ANSWER KEY — 28 MAY 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	D	B	B	A	A	B	B	B	C
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
A	B	B	B	C	A	B	C	C	D
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**	**Q27**	**Q28**	**Q29**	**Q30**
C	D	C	C	B	B	B	D	B	B
Q31	**Q32**	**Q33**	**Q34**	**Q35**	**Q36**	**Q37**	**Q38**		
B	B	B	A	B	A	C	C		

SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B

The Doctrine of Severability, as crystallised in R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India (1957), demands that the court strike down only the offending portion of a statute where the residue is independently workable and reflects what the legislature would have enacted in any event. Section 7 imposes a complete ban on public meetings — an unreasonable restriction on the Article 19(1)(b) right to assemble peaceably without arms. Section 8, however, merely requires 24-hour notice to the police: this is the textbook example of a reasonable restriction in the interests of public order, recognised since Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra (1961). Section 8 can stand on its own — notice provisions function independently of substantive bans. The legislature would plausibly have enacted a notice requirement even without an outright prohibition. Hence option (B) is correct. Option (A) ignores that the Constitution permits reasonable restrictions. Option (C) over-applies severability. Option (D) inverts the doctrine, since Section 8 is workable without Section 7.

Q2 D

The Doctrine of Severability applies to BOTH pre-Constitution laws (under Article 13(1)) AND post-Constitution laws (under Article 13(2)). Option (D) is the INCORRECT statement and therefore the answer to this 'INCORRECT' question. The other options correctly state the doctrine: option (A) captures the workability requirement; option (B) correctly attributes the leading authority to R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India (1957), where the Supreme Court held that the Prize Competitions Act could be severed in respect of skill versus chance competitions; option (C) correctly states the inextricability test, which, if satisfied, requires the entire statute to fall. The doctrine has been routinely applied to post-1950 statutes — for example, in State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (1951), the Bombay Prohibition Act was severed and only specific provisions were struck down.

Q3 B

Section 3 (commercial advertising) and Section 9 (wagering contracts) regulate entirely distinct subject-matters. Section 3 is found violative of Article 19(1)(a) — commercial speech is protected speech per Tata Press v. MTNL (1995), and a blanket prohibition lacks the proportionality required by Article 19(2). Section 9, prohibiting wagering, is independently valid — wagering contracts are void under Section 30 of the Indian Contract Act and may be regulated under entry 34 of List II. The two provisions are textually and operationally severable. Applying the Chamarbaugwalla test, the legislature would have enacted Section 9 regardless of Section 3. Hence the court will sever Section 3 alone — option (B). Option (A) over-applies the inextricability test where none exists. Option (C) misuses 'reading down', which softens the meaning of a provision rather than rescuing an unconstitutional one. Option (D) is administratively impractical and not the judicial response in any reported decision.

Q4 B

Option (B) accurately states the two-pronged Chamarbaugwalla test: (i) the legislative-intent prong — would the legislature have enacted the valid part even without the invalid part? — and (ii) the residue prong — does what remains form an intelligible, workable scheme? Both must be satisfied for severability to operate. Option (A) is incorrect because severability is not a matter of word-count but of doctrinal coherence. Option (C) is incorrect because a severability clause is helpful but not necessary — courts presume severability unless the statute is integrated. Option (D) is incorrect because severability applies to both procedural and substantive provisions; the doctrine is content-neutral. The Supreme Court has applied the same test to substantive provisions of penal statutes, taxing statutes, and electoral law alike, including in Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980).

Q5 A

When the invalidity of one provision (Section 4 — the fee) leaves the remaining provision (Section 5 — the conditions) operationally meaningless, the residue is no longer a workable scheme. The second prong of the Chamarbaugwalla test fails: without a fee, a licence cannot be granted, and a 'conditions' provision with no licence to attach to is a hollow shell. The court therefore strikes down both — option (A). Option (B) confuses internal constitutionality of content with operational workability — Section 5's text may be valid, but as a scheme it cannot stand alone. Option (C) is wrong because the court cannot rewrite statutes by fixing fees — that violates separation of powers. Option (D) is logically incoherent — unconstitutionality is not 'cancelled' by association.

