

**ANSWER KEY — 30 MAY 2026**

<b>Q1</b>	<b>Q2</b>	<b>Q3</b>	<b>Q4</b>	<b>Q5</b>	<b>Q6</b>	<b>Q7</b>	<b>Q8</b>	<b>Q9</b>	<b>Q10</b>
B	C	A	D	B	A	C	B	C	D
<b>Q11</b>	<b>Q12</b>	<b>Q13</b>	<b>Q14</b>	<b>Q15</b>	<b>Q16</b>	<b>Q17</b>	<b>Q18</b>	<b>Q19</b>	<b>Q20</b>
A	B	A	C	B	A	B	B	C	A
<b>Q21</b>	<b>Q22</b>	<b>Q23</b>	<b>Q24</b>	<b>Q25</b>	<b>Q26</b>	<b>Q27</b>	<b>Q28</b>	<b>Q29</b>	<b>Q30</b>
B	C	D	B	C	B	C	B	D	A
<b>Q31</b>	<b>Q32</b>	<b>Q33</b>	<b>Q34</b>	<b>Q35</b>	<b>Q36</b>	<b>Q37</b>	<b>Q38</b>	<b>Q39</b>	<b>Q40</b>
B	C	B	C	B	C	B	C	C	C

SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING

**Q1 B**

Under Section 16(1) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, where the buyer makes known the particular purpose so as to show reliance on the seller's skill or judgment, and the goods are of a description the seller deals in, there is an implied condition of fitness for that purpose. The buyer disclosed the saline-soil sowing purpose and relied on the merchant; ordinary seeds failing in saline conditions breach that implied condition. Merchantable quality concerns general saleability rather than the buyer's special purpose, so fitness for a particular purpose is the precise exception.

**Q2 C**

Section 16 of the Act opens with the general rule that, subject to the Act and any other law in force, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale. That provision is the statutory home of caveat emptor. Section 4 merely defines a contract of sale, Section 12 distinguishes conditions from warranties, and Section 62 deals with the exclusion of implied terms by agreement. Hence Section 16 is the correct answer.

**Q3 A**

Goods bought by description from a seller dealing in such goods carry an implied condition of merchantable quality under Section 16(2). Tinned salmon described as fit for consumption but in fact poisonous is plainly not of merchantable quality, since it is unfit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are bought. This mirrors the classic reasoning that defective food sold by description founds liability irrespective of the seller's personal knowledge, making merchantable quality the strongest single ground to defeat caveat emptor here.

**Q4 D**

Where the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied condition as regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed — this is a limitation that protects the seller, not an exception operating in the buyer's favour. The genuine buyer-favouring exceptions are fitness for purpose, merchantable quality on a sale by description, and fraud or active concealment. Therefore the statement that the buyer had a full opportunity to inspect a patent defect is NOT a pro-buyer exception; it reinforces caveat emptor and is the correct choice.

**Q5 B**

Modern consumer-protection jurisprudence has progressively eroded the harshness of caveat emptor, shifting responsibility onto sellers who possess superior knowledge and bargaining power. This trend is captured by the maxim caveat venditor — 'let the seller beware'. The other options are unrelated maxims: volenti non fit injuria is a tort defence based on consent, nemo dat quod non habet concerns transfer of title, and respondeat superior governs vicarious liability. Hence caveat venditor is the correct answer.

**Q6 A**

The proviso to Section 16(2) states that if the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied condition as regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed. The implied condition of merchantable quality therefore does not extend to those patent defects an actual examination should have disclosed. It is not converted into a warranty, nor does it make the sale voidable at the buyer's option; the condition simply does not attach to the inspected defect, so the first option is correct.

**Q7 C**

On the classic 'unauthorised mode' principle, a master is liable for a servant's wrongful and unauthorised manner of performing an authorised act, even where the precise act was prohibited, provided it was done to further the master's business. The conductor's job included responsibility for the bus; turning it around served the employer's purpose, so driving it was merely an unauthorised mode of doing authorised work. The mere prohibition of driving does not remove the act from the course of employment, so the master is liable.

**Q8 B**

The Latin maxim respondeat superior translates as 'let the master answer' and expresses the rule that an employer answers for the torts of an employee committed in the course of employment. 'He who acts through another acts himself' is the separate maxim qui facit per alium facit per se; 'the thing speaks for itself' is res ipsa loquitur, a rule of evidence in negligence; and 'no one gives what he does not have' is nemo dat quod non habet. Hence 'let the master answer' is correct.

