ANSWER KEY — 11 MAY 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	D	B	B	B	C	B	D	A	C
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
D	C	B	A	B	B	C	C	B	B
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**	**Q27**	**Q28**	**Q29**	**Q30**
A	B	A	C	B	D	C	D	C	C
Q31	**Q32**	**Q33**	**Q34**	**Q35**	**Q36**	**Q37**	**Q38**	**Q39**	**Q40**
B	A	B	A	C	C	B	C	C	C

SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B

Veena, a regular dealer in kitchen equipment, was made aware by Rohit of the particular commercial purpose for which he required the fryer — namely 200 portions per hour to serve his restaurant. Rohit relied on her skill and judgment as a professional supplier. Section 16(1) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, creates an implied condition of fitness for that disclosed purpose. The fryer failing to perform at the disclosed throughput therefore breaches that condition. Caveat emptor is displaced once purpose and reliance are established. Negligence (option C) is unnecessary; the cause of action sounds in contract via the statutory implied condition.

Q2 D

Merchantable quality under Section 16(2) is an implied condition of law where goods are bought by description from a seller dealing in goods of that description. It does not require any express written term in the contract. Statements A (caveat emptor narrowed to undisclosed-purpose sales), B (sale-by-sample correspondence under Section 17) and C (fraud defeats caveat emptor) are all correct propositions of Indian sales law. Option D incorrectly elevates merchantable quality from an implied to an express condition, which contradicts the statutory scheme.

Q3 B

Pre-packaged branded rice sold by description triggers Section 16(2): the goods must be of merchantable quality, that is, reasonably saleable and usable under the description applied. Broken rice mixed with stones manifestly fails that test. The lack of physical inspection by the buyer is immaterial because the goods were sold by description in sealed packaging — the buyer could not reasonably have inspected. No fraudulent intent need be proved for Section 16(2). Rice is not excluded from the Act; perishability is irrelevant. The remedy is rejection of the goods and damages.

Q4 B

The traditional caveat emptor rule has been substantially narrowed by Sections 14-17 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, by judicial gloss recognising fraud as defeating the doctrine, and by the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, which imposes additional duties on sellers. It is therefore not absolute, contrary to A. It has not been entirely abrogated — it survives as a default position where no description, sample, or disclosed purpose is involved — contrary to C. It is not limited to second-hand goods sales, contrary to D. The doctrine survives as a narrowed default.

Q5 B

A private seller is not a 'seller dealing in such goods' for Section 16(2) purposes, so the merchantable-quality condition does not arise automatically (eliminating D). However, the seller's positive statement that the car had 'no mechanical issues,' made while concealing knowledge of a defect, constitutes both fraudulent misrepresentation under Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and a fraud that defeats caveat emptor under settled common law. Maya may rescind the contract and claim damages. The buyer's failure to hire a mechanic does not bar relief because the fraud was active.

Q6 C

A sale by sample, governed by Section 17 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, imposes three implied conditions: first, the bulk shall correspond with the sample in quality; second, the buyer shall have a reasonable opportunity of comparing the bulk with the sample; and third, the goods shall be free from any defect rendering them unmerchantable which a reasonable examination of the sample would not reveal. A different internal chipset though the same outer casing breaches the first of these — the bulk does not correspond to the sample inspected. Section 17 therefore applies directly.

Q7 B

Libel is a defamation in permanent form. An Instagram post — text on a public-facing platform with a wide audience, persistent in the platform's records, and indistinguishable from print for legal purposes — qualifies as libel. It is therefore actionable per se, without proof of special damage. The 'privacy' of the platform is irrelevant once the statement has been published to third persons, namely Anita's followers. Free speech under Article 19(1)(a) is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), which expressly include defamation; it is not a defence to a false statement of fact.

