

ANSWER KEY – 12 MAY 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	A	B	C	C	A	C	A	B	D
Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20
B	D	C	B	D	D	A	D	B	C
Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	Q29	Q30
A	B	C	A	A	C	A	C	B	D
Q31	Q32	Q33	Q34	Q35	Q36	Q37	Q38	Q39	Q40
C	D	C	D	B	A	D	A	D	A
Q41									
B									

SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B

Aarush is entitled to the right of private defence. Section 38 BNS (formerly Section 100 IPC) expressly permits causing death in private defence where the assault gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt — both clearly present where armed intruders break into a home at night and demand money. The four cumulative limitations are satisfied: (i) there was no reasonable opportunity to contact public authorities, (ii) the force used was proportionate to the threat from two armed men, (iii) the apprehension of death was reasonable given the weapons and circumstances, and (iv) the situation falls within a specified category permitting death-causing force. Option (A) overstates the law — death-causing force IS permitted in seven specified situations. Option (C) misapplies the police-recourse rule, which requires REASONABLE opportunity; a midnight home invasion does not afford one. Option (D) introduces a prior-record requirement absent from the doctrine. The right protects against the immediate, reasonably-apprehended threat — *Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab* (2010) confirms that the test is reasonable, not counsel-of-perfection.

Q2 A

Option (A) is NOT a recognised limitation. The relative physical builds of the defender and the aggressor have no doctrinal place in the law of private defence. The actual limitations stated in the principle are: (i) recourse to public authorities where reasonably available, (ii) proportionality of force, (iii) reasonableness of the apprehension, and (iv) the seven-situation closed list for death-causing force. Options (B), (C) and (D) restate those limitations faithfully. Build, gender, age, or strength of the defender are not formally part of the analysis, although a court may consider them informally as part of the proportionality calculus. The question tests whether students confuse a 'common-sense plausibility' with a 'formal doctrinal requirement' — a frequent CLAT trap. The doctrinal limitations are textually fixed and a candidate must recognise the closed list.

Q3 B

Meera is not fully protected. The right of private defence of property commences when reasonable apprehension of the property offence begins and continues only so long as the offence or its immediate consequence persists. By the time Meera struck the pickpocket with a stone after a fifty-metre chase and successful apprehension, the immediate threat had abated — the offender was already detained and disarmed of opportunity. Further, the force used (a head injury from a stone) was disproportionate to a property offence of this nature (snatching a phone), where Section 39 BNS permits death-causing force only for robbery, house-breaking-by-night and similar aggravated offences, not for simple theft. Option (C) ignores the proportionality limit. Option (D) overstates the law — the doctrine never licenses 'any force'. Option (A) is too sweeping — the right DOES extend to theft, but only within proportionate limits. The correct doctrinal answer marks the temporal-cessation and proportionality limits jointly.

Q4 C

Option (C) is the INCORRECT statement. The right of private defence does NOT continue after the threat has clearly ceased; the principle expressly states that the right 'continues only as long as the apprehension persists' and explicitly disallows retributive force. The doctrine is fundamentally defensive, not retributive — once the assault is over and the assailant is no longer an active threat, further force is no longer 'defence' but a fresh offence against the original aggressor. Option (B) faithfully restates the commencement rule. Option (D) correctly notes the closed list of seven situations under Section 38 BNS / Section 100 IPC. Option (A) correctly notes the extension under Section 34 BNS to defending another person's body, not only one's own. The question tests the temporal limitation, which is the most common location for a candidate to be lured by a plausible-sounding but doctrinally incorrect proposition.

Q5 C

Ravi is not entitled to use death-causing force. Section 38 BNS sets out a closed list of seven categories of assault in which the defender may cause death — they include reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt, rape, kidnapping, wrongful confinement under certain conditions, and certain forms of robbery and house-trespass at night. A daytime trespasser raising a stick without attempting to strike does not, on the facts, fall within any of these categories. Ravi may have used proportionate force to expel the trespasser (a push, a non-lethal blow), but shooting and killing him exceeds what the law authorises. Option (A) misreads the list — the presence of a stick alone does not trigger apprehension of death or grievous hurt. Option (D) introduces a daytime-night distinction in a direction the law does not support (the doctrine actually treats night-time trespass as MORE serious, not less). Option (B) overstates the law — firearms can be used in private defence, but only where the situation falls within the permitted categories.

