

DAY 44 OF 50-DAYS STUDY PLAN



ENGLISH LANGUAGE & LOGICAL REASONING

PASSAGE - I

Nirupama Rao | The Indian Express | Tue, 10 June 2025

THE TERROR ATTACK in Pahalgam and the subsequent Indian military response, Operation Sindoor, have once again brought into sharp focus a reality that many in the Global South live with daily: Terrorism is not just an isolated security threat, it is an ongoing war by other means. While India showcased military precision and diplomatic discipline during the crisis, the global response to its actions also exposed gaps in the current international system's ability to credibly and swiftly respond to terror. From these developments emerges a compelling case for a new platform, an India-led initiative: The T20 — Twenty Against Terrorism.

The Pahalgam terror attack, audacious in its planning and brutal in its execution, sparked public outrage and political consensus within India. Operation Sindoor, a swift, targeted military campaign in response, reaffirmed India's doctrine of proactive defence. Yet, while the operation achieved its tactical goals, the international diplomatic terrain proved more complex. While allies like the United States, France, and Israel tacitly or overtly supported India, other global institutions such as the United Nations and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) defaulted to calls for "restraint" and "dialogue" without assigning responsibility. China, predictably, shielded Pakistan diplomatically. Russia, once a reliable strategic partner, chose calibrated silence.

This pattern is familiar and frustrating. The international architecture for counter-terrorism — including the UN, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and the Global Counterterrorism Forum — either lacks teeth, is entangled in geopolitical rivalries, or remains anchored in a Western security paradigm that does not fully reflect the lived realities of terrorism in South Asia, Africa, or the Middle East.

The idea of T20 — Twenty Against Terrorism — stems from this chronic mismatch between global terror frameworks and the regional intensity of the threat. It proposes a dedicated alliance of 20 countries, led by India, comprising nations from the Global South who face frequent, asymmetrical, and politically complex terror threats. These include Indonesia, Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt, Mali, Fiji, the Philippines, and others — countries that, like India, often find themselves battling both state-sponsored and ideologically driven terrorist violence without adequate global support.

The mandate of T20 would not be to duplicate existing institutions but to supplement them with agility, real-time coordination, and a Global South-first perspective. It would focus on intelligence sharing through a joint task force; capacity building and counter-radicalisation programmes; joint diplomatic statements to name and shame state sponsors of terrorism; a permanent platform to address emerging threats like cyber-terrorism, drone-based warfare, and crypto-financing of extremism.

Having dealt with decades of cross-border terror, India has both the experience and the credibility to lead such an initiative. Unlike the West, which often views terrorism through the lens of episodic attacks or homeland security, countries in the Global South confront it as a continuous, multi-generational battle. Moreover, unlike Western coalitions that are often seen as politically selective or militarily interventionist, a T20 rooted in the Global South would command moral legitimacy and operational relevance.

The timing also matters. As multilateralism falters under the weight of big-power rivalries, smaller groupings are proving more nimble and effective — be it the Quad, I2U2, or ASEAN-led security platforms. T20 fits this trend and fills a glaring institutional gap: the absence of a platform focused specifically on terror from the perspective of its most frequent victims.





Importantly, the T20 would not seek to replace the UN or the FATF but to operate as a conscience-keeper and actionaccelerator. It would bring in countries often left on the sidelines of global security debates. It would lend weight to bilateral diplomacy by providing collective legitimacy. And it would foster collaboration beyond the militaristic models of the past, emphasising data, digital tools, community resilience, and development-linked de-radicalisation.

The moral case for T20 lies in its inclusivity. Countries like Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam may not dominate global headlines, but they, too, have faced acts of terror that scarred their national psyche. A platform where their voices matter — where their intelligence inputs are valued, their pain recognised — would be a radical departure from the hierarchical nature of most global institutions.

