

ANSWER KEY – 16 MAY 2026

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|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q5 | Q6 | Q7 | Q8 | Q9 | Q10 |
| A | A | D | A | C | A | C | A | B | D |
| Q11 | Q12 | Q13 | Q14 | Q15 | Q16 | Q17 | Q18 | Q19 | Q20 |
| C | C | C | C | B | D | C | A | D | A |
| Q21 | Q22 | Q23 | Q24 | Q25 | Q26 | Q27 | Q28 | Q29 | Q30 |
| D | D | B | C | C | A | B | A | B | B |
| Q31 | Q32 | Q33 | Q34 | Q35 | Q36 | | | | |
| D | B | C | B | A | A | | | | |

SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING

Q1 A

Apply the V.G. Row test. The asserted purpose — preventing 'inconvenience to traffic' — is at the lowest end of legitimate State concerns. The measure imposed is a complete ban on assemblies of more than ten persons in any State. The disproportion between asserted aim and chosen means is extreme. Proportionality requires the State to choose the LEAST RESTRICTIVE measure adequate to the aim; here a permitting regime, route regulation, or time/place restriction would be obvious less-restrictive alternatives. The law fails on the disproportion limb of the V.G. Row test. Option (A) misreads Article 19(3): traffic management is not an enumerated ground; sovereignty, public order, decency and morality are. Option (B) inverts the constitutional test — reasonableness is a question for the Court, not Parliament. Option (D) overstates Article 19(3): reasonable restrictions are permitted, but not unreasonable ones. Answer: (A) the third option.

Q2 A

The four-limb proportionality test articulated in *Modern Dental College v. State of M.P.* (2016) and reaffirmed in *Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India* (2020) requires: (i) a LEGITIMATE STATE AIM, (ii) SUITABILITY of the means to that aim, (iii) NECESSITY — that no less restrictive alternative is reasonably available, and (iv) BALANCING — the impact on rights is not disproportionate to the importance of the objective. None of these limbs requires parliamentary ratification by a two-thirds majority. That is a constitutional-amendment requirement under Article 368, not a proportionality limb. Options (A), (B) and (C) all correctly name the first three limbs. Only (D) is the imposter. Answer: (A) the two-thirds parliamentary majority option.

Q3 D

Article 19(2) authorises the State to impose reasonable restrictions on free speech ON ENUMERATED GROUNDS, but the restriction must be 'imposed by law' — the words appear expressly in the clause. An executive order without statutory backing fails this threshold requirement, regardless of the content of the restriction (*Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala*, 1986; *Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India*, 2020). Option (A) captures this exactly. Option (B) is wrong on the substantive question — public order (within which 'communal disharmony' may sometimes fall) IS a permissible ground; the defect lies in the procedural requirement. Option (C) overstates protection — documentaries do not enjoy absolute protection. Option (D) invents a Centre/State distinction not present in Article 19(2). Answer: (D) the first option.

Q4 A

Apply the Chintaman Rao test of reasonableness. The State has imposed a COMPLETE BAN on a lawful trade following a SINGLE INCIDENT. The disproportion between the regulatory aim (preventing fraud) and the chosen means (banning the entire profession) is extreme. Less restrictive measures — registration, licensing, identification, code-of-conduct regulation — are obvious and were not considered. The complete ban therefore fails the proportionality limb. Option (B) captures this. Option (A) overstates State plenary power — it is subject to Article 19(6) reasonableness scrutiny. Option (C) misreads Article 19(6): 'reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public' is not a blank cheque. Option (D) invents a geographic limit not derived from the test. Answer: (A) the second option.

Q5 C

Article 19(2) enumerates eight permissible grounds for restricting freedom of speech and expression: (i) sovereignty and integrity of India, (ii) the security of the State, (iii) friendly relations with foreign States, (iv) public order, (v) decency or morality, (vi) contempt of court, (vii) defamation, and (viii) incitement to an offence. 'Economic justice and equitable distribution of wealth' is NOT among them — that is a Directive Principle under Article 39, not a ground for restricting Article 19(1)(a). Options (A), (B) and (C) are all expressly enumerated. Only (D) is absent from Article 19(2). Answer: (C) the economic-justice option.

Q6 A

Article 19(2) operates as a CLOSED LIST of permissible grounds. A restriction on free speech is permitted ONLY on a ground enumerated in the clause; restrictions purporting to operate on other grounds are invalid. If 'public order' had not been enumerated, a State law restricting hate speech ON THAT GROUND would lack constitutional warrant — even if the restriction were otherwise reasonable. The State could not borrow grounds (e.g., implying public order from sovereignty) because Article 19(2)'s enumeration is exhaustive. Option (A) misreads the clause as containing implicit grounds. Option (C) invents a Centre-only authority. Option (D) introduces an arbitrary date with no constitutional basis. Answer: (A) the second option.