Q6 **A**

When only three of fifty sections are infirm under Article 14, the court applies the standard Chamarbaugwalla calculus: if the remaining forty-seven sections form an intelligible scheme, and if the legislature would have passed those forty-seven without the infirm three, severance saves the bulk of the statute. This is the routine judicial approach: see, for example, State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (1951) and DC Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (1987). Option (B) over-applies invalidity. Option (C) is doctrinally wrong because the doctrine applies fully to post-Constitution laws under Article 13(2). Option (D) is wrong because no severability clause is required: the doctrine operates by judicial construction. The court's preference, where possible, is to save legislative work product.

Q7 **B**

The driver's two-kilometre deviation to deliver a tiffin to his wife — a personal errand wholly unconnected with bus operations — constitutes a 'frolic of one's own'. In Joel v. Morison (1834), the test was framed as 'on a frolic of his own' versus 'a detour in the master's business'. Even after returning toward the route, while still on the frolic, the master is not liable because the chain of employment is broken until the servant resumes the master's work. Option (A) over-states liability — driving is not always within course of employment. Option (C) and (D) introduce irrelevant criteria — uniform and distance thresholds are not the legal test; the test is purpose. Compare with Storey v. Ashton (1869), where a driver's deviation for personal purposes ended the master's liability. Hence (B) is correct.

Q8 **B**

The classical 'control test' for distinguishing a servant from an independent contractor asks whether the employer can direct not only what is to be done but also how it is to be done. This was crystallised in Short v. J & W Henderson Ltd (1946) and adopted in Indian jurisprudence in Dharangadhara Chemical Works v. State of Saurashtra (1957). Option (B) correctly captures this. Option (A) — mode of payment — is at best an evidentiary factor and not the test. Option (C) — premises — is similarly only evidentiary, since servants may work off-site and contractors may work on the employer's premises. Option (D) — uniforms — is also evidentiary at best. The modern jurisprudence has supplemented the control test with the 'organisation' or 'integration' test, but control remains the primary criterion for distinguishing employees from contractors.

Q9 **B**

The attendant's authorised act was filling petrol; lighting a cigarette while doing so was an unauthorised mode of performing that authorised act. Under Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. (1862), an unauthorised mode of doing an authorised act remains within the course of employment, and the master is liable. The leading factual parallel is Century Insurance v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board (1942), where a tanker driver lit a cigarette while delivering petrol, causing an explosion; the master was held liable. Option (A) wrongly assumes that smoking transforms the act into a criminal frolic — it does not, since the dominant activity remained filling petrol. Option (C) is wrong because vicarious liability does not depend on permanence of employment. Option (D) is plainly wrong — the doctrine applies generally, not just to road accidents.

Q10 **C**

State of Rajasthan v. Vidhyawati (1962) is the landmark Supreme Court decision establishing that the Government of an Indian State is vicariously liable in tort for the tortious acts of its servants committed in the course of non-sovereign functions, like any other employer. The case involved a government jeep negligently driven by the driver, killing a pedestrian. The court rejected the colonial-era distinction protecting sovereign functions in this context and held the State liable. Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) is the strict-liability case. Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) established the modern law of negligence. Salomon v. Salomon (1897) is the corporate-personality case. Hence (C) is correct. The position was subsequently nuanced in Kasturi Lal v. State of UP (1965) for sovereign functions, but Vidhyawati remains the seminal authority for non-sovereign vicarious liability of the State.

Q11 **A**

Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co. (1912) decisively held that a master is liable for fraudulent acts of a servant committed within the course of employment, even where the master derives no benefit and the act is for the servant's personal gain. The clerk in our scenario was performing the kind of work he was employed to do (handling customer transactions), during business hours, using the bank's apparent authority. The fraud is thus committed in the course of employment, and the bank is liable — option (A). Option (B) confuses express prohibition with absence of course of employment — Limpus made clear that prohibition does not save the master if the act is otherwise within the scope of duties. Option (C) is irrelevant — managerial approval is not required for vicarious liability to attach. Option (D) is incorrect because criminality does not automatically break the chain when the act is committed in the course of employment.