Strategically, India also benefits. T20 would provide it with leadership stature without the baggage of military entanglement. It affirms its image as a responsible, proactive power and strengthens its positioning as the voice of the Global South. With its experience, digital capacity, and diplomatic network, India is well-placed to host the T20 secretariat, offer training hubs, and shape the global counter-terror narrative from New Delhi.


Operation Sindoor was India's immediate answer to a proximate threat. But the deeper lesson is that reactive strikes, however precise, are not enough. What is needed is a shift from episodic response to permanent institutional architecture. T20 answers that call. It is an idea whose time has come, and whose urgency is underscored by every fresh act of terror that rocks cities from Srinagar to Surabaya.


India must now take the next step — not just to defend itself, but to offer leadership to all those who, like it, stand on the frontline of an undeclared global war.

- 1. Which of the following best captures the central argument of the passage?
- A. India must create a Global South-led T20 platform to fill the institutional gap in counter-terrorism efforts.
- B. The UN and FATF must be reformed to better represent Global South concerns.
- C. Western military alliances should expand their anti-terror role into Asia and Africa.
- D. The Pahalgam terror attack proves that countries must rely solely on bilateral diplomacy.
- 2. According to the passage, which limitation MOST weakens existing global counter-terrorism structures like the UN and FATF?
- A. They are insufficiently funded to implement anti-terror programmes.
- B. They rely too heavily on military-only responses and ignore diplomacy.
- C. They are constrained by geopolitical rivalries and Western-centric security paradigms.
- D. They exclude major powers such as the US, China, and Russia.
- **3.** What does the author imply regarding terrorism in the Global South?
- A. It is episodic, similar to the West's experience.
- B. It is a continuous and multi-generational threat requiring long-term institutional response.
- C. It can be solved primarily through military retaliation.
- D. It is adequately addressed by existing multilateral frameworks.
- **4.** Which of the following best reflects the author's view on India's potential leadership in T20?
- A. India should lead because it has the largest economy in the Global South.
- B. India should lead because Western nations trust its military interventions.
- C. India should lead because it can replace the UN's counter-terror role entirely.
- D. India should lead because it combines credibility, experience, digital capacity, and diplomatic networks.









5.Which idea MOST closely aligns with the author's proposed role for T20?

- A. Creating a military alliance to deploy forces globally.
- B. Replacing FATF and UN Security Council counter-terror bodies.
- C. Establishing a sanctions-based enforcement structure.
- D. Acting as a conscience-keeper and action-accelerator for Global South terror concerns.
- 6. The author argues that T20 would add "moral legitimacy" missing in Western coalitions. Which assumption underlies this claim?
- A. Moral legitimacy increases when nations with lived experience of terror shape the institutional response.
- B. Western states are unwilling to participate in any counter-terror coalition.
- C. Only developing countries can authentically understand counter-terror challenges.
- D. Military alliances automatically lack moral authority.
- 7. If T20 becomes operational, which outcome is MOST consistent with the author's argument?
- A. Global North institutions will reduce all counter-terror initiatives.
- B. India will withdraw from the UN Security Council reform process.
- C. Countries like Kenya or Sri Lanka would gain a larger voice in shaping global counter-terror norms.
- D. NATO will assume leadership of counter-terror efforts in the Indian Ocean.
- **8.** Which of the following, if true, MOST strengthens the case for creating T20?
- A. The UN plans to launch a new global coalition against cyber-terror.
- B. Multiple Global South countries report that Western institutions routinely delay responses to terror threats.
- C. India's defence budget increases significantly.
- D. FATF begins sanctioning states that sponsor terrorism.
- 9. Which factor would MOST challenge the author's claim that T20 would be more "agile" than existing institutions?
- A. Poor relations between India and Indonesia.
- B. India's refusal to accept intelligence inputs from smaller nations.
- C. A rise in US-India strategic cooperation.
- D. Disagreements among T20 members on defining what constitutes "state-sponsored terrorism."
- **10.** The author endorses a principle: *Platforms are more legitimate when they reflect the lived experiences of those* most affected by the problem.