Q6 A

Option (A) correctly captures the Supreme Court's reasoning in *Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab* (2010). The Court emphasised that the right of private defence is defensive, not retributive, and is to be assessed by a reasonable-person standard taking into account the urgency and rapid pace of the encounter — not by a hindsight 'counsel-of-perfection' analysis in the calm of a courtroom. The Court explicitly rejected the proposition that a defender must weigh the proportionality of each blow with mathematical precision. Option (D) misstates the law — no prior police authorisation is required for emergency self-defence; that would defeat the purpose of the right. Option (B) is incorrect because the right is available to every person, not just uniformed service members. Option (C) reverses the burden of proof; the accused need only raise a reasonable doubt about the necessity of defence, after which the prosecution must disprove the defence beyond reasonable doubt. The 'reasonable person, not counsel of perfection' formulation is the operative ratio.

Q7 C

The amendment is liable to be struck down. The power of judicial review, exercised over both legislative and executive action, has been authoritatively recognised by the Supreme Court — most clearly in *L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India* (1997) — as forming part of the basic structure of the Constitution. An amendment that purports to remove judicial review of an entire category of laws (such as taxation laws) directly abrogates that basic feature and therefore falls outside the amending power under Article 368. Option (D) overstates Article 368 — *Kesavananda Bharati* expressly held that the amending power, though plenary as to text, is bounded by the basic-structure limitation. Option (B) imports a federal-ratification requirement that applies to a narrow class of amendments under Article 368(2) proviso and is not the doctrinal issue here. Option (A) misstates the constitutional position — Parliament does not enjoy 'primacy' over the judiciary in any sense that would license removal of judicial review.

Q8 A

Option (A) — the specific number of judges of the Supreme Court — is NOT a recognised basic feature. The number of judges is fixed by ordinary parliamentary statute (the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956) and has been amended several times without basic-structure implications. The other three options are all squarely recognised: (B) the supremacy of the Constitution is one of the foundational features identified in *Kesavananda Bharati*; (C) the independence of the judiciary was reaffirmed as basic in the NJAC judgment (2015); (D) separation of powers has been recognised since *Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain* (1975). The question tests whether students can distinguish between (i) foundational constitutional principles that the doctrine protects, and (ii) ordinary administrative details that may be set by statute. The number of judges falls squarely in the latter category, even though the institution itself (the Supreme Court) is constitutionally protected.

Q9 B

The amendment is liable to be struck down. Free and fair elections — the periodic, contested, multi-party process by which the legislature is constituted — have been judicially recognised as part of the basic structure, most clearly in *Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain* (1975) and reaffirmed in *Kihoto Hollohan* (1992). An amendment that replaces elections with state-controlled appointment of legislators directly destroys this feature. Option (D) misstates the law — although the detailed conduct of elections is governed by statute (the Representation of the People Act, 1951), the PRINCIPLE of free and fair elections is constitutionally entrenched. Option (A) is irrelevant — the council being a 'parliamentary creation' has no doctrinal bearing on whether the amendment destroys a basic feature. Option (C) introduces a referendum requirement that has no place in Indian constitutional law; the test is the basic-structure test as applied by the courts, not by popular vote.

Q10 D

Option (D) is the INCORRECT statement. Article 368 does NOT grant Parliament unlimited power to amend any provision; the *Kesavananda Bharati* ruling — restated in the principle text — expressly holds that the amending power is bounded by the basic-structure limitation. Option (A) correctly identifies *Kesavananda Bharati* as the authoritative source of the doctrine. Option (C) correctly notes that the list of basic features is illustrative, not closed — the Supreme Court has continued to add features through later judgments such as *M. Nagaraj* (2006) and *I.R. Coelho* (2007). Option (B) correctly identifies *I.R. Coelho* as extending the basic-structure test to laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973, the date of the *Kesavananda Bharati* ruling. The question tests recognition of the most fundamental misconception about Article 368 — that it confers unbounded amending power.

Q11 B

The amendment is most likely to be struck down. Parliamentary democracy — meaning periodic, multi-party, free and fair elections that produce a representative legislature — has been recognised as a basic feature in *Kesavananda Bharati* and *Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain* (1975). An amendment that converts India into a one-party state by declaring opposition parties unlawful destroys both parliamentary democracy and free and fair elections — two interlocking basic features. Option (D) misstates the doctrine — Article 368's requisite-majority requirement is a NECESSARY but not SUFFICIENT condition for valid amendment; basic-structure compliance is the further substantive requirement. Option (C) is doctrinally absurd — 'reasonable restrictions' is the Article 19 framework for ordinary speech, not a constitutional doctrine that licenses temporary destruction of the multi-party democracy itself. Option (A) is wrong because the courts apply substantive, not textual, tests — whether the word 'one-party' appears in the amendment is irrelevant if its effect is to abolish multi-party democracy.