Q7 C

Section 73's first limb gives the seller the difference between the contract price and the market price prevailing at the date of breach, where there is an available market. The seller has effectively mitigated by reselling immediately at market value, so the recoverable loss is the price differential: ₹500 × 100 tonnes = ₹50,000. This is the EXPECTATION measure — putting the seller in the position he would have been in had the contract been performed. Option (B) is wrong — specific performance is not the default remedy for ordinary commodity sales. Option (C) wrongly treats the resale as fully compensatory; the lower resale price means the seller is still ₹500 per tonne short. Option (D) misstates the measure as 'lost profit on the entire contract' rather than the price differential. Answer: (C) the first option.

Q8 A

This is the classical fact pattern of Hadley v. Baxendale itself. The carrier was held NOT liable for the lost profit because: (i) the loss did not arise naturally in the usual course of things — many millers have spare shafts, so an idle mill is not the natural consequence of carrier delay; AND (ii) the special circumstance (no spare shaft) was NOT communicated to the carrier at contract formation, so the second limb does not apply either. Both limbs fail; the carrier is not liable for the consequential loss of profit. Option (A) overstates the rule (Section 73 does not extend liability to all flowing loss). Option (C) understates by limiting recovery to the shaft itself. Option (D) gets the second-limb question right in principle but the facts state no such awareness. Answer: (A) the second option.

Q9 B

Option (C) is INCORRECT — Section 73 expressly EXCLUDES recovery for loss that is REMOTE OR INDIRECT, regardless of whether the breach was wilful. The wilfulness of the breach does not enlarge the recoverable category of loss; indirectness operates as a doctrinal limit. Options (A), (B) and (D) all state the law correctly: damages compensate rather than punish; the aggrieved party must mitigate; and the expectation measure is the operative measure. The trap in this question is the intuitive idea that a more egregious breach should produce a wider remedy — but the law of damages does not work this way. Answer: (B) the third option.

Q10 D

Y does not recover the lost premium on the manifesto contract. Apply both limbs of Hadley v. Baxendale: (i) the premium does not arise NATURALLY from a paper-supply breach — most paper buyers do not have lucrative side-contracts dependent on that paper; AND (ii) X did not KNOW of the manifesto contract at the time of the original supply contract, so the special circumstance is not within X's contemplation. Both limbs fail. Y can recover only the ordinary loss (typically the difference between contract price and replacement cost). Option (A) misreads the first limb. Option (C) overstates by treating all consequential losses as recoverable. Option (D) raises mitigation, which goes to quantum but does not zero out recovery. Answer: (D) the second option.

Q11 C

The seller has failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate by selling at the prevailing market price. Section 73 is explicit: 'In estimating the loss or damage arising from a breach of contract, the means which existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non-performance of the contract must be taken into account.' Mitigation is not optional; failure to mitigate cuts down the recoverable compensation to what the seller would have suffered had he taken reasonable steps. Option (A) overrides the mitigation rule. Option (C) applies a contributory-fault doctrine that is not the standard remedy; mitigation works by reducing damages, not barring them entirely. Option (D) misidentifies the remedy — specific performance is not the default for ordinary sales of fungible goods. Answer: (C) the fourth option.

Q12 C

The second limb of Hadley v. Baxendale is the doctrinal mechanism by which a party who COMMUNICATES special circumstances at contract formation enlarges the recoverable damages. If only the first limb were codified, mere communication of special circumstances would not enlarge damages: the breaching party would be liable only for loss arising NATURALLY in the usual course, regardless of any special notice. This is precisely the pattern that the second limb was designed to address. Option (A) overstates — the first limb is perfectly coherent on its own. Option (C) is fanciful — there is no fixed-multiple rule. Option (D) has only formal force; Section 73 would still partially codify the rule (just minus the second limb). Answer: (C) the second option.

SECTION B — ANALYTICAL REASONING

Q13 C

Compare the two views to identify which colours are visible TOGETHER and which are not. View A shows Red (top), Blue (left), Yellow (right). View B shows Pink (top), Yellow (left), Green (right). Yellow appears in BOTH views — meaning Yellow is adjacent to Red, Blue, Pink and Green. The only colour Yellow does NOT share a view with is White. Therefore Yellow is OPPOSITE White. Now compare the remaining colours: Red appears with Blue and Yellow (View A), and by elimination Red also adjoins Pink and Green (since Pink and Green are visible alongside Yellow in View B). So Red's neighbours are Blue, Yellow, Pink and Green; the only colour not adjacent to Red is White — but Yellow already opposes White. Re-analysing, the consistent pairing has Red opposite Pink (since Pink appears in View B as the top, Red appears in View A as the top, and the two top faces of two distinct three-face views are necessarily on opposite faces). Answer: (C) the first option.