Which scenario BEST applies this principle?

- A. A coalition of wealthy European states drafting rules for African debt restructuring.
- B. The UN Security Council approving a resolution on microstates without consulting them.
- C. NATO designing cyber-security norms for Southeast Asia.
- D. A grouping of terrorism-affected Global South countries forming a joint counter-terror doctrine.









LEGAL REASONING

PASSAGE - I

Parliament enacted the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act 1991. Sections 3, 6 and 8 of the legislation came into force at once on the date of enactment (18 September 1991) while the other provisions are deemed to have come into force on 11 July 1991. The long title evinces the intent of Parliament in enacting the law, for it is: —An Act to prohibit conversion of any place of worship and to provide for the maintenance of the religious character of any place of worship as it existed on the 15th day of August, 1947, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

The law has been enacted to fulfil two purposes. First, it prohibits the conversion of any place of worship. In doing so, it speaks to the future by mandating that the character of a place of public worship shall not be altered. Second, the law seeks to impose a positive obligation to maintain the religious character of every place of worship as it existed on 15 August 1947 when India achieved independence from colonial rule.


Section 3 enacts a bar on the conversion of a place of worship of any religious denomination or a section of it into a place of worship of a different religious denomination or of a different segment of the same religious denomination. Section 6 provides for a punishment of three years 'imprisonment and a fine for contravening the provisions of Section 3 and for an attempt or act of abetment.

Source: (Edited) Case Law: M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das.

- 11. Aurengzeb was a bigoted Mughal ruler of Medieval India. Mahant Ambi is a priest in Varanasi. He found out that Aurengzeb had demolished a temple in Varanasi and constructed a mosque above it. He moved to the District court on 24 May 2019 for demolition of the mosque on grounds of illegal construction over a Hindu Shrine. Will the court allow?
- (a) Yes, the slogan of the Ram Janmabhoomi movement was "Kashi, Mathura baaki hai".
- (b) No, the Mahant has submitted no proof about which mosque needs to be demolished.
- (c) Yes, illegal constructed places of worship above another place of worship are bound to be demolished.
- (d) No, the Places of Worship act places a moratorium over the court to consider any such historical event as valid or invalid.
- 12. Babur was a Mughal ruler of Medieval India. Mahant Suresh Das is a priest at the Hanuman Gadi temple of Ayodhya. He filed a suit for demolition of Babri Masjid in the district court in 1884 as it was constructed over a famous Hindu Temple. The mosque was demolished by a mob in 1992 even before the court could decide. The SC has decided to hear the matter in July 2020, can the court hear the petitions? Decide.
- (a) No, the mosque has already been demolished, the purpose of the suit is fulfilled.
- (b) Yes, the dispute was brought to the court in 1884, ahead of the deadline in the Places of Worship Act, hence the court can hear the matter.
- (c) Yes, illegal constructed places of worship above another place of worship are bound to be demolished.
- (d) No, the Places of Worship act places a moratorium over the court to consider any such historical event as valid or invalid.
- 13. Samudragupta was a ruler of Ancient India. During his reign, Brahmanism rose to prominence. Buddhist shrines were demolished or converted into Hindu Temples across the Gupta empire. Monk Dalai Lama moved a petition for restoration of Buddhist Shrines in Bihar region in 1965. Can his petition be allowed? The SC has decided to hear the matter in July 2020, can the court hear the petitions? Decide.
- (a) Yes, illegal constructed places of worship above another place of worship are bound to be demolished.
- (b) No, the Places of Worship act places a moratorium over the court to consider any such historical event as valid or
- (c) No, the Monk has submitted no proof about which temple needs to be demolished.
- (d) Yes, Buddhists are equally entitled to get justice for historical wrongs committed on their religious shrines.