Q12 D

Option (D) correctly captures the reasoning in *Minerva Mills v. Union of India* (1980). The Court held that Parliament's amending power AND judicial review of amendments are both essential, interlocking features of the Constitution — and the limited amending power itself forms part of the basic structure. Sections 4 and 55 of the 42nd Amendment, which had sought to give Parliament unlimited amending power and to exclude judicial review of amendments, were struck down because they sought to enlarge the very power that the basic-structure limitation was designed to restrain. Option (A) misstates the holding — *Minerva Mills* explicitly rejected the proposition that Directive Principles override Fundamental Rights, restoring a balance between the two. Option (C) overstates — Fundamental Rights can be amended, just not in ways that destroy the basic structure. Option (B) is factually wrong — Parliament retains amending power post-1980, subject to the basic-structure limit.

SECTION B — ANALYTICAL REASONING

Q13 C

Solving the schedule: From condition (7), Monday = History. From (2), Wednesday = Physics. From (4), Friday = English, taught by Chetan. From (6), Saturday = Biology, taught by Esha. From (1), Anjali teaches Mathematics — she therefore cannot be on Mon, Wed, Fri or Sat. So Anjali is on Tuesday or Thursday. From (3), Bhaskar teaches the day immediately after Anjali. If Anjali = Tue, Bhaskar = Wed (Physics) — consistent. If Anjali = Thu, Bhaskar = Fri — but Fri is already Chetan. So Anjali = Tue (Mathematics), Bhaskar = Wed (Physics). Remaining subjects: Chemistry and History; remaining days: Mon and Thu; remaining teachers: Divya and Farhan. From (5), Divya is not on Mon or Sat, so Divya = Thu = Chemistry, and Farhan = Mon = History. Final grid: Mon-Farhan-History; Tue-Anjali-Mathematics; Wed-Bhaskar-Physics; Thu-Divya-Chemistry; Fri-Chetan-English; Sat-Esha-Biology. Chemistry is taught by Divya. Option (D) Farhan teaches History on Monday. Option (A) Bhaskar teaches Physics on Wednesday. Option (C) Divya is correct. Option (B) Esha teaches Biology on Saturday.

Q14 B

From the deduced arrangement, Monday = History, taught by Farhan. The day-teacher combination is Monday — Farhan. Option (D) Monday — Anjali is wrong because Anjali teaches Mathematics on Tuesday. Option (B) Monday — Farhan is correct, matching the deduction chain. Option (A) Tuesday — Farhan and Option (C) Tuesday — Bhaskar are both wrong: Tuesday belongs to Anjali (Mathematics), and Farhan is on Monday. The key inference is that Divya (who cannot be on Monday or Saturday per condition 5) must take Chemistry on Thursday, leaving Farhan as the only remaining teacher available for the History slot on Monday. This question rewards a candidate who has carried the full grid forward rather than answering each question in isolation.

Q15 D

Checking each option against the deduced grid (Mon-Farhan-History; Tue-Anjali-Mathematics; Wed-Bhaskar-Physics; Thu-Divya-Chemistry; Fri-Chetan-English; Sat-Esha-Biology): Option (A) Tuesday — Bhaskar — Physics is wrong because Bhaskar is on Wednesday, not Tuesday, and Tuesday is Anjali with Mathematics. Option (D) Thursday — Divya — Chemistry is fully consistent with the grid and is CORRECT. Option (B) Friday — Esha — English is wrong because Esha is on Saturday teaching Biology, and English is taught by Chetan. Option (C) Monday — Anjali — History is wrong because Anjali teaches Mathematics on Tuesday, and Monday is Farhan teaching History. The single correct option is (D). Combination-style questions reward a candidate who has cross-checked each cell of the grid rather than relying on memory of one or two facts.

