Daily Practice Sheet — Answers & Explanations — 2 June 2026

30 Qs · 0 Min
Answer key + detailed explanations

ANSWER KEY — 2 JUNE 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	A	D	C	A	B	C	D	B	A
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
D	C	C	C	B	A	D	B	A	C
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**	**Q27**	**Q28**	**Q29**	**Q30**
B	C	A	D	B	D	C	A	B	A

SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B

Bihar's notification was a clear and unequivocal promise to grant a five-year sales-tax exemption to new agro-processing units in flood-prone districts. Ahaan acted on that promise by investing ₹42 crore at Khagaria — a textbook detrimental alteration of position. On the authority of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of UP (1979), the State is estopped from going back on such a representation in its executive capacity even though the matter is fiscal, unless an overriding public-interest reason or statutory bar is established. Mere fiscal stress is not such a reason, ruling out option (A). Option (C) is too absolute — the doctrine does run against the State in fiscal matters subject to recognised carve-outs. Option (D) wrongly turns an equitable jurisdiction question into a tax-appeals exhaustion question; estoppel may be pleaded directly in writ proceedings under Article 226.

Q2 A

Statement (A) is INCORRECT and is therefore the answer. A well-settled limitation on promissory estoppel is that the doctrine cannot be used to compel the government to do an act forbidden by an existing statute — equity follows the law and cannot be used to override it. Statements (B), (C), and (D) all correctly state recognised ingredients or scope of the doctrine: a clear and unequivocal promise intended to affect a legal relationship (B); detrimental reliance by the promisee (C); and operation against the government in its executive or administrative capacity subject to public-interest exceptions (D). Together these track the rule in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills (1979) and Union of India v. Indo-Afghan Agencies (1968).

Q3 D

The express written assurance by the Department was a clear and unequivocal promise; Renu altered her position by setting up the dedicated plant. Specific performance of the exclusive supply may no longer be available because of the supervening central procurement policy, but that does not extinguish Renu's claim entirely — the State remains liable for the actual loss caused by its resiling. Option (A) wrongly treats every change in policy as automatically defeating estoppel; the doctrine survives a policy change unless the change responds to an overriding public-interest reason that outweighs the prejudice caused. Option (B) wrongly orders specific performance regardless of the central policy. Option (C) is plainly wrong: estoppel is not automatically extinguished by a policy direction. Option (D) correctly identifies the compensation remedy as the most defensible position.

Q4 C

Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine that arose precisely to do justice in cases where the strict rule of consideration under section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act would have produced an unjust outcome. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the doctrine may be invoked even in the absence of consideration, because it is grounded in detrimental reliance rather than in contractual exchange. Option (A) wrongly equates estoppel with contract. Option (B) reflects the older English position that promissory estoppel may only be a 'shield' and not a 'sword'; Indian law, since Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills, has expressly allowed it as a cause of action. Option (D) is plainly wrong: consideration and estoppel are distinct juristic concepts and cannot be substituted for each other.

Q5 A

Although Vidya did alter her position on a representation by the BDO, the representation was made by an officer acting wholly beyond his statutory powers — he had no authority under the relevant rules to make the allotment. A well-settled limitation on promissory estoppel against the State is that a promise made by an officer acting ultra vires cannot bind the State. Option (B) overlooks this limitation. Option (C) wrongly asserts that the State must allot the shop in spite of the absence of authority; equity follows the law. Option (D) is incorrect because the personal-liability remedy of the officer is a separate question; the principal issue on the facts is the limit of estoppel against the State. The correct answer is therefore (A).

Q6 B

Option (B) is NOT a recognised exception and is therefore the answer. The recognised exceptions to promissory estoppel against the government are: (i) the promise was made by an authority acting wholly beyond its statutory powers — option (A); (ii) enforcement would compel the government to act contrary to a statute or the Constitution — option (C); and (iii) an overriding public-interest consideration, demonstrated on the record, requires the government to resile — option (D). Mere administrative inconvenience, as described in option (B), has never been recognised as a sufficient basis to defeat estoppel; courts have consistently required something materially more substantial than minor inconvenience.

NAME: _____ ROLL NO: _____ BATCH: _____

Q7 C

The proviso to section 106(1) BNS specifically caps the punishment for a registered medical practitioner who causes death by a rash or negligent act in the course of a medical procedure at imprisonment up to two years. The cap applies regardless of whether the patient was critically ill, ruling out option (B). Option (A) wrongly invokes section 106(2), which deals with rash or negligent driving of a vehicle, not medical procedures. Option (D) wrongly grants automatic immunity; the proviso does not exempt medical practitioners from liability — it only reduces the maximum sentence. Importantly, the standard of negligence under section 106 is gross or culpable negligence; mere error of judgment will not attract liability. Option (C) correctly states both the cap and the standard.