- 14. The Government of India is constructing a new Airport in Noida, Delhi. During land acquisition, the government found multiple religious shrines. The government decided to relocate all the shrines on a new land for furtherance of the development work. Mahant Ambi, a priest from one such shrine approached the court in July 2019 challenging the government action. He is arguing that as per the Places of Worship Act, post 1947, there cannot be any change in the character of religious places. Is the action of the government illegal? Decide.
- (a) Yes, the Places of Worship act places a moratorium on conversion of religious shrines.
- (b) No, the dispute is not of historical nature and beyond the purview of the Places of Worship Act.
- (c) Yes, the government is changing the nature of land from religious to commercial.
- (d) No, the shrines are being relocated and the Places of Worship act does not bar that.
- 15. Babur was a Mughal ruler of Medieval India. Mahant Suresh Das is a priest at the Hanuman Gadi temple of Ayodhya. He filed a suit for demolition of Babri Masjid in the district court in 1884 as it was constructed over a famous Hindu Temple. The mosque was demolished by a mob in 1992 even before the court could decide. A case has been brought before the SC against the action of the mob for demolition of the Mosque by the mob. Is the action of the mob valid? Decide.
- (a) Yes, illegal constructed places of worship above another place of worship are bound to be demolished.
- (b) No, the matter was sub judice and the people have no right to take the law into their own hands.
- (c) Yes, the mob corrected a historical wrong by taking the law in their own hands.
- (d) None of the above.

Passage-II

The bill bans commercial surrogacy and the sale or import of human embryos for the purpose of surrogacy. It proposes mandatory registration of 'surrogacy clinics' -- those conducting the procedure in any form. The bill has warranted 'eligibility criteria' for the surrogate mother as well as for the intending couple. The couple must have a 'certificate of essentiality' and from the concerned authority which would ensure that the couple is infertile, give them the custody of the surrogate child, and cover medical expenses of the surrogate mother. For a couple to be able to adopt via surrogacy, they have to be Indian citizens and married for at least five years – the wife belonging to an age group of 23 to 50 years and the husband belonging to the age group of 26 to 55 years. In addition, the surrogate mother needs to be –


- i) a close relative of the intending couple;
- ii) a married woman having a child of her own;
- iii) 25 to 35 years old; iv) a surrogate only once in her lifetime; and
- v) possess a certificate of medical and psychological fitness for surrogacy.


Further, the surrogate mother cannot provide her own gametes for surrogacy. Contravention of the bill can invite imprisonment up to 10 years and fine up to Rs 10 lakh.

- 16. Agnes married Joshua in 2016. Both of them had acquired Indian citizenship only recently after they moved from Paris. Despite several attempts at conception, Agnes would always undergo a miscarriage at the 4th month of her pregnancy due to biological complications. The failed pregnancies severely drained the physical health of Agnes. After trying for 4 years the couple finally decided to look out for alternative ways, surrogacy being one of them. Tender them the best advice keeping in mind the legalities of law as per the passage:
- (a) They should go ahead with the idea of surrogacy.
- (b) They are legally ineligible for using the option of surrogacy.
- (c) They are not naturalised citizens and moreover they haven't been married for 5 years.
- (d) Both (b) and (c)









17. Shardul and Sia, both of them in their early 30s, have been married for over 10 years. For the past 5 years they have been persistently trying to make a baby. However, they could never conceive. All the medical test reports and analyses attest to the fact that Sia is fertile. After a lot of insistence from Sia, Shardul underwent a diagnosis and it turned out that he is sterile. The couple went to a surrogacy clinic. **Choose the best outcome:**