Q8 D

The four traditional exceptions in which slander is actionable without proof of special damage are imputations of: (i) a serious criminal offence punishable with imprisonment; (ii) a contagious or infectious disease that would cause the claimant to be shunned; (iii) unchastity in a woman; and (iv) unfitness, dishonesty, or want of integrity in any office, profession, calling, trade or business. Religious heresy or unorthodox belief is not among them. Option D is the false statement and is therefore the correct answer to a NOT-stem question.

Q9 A

Fair comment is a defence in defamation law that protects honest opinion — not statements of fact — on a matter of public interest, where the opinion is based on facts that are true and either stated or sufficiently indicated. Option B is too broad: good faith alone is not enough if the underlying facts are false. Options C and D describe absolute privilege (covering parliamentary and judicial proceedings) and qualified privilege (defeasible by malice) respectively, which are distinct defences. The defence has been refined in cases such as London Artists Ltd v Littler.

Q10 C

Absolute privilege attaches to all statements made in the course of judicial proceedings by judges, advocates, parties and witnesses, irrespective of malice or knowledge of falsity. This is a settled common-law principle preserved by Indian law. Its rationale is that participants in judicial proceedings must be free to speak without fear of subsequent civil suit. Truth (A) would be harder to prove and is unnecessary because absolute privilege does not depend on truth. Fair comment (B) applies to opinion, not bench-side remarks during testimony. Qualified privilege (D) can be defeated by malice, which absolute privilege cannot.

Q11 D

Absolute privilege in tort law covers only specific contexts — parliamentary proceedings, judicial proceedings, and certain high-level state communications. It does not attach to journalism, however valuable journalism is to democratic discourse. Constitutional protection for the press under Article 19(1)(a) is itself subject to the reasonable restriction of defamation under Article 19(2). Justification fails because Vijay cannot prove substantial truth; fair comment fails because the underlying facts (the forged documents) are not accurate; qualified privilege is defeated by Vijay's actual knowledge of falsity, which constitutes malice.

Q12 C

Each republication of a defamatory statement constitutes a fresh publication in tort and gives rise to an independent cause of action against the republisher. This is a settled rule of common law reaffirmed by Indian courts in the context of social-media forwarding. WhatsApp groups are not legally 'private' communications for defamation purposes once the audience exceeds the speaker and the subject — here, thirty contacts constitute publication. The identifiability of the original author does not absolve the republisher, who has independently caused fresh harm by spreading the statement further.

SECTION B — ANALYTICAL REASONING

Q13 B

From constraint 5, Esha > Divya. From 4, Divya > Chirag. From 1, Chirag > Faisal. From 2, Faisal > Bhavna. From 3, Bhavna > Aarav. Stringing these inequalities together yields the chain: Esha > Divya > Chirag > Faisal > Bhavna > Aarav. Esha therefore occupies the top position. Constraint 6 (exactly five students scored higher than Aarav) confirms that Aarav is the lowest, which is consistent with the deduced chain. The ordering is fully determined by the six constraints.

Q14 A

Using the deduced ranking Esha (1) > Divya (2) > Chirag (3) > Faisal (4) > Bhavna (5) > Aarav (6), the third-from-top position is occupied by Chirag. Constraints 4 and 5 jointly place Divya immediately below Esha; constraint 1 places Chirag immediately below Divya. Faisal, Bhavna and Aarav each take lower positions, in that order, by constraints 1, 2 and 3 respectively. No alternative ordering is consistent with the six constraints, so Chirag's position is unique.

Q15 B

Three students scored higher than Faisal: Esha, Divya and Chirag, who occupy positions 1, 2 and 3 respectively in the ranking. Faisal himself is in position 4. The chain follows from Esha > Divya (constraint 5), Divya > Chirag (constraint 4), Chirag > Faisal (constraint 1). No other student in the puzzle is shown to be above Faisal — Bhavna and Aarav are both below him by constraints 2 and 3. Hence exactly three students score higher than Faisal.