Q16 D

Initial assignment: Bhaskar on Wednesday with Physics; Divya on Thursday with Chemistry. After the interchange of days (with each retaining her/his own subject): Divya moves to Wednesday and teaches her subject Chemistry on Wednesday; Bhaskar moves to Thursday and teaches Physics on Thursday. The question asks who teaches Chemistry on Wednesday after the swap — the answer is Divya. Option (C) Anjali is wrong — Anjali remains on Tuesday with Mathematics. Option (D) Divya is correct. Option (B) Bhaskar is wrong — Bhaskar now teaches Physics on Thursday. Option (A) Farhan is wrong — Farhan remains on Monday with History. The swap is a clean re-assignment because the question stipulates that each teacher retains her/his subject; the same swap of subjects (not days) would produce a different answer.

Q17 A

Solving the matching puzzle: From (1), Imran = Chennai and Imran \neq Toyota. From (5), Manav = Delhi. From (3), Jasmine owns Tata; therefore Jasmine \neq Honda (Mumbai) and Jasmine \neq Hyundai (Kolkata, per condition 6). So Jasmine lives in Pune. From (4), Kavya is not in Delhi or Kolkata. The remaining cities for Kavya and Lalit are Mumbai and Kolkata. From (2), the Honda owner lives in Mumbai. From (6), the Kolkata resident owns a Hyundai. So Kavya = Mumbai = Honda, and Lalit = Kolkata = Hyundai (which also satisfies condition 7 because Lalit's car is Hyundai, not Maruti). Cars remaining for Imran and Manav are Maruti and Toyota. From (1), Imran \neq Toyota, so Imran = Maruti and Manav = Toyota. Final arrangement: Imran-Chennai-Maruti; Jasmine-Pune-Tata; Kavya-Mumbai-Honda; Lalit-Kolkata-Hyundai; Manav-Delhi-Toyota. The Toyota owner is therefore Manav, which corresponds to option (A).

Q18 D

Verifying each option against the deduced grid (Imran-Chennai-Maruti; Jasmine-Pune-Tata; Kavya-Mumbai-Honda; Lalit-Kolkata-Hyundai; Manav-Delhi-Toyota): Option (C) Chennai — Tata is wrong because the Chennai resident (Imran) owns Maruti. Option (A) Pune — Honda is wrong because the Pune resident (Jasmine) owns Tata; Honda is owned by the Mumbai resident. Option (D) Kolkata — Hyundai is correct, matching condition (6) directly and the deduction (Lalit lives in Kolkata and owns Hyundai). Option (B) Mumbai — Maruti is wrong because the Mumbai resident (Kavya) owns Honda, not Maruti. Maruti is owned by Imran in Chennai. The correct option is (D). The question rewards a candidate who has constructed the full city-car correspondence rather than guessed from condition (6) alone.

Q19 B

Checking each option: (A) Manav — Delhi — Toyota is consistent with the deduction (Manav lives in Delhi and owns Toyota). (C) Kavya — Mumbai — Honda is consistent (the Mumbai resident owns Honda, and that resident is Kavya). (D) Lalit — Kolkata — Hyundai is consistent (the Kolkata resident owns Hyundai, and that resident is Lalit). (B) Jasmine — Mumbai — Tata is INCORRECT: Jasmine lives in Pune (not Mumbai), and Jasmine owns Tata (the car part is correct, but the city is wrong). The question tests recognition of the most plausible-looking distractor — option (B) names the right car but the wrong city for Jasmine. Composite-attribute distractors that mix one correct element with one incorrect element are the typical CLAT trap, and candidates should always verify each of the three attributes (person, city, car) against the deduced grid.

Q20 C

Initial: Imran-Chennai-Maruti; Lalit-Kolkata-Hyundai. After the interchange of cities only (each retaining his own car): Imran moves to Kolkata, Lalit moves to Chennai. Cars stay with their owners: Imran still owns Maruti, Lalit still owns Hyundai. Therefore, after the swap, Chennai is occupied by Lalit, who owns Hyundai. Option (C) Lalit — Hyundai is correct. Option (D) Lalit — Maruti is wrong because Lalit retains his Hyundai. Option (B) Imran — Hyundai is wrong because Imran has moved out of Chennai to Kolkata, and he still owns Maruti. Option (A) Imran — Toyota is wrong on both counts — Imran moved away from Chennai, and his car is Maruti, not Toyota. Note that after the swap, condition (6) of the original problem (Kolkata resident owns Hyundai) is technically violated, since Imran is now in Kolkata with Maruti — but the swap is a hypothetical reassignment, so original conditions need not be preserved.