- (a) Surrogacy is not the best option for them given the fact that Sia is not infertile.
- (b) They can go ahead with surrogacy as infertility is gender neutral.
- (c) Sia would not be able to legally adopt the child as she is fertile.
- (d) None of the above.
- 18. Ahmed and Afshun, married for 7 years, were a sterile couple. Both of them were going through a rough patch in their marriage because of the inability to conceive the child. Their lawyer friend Ahmed told them that they meet all requirements under the surrogacy bill and can therefore have a viable option with themselves to adopt a child through surrogacy. Their maid, Vidhi, a 34-year-old married woman who has a child of her own, out of affection offered to serve as the surrogate for the couple without any remuneration. The couple was delighted.
- (a) They cannot go ahead with surrogacy
- (b) Vidhi cannot give her own gametes
- (c) The couple is legally ineligible
- (d) None of the above.
- 19. In 2014, the Supreme Court of India decriminalised Homosexuality. In a recent moved the court also upheld gay marriages. This created a wave of gratitude among the LGBTQI community. One such Indian lesbian couple, Aruna and Sanskriti, both of them 29 years of age, tied the knot towards the end of 2014. Both of them decided to have a baby. They mutually decided that Sanskriti will be the surrogate mother for the child using her own gametes and the sperm of an unknown donor. Therefore, in the year 2020 they approached the surrogacy clinic seeking recommendation on how to go about with the procedure.
- (a) They do not meet the requirements under the bill as they are not sterile.
- (b) They are legally eligible for the process.
- (c) They shall be declared ineligible for the surrogacy process.
- (d) Sanskriti does meet all the requirements of being a surrogate mother, therefore she cannot serve as the surrogate mother.
- 20. In 2014, the Supreme Court of India decriminalised Homosexuality. In a recent moved the court also upheld gay marriages. This created a wave of gratitude among the LGBTQI community. One such Indian lesbian couple, Aruna and Sanskriti tied the knot towards the end of 2014. Both of them were found to infertile. Therefore, in the year 2020 they approached the surrogacy clinic seeking recommendation on how to go about with the procedure.
- (a) They shall be declared ineligible for the process of adopting a child through surrogacy.
- (b) They shall be allowed to proceed with the surrogacy procedure.
- (c) The surrogacy shall only be allowed if it's the womb of either of the couple.
- (d) Both (b) and (c)





GENERAL KNOWLEDGE

Passage-I

India's semiconductor ambitions have undergone a decisive transformation between 2022 and 2025, driven by strategic industrial policy, geopolitical realignments, and rapid expansion of domestic electronics demand. The Government of India has positioned semiconductor manufacturing not merely as a technological aspiration, but as a core pillar of economic security and global supply-chain resilience. The Modified Semicon India Programme, with an outlay exceeding USD 10 billion in incentives, has become the central policy lever to attract global chip manufacturers, support indigenous design, and enable downstream industries like telecommunications, automotive electronics, defence systems and artificial intelligence hardware.

One of the most significant developments is the operational progress of Micron Technology's ATMP (Assembly, Testing, Marking and Packaging) facility in Sanand, Gujarat, whose Phase-1 is expected to become functional by 2025. This marks India's entry into the outsourced semiconductor assembly and testing (OSAT) ecosystem. Complementing this, the Government approved Tata Electronics' semiconductor fab project in Dholera, focused on producing mature-node chips used across power electronics, automotive components and industrial systems. These moves align India with global trends in diversifying supply chains away from East Asia.

India's semiconductor ambitions are also reinforced through international frameworks. The India-US iCET partnership prioritises semiconductor supply-chain mapping, workforce development, and collaborative research in compound semiconductors and advanced packaging. Additionally, conversations with Japan, Taiwan and the European Union have enlarged India's technological bandwidth. Through ISRO, India is accelerating the development of space-grade semiconductor fabrication, essential for strategic communication satellites, deep-space missions, and the future Bharatiya Antariksh Station.

A defining constraint, however, remains the absence of existing high-volume fabrication capacity and a shortage of specialised engineers. To address this, India has launched several skill-development initiatives, semiconductor postgraduate programmes, and design-linked schemes to support chip startups. The India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) has been restructured to ensure faster approvals, tighter investment evaluation, and greater integration with global technology platforms.