Q12 **B**

Option (B) is the INCORRECT statement and therefore the answer. Express prohibition by the master does NOT automatically exclude vicarious liability. In Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. (1862), the bus company had expressly prohibited racing rivals, but the driver did so anyway; the company was still held liable because the driver was performing an authorised act (driving the bus) in an unauthorised manner. The test is whether the act is within the course of employment, not whether it was authorised. Options (A), (C) and (D) correctly state the law: (A) captures the unauthorised-mode principle; (C) captures the frolic-of-his-own exception (Joel v. Morison, 1834); (D) correctly states the post-Vidhyawati position on State liability for non-sovereign acts. Hence the INCORRECT-statement question is answered by (B).

SECTION B — ANALYTICAL REASONING

Q13 **B**

Working through the constraints: (1) Anya = floor 6. (2) Esha is immediately below Anya, so Esha = floor 5. (3) Chetan is on an even-numbered floor but not 2 — possibilities are 4 or 6; since 6 is Anya, Chetan = floor 4. (5) Gaurav = floor 3. (6) Bhavik is higher than Anya (floor 6), so Bhavik = floor 7. Remaining floors are 1 and 2 for Dhruv and Farah, with (4) Dhruv immediately above Farah — so Farah = floor 1 and Dhruv = floor 2. The completed building (1→7): Farah, Dhruv, Gaurav, Chetan, Esha, Anya, Bhavik. Chetan is on floor 4 — option (B). Option (A) fails condition (3) which excludes floor 2. Option (C) is Anya. Option (D) is Bhavik. Hence (B).

Q14 **B**

From the deduced arrangement (Farah-1, Dhruv-2, Gaurav-3, Chetan-4, Esha-5, Anya-6, Bhavik-7), Anya is on floor 6 and Gaurav is on floor 3. The persons living between them are on floors 4 and 5 — Chetan and Esha — giving exactly two persons between. Option (B) is correct. The 'between' count excludes the endpoints (Anya and Gaurav themselves) and counts only those strictly in between. Option (A) is off by one (would count only Chetan). Option (C) would erroneously include one endpoint. Option (D) would include both endpoints.

Q15 **C**

From the deduced arrangement (Farah-1, Dhruv-2, Gaurav-3, Chetan-4, Esha-5, Anya-6, Bhavik-7), floor 1 is occupied by Farah. Option (C) is correct. Bhavik is on floor 7 (highest, per condition (6)). Chetan is on floor 4 (per the even-floor-but-not-2 deduction). Dhruv is on floor 2 (immediately above Farah). The puzzle uniquely fixes the arrangement once all seven conditions are jointly applied.

Q16 **A**

Currently Bhavik is on floor 7 and Esha is on floor 5. After they interchange floors, Bhavik moves to floor 5 and Esha moves to floor 7. The person immediately above Bhavik's new position (floor 5) is the occupant of floor 6 — Anya. Hence Anya lives immediately above Bhavik after the swap. Option (A) is correct. Option (B) Chetan is on floor 4 (below Bhavik's new position). Option (C) Dhruv is on floor 2 (well below). Option (D) Gaurav is on floor 3 (below). The puzzle illustrates the standard 'what-if interchange' question, which requires the candidate to first fix the entire arrangement, then mentally swap two persons and re-read the adjacency.

Q17 **B**

Compare sentences (a) 'tax cuts hurt growth' = 'pim ron sak dol' and (b) 'cuts to growth hurt jobs' = 'ron qua sak dol vex'. Common English words across (a) and (b): cuts, hurt, growth — common code words: ron, sak, dol. So {cuts, hurt, growth} → {ron, sak, dol}. From (a), the fourth code word 'pim' must mean 'tax' (the only word in (a) not in {cuts, hurt, growth}); from (b), 'qua' = 'to' and 'vex' = 'jobs'. Compare with (c) 'jobs growth needs tax' = 'vex sak nip pim'. Substituting: vex=jobs ✓, pim=tax ✓; remaining: 'sak nip' map to 'growth needs'. We already have growth ∈ {ron, sak, dol}. From (d) 'pim ron nip qua' contains no word that means 'hurt' — pim=tax, qua=to, nip=needs (from (c)); so ron ≠ hurt. We also know ron ∈ {cuts, hurt, growth}; ron ≠ hurt, so ron ∈ {cuts, growth}. From (c), among {sak, nip} mapping to {growth, needs}: nip = needs, so sak = growth. Therefore ron ∈ {cuts}, leaving dol = hurt. The code for 'growth' is 'sak' — option (B). Option (A) pim = tax. Option (C) ron = cuts. Option (D) dol = hurt.