Q14 C

Following the deductive chain in Q1: Red ↔ Pink (the two tops are opposite), Yellow ↔ White (Yellow is adjacent to four colours, leaving White as its opposite). The remaining pair must be Blue and Green, by elimination. So Blue is opposite Green. Option (A) misidentifies the pairing — Blue and Yellow are visible together in View A, so they are ADJACENT (not opposite). Option (C) wrongly pairs Blue with White. Option (D) wrongly pairs Blue with Pink — but Pink is the opposite of Red, not Blue. Answer: (C) the second option.

Q15 B

The correct three pairs are: Red ↔ Pink, Blue ↔ Green, and Yellow ↔ White. The two top faces of the two distinct views are Red (View A) and Pink (View B); since each cube face is visible in at most one of the two views as the top face, these two are opposite. Yellow appears in both views as a SIDE face, never as a top, indicating it is adjacent to four faces (the two tops and the two side neighbours in each view); the only face it cannot see is White. The remaining pair is Blue–Green. Options (A), (C) and (D) misidentify one or more pairings. Answer: (B) the second option.

Q16 D

From Q3, the opposite pairings are Red ↔ Pink, Blue ↔ Green, Yellow ↔ White. If Green is on the top, the bottom face is its opposite — which is Blue. Option (A) is wrong (Red opposes Pink, not Green). Option (C) is wrong (Yellow opposes White). Option (D) is wrong (White opposes Yellow). Only Blue is opposite Green. Answer: (D) the second option.

Q17 C

Build the ordering chain. From clue 4, Farhan > Aarav. From clue 2, Aarav > Esha > Chintan. From clue 3, Chintan > Bina. From clue 1, Bina > Devi. Combining: Farhan > Aarav > Esha > Chintan > Bina > Devi. The full ordering is determined. The HIGHEST score belongs to Farhan. Option (A) Aarav is second-highest. Option (B) Esha is third. Option (D) is wrong — the ordering IS determined. Answer: (C) the third option.

Q18 A

Continuing the chain Farhan > Aarav > Esha > Chintan > Bina > Devi, the LOWEST score belongs to Devi. The chain is determined completely from the five clues; no element of indeterminacy remains. Option (A) Bina is the second-lowest. Option (C) Chintan is third-lowest. Option (D) — cannot be determined — is wrong because the chain is fully ordered. Answer: (A) the second option.

Q19 D

From the chain Farhan > Aarav > Esha > Chintan > Bina > Devi, Esha (rank 3) scored MORE than Bina (rank 5). The relative order of Esha and Bina IS determined; in fact Esha always scored more than Bina. Option (B) inverts the relation. Option (C) is wrong — the order IS determined. Option (D) introduces an irrelevant qualifier (Devi's relation to Chintan is already fixed by clue 1). Answer: (D) the first option.

Q20 A

From the determined chain, Aarav (rank 2) > Esha > Chintan > Bina (rank 5). Therefore Aarav scored MORE than Bina. This MUST be true. Option (B) Devi < Esha is also true (Devi is rank 6, Esha is rank 3) — but the question asks for which MUST be true; BOTH statements are true. Looking more carefully, only one of the four options aligns with the correct chain. Option (C) Farhan < Esha is FALSE (Farhan is rank 1). Option (D) Chintan < Devi is FALSE (Chintan is rank 4, Devi is rank 6, so Chintan > Devi). So both (A) and (B) are true. Mark (A) as the intended single-answer choice. Answer: (A) the first option.

SECTION C — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q21 D

The working-age population is the sum of the 15-24, 25-44 and 45-64 cohorts. Reading the population column: 259 + 432 + 259 = 950 million. Verify by percentage: 18% + 30% + 18% = 66% of 1,440 = 950.4 million ≈ 950 million. Option (A) 864 corresponds to 60% — slightly under the actual; (C) 1,040 to 72%; (D) 1,080 to 75%. Only 950 matches the correct cohort sum. Answer: (D) the second option.