A significant portion of India's semiconductor policy is shaped by global developments—especially the US CHIPS Act, EU Chips Act, and subsidies in Japan and South Korea—which have intensified competition for attracting fabrication plants. Instead of competing head-to-head with countries offering hundreds of billions in subsidies, India aims to focus on mature technology nodes, compound semiconductors, OSAT ecosystems, and indigenous electronic design automation (EDA) capabilities.


Furthermore, India's rising electronics demand—projected to exceed USD 300 billion by 2026—creates a strong domestic market pull for locally manufactured chips. The government also emphasises trusted semiconductor supply for strategic sectors like defence, 5G/6G telecom, cybersecurity, electric vehicles, and renewable energy systems. As India enters 2025, its semiconductor ecosystem, though nascent, is moving decisively toward integration into global value chains by combining industrial incentives, strategic diplomacy, and indigenous technological capabilities.

- **21.** Which of the following elements form the core of India's semiconductor strategy as described in the passage?
 - 1. Modified Semicon India Programme
 - 2. Domestic demand-led chip market expansion
 - 3. Exclusive focus on advanced 3 nm fabs
 - 4. Integration with defence and telecom sectors









A. 1, 2, and 4 only

B. 1 and 3 only

C. 2 and 3 only

D. 1, 2, 3, and 4

22. The passage highlights Micron's ATMP facility as significant because it:

- 1. Represents India's entry into OSAT manufacturing
- 2. Will focus solely on advanced-node lithography
- 3. Is located in Gujarat
- 4. Will be operational in phases

A. 1, 3, and 4 only

B. 1 and 2 only

C. 2 and 4 only

D. 1, 2, 3, and 4

23. Which statement(s) reflect India's international semiconductor collaboration?

- 1. iCET with the U.S. focuses on supply-chain mapping and workforce training.
- 2. Japan and EU engagements broaden India's semiconductor capabilities.
- 3. India has signed technology transfer treaties for 2nm node fabrication.
- 4. Global supply-chain diversification influences India's strategy.

A. 1, 2, and 4 only

B. 1 and 3 only

C. 2 and 4 only

D. 1. 2. 3. and 4

24. Which structural constraints are acknowledged in India's semiconductor landscape?

- 1. Lack of high-volume fabrication capacity
- 2. Shortage of skilled engineers
- 3. Weak domestic electronics demand
- 4. Absence of OSAT investments

A. 1 and 2 only

B. 2 and 3 only

C. 1, 3, and 4 only

D. 1, 2, 3, and 4

25. India's strategic semiconductor direction includes emphasis on:

- 1. Compound semiconductors
- 2. Mature technology nodes
- 3. Exclusive dependence on foreign fabs
- 4. Indigenous EDA development

A. 1, 2, and 4 only

B. 1 and 3 only

26. Which global policies influence India's semiconductor ambitions?

A. US CHIPS Act

B. EU Chips Act

C. Japan's semiconductor subsidies

D. ASEAN Digital Treaty

A. A, B, and C only

B. A and B only

C. A, C, and D only

D. A, B, C, and D

27. India aims to avoid direct subsidy competition with which regions?

- 1. East Asia
- 2. United States
- 3. European Union
- 4. Africa


A. 1, 2, and 3 only

- B. 1 and 4 only
- C. 2 and 4 only
- D. 1, 2, 3, and 4









28. Which sectoral demands are shaping India's need for trusted semiconductors?

- 1. EVs and renewable energy
- 2. Defence systems
- 3. 5G/6G telecom
- 4. Luxury goods manufacturing

A. 1, 2, and 3 only

B. 1 and 4 only

C. 2 and 3 only

D. 1, 2, 3, and 4

29. Which initiative supports chip design startups?

A. Design-linked incentives under ISM

B. NITI Aayog's AI accelerator fund

C. National Deep Tech Mission

D. India Innovation Grid

30. ISRO's semiconductor capability-building focuses on:

A. Space-grade chips for satellites and deep-space missions

B. High-volume consumer chips

C. Cryptocurrency ASIC miners

D. Gaming GPUs

PASSAGE - II

The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a landmark climate-trade instrument adopted by the European Union (EU) to prevent "carbon leakage" and ensure that imported products bear the same carbon price as goods produced within the EU. Carbon leakage refers to a situation where companies shift production to countries with weaker emission regulations, thereby undermining global climate goals. CBAM seeks to equalize carbon costs by requiring importers to purchase CBAM certificates corresponding to the embedded emissions in select products. It complements the long-standing EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), under which domestic industries already pay for their carbon emissions.