**Q9 C**

A precondition of vicarious liability is that the wrongdoer be a servant (employee) and not an independent contractor; as a rule the employer is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor. The fact that the servant acted merely negligently, or disobeyed an instruction while still furthering the master's business, does not defeat liability, and liability is not confined to physical as opposed to economic loss. Therefore establishing that the wrongdoer was an independent contractor is the choice that defeats the claim.

**Q10 D**

A servant who departs substantially from the authorised route or task to pursue a purpose of his own is said to be on 'a frolic of his own', and the master is not liable for torts committed during that deviation. A long detour to visit a friend, unconnected with the employer's business, takes the conduct outside the course of employment. Ownership of the van and the fact that driving is generally authorised do not, by themselves, fix liability, so the correct answer is that the master is not liable.

**Q11 A**

Vicarious liability is liability imposed without personal fault on the part of the person held responsible; it arises from the relationship between the parties, classically master and servant, rather than from any wrongdoing by the master himself. It is distinct from strict liability under Rylands v. Fletcher, which concerns the escape of dangerous things, and it does not depend on the master's own negligence or on a contractual indemnity. Hence the description 'liability without personal fault, based on the relationship' is correct.

**Q12 B**

While an employer is generally not liable for the torts of an independent contractor, an established exception arises where the duty is non-delegable or the work entrusted is extra-hazardous, in which case responsibility cannot be shifted by delegating the task. The mode of payment, the use of the employer's premises, and whether the contractor was negligent rather than fraudulent are irrelevant to this exception. Therefore the non-delegable or extra-hazardous-work situation is the correct answer.

## SECTION B – ANALYTICAL REASONING

**Q13 A**

Clue (1) places Jaipur on floor 8, and clues (2), (4) and (5) constrain C, B and F. Working through the chain — F (Delhi) below C, C below E, B (Chennai) on an odd floor below C, H on floor 1, and D immediately above G — forces E to the top floor, floor 8, as the only placement consistent with every constraint while keeping D-G adjacent and Patna on an even floor above 4. Hence E lives on floor 8 and is the person from Jaipur.

**Q14 C**

Clue (8) expressly states that the person from Patna lives on an even-numbered floor above floor 4, which leaves only floor 6 (since floor 8 is taken by Jaipur). The clue is a direct constraint, so the correct description is 'an even-numbered floor above floor 4'. The distractors — an odd floor below 4, floor 1 (occupied by H) and floor 3 — all contradict the explicit wording of the clue, making the second option the only defensible answer.

**Q15 B**

Clue (2) states that C lives immediately above the person from Delhi and immediately below E, and clue (5) identifies F as the person from Delhi. It follows directly that C is the professional living immediately above the Delhi resident, F. E lives above C, and H occupies floor 1, so neither E, H nor B can be immediately above Delhi. Therefore C is the correct answer.

**Q16 A**

Clue (4) specifies that B, who is from Chennai, lives on an odd-numbered floor below C. This is a direct relational constraint, so the correct description is simply 'an odd-numbered floor below C'. B cannot be immediately above C (that contradicts 'below'), cannot be on floor 8 (Jaipur's floor), and is not stated to be immediately below H, who is on floor 1 with nothing beneath. Hence the first option is correct.

**Q17 B**

Clue (1) confines Polity to one of the first three days and clue (2) places Geography immediately after Polity. Clue (3) bars Law from Monday and clue (5) bars Economics from Monday and Science from Saturday. The only subject left free to occupy Monday consistent with all constraints is Polity, with Geography following on Tuesday. History, Science and the remaining subjects then fall later in the week, so Polity on Monday is the most defensible placement and the correct answer.

**Q18 B**

Clue (2) explicitly requires the Geography seminar to be held immediately after the Polity seminar, fixing the ordered consecutive pair 'Polity then Geography'. None of the other pairings is mandated: 'Law then Economics', 'History then Science' and 'Geography then Law' are not required to be consecutive by any clue. Therefore the only pairing that must occur on consecutive days in the stated order is Polity then Geography, making the second option correct.

**Q19 C**

Clue (4) states that exactly two seminars are held between Economics and History, with Economics before History. The word 'between' refers to the seminars strictly separating the two named subjects, so the count is precisely two. The options 'three', 'one' and 'zero' all contradict the explicit number given in the clue. Therefore the correct answer is two seminars between Economics and History, which is the third option.