Q16 **B**

The fourth-from-top position belongs to Faisal in the ranking Esha > Divya > Chirag > Faisal > Bhavna > Aarav. The supplementary condition that the fourth-ranked student scored 72% therefore assigns 72% to Faisal. The remaining four students lie above or below this anchor in the order determined by the original six constraints. No other student can occupy the fourth slot consistently with the deductive chain.

Q17 **C**

Enumeration of valid four-member compositions by profession distribution proceeds as follows. (2L, 1E, 1D) yields four committees, all with L3 included and D2 forced (constraint 4 bars D1 with L3): {L1,L3,E1,D2}, {L1,L3,E2,D2}, {L2,L3,E1,D2}, {L2,L3,E2,D2}. (1L, 2E, 1D) requires both E1 and E2, with D2 forced by constraint 3, and the lawyer free: {L1,E1,E2,D2}, {L2,E1,E2,D2}, {L3,E1,E2,D2} — three committees. (1L, 1E, 2D) requires both doctors, so L3 is barred by constraint 4: {L1,E1,D1,D2}, {L1,E2,D1,D2}, {L2,E1,D1,D2}, {L2,E2,D1,D2} — four committees. Total: 4+3+4 = 11.

Q18 **C**

Constraint 4 expressly forbids D1 from serving on any committee that also contains L3. Therefore if D1 is selected, L3 must be excluded. None of the other answer options is prohibited by any constraint when D1 is on the committee: L1 and L2 are each permissible alongside D1 (subject only to the rule against L1 and L2 together), and E2 is freely allowable. The only certainty is that L3 cannot share a committee with D1.

Q19 **B**

Constraint 3 requires that if E1 is selected, then D2 must also be selected. This is a one-way conditional implication: E1 ⇒ D2. The reverse implication is not required by the constraints. None of the other options is forced by E1's presence: D1 is not implied (and in some compositions is even excluded); L3 may or may not be present depending on D1's status; E2 need not be selected merely because E1 is. Therefore D2's presence is the only certainty.

Q20 **B**

A committee containing exactly two economists must include both E1 and E2 (since there are only two economists available). Constraint 3 (E1 implies D2) forces D2 into the committee. With three of the four seats already filled (E1, E2, D2), exactly one slot remains and must go to a lawyer to satisfy constraint 1 (at least one from each profession). The lawyer can be L1, L2 or L3 — constraints 2 (no L1 with L2) and 4 (D1 with L3) are both inactive here. Hence three valid committees: {L1,E1,E2,D2}, {L2,E1,E2,D2}, {L3,E1,E2,D2}.

SECTION C — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q21 **A**

Year-on-year percentage changes in yield: Hoshangabad (50-40)/40 = 25%; Vidisha (42-35)/35 = 20%; Bhopal (36-30)/30 = 20%; Indore (30-25)/25 = 20%. Hoshangabad's 25% change is the largest, with the other three districts each posting a uniform 20% gain. The result suggests that the HYV-2025 variety performed particularly well in Hoshangabad's agro-climatic conditions relative to the other districts. The differential is small in absolute terms but visible in percentage terms.

Q22 **B**

FY25 production by district equals yield × area: Hoshangabad 50 × 200,000 = 100 lakh quintals; Vidisha 42 × 150,000 = 63 lakh; Bhopal 36 × 100,000 = 36 lakh; Indore 30 × 250,000 = 75 lakh. Total production across the four districts = 274 lakh quintals = 27,400,000 quintals. Total cultivated area = 200 + 150 + 100 + 250 = 700,000 hectares. The state's average yield is therefore 27,400,000 ÷ 700,000 = 39.14 q/ha, which rounds to 39.1 q/ha.

Q23 **A**

Hoshangabad's FY25 production is 50 q/ha × 200,000 ha = 10,000,000 quintals = 100 lakh quintals. Vidisha records 63 lakh, Bhopal 36 lakh and Indore 75 lakh. Hoshangabad therefore tops total production despite Indore having the largest cultivated area. The reason is that Hoshangabad's higher yield per hectare more than compensates for its smaller cultivated area. The result illustrates that productivity matters at least as much as scale in measuring agricultural performance across districts.