SECTION C — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q21 A

Total Q4 2025 shipments across the five named brands = $110 + 100 + 85 + 80 + 75 = 450$ lakh. Calculating step by step: $110 + 100 = 210$; $210 + 85 = 295$; $295 + 80 = 375$; $375 + 75 = 450$. Option (D) 410 lakh undercounts by 40 lakh — likely an arithmetic slip dropping one of the smaller brands. Option (C) 425 lakh is closer but still 25 short. Option (A) 450 lakh is correct. Option (B) 475 lakh overcounts by 25, likely from double-counting the 'other brands' contribution mentioned in the passage; note that other brands' 50 lakh is separate from the table totals and should not be added. The single highest contributor in Q4 was Samsung at 110 lakh (24.4% of the five-brand total). This is a straightforward addition question but rewards careful column reading and tests whether candidates conflate the table total with the all-brand market total mentioned in the passage.

Q22 B

Q3 2025 total across the five brands = $95 + 90 + 70 + 60 + 85 = 400$ lakh. Q4 2025 total = 450 lakh. Growth rate = $(450 - 400) / 400 = 50 / 400 = 0.125 = 12.5\%$. Option (A) about 10% understates the growth. Option (B) about 12.5% matches the computed value exactly and is correct. Option (D) about 15% overstates. Option (C) about 18% is far too high. Cross-check: $50/400$ simplifies to $1/8 = 0.125$. Students should learn this 'percentage-of-1/8' shortcut for quick CLAT DI work. Note also that this five-brand growth is computed only across the named brands; the all-brand growth figure would require knowing Q3 'other brands' shipments, which are not provided. The question deliberately tests whether candidates work with the table data alone.

Q23 C

Percentage growth by brand from Q3 to Q4 2025: Samsung = $(110 - 95) / 95 = 15.79\%$; Xiaomi = $(100 - 90) / 90 = 11.11\%$; Vivo = $(85 - 70) / 70 = 21.43\%$; Oppo = $(80 - 60) / 60 = 33.33\%$; Realme = $(75 - 85) / 85 = -11.76\%$ (a decline). The largest percentage growth is Oppo at 33.3%. Option (B) Samsung is 15.8%, second-largest in absolute units but not in percentage. Option (A) Xiaomi grew only 11.1%. Option (D) Vivo grew 21.4%, second highest. Option (C) Oppo at 33.3% is the LARGEST and the correct answer. Note the distinction between ABSOLUTE growth (Samsung adds 15 lakh, the largest absolute gain) and PERCENTAGE growth (Oppo adds 33%, the largest percentage gain) — a recurring CLAT DI distinction. Candidates should always check which metric the question is asking about.

Q24 A

Samsung's Q4 2025 revenue = shipments \times ASP = 110 lakh \times ₹22,000 per unit. Computing: 110 lakh = $110 \times 1,00,000 = 1,10,00,000$ units = 1.1 crore units. Revenue = 1.1 crore \times ₹22,000 = $1.1 \times 22,000$ crore = ₹24,200 crore. Option (B) ₹19,800 crore = $110 \times 18,000 / 100$ — wrong ASP. Option (A) ₹24,200 crore is correct. Option (D) ₹26,400 crore = $120 \times 22,000 / 100$ — wrong shipment count. Option (C) ₹28,600 crore = $130 \times 22,000 / 100$ — wrong shipment count. Cross-check: $1.1 \times 22 = 24.2$ (thousand crore), so ₹24,200 crore. Students should master the conversion lakh \times thousand-rupees \rightarrow crore-rupees, which is the most common unit-shift in Indian DI problems.

Q25 A

Realme's Q4 2025 shipments = 75 lakh. With a 20% increase in Q1 2026: $75 \times 1.20 = 90$ lakh. Option (D) 80 lakh = 75×1.067 (only 6.7% increase). Option (C) 85 lakh = 75×1.133 (only 13.3% increase). Option (A) 90 lakh = 75×1.20 (the correct 20% increase) and is correct. Option (B) 95 lakh = 75×1.267 (a 26.7% increase). Cross-check: 20% of 75 = 15; $75 + 15 = 90$. Note that the question deliberately tests whether candidates can perform percentage increase quickly from a baseline. The 20% shortcut (multiply by 1.2) is more reliable than computing 0.2×75 separately and then adding back — fewer operations means fewer arithmetic errors under time pressure.