**Q20 A**

Clue (5) contains two parts, one of which expressly states that the Science seminar is not held on Saturday. It is therefore clue (5) that directly prevents Science from occupying Saturday. Clue (1) constrains Polity, clue (2) fixes the Polity-Geography adjacency, and clue (4) governs the Economics-History gap; none of these mentions Saturday or Science. Hence clue (5) is the constraint responsible, making the first option correct.

## SECTION C – QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

**Q21 B**

Solar in FY25 is 90 GW against a total of 161 GW. The share is  $90 \div 161$ , which equals approximately 0.559, or about 56%. The other options misread the proportion: 45% understates it, while 62% and 50% do not match the arithmetic. Computing  $90/161 \approx 56\%$  confirms that Solar accounts for a little over half of total installed renewable capacity in FY25, so 'about 56%' is the correct answer.

**Q22 C**

The absolute increases are: Solar  $90 - 72 = 18$  GW, Wind  $54 - 45 = 9$  GW, Biomass  $11 - 10 = 1$  GW, and Small Hydro  $6 - 5 = 1$  GW. The largest of these is Solar's increase of 18 GW, comfortably exceeding Wind's 9 GW and the marginal 1 GW gains of Biomass and Small Hydro. Therefore Solar recorded the highest absolute increase in capacity from FY24 to FY25, making 'Solar (+18 GW)' the correct choice.

**Q23 D**

Total capacity rose from 132 GW in FY24 to 161 GW in FY25, an increase of  $161 - 132 = 29$  GW. This also equals the sum of the individual increases: 18 (Solar) + 9 (Wind) + 1 (Biomass) + 1 (Small Hydro) = 29 GW, providing a useful cross-check. The other options (27, 31 and 25 GW) do not match this calculation, so the correct answer is a growth of 29 GW.

**Q24 B**

Wind and Biomass in FY25 are 54 GW and 11 GW respectively, summing to 65 GW. Against the FY25 total of 161 GW, this is  $65 \div 161 \approx 0.40$ , or about 40%. The option 'about 50%' overstates the share, while 'about 33%' and 'about 25%' understate it. Computing  $65/161$  confirms roughly two-fifths of total capacity, so 'about 40%' is the correct answer.

**Q25 C**

Solar grew 25% from FY24 to FY25 (72 to 90 GW). Applying the same 25% rate to the FY25 figure of 90 GW gives  $90 \times 1.25 = 112.5$  GW for FY26. The options 100, 108 and 120 do not result from a 25% increase on 90. Hence, if the growth rate is sustained, Solar capacity would reach approximately 112.5 GW, making the third option correct.

**Q26 B**

Adding the category GMVs gives  $4800 + 3000 + 1800 + 1200 + 1200 = 12,000$  ₹ crore. This is consistent with the share column, where Electronics at 40% corresponds to 4800 out of 12,000. The alternatives 11,400, 12,600 and 10,800 do not match the sum of the rows. Therefore the total GMV across all five categories is ₹12,000 crore, making the second option correct.

**Q27 C**

Average order value is GMV divided by orders. Electronics:  $4800 \text{ Cr} \div 40 \text{ lakh} = ₹12,000$  per order; Fashion:  $3000 \div 120 = ₹2,500$ ; Home & Kitchen:  $1800 \div 60 = ₹3,000$ ; Beauty:  $1200 \div 80 = ₹1,500$ . Electronics, at ₹12,000 per order, has by far the highest average order value, reflecting its high GMV on relatively few orders. Hence Electronics is the correct answer.

**Q28 B**

Fashion generated ₹3000 crore of GMV across 120 lakh orders. The average order value is  $3000 \text{ crore} \div 120 \text{ lakh} = 3000 \times 10,000,000 \div (120 \times 100,000) = ₹2,500$  per order. The options ₹2,000, ₹1,200 and ₹3,000 do not match this computation. Therefore the average order value for Fashion is approximately ₹2,500, making the second option correct.

**Q29 D**

Electronics GMV is ₹4800 crore and Beauty & Personal Care GMV is ₹1200 crore. The ratio is  $4800 \div 1200 = 4$ . Thus Electronics GMV exceeds Beauty & Personal Care GMV by a factor of four. The alternatives — three, five and two times — do not match the division. Hence the correct answer is that Electronics GMV is four times that of Beauty & Personal Care.

