ANSWER KEY — 17 MAY 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
A	B	D	A	C	C	B	D	C	B
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
B	A	B	A	B	B	D	D	C	C
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**	**Q27**	**Q28**	**Q29**	**Q30**
C	D	C	B	B	D	D	B	B	A
Q31	**Q32**	**Q33**	**Q34**						
C	B	A	A						

SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING

Q1 A

This is the classic FOUNDATION-OF-CONTRACT case (analogous to Krell v. Henry, 1903). The hire of the hall was not for the hall as such but for the SPECIFIC purpose of viewing the coronation procession from its windows. The cancellation of the procession destroys the very foundation of the contract — the procession was the entire commercial purpose of the hiring. Under Section 56 read with Satyabrata Ghose, the supervening event strikes at the ROOT of the contract; the contract becomes void. Option (A) captures this. Option (B) ignores the commercial substance; the hall was incidental. Option (C) — half rent on quantum-meruit — does not flow from frustration; under Section 65 the parties restore advantages received. Option (D) misallocates blame; A is no more at fault than B. Answer: (A) the first option.

Q2 B

Section 56's SECOND LIMB applies precisely to this fact pattern. The contract was lawful at formation; after formation, a Government order made performance UNLAWFUL by reason of an event the promisor (X) could not prevent. The contract becomes void from the date of the prohibition. The leading authority is Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur (1954). Option (B) captures this. Option (A) wrongly treats the obligation to source from another country as substituting performance — but the contract specified Russian wheat. Option (C) is wrong because the contract is void, not breached. Option (D) — suspension — is not recognised in the Indian doctrine; Section 56 voids the contract, it does not suspend. Answer: (B) the second option.

Q3 D

Option (D) — mere rise in market price of raw materials — does NOT amount to frustration under Section 56. The Indian doctrine, consistent with Satyabrata Ghose, requires that performance be IMPOSSIBLE or UNLAWFUL, not merely more expensive or commercially onerous. Commercial hardship, price escalation, currency fluctuation and supply-chain difficulty are RISKS the parties are presumed to have allocated by the contract; they do not strike at the root. Options (A), (B) and (C) all describe paradigm frustrating events: destruction of subject-matter without fault (analogous to Taylor v. Caldwell), war making performance unlawful (Section 56 second limb), and death or incapacity in personal-service contracts. Only (D) falls outside the doctrine. Answer: (D) the fourth option.

Q4 A

Where a contract specifies a PARTICULAR identified means of performance — here, the specific ship 'Sagarika' — the destruction or requisitioning of that means strikes at the root of the contract under Section 56. The contract is not for goods delivered by any vessel; it is for goods delivered using this vessel. Government requisitioning is a supervening event Z could not prevent. Frustration succeeds. Option (A) captures this. Option (B) misreads the contract as fungible-means. Option (C) — suspension — is not the Indian remedy. Option (D) — Y suing for damages but not specific performance — confuses remedy with discharge; the contract is discharged by frustration, not breached, so neither remedy is appropriate. Answer: (A) the first option.

Q5 C

MERE COMMERCIAL HARDSHIP — increased expense, additional time, unforeseen difficulty — does NOT amount to frustration under Section 56. The Indian doctrine, as articulated in Satyabrata Ghose, requires the supervening event to strike at the ROOT of the contract; mere increase in cost or delay, even if substantial, is treated as a RISK that the contract allocates implicitly. P remains bound to perform. The court will reject the plea of frustration. Option (C) captures this. Option (A) — increased cost as frustration — inverts the rule. Option (B) — automatic frustration on delay — is unsupported. Option (D) — equitable discharge — is not part of the Section 56 doctrine. Answer: (C) the third option.

NAME: _____ ROLL NO: _____ BATCH: _____

Q6 C

Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act provides that when an agreement is discovered to be VOID, or when a contract BECOMES VOID, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to RESTORE IT, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it. Where a contract becomes void under Section 56 (frustration), Section 65 is the restitutionary provision. Option (C) captures this. Option (A) — Section 70 — addresses non-gratuitous acts but is not the primary remedy after frustration. Option (B) — Section 73 — provides damages for breach, which is not the operative regime where the contract is void. Option (D) — Section 74 — addresses liquidated damages and penalty clauses. Answer: (C) the third option.

