are girls. So number of total girls in School D is?

- (A)88 (B)77 (C)55 (D)66

43. Student in class 10th of school A is how much % more or less to the 10th class students of school C?

- (A)50.2%more (B)33.33%less (C)65.5%more (D)65% less

44. What is the ratio of total student in class 12th to total students in class 10th of all the school together?

- (A)18:17 (B)31:27 (C)27:31 (D)17:18

45. Average number of students in school A, B, C and D together is?

- (A)290 (B)275 (C)285 (D)260

Passage - II

The total population of a village Rampur is 14200 out of which 24% population are below poverty line. And total population of Village Rampur is $11\frac{1}{4}\%$ less than the total population of Village Fatehpur and 25% of population in Fatehpur is below poverty line. Population other than below poverty line in Village Sirsa is 320 more than population of village Rampur, which are not below poverty line. Average population of Village Belapur and Kolapur is equal to average population of Village Rampur and Fatehpur and population of Belapur is 150% of population of Kolapur. Ratio of below poverty line population in Village Fatehpur to village Kolapur is 2:3. 20% of total population are below poverty line in village Belapur and Fatehpur. Below poverty line population in village Sirsa is equal to below poverty line in village Rampur.

46. Average population of Village Kolapur and Sirsa is what % of total population of village Fatehpur?

- (A)83.125% (B)85.125% (C)87.125% (D)81.125%

47. Find the total population of village Belapur?

- (A)54000 (B)18120 (C)12180 (D)16000

48. What is the average below poverty level population of all the villages? (Approx)

- (A)3317 (B)3371 (C)3928 (D)3327

49. How much people of below poverty line population of village Sirsa?

- (A)11112 (B)3408 (C)4000 (D)3456

50. Find the ratio of population of village Fatehpur to the Rampur.

- (A)80:71 (B)54:97 (C)3:4 (D)NOT