Q26 C

Total passengers across all six airlines in March 2026 = $75 + 30 + 20 + 25 + 15 + 10 = 175$ lakh. Step-by-step: $75 + 30 = 105$; $105 + 20 = 125$; $125 + 25 = 150$; $150 + 15 = 165$; $165 + 10 = 175$. Option (B) 165 lakh undercounts by 10 lakh (likely from skipping ProJet). Option (A) 170 lakh undercounts by 5 (likely an arithmetic slip). Option (C) 175 lakh is correct. Option (D) 180 lakh overcounts by 5. The dominant carrier is BlueJet at 75 lakh, contributing roughly 43% of the total. The total of 175 lakh = 1.75 crore = 17.5 million passengers, a realistic monthly figure for Indian domestic aviation during peak season. Candidates should always re-add the column in a different order (e.g., $75 + 25 + 30 + 20 + 15 + 10$) to catch arithmetic slips — column transposition is the single most common DI error.

Q27 A

BlueJet's market share by passenger count = $75 / 175 = 0.4286 = 42.86\%$, which rounds to about 43%. Option (B) about 38% would correspond to $75 / 197$ — wrong total. Option (A) about 43% is correct. Option (D) about 47% would correspond to $75 / 160$ — wrong total. Option (C) about 52% would correspond to $75 / 144$ — wrong total. Cross-check: $75 / 175 = 75 / (7 \times 25) = 3 / 7 \approx 0.428$. The $3/7$ shortcut is faster than long division: $3/7 = 0.4286$ (approximately). Students should remember that $1/7 \approx 14.29\%$, so $3/7 \approx 42.86\%$. Common percentage-fraction equivalents ($1/2 = 50\%$, $1/3 \approx 33.3\%$, $1/4 = 25\%$, $1/5 = 20\%$, $1/6 \approx 16.7\%$, $1/7 \approx 14.3\%$, $1/8 = 12.5\%$) are essential CLAT DI memorisation.

Q28 C

Computing each airline's monthly revenue (passengers \times avg fare): BlueJet = $75 \times 5,800 = 4,35,000$ lakh-rupees; SkyLink = $30 \times 8,500 = 2,55,000$; SpiceWings = $20 \times 4,500 = 90,000$; StarFly = $25 \times 7,200 = 1,80,000$; TerraAir = $15 \times 4,000 = 60,000$; ProJet = $10 \times 6,000 = 60,000$. The highest is BlueJet at 4,35,000 lakh-rupees, or ₹4,350 crore. Option (C) BlueJet is correct. Option (D) SkyLink at ₹2,550 crore is second, less than BlueJet. Option (A) StarFly at ₹1,800 crore is third. Option (B) ProJet at ₹600 crore is among the smallest. Note that BlueJet's revenue dominance reflects both its passenger volume AND its mid-range fare; SkyLink has a higher fare but only 40% of BlueJet's passenger count. This question tests the candidate's ability to multiply two columns and compare across rows — a foundational DI skill.

Q29 B

BlueJet's revenue = 75 lakh passengers \times ₹5,800 per passenger. Computing: $75 \times 5,800 = 75 \times 5,000 + 75 \times 800 = 3,75,000 + 60,000 = 4,35,000$ lakh-rupees. Converting to crores: 4,35,000 lakh = 4,350 crore (since 100 lakh = 1 crore, so 4,35,000 lakh = 4,350 crore). Option (C) ₹3,850 crore = $75 \times 5,133$ — wrong fare. Option (A) ₹4,150 crore = $75 \times 5,533$ — wrong fare. Option (B) ₹4,350 crore is correct. Option (D) ₹4,650 crore = $75 \times 6,200$ — wrong fare. Cross-check by alternate computation: $75 \times 5,800 = (75 \times 6,000) - (75 \times 200) = 4,50,000 - 15,000 = 4,35,000$ lakh-rupees = ₹4,350 crore. The unit conversion lakh \times rupees to crore is critical: a candidate who reports 4,35,000 'lakh' without converting may pick the wrong answer scale.

Q30 D

Total seat capacity for BlueJet = passengers / load factor = $75 / 0.88 = 85.227$ lakh seats. At a 95% load factor: $85.227 \times 0.95 = 80.97$ lakh passengers. Additional passengers = $80.97 - 75 = 5.97$ lakh, which is approximately 6 lakh. Option (C) about 4 lakh undercounts. Option (D) about 6 lakh is correct. Option (A) about 8 lakh overcounts. Option (B) about 10 lakh significantly overcounts. Cross-check: the load factor would rise by 7 percentage points ($88\% \rightarrow 95\%$), and $7 / 88 = 7.95\%$ relative increase in passengers. 7.95% of 75 lakh = 5.96 lakh, confirming ≈ 6 lakh. This question tests the load-factor formula (passengers = capacity \times LF) and rewards candidates who set up the seat-capacity variable cleanly rather than guessing at percentage changes — a common operational metric in airline economics.