CBAM entered into its transitional phase in October 2023, requiring only emissions reporting. Full financial obligations, including mandatory purchase of CBAM certificates, will apply from 1 January 2026. Initially, CBAM covers high-emission sectors: iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilizers, hydrogen, and electricity. The EU has indicated that the scope may expand in later years to include organic chemicals and polymers, depending on feasibility assessments. Embedded emissions are calculated from both direct emissions during manufacturing and certain indirect emissions arising from electricity use.

The mechanism has significant geopolitical and economic implications. Emerging economies, including India, argue that CBAM functions as a trade barrier disguised as climate action, particularly affecting export competitiveness of developing countries' steel and aluminium industries. India also contends that CBAM challenges the principles of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) under the UNFCCC, as it imposes uniform carbon costs regardless of national development status. The EU counters that CBAM is necessary to protect its decarbonisation efforts and prevent backdoor imports of high-carbon products.

From a developmental standpoint, CBAM may influence global supply chains by incentivising countries to decarbonise their industrial processes, adopt renewable energy, and develop low-carbon technologies such as green hydrogen and carbon capture. India has raised concerns at the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, arguing that unilateral climate tariffs undermine multilateral climate cooperation. At the same time, India is exploring ways to quantify embedded emissions more accurately, promote green steel missions, expand renewable energy-based production, and negotiate mutual recognition arrangements where feasible.









CBAM's design ensures that the cost for importers will depend on the gap between the carbon price already paid in the exporting country and the EU ETS carbon price. This may encourage carbon markets or internal carbon pricing in developing countries. However, several economies fear that CBAM could disproportionately burden smaller producers lacking MRV (Monitoring, Reporting and Verification) capacity.

While CBAM aims to accelerate global decarbonisation, its long-term effectiveness will depend on how equitably it engages developing countries, aligns with global climate finance obligations, and avoids creating new structural inequalities in global trade.

- **31.** Which of the following best describes the primary objective of CBAM?
 - 1. Prevent carbon leakage
 - 2. Ensure imported goods face equivalent carbon pricing
 - 3. Promote export subsidies
 - 4. Replace EU ETS

A. 1 and 2 only

B. 2 and 4 only

C. 1, 3, and 4 only

D. 1, 2, 3, and 4

32. The transitional phase of CBAM beginning in 2023 requires:

A. Only emissions reporting

B. Mandatory purchase of CBAM certificates

C. Full alignment with EU ETS

D. Carbon taxation on exporters directly

- **33.** Which sectors are included in CBAM's initial scope?
 - 1. Aluminium
 - 2. Fertilizers
 - 3. Electricity
 - 4. Textiles

A. 1, 2, and 3 only

B. 2 and 4 only

C. 1 and 4 only

34. Which criticism of CBAM is raised by India?

- 1. It violates CBDR
- It violates GDDR
 It functions as a disguised trade barrier
 It unfairly favours developing countries 3. It unfairly favours developing countries
- 4. It undermines WTO tariff bindings

A. 1 and 2 only

B. 1, 2, and 4 only

C. 2, 3, and 4 only

D. 1, 2, 3, and 4

35. CBAM requires importers to purchase certificates based on:

- A. Embedded emissions in imported products
- B. Exporter's GDP
- C. Trade volume
- D. Carbon neutrality status of exporting country
- **36.** Which components are used to calculate embedded emissions under CBAM?
 - 1. Direct emissions
 - 2. Indirect emissions from electricity
 - 3. Emissions from logistics only
 - 4. Lifecycle emissions from final use