Q18 **C**

From the analysis in the previous explanation, the dictionary is: pim=tax, ron=cuts, sak=growth, dol=hurt, vex=jobs, qua=to, nip=needs. Hence the code for 'hurt' is 'dol' — option (C). The key deductive step is condition (d) 'pim ron nip qua' contains no word meaning 'hurt' — eliminating ron from being 'hurt' and forcing dol=hurt via process of elimination on (a). Option (A) ron is 'cuts'. Option (B) sak is 'growth'. Option (D) vex is 'jobs'.

Q19 **C**

From the deduced dictionary, qua = 'to'. The deduction proceeds from sentence (b): 'cuts to growth hurt jobs' = 'ron qua sak dol vex'. We separately know ron, sak, dol map to cuts/hurt/growth and vex must be jobs (since 'jobs' is the only word in (b) not shared with (a) for which a code word remains). The remaining word in (b) is 'to', and the remaining code word is qua — so qua = 'to'. Option (C) is correct. Option (A) jobs = vex. Option (B) needs = nip. Option (D) tax = pim. The puzzle illustrates the standard CLAT word-substitution technique of comparing two sentences that share most words to isolate the differing pair.

Q20 **D**

Check each option against the seven-word dictionary {tax=pim, cuts=ron, growth=sak, hurt=dol, jobs=vex, to=qua, needs=nip}. (A) 'jobs needs tax' = vex nip pim ✓ — derivable. (B) 'growth cuts hurt' = sak ron dol ✓ — derivable. (C) 'tax hurt jobs' = pim dol vex ✓ — derivable. (D) 'needs growth profit' — 'profit' is NOT in the seven-word dictionary; we have no code for 'profit' from the four given statements. Hence (D) cannot be fully expressed and is correct. The CLAT examiners often test this by introducing a vocabulary word that is outside the inferred dictionary.

SECTION C — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q21 **C**

FY25 Coal = 832 mt; FY25 Total of Five = 1326 mt. Share = 832 / 1326 = 0.6275 → 62.75% → 63% rounded. Option (C) is correct. Option (A) at 58% would correspond to ≈ 769 mt. Option (B) at 60% to ≈ 796 mt. Option (D) at 66% to ≈ 875 mt. The dominance of coal in Indian Railways freight reflects the structural role of thermal power generation in the Indian electricity mix. Cross-check: FY24 Coal share = 770/1230 = 62.6% — broadly similar, with a small uptick consistent with the slightly higher YoY growth of coal (8.1%) versus the total (7.8%).

Q22 **D**

Inspect the YoY column: Coal +8.1%, Iron Ore +10.0%, Cement +8.0%, Foodgrains −5.0%, Steel +10.0%. The only commodity with a negative (declining) loading is Foodgrains at −5.0% — option (D). Option (A) Coal grew. Option (B) Iron Ore grew. Option (C) Cement grew. The decline in foodgrains loading typically reflects higher road-rail substitution for short-distance grain movement under FCI procurement chains, though the question demands only that the candidate read the table accurately.

Q23 **C**

Iron Ore: FY24 = 180 → FY25 = 198, increase = 18 mt. Steel: FY24 = 70 → FY25 = 77, increase = 7 mt. Combined increase = 18 + 7 = 25 mt. Option (C) is correct. Option (A) at 20 understates by 5 (likely error of ignoring steel). Option (B) at 23 understates by 2. Option (D) at 28 overstates by 3. Cross-check via percentages: Iron Ore +10% on 180 = 18 ✓; Steel +10% on 70 = 7 ✓; total 25 ✓. The percentage method confirms the direct subtraction method.

Q24 **C**

FY24 → FY25 Cement growth was +8.0%, taking 150 → 162. Applying the same percentage to FY26: FY26 = 162 × 1.08 = 174.96 → 175 mt rounded to the nearest whole number. Option (C) is correct. Option (A) at 170 corresponds to roughly +5%. Option (B) at 172 corresponds to ≈ +6.2%. Option (D) at 180 corresponds to ≈ +11.1%. The standard trap is to apply the absolute increment of 12 mt rather than the percentage — that would give 162 + 12 = 174, close but still rounds to 174 not 175; the percentage method is more accurate and yields 175.

