ANSWER KEY — 13 MAY 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	C	B	B	B	A	B	B	D	B
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
B	B	B	B	D	B	C	B	B	B
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**	**Q27**	**Q28**	**Q29**	**Q30**
D	C	A	C	C	B	B	B	A	B
Q31	**Q32**	**Q33**	**Q34**	**Q35**	**Q36**	**Q37**	**Q38**	**Q39**	**Q40**
A	A	A	B	A	B	D	B	B	B

SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B

Rakesh succeeds. The four classical ingredients of adverse possession — peaceful, open, continuous and hostile possession to the knowledge of the true owner — are all present from 2008 to 2022. The statutory period under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is twelve years for private land, and that period has been fully completed before Suman's suit. Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai (2009) requires the possessor to plead the date from which possession became hostile, and the facts here support 2008 as that date. Option (A) is wrong because the law expressly does extinguish the registered owner's title at the end of the limitation period (Section 27, Limitation Act). Option (C) is irrelevant — adverse possession is precisely possession WITHOUT the owner's consent; consent would destroy the claim, not defeat it. Option (D) is a distractor — payment of land revenue is corroborative but not a legal pre-requisite.

Q2 C

Option (C) is incorrect — a tenant in lawful occupation cannot perfect title by adverse possession unless and until she openly repudiates the tenancy and the possession becomes hostile to the landlord, with notice. This is the settled rule in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India (2004): permissive possession never ripens into adverse possession without a clear ouster. Options (A), (B) and (D) state the law correctly. Adverse possession requires open, peaceful, continuous possession adverse to the true owner; the period is twelve years for private land; and the possessor must hold the property as her own. The trap in this question is the intuitive idea that mere passage of time is enough; the law rejects that view.

Q3 B

Mohan's adverse possession period begins in 2010, not 2005. The 2005 occupation was permissive; permissive possession by a licensee or family member cannot ripen into adverse possession because the animus is absent. The doctrine requires a clear, open conversion of permissive possession into hostile possession, with notice to the true owner (Karnataka Board of Wakf, 2004). The 2010 statement at the village panchayat satisfies that requirement — it is public, unequivocal, and directly communicated to Kanta. Therefore the limitation clock starts in 2010. By 2024, fourteen years have passed — exceeding the twelve-year statutory limit. Option (A) misstates the starting date. Option (C) overstates the rule — permissive entry is not a permanent disability if openly repudiated. Option (D) is a fabrication; there is no familial exception to limitation.

Q4 B

Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a thirty-year period for adverse possession against Government land. Daksha's possession runs from 1992 to 2024 — thirty-two years — which exceeds the statutory threshold. All other ingredients (peaceful, open, continuous, hostile) are stated to be satisfied. Option (A) applies the wrong limitation period — twelve years is for private land under Article 65, not Government land. Option (C) is incorrect; adverse possession is NOT excluded against Government land — only the period is longer. Option (D) is a distractor; payment of land tax is corroborative evidence but not a statutory ingredient.

Q5 B

In Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019), a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court clarified that adverse possession may be pleaded both as a defence (shield) and as the basis of a positive declaration of title (sword), departing from the narrower earlier view. The Court held that once the ingredients are satisfied, the possessor obtains a substantive title that she can affirmatively assert. Option (A) reflects the older, now-overruled position. Option (C) is wrong — the doctrine has not been abolished; it has been clarified. Option (D) is wrong — adverse possession runs against private owners (12 years) and the State (30 years).

Q6 A

Co-ownership creates a strong presumption that possession by one co-owner is on behalf of all co-owners. To convert this joint possession into adverse possession requires clear evidence of ouster — open, unequivocal denial of the other co-owner's rights and notice of that denial. Manish has merely lived in the house; he has not given Reena notice of any hostile claim or denied her share. Therefore his possession is presumed to be on behalf of both. Option (B) is wrong — adverse possession is not categorically excluded for ancestral property; the rule is just that ouster must be proved. Option (C) is incorrect — the Limitation Act does not suspend periods for overseas residents. Option (D) states no legal rule; payment is unrelated to the limitation defence.

Q7 **B**

The neighbours succeed. A municipal licence to operate a flour mill is regulatory permission — it does not authorise the commission of a nuisance unless the statute that grants the licence expressly authorises the precise interference complained of (the rule in Geddis v. Bann Reservoir Proprietors, 1878, followed in India). A general trade licence to grind flour does not license the dust and noise that affect the neighbours' health. Substantial and unreasonable interference — including health damage — is the textbook case of actionable private nuisance. Option (A) overstates the defence of statutory authority. Option (C) misstates the law — 'coming to the nuisance' is not a defence in India. Option (D) is wrong — nuisance includes intangible interference (noise, dust, smell) and is not limited to physical encroachment.