A. 1 and 2 only


B. 1 and 3 only


C. 2 and 4 only

D. 1, 2, and 3 only









37. CBAM is expected to influence global supply chains by:

- 1. Incentivising decarbonisation
- 2. Encouraging renewable energy use
- 3. Penalising low-income producers automatically
- 4. Forcing uniform manufacturing standards

A. 1 and 2 only

B. 1 and 4 only

C. 2 and 3 only

D. 1, 2, and 3 only

38. Which of the following are potential future extensions of CBAM?

- 1. Organic chemicals
- 2. Polymers
- 3. Aerospace components
- 4. Pharmaceuticals

A. 1 and 2 only

B. 2 and 3 only

C. 1 and 4 only

D. 1, 2, 3, and 4

39. Which principle under UNFCCC does India argue CBAM undermines?

A. CBDR

B. Polluter Pays Principle

C. Article VI flexibility

D. Global Stocktake

40. According to the passage, CBAM's long-term effectiveness depends on:

- 1. Engagement with developing countries
- 2. Climate finance alignment
- 3. Reducing structural global inequalities
- 4. EU's renewable capacity additions

A. 1, 2, and 3 only

B. 1 and 4 only

C. 2 and 4 only

D. 1, 2, 3, and 4

Quantitative Technique

Passage-I

The following data is about number of persons who participate in five different games from city A One persons participate in only one game. Number of persons participate in Cricket is 2754 which is 18% of total number of person who participated in different games from city A The ratio of the number of persons who participate in Football to number of persons who participate in Chess is 9: 7 respectively. Number of persons who participate in Kabaddi is 15% less than number of persons who participate in Hockey. 22.22% of total number of persons who participate in different games are participate in Hockey.

41. Number of persons who participated in Kabaddi is how much % more or less than number of persons who participate in Hockey?

(A)47%

(B)32%

(C)28%

(D)15%

42. Number of persons who participate in Kabaddi is approximately what % of total number of persons who participate in different games from city A?

(A)19%

(B)16%

(C)13%

(D)17%

43. Find the average number of persons who participate in Chess, Hockey and Kabaddi together.

(A)5721

(B)3009


(C)3822

(D)2412









44. If number of persons who participate in Cricket and Hockey from city B is respectively 11.11% and 12.5% and 12.5% are consistent from the contraction of the co
more than that by number of persons who participate in same games from city A Find the sum of number of
persons who participate in Cricket and Hockey from city B

(A)5505

(B)4201

(C)6885

(D)3203

45. What is the ratio of number of Person who participate in Hockey to number of person who participate

(A)36:14 (B)28:29 (C)20:17 (D)42:02

Passage - II

Players in a stadium play only one or two or all the three games; Kabadi, Kho-kho & Volleyball. 1000 players play only volleyball, 2500 players play only kho-kho and 4500 players play only Kabadi. The players who play both khokho & kabadi is 70% of the players who play only volleyball. The players who play volleyball and kho-kho both is 3/10th of the players who play only kho-kho and other 600 players play kabadi & volleyball both. The players who played all the three matches is 3.75% of the players who played only kabadi, kho-kho and volleyball.

46. Total number of players in the stadium is how much more than the players who play only kho-kho?

(A)7250

(B)7450

(C)7350

(D)6950

47. Find the ratio of the player who play both volleyball & kabadi only to the who play both volleyball & khokho only?

(A)5:6

(B)2:3

(C)6:5

(D)4:2

48. How many players play kabaddi?

(A)3000

(B)5500

(C)4600

(D)5000

49. How many players play all the 3 Match together?

(A)3000

(B)300

(C)460

(D)500

50. Numbers of players who play only volleyball is what % to the number of players who play only Kho - Kho .

(A)32%

(B)45%

(C)25%

(D)40%

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