Q24 **C**

A further 20% rise on Indore's FY25 yield of 30 q/ha gives 30 × 1.20 = 36 q/ha for the projected FY26. The cultivated area remains 250,000 hectares. FY26 production = 36 × 250,000 = 9,000,000 quintals = 90 lakh quintals. This projected output is one lakh quintals below Hoshangabad's FY25 figure of 100 lakh quintals, but represents a notable improvement for Indore from its current 75 lakh, narrowing the gap with the leading districts substantially.

Q25 **B**

Vidisha's FY25 production is 63 lakh quintals; combined four-district production is 274 lakh quintals. The ratio 63 ÷ 274 = 0.2299, or approximately 23%. By comparison Hoshangabad accounts for roughly 36.5%, Indore 27.4% and Bhopal 13.1%. Vidisha's share, second smallest among the four, arises from its intermediate yield of 42 q/ha combined with a smaller cultivated area than Indore or Hoshangabad. The other answer options would imply yield or area figures inconsistent with the table.

Q26 D

International-to-domestic visitor ratios calculated from the table: Taj Mahal 200/800 = 0.25; Qutub Minar 50/600 ≈ 0.083; Red Fort 80/700 ≈ 0.114; Hampi Group 40/300 ≈ 0.133; Ajanta Caves 60/200 = 0.30. Ajanta's 0.30 is the highest of the five, reflecting its iconic World Heritage status drawing a disproportionately high share of foreign art-historical interest relative to its modest total footfall. Taj Mahal is second-highest by ratio despite having the largest absolute international audience.

Q27 C

Total quarterly revenue is simply the sum of revenue across all five monuments as given in the table: Taj ₹1,600 + Qutub ₹600 + Red Fort ₹830 + Hampi ₹390 + Ajanta ₹460 = ₹3,880 lakh. This can be cross-checked from the underlying visitor counts and ticket prices: total domestic = 2,600,000 × ₹50 = ₹1,300 lakh; total international = 430,000 × ₹600 = ₹2,580 lakh; combined ₹3,880 lakh — matching the row-wise sum exactly.

Q28 D

Taj Mahal's international revenue equals 200,000 visitors × ₹600 per ticket = ₹1,200 lakh. Its total revenue is ₹1,600 lakh from the table. The international share is therefore 1,200 ÷ 1,600 = 0.75, or 75%. Despite international visitors being only one-fifth of the Taj's total footfall (200 thousand out of 1,000 thousand), their twelve-fold higher ticket price makes them the dominant revenue source. The 75% figure is a striking illustration of how price differentials can reshape revenue contribution.

Q29 C

Sum of domestic visitors across all five monuments (in thousands): Taj 800 + Qutub 600 + Red Fort 700 + Hampi 300 + Ajanta 200 = 2,600 thousand = 26 lakh. International visitors total 200 + 50 + 80 + 40 + 60 = 430 thousand = 4.3 lakh. Overall footfall is therefore approximately 30.3 lakh for the quarter, with a domestic share of about 86%. This pattern is broadly typical of Indian heritage sites in pre-pandemic baseline years.

Q30 C

New domestic revenue at Qutub Minar after the price rise = 600,000 visitors × ₹75 = ₹450 lakh, up from the original ₹300 lakh. International revenue remains unchanged at 50,000 × ₹600 = ₹300 lakh. New total quarterly revenue = ₹450 + ₹300 = ₹750 lakh. The ₹150 lakh increase corresponds precisely to the ₹25 per-ticket rise applied to 6 lakh domestic visitors — a useful check on the arithmetic via direct sensitivity computation.

SECTION D — RAPID-FIRE MIXED REASONING & GK

Q31 B

Asha's mother's father is her maternal grandfather. The grandfather's 'only son' refers to his sole male child — i.e., Asha's mother's brother. In standard Indian kinship terminology that relation is the maternal uncle (mama). The grandfather himself is not a son, so option D is wrong. The 'only son' phrasing rules out Asha's mother (she is a daughter, not a son) and Asha herself. Therefore the correct relation is maternal uncle.