Q8 **B**

Mr. Lal can sue. The general rule is that an individual cannot bring a civil action for public nuisance — that is the function of the State or the Advocate-General under Section 91 CPC. However, an individual MAY sue in her own capacity if she proves that she has suffered SPECIAL DAMAGE distinct from, and over and above, the inconvenience suffered by the general public. This is the rule in Ram Raj Singh v. Babulal (1982). Lal's 70 per cent loss of customers is a quantifiable, specific business loss greater than the generic inconvenience of the stench. Option (A) is wrong — public nuisance is both a tort and a crime; only the civil action by an individual requires special damage. Option (C) overstates the requirement of a class action. Option (D) applies to suits BY the Advocate-General, not by an individual proving special damage.

Q9 **D**

Option (D) — 'coming to the nuisance' — is NOT a recognised defence. The settled position is that a plaintiff who acquires property near a pre-existing nuisance retains the right to sue once she becomes the occupier; the defendant cannot insist that the plaintiff should have stayed away (Bliss v. Hall, 1838). Options (A), (B) and (C) are all recognised defences. Statutory authority defeats a nuisance suit where the statute expressly authorises the interference. A prescriptive right arises after twenty years of uninterrupted, open and peaceable user of the offending activity, and operates as an easement. Consent destroys the wrongfulness of the interference. The trap in this question is the intuitive appeal of 'you knew it was there' — but Indian law follows the English rule rejecting this as a defence.

Q10 **B**

Ms. Sharma loses. The test in nuisance is what a person of ORDINARY sensibilities living in the locality would tolerate, not what an unusually sensitive plaintiff finds offensive. The rule comes from Robinson v. Kilvert (1889): abnormal sensitiveness in the plaintiff cannot found an action. The faint odour, tolerated by every other resident for twenty-five years, does not become actionable merely because Ms. Sharma is medically hyperosmic. Option (A) inverts the test. Option (C) is irrelevant on these facts — even with statutory authority absent, abnormal sensitiveness defeats the claim. Option (D) is wrong because a pollution licence is regulatory; the action turns on the standard of the reasonable occupier.

Q11 **B**

In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987), responding to the oleum gas leak from Shriram Foods and Fertilizer, the Supreme Court evolved the rule of ABSOLUTE LIABILITY for hazardous and inherently dangerous activity. Crucially, this rule is stricter than the English rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868): there are NO exceptions for act of God, third-party intervention or statutory authority. Once a hazardous enterprise causes harm, liability follows without proof of negligence and without the traditional Rylands defences. Option (A) trivialises the holding. Option (C) is wrong — the case was a constitutional and civil matter, not exclusively criminal. Option (D) is wrong — the Court actively shaped the doctrine and did not treat it as policy-only.

Q12 **B**

The strongest counter is that prescriptive right cannot legalise a public nuisance. The doctrine of prescription operates between two private parties and gives the defendant an easement-like right to continue an activity that would otherwise be a private nuisance. It cannot, however, extinguish a RIGHT BELONGING TO THE PUBLIC at large — the right to clean air, the right to a public road free of obstruction, and so on. The public, by definition, cannot consent or lose a right through municipal inaction. Option (A) overstates the prescriptive defence and ignores the public/private distinction. Option (C) is doctrinally inaccurate — Governments can ordinarily plead prescription in proper cases, just not against public rights. Option (D) is fabricated.

SECTION B — ANALYTICAL REASONING

Q13 **B**

Label the six positions of the hexagonal table 1 to 6 in clockwise order. Since each friend faces the centre, the person's right hand points to the next seat clockwise and the left hand to the next seat anti-clockwise. From constraint 1, place P at seat 1 and U at seat 4 (directly opposite). From constraint 2, Q is immediately right of P → seat 2. From constraint 3, S is immediately right of U → seat 5. From constraint 4, T is immediately left of P → seat 6. The remaining seat (seat 3) is occupied by R. The final arrangement, clockwise from P, is P-Q-R-U-S-T. The seat opposite Q (seat 2) is seat 5, which is occupied by S. Answer: (B) S.