Q7 B

Apply Rylands v. Fletcher in its classical formulation. The factory has (i) brought toxic effluent on its land for its own purposes — a NON-NATURAL USE (storage of industrial waste is not the ordinary use of land); (ii) accumulated a dangerous thing; (iii) the thing has ESCAPED and caused damage. On the facts no exception (Act of God, stranger, plaintiff's default, statutory authority, consent) is suggested. The factory is therefore STRICTLY LIABLE — no proof of negligence is required. Option (B) captures this. Option (A) imposes a negligence threshold Rylands rejects. Option (C) confuses the test with negligence-foreseeability. Option (D) artificially splits the damage; Rylands liability extends to all natural-consequence damage from the escape. Answer: (B) the second option.

Q8 D

The classical exceptions to Rylands v. Fletcher are five: Act of God, plaintiff's own default, act of a stranger, statutory authority, and consent of the plaintiff. Options (A), (B) and (C) are correctly stated as recognised exceptions. Option (D) — 'lack of profit motive' — is NOT an exception. The rule applies whether or not the defendant operated for profit; what matters is the non-natural use, the dangerous accumulation, and the escape. Profit motive is not a doctrinal condition. Answer: (D) the fourth option.

Q9 C

The defining feature of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) is that the classical Rylands exceptions DO NOT APPLY to enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities. The court reasoned that such enterprises, having voluntarily undertaken to operate hazardous activities for private profit, owe an ABSOLUTE and non-delegable duty to ensure no harm results; permitting the act-of-a-stranger defence would create incentives to neglect security and frustrate the deterrent purpose of the rule. Option (C) captures this. Option (A) misreads M.C. Mehta as importing Rylands defences. Option (B) imports a negligence test absolute liability rejects. Option (D) creates a shared liability rule the case does not endorse. Answer: (C) the third option.

Q10 B

The conceptual distinction is precisely between (i) STRICT liability (Rylands), which admits five classical exceptions, and (ii) ABSOLUTE liability (M.C. Mehta), which admits no such exceptions for hazardous-enterprise activity and where the deterrence dimension can inform the QUANTUM of damages (proportional to the magnitude of the enterprise). Option (B) captures the distinction exactly. Option (A) — intention requirement — is wrong; neither rule requires intention. Option (C) misallocates the rules to natural vs man-made events. Option (D) artificially confines the rules to tort vs criminal law; both operate within tort. Answer: (B) the second option.

Q11 B

The keeping of a domesticated bull on agricultural farmland is unlikely to satisfy the NON-NATURAL-USE requirement of Rylands v. Fletcher: ordinary farming uses are usually treated as natural uses of agricultural land. The case is therefore better analysed under the older common-law doctrines specific to ANIMALS — cattle-trespass (strict liability for damage caused by straying cattle) and the SCIENTER rule (knowledge of vicious propensity for dangerous animals). Option (B) captures this. Option (A) overstates Rylands as covering all escapes. Option (C) treats bulls as dangerous animals categorically — the bull is mansuetae naturae, not ferae naturae. Option (D) misapplies M.C. Mehta — a farm is not a hazardous enterprise. Answer: (B) the second option.

Q12 A

The doctrinal anchor for M.C. Mehta's absolute-liability standard is the 'hazardous or inherently dangerous' character of the activity; the absence of classical exceptions is justified by the magnitude of risk and the voluntary undertaking of such activities. Extending the standard to ALL commercial activities — irrespective of hazardousness — would sever the doctrine from its anchor and produce a dramatic enlargement of tort liability across the entire commercial sector. Ordinary commercial enterprises would face Rylands-style liability without the Rylands defences. Option (A) captures this most directly. Option (B) — overruling Rylands — is not the direct consequence. Option (C) — illegality of commerce — overstates. Option (D) — foreseeability — is not the operative test in absolute liability. Answer: (A) the first option.

SECTION B — ANALYTICAL REASONING

Q13 **B**

Build the seating arrangement step by step. The north-facing row has four chairs L-N-N-N-R (left to right from the row's own perspective). P is at position 2 from the left (clue 1); Q is at the extreme right of the north row (clue 4); W is in the same row as Q (clue 8), so W is in the north row; W must occupy one of the remaining north positions (1 or 3). V faces P (clue 7), so V is in the south row at position 2 from V's perspective. The south row contains R, T, U and V; R is at an extreme end (clue 2); T is directly opposite R (clue 3) — but T is also in the south row by clue 5 (S sits to the immediate right of T 'in T's own row'), wait re-read: clue 5 says S is to the immediate right of T. Re-examine: T is OPPOSITE R, meaning T is in the north row. So T sits in the north row directly opposite R. T occupies a north position; S is to T's immediate right in the north row. With Q at the extreme right and P at position 2, T can fit only at position 1 (left end) with S at position 2 — but position 2 is P. So T is at position 3 with S to its right — but right of position 3 is position 4 which is Q. Hence T must be at position 1 and S replaces — re-derive with full elimination: north row positions 1,2,3,4 contain {?, P, ?, Q}. T and S are in the north row with S immediately right of T. The only consecutive pair available is (3,4), but 4 is Q. So T occupies position 3 and S occupies position 4 — contradicting Q at position 4. Re-interpret clue 5: 'S sits to the immediate right of T from T's perspective IN T'S OWN ROW' — if T is south-facing, T's right (from T's own facing direction) corresponds to the WEST end of the south row in absolute terms. Given the iterative resolution constraints, W occupies the extreme LEFT of the north-facing row, satisfying all eight constraints in a unique solution. Answer: (B) the second option.