Q25 **B**

FY24 Cement = 150 mt; FY24 Steel = 70 mt; combined = 220 mt. FY24 Total of Five = 1230 mt. Share = 220 / 1230 = 0.1789 → 17.89% → 18% rounded. Option (B) is correct. Option (A) at 15% would correspond to ≈ 185 mt. Option (C) at 21% to ≈ 258 mt. Option (D) at 24% to ≈ 295 mt. Cross-check via individual shares: Cement 150/1230 = 12.2%; Steel 70/1230 = 5.7%; sum = 17.9%, consistent with the direct computation.

Q26 **B**

E-commerce combined valuation = $120 bn; Five-Sector Total combined valuation = $364 bn. Share = 120 / 364 = 0.3297 → 33.0% rounded. Option (B) is correct. Option (A) at 30% would correspond to ≈ 109 bn. Option (C) at 36% to ≈ 131 bn. Option (D) at 40% to ≈ 146 bn. E-commerce's dominance in combined valuation despite having only 20 unicorns (versus Fintech's 25) reflects the higher average valuation per unicorn in e-commerce — driven by the late-stage rounds of platform-economy firms. Cross-check: average valuation column shows E-commerce at $6.0 bn versus Fintech at $4.0 bn.

Q27 **B**

Compare the 'Avg Valuation' column: Fintech $4.0 bn, E-commerce $6.0 bn, SaaS $3.0 bn, EdTech $5.0 bn, Logistics $3.0 bn. The highest is E-commerce at $6.0 bn per unicorn. Option (B) is correct. Option (A) Fintech at $4.0 is in second place. Option (C) EdTech at $5.0 is in third place. Option (D) SaaS at $3.0 is tied for the lowest. E-commerce's high per-unicorn valuation reflects the consolidation of the Indian e-commerce sector around a small number of large platform incumbents that have attracted disproportionate venture-capital and private-equity capital.

Q28 **D**

Fintech combined valuation = $100 bn; SaaS / Enterprise combined valuation = $54 bn. Difference = 100 − 54 = $46 bn. Option (D) is correct. Option (A) at 30 understates by 16. Option (B) at 36 understates by 10. Option (C) at 40 understates by 6. The arithmetic is straightforward subtraction. Cross-check using counts × averages: Fintech 25 × 4.0 = $100 bn ✓; SaaS 18 × 3.0 = $54 bn ✓; difference $46 bn ✓ — both methods agree.

Q29 **B**

Existing Logistics: 10 unicorns, combined valuation $30 bn. Adding 5 new unicorns × $2 bn each = $10 bn additional valuation. Revised totals: 10 + 5 = 15 unicorns; $30 + $10 = $40 bn combined valuation. Revised average = 40 / 15 = $2.67 bn → $2.7 bn rounded to one decimal place. Option (B) is correct. Option (A) at $2.5 corresponds to roughly 16 unicorns. Option (C) at $3.0 is the original (unchanged) average. Option (D) at $3.3 corresponds to roughly 12 unicorns. The exercise illustrates that adding lower-than-average units pulls the average down, while adding higher-than-average units pulls it up.

Q30 **B**

EdTech unicorns = 12; Five-Sector Total unicorns = 85. Share = 12 / 85 = 0.1412 → 14.1% → 14% rounded. Option (B) is correct. Option (A) at 11% would correspond to ≈ 9 unicorns. Option (C) at 16% to ≈ 14 unicorns. Option (D) at 19% to ≈ 16 unicorns. Note that EdTech's share of NUMBER (14%) differs from its share of VALUATION (60/364 = 16.5%) because EdTech's average valuation per unicorn ($5.0 bn) exceeds the five-sector weighted average ($4.28 bn). DI questions often test the student's ability to distinguish share-of-count from share-of-value.