**Q30 A**

Home & Kitchen GMV is ₹1800 crore on 60 lakh orders, giving a current average order value of ₹3,000. A 50% rise in GMV with orders unchanged means the new GMV is  $1800 \times 1.5 = ₹2700$  crore over the same 60 lakh orders, so the new average order value is  $₹2700 \text{ crore} \div 60 \text{ lakh} = ₹4,500$ . Equivalently, the average order value itself rises 50% from ₹3,000 to ₹4,500. Hence ₹4,500 is correct.

## SECTION D – RAPID-FIRE MIXED REASONING &amp; GK

**Q31 B**

The Indian Penal Code, 1860 was replaced in the 2023 criminal-law overhaul by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, which is the new substantive penal code. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhinyam replaced the Indian Evidence Act. The Code of Criminal Procedure is itself the old procedural law now superseded. Therefore the law replacing the IPC is the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, making the second option correct.

**Q32 C**

Article 368 of the Constitution confers on Parliament the power to amend the Constitution by way of addition, variation or repeal, subject to the procedure prescribed there and to the basic-structure limitation laid down by the Supreme Court. Article 32 is the right to constitutional remedies, Article 123 deals with the President's ordinance-making power, and Article 245 concerns the distribution of legislative power between Parliament and the States. Hence the amending power is vested in Parliament under Article 368.

**Q33 B**

The basic-structure doctrine, holding that Parliament's amending power under Article 368 cannot be used to destroy the essential features of the Constitution, was propounded in *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala* (1973). Golaknath had earlier taken a different view on amendability, *Minerva Mills* later refined and applied the doctrine, and *A.K. Gopalan* concerned the interpretation of Article 21. Therefore the doctrine's origin is *Kesavananda Bharati*, making the second option correct.

**Q34 C**

Article 32 guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights and empowers the Court to issue writs; Dr Ambedkar famously called it the 'heart and soul' of the Constitution. Article 21 protects life and personal liberty, Article 14 guarantees equality before law, and Article 19 protects specified freedoms. Since the question asks for the right to constitutional remedies specifically, the correct answer is Article 32.

**Q35 B**

The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, has its seat at the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands. Geneva houses several UN agencies but not the ICJ, New York is the seat of the UN General Assembly and Security Council, and Vienna hosts bodies such as the IAEA. Therefore the ICJ sits at The Hague, making the second option correct.

**Q36 C**

The Mediation Act, which provides a statutory framework for institutional and pre-litigation mediation in India and establishes the Mediation Council of India, was enacted in 2023. The years 2019, 2021 and 2016 do not correspond to this legislation; 2016 is associated with the commercial-courts and insolvency reforms instead. Hence the Mediation Act was passed in 2023, making the third option correct.

**Q37 B**

A writ of mandamus, meaning 'we command', is issued by a superior court to a public authority or lower body to compel the performance of a public or statutory duty that it has failed or refused to perform. Quashing a lower court's order is the office of certiorari, producing a detained person is habeas corpus, and restraining a usurper of public office is quo warranto. Therefore mandamus commands performance of a legal duty, making the second option correct.

**Q38 C**

The 44th Constitutional Amendment, 1978 deleted the right to property from the list of Fundamental Rights, repealing Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31, and recast it as a constitutional legal right under Article 300A. The rights to freedom of religion, against exploitation and to equality were not removed. Therefore the right that ceased to be a fundamental right after the 44th Amendment is the right to property, making the third option correct.

**Q39 C**

*Audi alteram partem* — 'hear the other side' — is one of the twin pillars of natural justice, the other being *nemo iudex in causa sua* (no one a judge in his own cause). It requires that no person be condemned without a fair opportunity to be heard. It is unrelated to strict liability, vicarious liability or promissory estoppel, which are doctrines of substantive law. Therefore *audi alteram partem* is a facet of natural justice, making the third option correct.

**Q40 C**

The Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) is conducted by the Consortium of National Law Universities, a body comprising the participating National Law Universities that administers admissions to their integrated and postgraduate law programmes. The University Grants Commission regulates higher education generally, the Bar Council of India regulates the legal profession and legal education standards, and the National Testing Agency conducts exams such as NEET and CUET, not CLAT. Hence the Consortium of NLUs is correct.