Q22 D

Dependency ratio = (children 0-14 + elderly 65+) / working-age (15-64) × 100. Numerator: 374 + 115 = 489 million. Denominator: 950 million (from Q1). Ratio: 489 / 950 ≈ 51.5%, which rounds closest to 52%. Looking at the options, the closest values are (B) 47% and (C) 53%. The actual is 51.5%, which is closer to 53% (difference 1.5) than to 47% (difference 4.5). The intended answer is the closer rounding (C) 53%. Treating (C) as the correct choice. Answer: (D) the third option.

Q23 B

The youth bulge is conventionally the 15-29 age group. The table provides the 15-24 cohort (259 million) and the 25-44 cohort (432 million), but the 25-29 sub-cohort cannot be isolated from the broader 25-44 figure without an additional uniform-distribution assumption. Strictly, on the data alone, the youth bulge cannot be determined precisely. Option (D) captures this honestly. Option (A) understates by using only the 15-24 figure. Option (B) makes the uniform-distribution assumption (yielding $259 + 432/4 = 367$ — close to 350) but blurs precision. Option (C) over-counts. Answer: (B) the fourth option.

Q24 C

If 65+ rises from 8% to 14% of 1,440 million: new size = $1,440 \times 0.14 = 201.6$ million. Current size = $1,440 \times 0.08 = 115.2$ million. Growth = $201.6 - 115.2 = 86.4$ million ≈ 86 . Option (C) 86 matches. Options (A) 57, (B) 73 and (D) 115 correspond to incorrect arithmetic. The 65+ cohort grows by approximately 86 million in this hypothetical projection. Answer: (C) the third option.

Q25 C

Compute the smallest two-cohort sum. Cohorts: 0-14 = 26%, 15-24 = 18%, 25-44 = 30%, 45-64 = 18%, 65+ = 8%. Pairwise totals: 0-14 + 15-24 = 44%; 15-24 + 65+ = 26%; 45-64 + 65+ = 26%; 25-44 + 65+ = 38%. The smallest pair shares are 15-24+65+ AND 45-64+65+, both at 26%. Option (B) and option (C) tie. Mark (B) as the intended single-answer choice. Answer: (C) the second option.

Q26 A

Read the India column carefully across all six years: FY20 = 33, FY21 = 30, FY22 = 44, FY23 = 44, FY24 = 36, FY25 = 40 (all in USD billions). The HIGHEST value across the period is 44, occurring in BOTH FY22 and FY23 — a tie at the peak. The first such year is FY22, the year in which India's textile exports first reached the peak of 44 USD billion. Options (A) FY20 (33), (C) FY23 (44 — also a peak but later) and (D) FY25 (40, lower) either understate the peak or come later than FY22. Option (B) FY22 is the correct identification. Answer: (A) the second option.

Q27 B

India's exports fell from FY23 (44) to FY24 (36). Decline = $44 - 36 = 8$. Percentage decline = $8 / 44 \times 100 = 18.18\%$, which rounds to 18%. Option (A) 14% would correspond to a fall of about 6.16; (B) 16% to 7.04; (D) 22% to 9.68 — none match the actual fall of 8. Only 18% reflects the correct percentage decline on the FY23 base. Answer: (B) the third option.

Q28 A

Read the China column carefully: FY20 = 270, FY21 = 290, FY22 = 320, FY23 = 300, FY24 = 295, FY25 = 310 (all in USD billions). The HIGHEST value across the period is 320, occurring in FY22. Option (A) FY21 (290) is the second-highest. Option (C) FY23 (300) declined from the FY22 peak. Option (D) FY25 (310) shows a partial recovery but still below the FY22 high. Only FY22 corresponds to the peak of 320. Answer: (A) the second option.

Q29 B

Sum India's six annual figures step by step: $33 + 30 = 63$; $63 + 44 = 107$; $107 + 44 = 151$; $151 + 36 = 187$; $187 + 40 = 227$ USD billion across the six years. Average = total / number of years = $227 / 6 = 37.833$. Option (A) 36.5 corresponds to an incorrect sum of 219 (under-counts); (B) 37.83 matches the correct calculation; (C) 38.50 corresponds to 231 (over-counts); (D) 39.00 corresponds to 234. Only 37.83 is the correct arithmetic mean of the six figures. Answer: (B) the second option.

Q30 B

In FY22, India's textile exports were 44 USD bn and China's were 320 USD bn. India as a percentage of China = $44 / 320 \times 100 = 13.75\%$, which rounds to 14%. Option (A) 12% would correspond to a ratio of $38.4 / 320$ — too low; (C) 16% to $51.2 / 320$ — too high; (D) 18% to $57.6 / 320$ — much too high. Only 14% matches the actual ratio. Answer: (B) the second option.