Q14 **B**

Using the seating arrangement established in the previous question — clockwise from P: P(1)-Q(2)-R(3)-U(4)-S(5)-T(6) — we need the seat immediately to the LEFT of R. Since every friend faces the centre, the left-hand side points in the anti-clockwise direction. The anti-clockwise neighbour of seat 3 (R) is seat 2, which is occupied by Q. Option (A) P is incorrect — P sits at seat 1, two seats away from R. Option (C) T is incorrect — T sits at seat 6, on the other side of P. Option (D) U is incorrect — U is at seat 4, immediately to the right of R, not the left. Answer: (B) Q.

Q15 **D**

Start with the original arrangement (clockwise): P(1)-Q(2)-R(3)-U(4)-S(5)-T(6). When S and T exchange seats, the layout becomes P(1)-Q(2)-R(3)-U(4)-T(5)-S(6). Each person still faces the centre, so 'immediately to the right of U' means the clockwise neighbour of U's seat. U sits at seat 4; the clockwise neighbour is seat 5. After the swap, seat 5 is occupied by T. Therefore T sits immediately to the right of U after the exchange. Option (A) P, (B) Q and (C) S are all in incorrect positions relative to U. Answer: (D) T.

Q16 **B**

From the seating arrangement (clockwise from P): P(1) → Q(2) → R(3) → U(4) → S(5) → T(6). Counting clockwise from P, we move to the next seat each time: the 1st person reached is Q at seat 2, the 2nd person is R at seat 3, and the 3rd person is U at seat 4. Therefore the third person reached is U. Option (A) S is the 4th person, option (C) R is the 2nd, and option (D) T is the 5th, so they are all incorrect. Answer: (B) U.

Q17 **C**

Test each option against the five constraints. (A) E1, E2, D1, D2, M1 — violates constraint 2 because E1 and D1 are both present. (B) E1, E3, D1, D2, M1 — also violates constraint 2 (E1 with D1). (D) E2, E3, D2, D3, M2 — violates constraint 3: E2 is selected but M1 is not. (C) E2, E3, D1, D2, M1 — checks: two Engineering (✓), one Design represented (D1 and D2, ✓), one Marketing (M1, ✓); E1 not in team so constraint 2 is vacuously true; E2 in team and M1 also in team (✓ constraint 3); D3 not in team so constraint 4 is vacuously true; M2 not in team so constraint 5 is vacuously true. (C) satisfies every rule. Answer: (C).

Q18 **B**

Constraint 5: 'M2 cannot be selected unless E3 is also selected.' This is a necessary condition: M2 → E3. If M2 is in the team, E3 must also be in the team. Therefore option (B) — E3 is on the team — must be true. Option (A) is false: D1 may or may not be in the team independently of M2. Option (C) is false: M2 being in the team does not require E2; E3 is the binding Engineering member. Option (D) is false: D3 selection depends on D2 (constraint 4), not on M2.

Q19 **B**

Constraint 3 reads: 'If E2 is selected, then M1 must also be selected.' The contrapositive is: if M1 is NOT selected, then E2 must NOT be selected. We are told M1 is excluded. Therefore E2 must also be excluded. Answer: (B) E2. Option (A) E1 is wrong because E1 has no constraint forcing his exclusion. Option (C) E3 is wrong because E3 is freely available. Option (D) is wrong because the rule is deterministic, not indeterminate.

Q20 **B**

The team must include at least two Engineering members and at least one Marketing member (constraint 1). That leaves at most two seats for Design (5 − 2 − 1 = 2). With two Design seats and constraint 4 (D3 requires D2), feasible Design pairs are {D1, D2} or {D2, D3}. Adding a third Design member would force either Engineering or Marketing below its minimum, violating constraint 1. Therefore the maximum is two. Answer: (B) Two.

SECTION C — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q21 **D**

Total each stream across the four colleges by adding the column figures. Arts = 120 + 200 + 90 + 150 = 560. Commerce = 180 + 160 + 210 + 150 = 700. Science = 150 + 120 + 240 + 210 = 720. Engineering = 300 + 180 + 360 + 330 = 1,170. Engineering at 1,170 admissions is the largest stream total — more than twice the Arts figure. Option (A) Arts is the smallest. Option (B) Commerce is second-smallest. Option (C) Science is second-largest but still well below Engineering. Answer: (D) Engineering.

Q22 **C**

Chetna's total admissions (last column) = 900. Engineering admissions at Chetna (fourth value column) = 360. Convert to percentage: (360 / 900) × 100 = 40%. Each option corresponds to a different fraction: (A) 33% would mean 300 admissions, (B) 36% would mean 324, (D) 44% would mean about 396 — none of which matches the actual 360 figure. Only 40% is exact for the ratio 360 : 900. Answer: (C) 40%.