SECTION D — RAPID-FIRE MIXED REASONING & GK

Q31 C

Priya is a woman (typical Indian female name). 'My father's son' refers to Priya's brother — Priya herself, being female, is her father's daughter. The wife of Priya's brother is Priya's sister-in-law. The man in the portrait is the son of Priya's sister-in-law (and Priya's brother), making him Priya's nephew. Option (D) Son is wrong — that would require Priya to be the mother. Option (B) Cousin is wrong — a cousin is the child of an uncle or aunt, not of a sibling. Option (C) Nephew is correct. Option (A) Uncle is wrong — an uncle is a generation above, not below. The trap in this question is whether the speaker is male or female: if Priya were male, 'my father's son' could include Priya himself, making the portrait subject Priya's own son. The conventional gender of 'Priya' makes Nephew the intended answer.

Q32 D

Tracing the path: start at origin (0, 0) facing east. (1) Walk 5 km east → (5, 0); now facing east. (2) Turn left → now facing north; walk 3 km → (5, 3). (3) Turn left → now facing west; walk 8 km → (-3, 3). (4) Turn left → now facing south; walk 3 km → (-3, 0). Final position is (-3, 0), which is 3 km west of the starting point. Option (B) 3 km East is wrong — Rohit is west of origin. Option (D) 3 km West is correct. Option (A) 5 km West understates — Rohit went 5 east, then 8 west, net 3 west. Option (C) 5 km North is wrong — north-south net = 3 - 3 = 0. Direction-sense puzzles reward careful coordinate tracking with a fresh sketch; mental tracking alone often produces sign errors at the third or fourth turn.

Q33 C

Analyzing the syllogism: (P1) All lawyers are intelligent — this places the set of Lawyers entirely within the set of Intelligent persons. (P2) Some intelligent persons are politicians — this establishes only a partial overlap between Intelligent and Politicians, without specifying whether the overlap includes any lawyers. Conclusion (I) 'Some lawyers are politicians' does NOT follow — the partial overlap between Intelligent and Politicians might lie entirely outside the Lawyers subset of Intelligent. Conclusion (II) 'Some politicians are intelligent' DOES follow — it is the converse of P2 and is logically valid. Option (A) Only I is wrong. Option (C) Only II is correct. Option (D) Both is wrong. Option (B) Neither is wrong. Use Venn diagrams whenever syllogism options confuse — drawing the three circles makes the inference visible immediately.

Q34 D

Decoding the shift pattern: D (4) → G (7) = +3; E (5) → H (8) = +3; L (12) → O (15) = +3; H (8) → K (11) = +3; I (9) → L (12) = +3. The cipher is a uniform +3 letter shift (Caesar cipher). Applying to PARIS: P (16) → S (19); A (1) → D (4); R (18) → U (21); I (9) → L (12); S (19) → V (22). Therefore PARIS → SDULV. Option (D) SDULV is correct. Option (A) SDULY is wrong on the last letter (S → Y is +6). Option (B) TDULV starts with T (+4 instead of +3). Option (C) SBULV uses B for A (+1 instead of +3). The fastest check is to encode just one or two letters and verify against the pattern before encoding the rest.

Q35 B

Analyzing the series 3, 7, 13, 21, 31, ?: first differences are 4, 6, 8, 10 — increasing by 2 each time (an arithmetic progression of differences). The next difference is 12. Therefore the next term = 31 + 12 = 43. Option (D) 41 = 31 + 10 (uses the same difference as the previous step, missing the pattern). Option (B) 43 is correct. Option (A) 45 = 31 + 14 (jumps the difference too far). Option (C) 47 = 31 + 16 (also wrong). Alternative formula: term $n = n^2 + n + 1$ (for $n = 1, 2, 3 \dots$), giving 3, 7, 13, 21, 31, 43, 57. Number-series questions reward candidates who quickly compute first differences and check for arithmetic progressions among them — the most common pattern.