Q32 A

Rohan's path traces a closed rectangle: 5 km north, then a right turn east for 3 km, then a right turn south for 5 km, then a right turn west for 3 km. The northward and southward legs are equal in length and opposite in direction, cancelling each other out. The eastward and westward legs likewise cancel. The net displacement is therefore zero, and Rohan ends up exactly at his starting point — a useful visualisation drill for direction-sense questions.

Q33 B

Conclusion II follows directly: 'Some graduates are economists' converts validly to 'Some economists are graduates' as a particular-affirmative immediate inference. Conclusion I does not necessarily follow: although all lawyers are graduates, only some graduates are economists, so the subset of graduates who happen to be economists may not overlap with the lawyer subset at all. A standard Venn diagram confirms this — the lawyer circle could lie wholly within the graduate circle but outside the economist subset.

Q34 A

The substitution rule maps each letter to the letter three positions forward in the alphabet: F(6)→I(9), R(18)→U(21), I(9)→L(12), E(5)→H(8), N(14)→Q(17), D(4)→G(7) — a uniform +3 shift, i.e., the classical Caesar cipher with shift 3. Applying the same +3 shift to LAWYER letter by letter: L→O, A→D, W→Z, Y→B, E→H, R→U, giving the coded word ODZBHU. The other options each contain at least one mismatch.

Q35 C

The sequence 2, 6, 12, 20, 30 has first differences 4, 6, 8, 10. The differences themselves form an arithmetic progression with common difference 2, so the next first difference is 12. Adding 12 to 30 gives 42. Equivalently, the general term is n(n+1) for n = 1, 2, 3, ... so the next is 6 × 7 = 42. Both methods agree, which is the standard cross-check for arithmetic-difference series.

Q36 C

Selling price SP = 1.25 × CP = 1.25 × ₹2,000 = ₹2,500. The selling price equals 80% of the marked price MP because of the 20% discount: SP = 0.80 × MP. Therefore MP = 2,500 ÷ 0.80 = ₹3,125. As a cross-check, the discount of ₹625 on the MP of ₹3,125 gives an SP of ₹2,500, and the profit of ₹500 on a CP of ₹2,000 is exactly 25%.

Q37 **B**

For equal distances at different speeds, the average speed is the harmonic mean: 2ab ÷ (a+b). Substituting a = 60 and b = 40 gives 2 × 60 × 40 ÷ (60+40) = 4,800 ÷ 100 = 48 km/h. The arithmetic mean (50 km/h) is incorrect because the slower leg takes proportionally more time and pulls the time-weighted average down. The result is always less than the arithmetic mean when speeds differ.

Q38 **C**

The Directive Principles of State Policy occupy Part IV of the Constitution of India, comprising Articles 36 to 51. They are not enforceable by any court (non-justiciable) but are 'fundamental in the governance of the country,' obliging the State to apply them while framing laws and policies. Part II contains citizenship provisions; Part III contains the Fundamental Rights; Part V deals with the Union government. Part IV is the correct location.

Q39 **C**

The Right to Property was originally a Fundamental Right under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. The 44th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1978, deleted both provisions from Part III and inserted Article 300A in Chapter IV of Part XII. The right thereby ceased to be a Fundamental Right and became an ordinary constitutional or legal right. Today no person can be deprived of property save by authority of law, but the strong protections of Part III no longer apply to property.

Q40 **C**

Starting from 1 January 2026 as a Thursday, 1 February 2026 falls exactly 31 days later. 31 modulo 7 = 3, so 1 February is Thursday + 3 = Sunday. February 2026 has 28 days because 2026 is not a leap year (2026 is not divisible by 4). 1 March 2026 is therefore 28 days after 1 February, and 28 modulo 7 = 0, so the day of the week does not advance. 1 March 2026 falls on a Sunday.