Q23 **A**

Read the relevant cells directly from the table. Arts admissions at Aravind = 120. Commerce admissions at Bhavya = 180. The required ratio is 120 : 180. Divide both terms by their highest common factor, 60, to get the simplest form: 120/60 : 180/60 = 2 : 3. The other options correspond to different ratios that do not reduce to the underlying figures. Answer: (A) 2 : 3.

Q24 **C**

Read the Science column for each college: 150 at Aravind, 120 at Bhavya, 240 at Chetna and 210 at Drishti. Total Science admissions = 150 + 120 + 240 + 210 = 720. The average across the four colleges = total / number of colleges = 720 / 4 = 180. Option (A) 170 corresponds to a total of 680, (B) 175 to 700, and (D) 185 to 740 — none match the actual 720. Answer: (C) 180.

Q25 **C**

Drishti's current Engineering intake is 330 admissions. A 20% increase = 330 × 0.20 = 66 additional admissions, so the new Engineering count = 330 + 66 = 396. The other streams at Drishti remain unchanged at 150 (Arts) + 150 (Commerce) + 210 (Science) = 510. Add the new Engineering figure: 510 + 396 = 906. Equivalently, Drishti's old total (840) + the 66-admission rise = 906. Answer: (C) 906.

Q26 **B**

Read the revenue column. Action genre revenue = ₹3,600 Cr; Animation genre revenue = ₹1,200 Cr. The difference between them = ₹3,600 − ₹1,200 = ₹2,400 Cr. Equivalently, this is a difference of 20 percentage points (30% − 10%) of the ₹12,000 Cr total = ₹2,400 Cr. The other options correspond to other genre pairings: (A) is closer to Action minus Comedy + Animation; (C) and (D) do not match any pair on the table. Answer: (B) ₹2,400 Cr.

Q27 **B**

From the percentage column, Romance is 15% of the total revenue and Comedy is 12%. Together they account for 15% + 12% = 27% of the total ₹12,000 Cr industry revenue, which in absolute terms is ₹3,240 Cr. The other options correspond to different pairings: (A) 25% would be Romance + 10%, (C) 29% is not a pair on the chart, and (D) 30% is the Action share alone. Answer: (B) 27%.

Q28 **B**

Animation grows 25% on its ₹1,200 Cr base: new Animation revenue = 1,200 × 1.25 = ₹1,500 Cr, an absolute rise of ₹300 Cr (or equivalently, 25% of 1,200 = 300). All five other genres remain unchanged. The new total industry revenue therefore = ₹12,000 Cr + ₹300 Cr = ₹12,300 Cr. Option (A) ₹12,200 Cr corresponds to a rise of 16.7%; (C) ₹12,400 Cr to a rise of 33.3%; (D) ₹12,500 Cr to a rise of 41.7% — none match the stated 25% increase. Answer: (B) ₹12,300 Cr.

Q29 **A**

Read the revenue column directly: Drama = ₹2,640 Cr; Romance = ₹1,800 Cr. The exact ratio is 2,640 : 1,800, which simplifies (divide both terms by 120) to 22 : 15, equivalent to a decimal value of approximately 1.467. Now compare each option's decimal value to find the closest match: 3:2 evaluates to 1.500 (difference 0.033), 4:3 evaluates to about 1.333 (difference 0.134), 7:5 evaluates to 1.400 (difference 0.067), and 11:7 evaluates to about 1.571 (difference 0.104). The smallest gap is for 3:2 at just 0.033 away from the true ratio. Answer: (A) 3 : 2.

Q30 **B**

The cess is described as applying ONLY to Action genre revenue, so we need only that figure. Action revenue = ₹3,600 Cr. A 5% Goods and Services cess on Action revenue = 3,600 × 0.05 = ₹180 Cr. The other options correspond to different (incorrect) cess rates: ₹160 Cr would imply approximately 4.44%, ₹200 Cr would imply about 5.56%, and ₹220 Cr would imply about 6.11% — none match a 5% rate on ₹3,600 Cr. The cess applies only to Action, so the other genres' revenues do not enter the calculation at all. Answer: (B) ₹180 Cr.

SECTION D — RAPID-FIRE MIXED REASONING & GK

Q31 **A**

Start with the phrase 'my grandfather's only son'. Akash's grandfather has exactly one son. Since Akash himself exists and is a descendant of that grandfather, the only son must be Akash's own father — there is no other male child of the grandfather. The girl in the photograph is described as 'the daughter of' that only son, which means she is a daughter of Akash's father. A daughter of Akash's father (other than Akash herself, if Akash is also a daughter) is Akash's sister. Answer: (A) Sister.