SECTION D — RAPID-FIRE MIXED REASONING & GK

Q31 D

Course of action questions test which proposed action LOGICALLY FOLLOWS from the statement. Action II (investigate the cases of mass copying, identify centres, cancel only the affected centres' results) is a PROPORTIONATE response that targets the wrong-doers without harming honest students. Action I (cancel and re-conduct the entire State exam) is a disproportionate response that punishes ALL students for the misconduct of some, and ignores the existence of less drastic remedies. Only Action II follows logically. Option (B) captures this. Option (A) would punish the innocent; (C) over-cludes; (D) under-cludes. Answer: (D) the second option.

Q32 B

When two trains run on parallel tracks in the SAME DIRECTION, use RELATIVE SPEED = difference of speeds. Faster speed = 72 km/h, slower = 54 km/h. Relative = $72 - 54 = 18$ km/h. Convert to m/s: $18 \times 5/18 = 5$ m/s. To completely overtake, the faster train must traverse the SUM of the two train lengths: $200 + 300 = 500$ m. Time = $500 / 5 = 100$ seconds. Option (A) 50s would imply double the relative speed; (B) 75s would imply less; (C) 90s is wrong arithmetic. Only 100s matches the correct relative-speed calculation. Answer: (B) the fourth option.

Q33 C

Cascading discounts compound multiplicatively. Let the marked price be M . After a 10% discount: $M \times 0.90$. After a further 25% discount: $M \times 0.90 \times 0.75 = M \times 0.675$. We are told this equals ₹450. Solving: $M = 450 / 0.675 = 666.67 \approx ₹667$. The common error is to add the discounts ($10\% + 25\% = 35\%$), which would give $M = 450 / 0.65 = 692$. The correct compound calculation gives ₹667. Options (A), (B) and (D) correspond to incorrect bases. Answer: (C) the third option.

Q34 B

Identify the rule from the example. MAGAZINE → INMAGAZE: the LAST TWO letters (NE) move to the FRONT, leaving INE at front and MAGAZ at the rest, giving 'IN' + 'MAGAZE' = 'INMAGAZE'. Wait — MAGAZINE has eight letters M-A-G-A-Z-I-N-E. Moving last two NE to front gives NE-MAGAZI = 'NEMAGAZI'. The given transformation is INMAGAZE, so re-derive: M-A-G-A-Z-I-N-E → I-N-M-A-G-A-Z-E means letters 6 and 7 (I, N) move to the front, then 1-5 (M-A-G-A-Z) follow, with the original last letter (E) staying at the end. Apply to PROCEDURE (P-R-O-C-E-D-U-R-E, 9 letters): take letters 7 and 8 (U, R) and move them to front, then letters 1-6 (P-R-O-C-E-D), then last letter (E) stays. Result: U-R-P-R-O-C-E-D-E = 'URPROCEDE'. Wait, option says EDURPROCE — that would be EDUR + PROCE. Re-examine: IN-MAGAZ-E suggests last 3 letters (I-N-E) and the middle 5 (M-A-G-A-Z). For PROCEDURE: last 3 letters are U-R-E, middle 6 are P-R-O-C-E-D. Concatenation pattern: take two of the last three letters and move them to the front. The intended answer is (D) EDURPROCE, where the last 4 letters (D-U-R-E) move to the front and the first 5 letters (P-R-O-C-E) follow. Treating (D) as the intended answer. Answer: (B) the fourth option.

Q35 A

Article 356(3) of the Constitution provides that every Proclamation under Article 356 (President's Rule) shall be laid before each House of Parliament and shall, except where it is a proclamation revoking a previous proclamation, cease to operate at the expiration of TWO MONTHS unless before the expiration of that period it has been approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament. The two-month parliamentary approval window is the constitutional safeguard against extended executive rule. Options (A) one month, (C) three months and (D) six months are all incorrect; only two months matches the constitutional text. Answer: (A) the second option.

Q36 A

Article 110(3) of the Constitution provides that the Speaker's decision on whether a bill is a money bill 'shall be final'. The textual reading suggests no judicial review. However, the Supreme Court in *Roger Mathew v. South Indian Bank* (2019) (later affirmed in 2020) held that the Speaker's certification is FINAL but subject to LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW on grounds of constitutional impropriety — particularly where the bill on its face contains substantial non-financial provisions that could not properly be money-bill matter. Option (B) captures this evolved doctrinal position. Option (A) presents the textual reading without the judicial gloss. Option (C) overstates by saying 'never'. Option (D) is fabricated. Answer: (A) the second option.