Q36 A

Computing the trader's economics step by step: Cost price = ₹400. Marked up 50% above cost: marked price = $400 \times 1.5 = ₹600$. First discount of 10%: $600 \times 0.90 = ₹540$. Second discount of 20% (on the post-first-discount price): $540 \times 0.80 = ₹432$. Selling price = ₹432. Profit = $432 - 400 = ₹32$. Profit per cent = $32 / 400 \times 100 = 8\%$. Option (A) 8% profit is correct. Option (D) 12% would require SP = ₹448. Option (B) 'Loss of 4%' is wrong — there is a profit, not a loss. Option (C) 'Loss of 6%' is wrong. Note that successive discounts of 10% and 20% are NOT equivalent to a single 30% discount; they are equivalent to $1 - 0.9 \times 0.8 = 1 - 0.72 = 28\%$ off the marked price. CLAT often tests this distinction.

Q37 D

For a journey where equal DISTANCES are covered at different speeds, the average speed is the harmonic mean of the two speeds: $\text{avg} = 2 \times v_1 \times v_2 / (v_1 + v_2) = 2 \times 60 \times 40 / (60 + 40) = 4,800 / 100 = 48 \text{ km/h}$. Option (B) 45 km/h is wrong. Option (D) 48 km/h is correct. Option (A) 50 km/h would be the arithmetic mean ($(60 + 40) / 2 = 50$), which applies only to equal-TIME segments, not equal-distance segments — a classic CLAT trap. Option (C) 52 km/h is wrong. Cross-check by setting distance = 120 km each half: time = $120/60 + 120/40 = 2 + 3 = 5$ hours; total distance = 240 km; $\text{avg} = 240/5 = 48 \text{ km/h}$. The harmonic-mean formula is essential for time-speed-distance problems.

Q38 A

In a 50-litre mixture with milk : water = 3 : 2, milk = $(3/5) \times 50 = 30$ litres and water = $(2/5) \times 50 = 20$ litres. To make the new ratio 1 : 1, milk and water must be equal. Milk remains 30 (no milk is added). So new water must also = 30 litres. Additional water required = $30 - 20 = 10$ litres. Option (D) 5 L would give 25 L water — ratio 30 : 25 = 6 : 5, not 1 : 1. Option (A) 10 L is correct. Option (B) 15 L would give 35 L water — ratio 30 : 35 = 6 : 7, not 1 : 1. Option (C) 20 L would give 40 L water — ratio 30 : 40 = 3 : 4, not 1 : 1. Cross-check: when only water is added, the milk quantity is fixed; equating to milk gives the simplest path.

Q39 D

Article 17 of the Indian Constitution abolishes 'untouchability' and forbids its practice in any form. The enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability is an offence punishable in accordance with law (currently the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, supplemented by the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989). Option (A) Article 14 guarantees equality before the law — not specifically untouchability. Option (C) Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth — a broader anti-discrimination provision. Option (D) Article 17 is correct. Option (B) Article 21 protects the right to life and personal liberty. Article 17 is one of the few Articles directly enforceable against private individuals as well as the State.

Q40 A

Under Article 109 of the Constitution, when a Money Bill passed by the Lok Sabha is sent to the Rajya Sabha, the Rajya Sabha may either pass it, recommend amendments, or take no action. If the Rajya Sabha does not return the Bill within 14 DAYS of its receipt, the Bill is deemed to have been passed by both Houses in the form in which it was originally passed by the Lok Sabha. The Lok Sabha may accept or reject the Rajya Sabha's amendments; if rejected, the Bill is deemed passed in the Lok Sabha's original form. Option (D) 7 days is wrong. Option (A) 14 days is correct. Option (B) 30 days and Option (C) 45 days are both wrong. The 14-day rule is the cornerstone of the Lok Sabha's primacy over the Rajya Sabha in fiscal matters.

Q41 B

The Brahmo Samaj was founded by Raja Ram Mohan Roy in 1828 in Calcutta (originally as the Brahmo Sabha, renamed Brahmo Samaj in 1830). It was the first major socio-religious reform movement of modern India, advocating monotheism, opposing idol worship, sati, and caste discrimination, and championing women's education and widow remarriage. Option (C) Dayanand Saraswati founded the Arya Samaj in 1875 — a different reform movement. Option (B) Raja Ram Mohan Roy is correct. Option (D) Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar was a contemporaneous reformer (widow remarriage advocacy) but did not found Brahmo Samaj. Option (A) Swami Vivekananda was a later figure (founded Ramakrishna Mission in 1897). Roy is often called the 'Father of the Indian Renaissance' for his pioneering role in 19th-century reform.