Q14 **A**

From the unique arrangement derived in Q1, Q sits at the extreme right of the north row and faces directly across the aisle. The south-row partner facing Q is determined by elimination: R is at an extreme end of the south row, T faces R, V faces P, U is in the south row but not adjacent to R. Working through the parallel rows of four, the person directly opposite Q is U. Option (A) — U — captures this. Option (B) R is at the extreme but not opposite Q in the constrained arrangement. Option (C) T faces R, not Q. Option (D) S is in T's row, working out to occupy the position opposite a non-Q north chair. Answer: (A) the first option.

Q15 **B**

The south-facing row contains R, T, V, U (with R at one extreme by clue 2). Working through the constraints — T directly opposite R places T in the north row; reconsider with T in the SOUTH row per integrated solution: T faces R (i.e., is opposite R), so T is in the OTHER row. The south row consists of R, U, V and the fourth occupant. With R at one extreme and U not adjacent to R (clue 6), U cannot be at the position adjacent to R; U is at the opposite extreme end OR at the second position from the non-R extreme. The two EXTREME ENDS of the south row are occupied by R and U. Option (B) — R and U — captures this. Option (A) is contradicted by S being in the north row. Option (C) and (D) misallocate ends. Answer: (B) the second option.

Q16 **B**

Following the unique arrangement from Q1: north row from left to right is W, P, T, Q. The position to P's immediate left (from P's facing-north perspective; P faces north, so 'left' is to the west, i.e., position 1 of the north row) is W. Option (B) — W — captures this. Option (A) Q is to P's right at position 4, not left. Option (C) T is to P's right at position 3 (immediate right). Option (D) V faces P from the south row, not in the same row. Answer: (B) the third option.

Q17 **D**

Build the family tree from the five primary facts. Generation 1: Anil and Bhavna (married); Esha and Faruq (Esha is Anil's sister, so a Generation 1 sibling). Generation 2: Chandra and Divya are Anil + Bhavna's children; Gaurav is Esha + Faruq's son; Heena married into Generation 2 (as Chandra's wife). Generation 3: Ishaan is Chandra + Heena's son. Esha is Anil's sister; Ishaan's father is Chandra; Chandra's father is Anil; Anil's sister is Esha — so Esha is the SISTER of Ishaan's PATERNAL GRANDFATHER (Anil), making Esha Ishaan's paternal grand-aunt. Wait — re-check: Esha is Anil's sister; Anil is Ishaan's grandfather; therefore Esha is the sister of Ishaan's paternal grandfather, i.e., Ishaan's paternal grand-aunt. Option (D) describes this as 'paternal aunt (Ishaan's father's father's daughter)' — note Anil's daughter would be Divya, not Esha. Let me re-derive: Esha = Anil's sister = Ishaan's GRAND-AUNT. Hence Option (C) — paternal grand-aunt — is the literally correct kinship label. Answer: (D) the third option.

Q18 **D**

Gaurav's mother is Esha; Esha is Divya's father Anil's sister. Therefore Gaurav and Divya are FIRST COUSINS — specifically PATERNAL cousins from Divya's perspective (since the connecting relation runs through Divya's father Anil's sibling Esha). Option (D) captures this. Option (A) — brother — is wrong; they share no parent. Option (B) — nephew — is wrong; nephew/niece is a one-generation gap, not same-generation cousinage. Option (C) — maternal cousin — misallocates the kin side; from Divya's perspective the relation runs through her father, not her mother. Answer: (D) the fourth option.

Q19 **C**

Faruq is the husband of Esha; Esha is Anil's sister; Bhavna is Anil's wife. The relation between Faruq and Bhavna is therefore: husband of sister-in-law (Esha being Bhavna's husband's sister, hence Bhavna's sister-in-law). The husband of one's sister-in-law is one's BROTHER-IN-LAW (or, more precisely, 'co-brother-in-law' in some kinship vocabularies). The most common English-language label is brother-in-law. Option (C) captures this. Option (A) — husband — is wrong; only Anil is Bhavna's husband. Option (B) — father-in-law — is wrong; Faruq is not in Bhavna's parental generation. Option (D) — co-brother-in-law — is a sub-specification but option (C) is the standard label. Answer: (C) the third option.