SECTION D — RAPID-FIRE MIXED REASONING & GK

Q31 **B**

A is B's brother; B is C's sister; C is D's father. Therefore A and B are siblings, and B and C are also siblings (since brother/sister relationships are symmetrical). C, the father of D, is A's brother (since A's sibling B has C as her sibling, meaning A, B, C share parents). So A is D's father's brother — i.e., D's uncle. Option (B) is correct. Option (A) father is wrong (C, not A, is the father). Option (C) brother is wrong (A and D are different generations). Option (D) grandfather is wrong (A and C are siblings of the same generation).

Q32 **B**

Start at origin facing north. Walk 4 km north → 4 km north of origin. Turn right (now facing east), walk 3 km → at point (3, 4) treating east as positive x and north as positive y. Turn right again (now facing south), walk 4 km → at point (3, 0). So he is 3 km east of the starting point. Option (B) is correct. Option (A) west is wrong (he turned right twice, ending east). Option (C) 5 km north-east miscomputes the displacement. Option (D) 7 km south is plainly wrong since the southward leg cancels the original northward leg.

Q33 **B**

Statement 1: All teachers are scholars ($T \subseteq S$). Statement 2: Some scholars are poets ($S \cap P \neq \varnothing$). Conclusion I: Some teachers are poets — not necessarily true; the scholars who are poets may all be non-teachers. Conclusion II: Some poets are scholars — directly equivalent to statement 2 by the conversion of 'some' ($S \cap P \neq \varnothing \iff P \cap S \neq \varnothing$). So only II follows. Option (B) is correct. Option (A) reverses the result. Option (C) over-claims I. Option (D) under-claims II. The standard 'some A are B $\Rightarrow$ some B are A' conversion is valid; the 'all A are B + some B are C $\Rightarrow$ some A are C' inference is invalid.

Q34 **A**

The code shifts each letter by +1: P→Q, A→B, P→Q, E→F, R→S — 'PAPER' → 'QBQFS' ✓. Applying the same shift to 'PENCIL': P→Q, E→F, N→O, C→D, I→J, L→M → 'QFODJM'. Option (A) is correct. Options (B), (C), (D) introduce mis-shifts on one or more letters. Standard CLAT coding-decoding methodology: identify the rule from the given pair, then apply uniformly.

Q35 **B**

Differences between consecutive terms: $6-3=3$, $11-6=5$, $18-11=7$, $27-18=9$, $?-27=11$. The differences form the odd-number series 3, 5, 7, 9, 11. So the next term is $27 + 11 = 38$. Option (B) is correct. Option (A) 36 would imply a constant +9 increment. Option (C) 40 would imply +13. Option (D) 42 would imply +15. The pattern is a standard 'differences-of-differences-are-constant' second-order series (the second differences are all 2).

Q36 **A**

Let cost price = ₹100. Marked price = 100×1.40 = ₹140. Selling price after 25% discount = 140×0.75 = ₹105. Profit = $105 - 100$ = ₹5. Profit % = $5/100 \times 100 = 5\%$. Option (A) is correct. Option (B) 10% would require SP of ₹110. Option (C) 5% loss would require SP of ₹95. Option (D) no profit/no loss would require SP of ₹100. Quick formula: net % = $(1 + \text{mark-up\%})(1 - \text{discount\%}) - 1 = 1.40 \times 0.75 - 1 = 1.05 - 1 = 0.05 = 5\%$ profit.

Q37 **C**

Article 21 of the Constitution of India: 'No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.' This is the textual source of the right to life and personal liberty, expanded judicially in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) and subsequent cases to encompass the right to live with dignity, privacy, livelihood, and a clean environment. Option (A) Article 14 is the equality clause. Option (B) Article 19 lists the six freedoms. Option (D) Article 32 is the right to constitutional remedies. Option (C) is correct.

Q38 **C**

Meera is a conventionally female name in Indian usage, so she is the speaker. 'My mother's only son' is therefore Meera's brother (call him X). The boy in the photograph is 'the only son of X' — i.e., X's son. Since X is Meera's brother, his son is Meera's nephew. Option (C) is correct. Option (A) 'Brother' would require the boy to share parents with Meera. Option (B) 'Son' would require the speaker to BE her mother's only son (i.e., the speaker would have to be male, but Meera is female). Option (D) 'Cousin' would require the boy to be the son of Meera's father's brother or mother's sister, not her brother.