Q32 **A**

Build the family map step by step. A is the brother of B; B is the sister of C. So A, B and C share the same parents — they are all siblings. C is the father of D, meaning D is C's child. A and C are brothers (A is male, C must also be male since he is a father), so A is the brother of D's father. The brother of one's father is one's paternal uncle. Therefore A is D's uncle. Answer: (A) Uncle.

Q33 **A**

Track Suresh's path step by step using coordinates with east-positive and north-positive. Start at (0, 0) facing north. Walk 6 km north → (0, 6), still facing north. Turn right → facing east; walk 4 km → (4, 6), facing east. Turn right → facing south; walk 6 km → (4, 0), facing south. Turn left → facing east; walk 4 km → (8, 0), facing east. Final position (8, 0): exactly 8 km east of the start. Direction faced: east. Answer: (A) 8 km, East.

Q34 **B**

Statement 1: All artists are dreamers — every artist is in the dreamer set. Statement 2: Some dreamers are realists — the dreamer set and the realist set overlap. Conclusion I: Some artists are realists — this does NOT necessarily follow because the dreamers who are realists may not be the dreamers who are also artists; the two subsets of dreamers could be disjoint. Conclusion II: Some realists are dreamers — this is simply the converse of Statement 2 ('some D are R' implies 'some R are D'), and follows directly. So only Conclusion II follows. Answer: (B).

Q35 **A**

Identify the coding rule: each letter is shifted forward by 1 in the alphabet. Verify with CLOUD: C(3)→D(4), L(12)→M(13), O(15)→P(16), U(21)→V(22), D(4)→E(5), giving 'DMPVE' (✓ matches the given code). Apply the same +1 shift to RAIN: R(18)→S(19), A(1)→B(2), I(9)→J(10), N(14)→O(15), giving 'SBJO'. The other options correspond to different shift values or scrambled mappings. Answer: (A) SBJO.

Q36 **B**

Look at consecutive differences in the series 3, 6, 11, 18, 27. They are: 6 − 3 = 3, 11 − 6 = 5, 18 − 11 = 7, 27 − 18 = 9. The differences form an arithmetic progression with common difference 2 (3, 5, 7, 9, ...). The next difference must therefore be 11, so the next term in the original series is 27 + 11 = 38. Equivalently, the nth term is $n^2 + 2$ — checking, $1^2 + 2 = 3$, $2^2 + 2 = 6$, $3^2 + 2 = 11$, etc. Answer: (B) 38.

Q37 **D**

When a train crosses a platform, the total distance covered equals the sum of the train's length and the platform's length. So distance = 200 m + 300 m = 500 m. Time = 25 seconds. Speed = distance / time = 500 / 25 = 20 m/s. Convert to km/h using the factor 18/5: 20 × 18 / 5 = 72 km/h. The other options correspond to slower speeds: 54 km/h ≈ 15 m/s (would require 33.3 s), 60 km/h ≈ 16.7 m/s, and 66 km/h ≈ 18.3 m/s. Answer: (D) 72 km/h.

Q38 **B**

Let the cost price be ₹100 (a convenient base). The marked price is 40% above cost, so MP = 100 × 1.40 = ₹140. A 10% discount is then offered on the marked price, giving selling price = 140 × 0.90 = ₹126. Profit = SP − CP = 126 − 100 = ₹26. Profit percentage = profit / cost × 100 = 26 / 100 × 100 = 26%. Note the common trap: mark-up minus discount is NOT simply 40% − 10% = 30%. Answer: (B) 26%.

Q39 **B**

Article 32 of the Constitution of India guarantees the right to constitutional remedies — the right to move the Supreme Court directly for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar called Article 32 the 'heart and soul' of the Constitution. The Court may issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari. The other options correspond to different fundamental rights: Article 14 (equality), Article 19(1)(a) (free speech), and Article 21A (education).

Q40 **B**

The 86th Constitutional Amendment, 2002 inserted Article 21A — the fundamental right to education for children aged 6 to 14 — and added a corresponding fundamental duty under Article 51A(k): 'who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child or, as the case may be, ward between the age of six and fourteen years.' Option (A) was added by the 42nd Amendment, 1976 — Article 51A(i). Option (C) corresponds to Article 51A(g), also from the 42nd Amendment. Option (D) corresponds to Article 51A(h), from the 42nd Amendment. Answer: (B).