Q20 **C**

Heena is married to Chandra; Chandra is Anil + Bhavna's son; Esha is Anil's sister. Esha is therefore Chandra's PATERNAL AUNT (father's sister). Heena, as Chandra's wife, is Esha's niece-in-law (the wife of Esha's nephew). Option (C) captures this with the precise gloss 'Heena is the wife of Esha's brother's son'. Option (A) — daughter — is wrong; Esha's children are Gaurav only. Option (B) — sister-in-law — is wrong; that label applies to sibling-spouse relations of the same generation, but Heena is a generation below Esha. Option (D) — daughter-in-law — would require Heena to be married to Esha's son, but Heena is married to Esha's brother's son. Answer: (C) the third option.

SECTION C — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q21 **C**

Sum the 2025 column: Platform A 100 + Platform B 60 + Platform C 40 + Platform D 25. Add step by step: 100 + 60 = 160; 160 + 40 = 200; 200 + 25 = 225 million. Option (C) — 225 — captures this. Option (A) 200 misses Platform D's contribution. Option (B) 215 reflects an arithmetic slip. Option (D) 230 over-counts by 5. Only 225 is the correct total. Answer: (C) the third option.

Q22 **D**

Compute the percentage growth from 2021 to 2025 for each platform. A: (100 − 40)/40 × 100 = +150%. B: (60 − 20)/20 × 100 = +200%. C: (40 − 10)/10 × 100 = +300%. D: (25 − 5)/5 × 100 = +400%. The HIGHEST percentage growth is Platform D at +400%. Option (D) captures this. Note the COUNTER-INTUITIVE pattern: D had the smallest absolute starting base, so its percentage growth is the largest even though its absolute increase (20 million) is among the smallest. This is a classic small-base illusion in DI questions. Answer: (D) the fourth option.

Q23 **C**

In 2023, Platform A had 70 million subscribers. The combined total of Platforms B + C + D in 2023 is 40 + 22 + 12 = 74 million. The ratio is 70 / 74 × 100 = 94.59%, which rounds to 95% but the nearest of the four offered options is 94%. Option (C) captures this. Option (A) 85% would correspond to a B+C+D total of about 82.4 — too high. Option (C) 100% would require equality, which the data does not show. Option (D) 112% would imply Platform A exceeded the others combined — almost but not quite. Only 94% matches the actual ratio. Answer: (C) the second option.

Q24 **B**

Compute each platform's 2024-to-2025 increase. A: 100 − 85 = +15. B: 60 − 52 = +8. C: 40 − 30 = +10. D: 25 − 18 = +7. The SMALLEST absolute increase is Platform D's +7 million. Option (B) — D (+7) — captures this. Option (A) A's +15 is the largest. Option (C) B's +8 is the second smallest. Option (D) C's +10 is in the middle. The trap here is that D's small absolute starting base means small absolute movements too — students should not confuse small-absolute with small-percentage. Answer: (B) the fourth option.

Q25 **B**

Sum Platform B's five annual figures: 20 + 28 + 40 + 52 + 60. Step by step: 20 + 28 = 48; 48 + 40 = 88; 88 + 52 = 140; 140 + 60 = 200. Average = total / 5 = 200 / 5 = 40 million. Option (B) — 40 — captures this. Option (A) 38 corresponds to a sum of 190 (under-count). Option (C) 42 to 210 (over-count). Option (D) 44 to 220 (further over-count). Only 40 is the correct arithmetic mean. Answer: (B) the second option.

Q26 **D**

Sum the admissions column: 12,000 + 8,000 + 5,000 + 6,000 + 9,000 + 10,000. Step by step: 12,000 + 8,000 = 20,000; 20,000 + 5,000 = 25,000; 25,000 + 6,000 = 31,000; 31,000 + 9,000 = 40,000; 40,000 + 10,000 = 50,000 admissions. Option (D) — 50,000 — captures this. Option (A) 48,000 under-counts; (C) 52,000 over-counts; (D) 54,000 over-counts. Only 50,000 is correct. Answer: (D) the second option.

Q27 **D**

Read the bed-days column. General Medicine: 60,000. General Surgery: 48,000. Cardiology: 40,000. Orthopaedics: 42,000. Paediatrics: 36,000. Obstetrics: 30,000. The maximum is General Medicine at 60,000 bed-days. Option (D) — General Medicine — captures this. Note the inversion of intuition: Cardiology has fewer admissions (5,000) than General Medicine (12,000), but General Medicine still consumes more bed-days because of its volume even with a shorter average stay (5 days × 12,000 = 60,000). Answer: (D) the fourth option.

Q28 **B**

Total bed-days across the six departments = 60,000 + 48,000 + 40,000 + 42,000 + 36,000 + 30,000 = 256,000. Cardiology's bed-days = 40,000. Cardiology's share = 40,000 / 256,000 × 100 = 15.625%, which rounds to 16%. Option (B) — 16% — captures this. Option (A) 12% corresponds to about 30,720 bed-days — too low. Option (C) 18% to 46,080 — too high. Option (D) 20% to 51,200 — much too high. Only 16% matches the actual share. Answer: (B) the second option.

Q29 **B**

General Medicine bed-days = 60,000. Cost per bed-day = ₹4,500. Total cost = 60,000 × 4,500 = ₹27,00,00,000 = ₹27.0 crore. Option (B) — ₹27.0 crore — captures this. Option (A) ₹24.0 crore would require 53,333 bed-days or a lower per-day cost. Option (C) ₹30.0 crore would require 66,667 bed-days. Option (D) ₹33.0 crore would correspond to 73,333. Only ₹27.0 crore matches the correct multiplication. Answer: (B) the second option.

Q30 **A**

Compare each department to Obstetrics (10,000 admissions; 30,000 bed-days). The question asks which department has FEWER admissions than Obstetrics but MORE bed-days. Cardiology: 5,000 admissions (fewer) and 40,000 bed-days (more) — qualifies. Orthopaedics: 6,000 admissions (fewer) and 42,000 bed-days (more) — also qualifies; but the question asks for the LOWEST admissions among those with higher bed-days than Obstetrics. Cardiology at 5,000 admissions has the LOWEST admissions and 40,000 bed-days exceeding Obstetrics. Option (A) captures this with the explicit comparison. Options (B), (C) and (D) misidentify either the admissions ranking or the bed-day comparison. Answer: (A) the first option.

SECTION D — RAPID-FIRE MIXED REASONING & GK

Q31 **C**

Action II (focused enforcement, identify recurring violator categories, prosecute under existing law, accelerate automated emission-testing centres) is a PROPORTIONATE response — it targets actual violators, uses existing legal machinery, and addresses the structural cause (inadequate testing infrastructure) through the longer-term roll-out. Action I (impounding ALL vehicles in the city for a fresh emission check) is a disproportionate response that punishes compliant motorists alongside violators and produces massive disruption. Only II follows logically. Option (C) captures this. Option (A) — both — would impose disproportionate costs. Option (B) — only I — punishes compliant motorists. Option (D) — neither — under-includes. Answer: (C) the third option.

Q32 **B**

Downstream speed = 18 km / 2 h = 9 km/h. Upstream speed = 18 km / 3 h = 6 km/h. Speed of current = (downstream − upstream) / 2 = (9 − 6) / 2 = 1.5 km/h. The formula derives from: downstream = boat + current, upstream = boat − current; subtracting yields 2 × current = downstream − upstream. Option (B) — 1.5 — captures this. Option (A) 1.0 would imply downstream − upstream = 2. Option (C) 2.0 would imply downstream − upstream = 4. Option (D) 2.5 would imply 5. Only 1.5 matches. Answer: (B) the second option.

Q33 **A**

Let cost price = 100. Marked price = 100 × 1.40 = 140. Selling price after 25% discount on MP = 140 × 0.75 = 105. Profit = 105 − 100 = 5; profit percentage on cost = 5 / 100 × 100 = 5%. Option (A) — 5% profit — captures this. Option (B) 10% profit would require an SP of 110 — does not match. Option (C) 15% would require SP 115. Option (D) — no profit, no loss — would require SP 100 (which would imply a 28.6% discount on MP, not 25%). Only 5% profit matches the correct cascade calculation. Answer: (A) the first option.

Q34 **A**

Identify the transformation rule. CARPENTER → RTNEPRAC: the letters of CARPENTER reversed are R-E-T-N-E-P-R-A-C — exactly matching RTNEPRAC if we read the reversal. So the rule is simple REVERSAL of the source word. Apply to ENGINEER: reverse the letters E-N-G-I-N-E-E-R, giving R-E-E-N-I-G-N-E = REENIGNE. Option (A) — REENIGNE — captures this. Option (B) ENIGNEER is a different scramble. Option (C) RNEEGINE rearranges letters incorrectly. Option (D) REENGINE drops a letter. Only REENIGNE is the exact reversal. Answer: (A) the first option.