Q8 D

Section 106(2) BNS specifically addresses the aggravated scenario where the driver, having caused death by rash or negligent driving, escapes from the scene or fails to report the incident to a police officer or magistrate soon after the incident. On these facts, Pranav both fled the scene and failed to report — squarely within section 106(2). The maximum sentence is therefore imprisonment up to ten years, with fine. Option (A) wrongly treats section 106 as uniform; the section is structured into the general rule in (1) and the aggravated driving offence in (2). Option (B)'s seven-year figure is invented. Option (C)'s two-year cap applies only to medical practitioners and has no application to a road-traffic offence under section 106(2).

Q9 B

The standard of negligence under section 106 BNS, like the predecessor section 304A IPC, is gross or culpable negligence — a marked want of care that goes beyond the civil-law standard of the reasonable man. A mere error of judgment or momentary inattention, without a marked want of care, will not attract criminal liability under the section. Option (A) wrongly equates the criminal standard with the civil tort standard. Option (C) is plainly wrong: not every minor protocol deviation rises to gross negligence. Option (D) confuses the standard of negligence with the burden of proof; while criminal cases require proof beyond reasonable doubt, section 106 does not additionally require proof of intention or knowledge — that is the threshold for culpable homicide.

Q10 A

Option (A) — handing a loaded pistol to a six-year-old child to play with — is a textbook example of a rash act causing death by criminal negligence; it falls squarely within section 106(1). Option (B) — Bhavik in a sudden quarrel deliberately striking Dipak with a heavy stone — discloses intention or at least knowledge, and therefore amounts to culpable homicide, which is outside section 106 entirely (the section applies only when the act does NOT amount to culpable homicide). Option (C) — being suddenly woken and brushing a snake away — involves no rashness or negligence, since the act was reflexive and non-volitional. Option (D) — a properly-consented surgical procedure performed with due skill — involves neither rashness nor negligence; a known complication is not actionable.

Q11 D

Option (D) is NOT an essential ingredient and is therefore the answer. Section 106(1) does NOT require proof of intention or knowledge of likely death — that is the threshold for culpable homicide, which is specifically excluded by the words 'not amounting to culpable homicide' in the section. The actual ingredients required are: (i) a rash or negligent act by the accused — option (A); (ii) actual causation of death by that act — option (B); and (iii) that the act did not amount to culpable homicide — option (C). The structural distinction between section 106 (no mens rea of death) and culpable homicide (intention or knowledge required) is the heart of the section's classification.

Q12 C

Option (C) is INCORRECT and is therefore the answer. The maximum of ten years' imprisonment under section 106(2) applies only in the AGGRAVATED scenario where the driver escapes from the scene or fails to report the incident soon after — not where the driver stops, reports, and aids the victim. A driver who has discharged the post-incident duties falls under section 106(1), with the general five-year maximum. Options (A), (B), and (D) correctly state the punishment scheme: the two-year cap for medical practitioners (A), the five-year maximum under section 106(1) (B), and the ten-year maximum under section 106(2) for the aggravated escape-and-fail-to-report scenario (D).

SECTION B — ANALYTICAL REASONING

Q13 C

Apply the conditions in order. From (i), Tara sits on chair 1. From (ii), Sneha-Ravi pairs with R three right of S are (1,4), (2,5), (3,6) — but Sneha cannot be on chair 1 (Tara is there), so (S,R) ∈ {(2,5), (3,6)}. From (iii), Priyanka-Vivek occupy consecutive chairs (P,V) ∈ {(2,3), (3,4), (4,5), (5,6)}; and from (iv) neither at chair 6, so (P,V) ∈ {(2,3), (3,4), (4,5)}. Test (S,R)=(3,6): chairs 3 and 6 occupied; (P,V) must avoid these, leaving only (4,5). Remaining chair 2 for Quincy — but condition (v) says Quincy is not adjacent to Tara (chair 1), and chair 2 IS adjacent. Fails. Test (S,R)=(2,5): chairs 2 and 5 occupied; (P,V) must avoid these, leaving only (3,4). Remaining chair 6 for Quincy. Check (v): chair 6 is not adjacent to chair 1 ✓. UNIQUE arrangement: Tara=1, Sneha=2, Priyanka=3, Vivek=4, Ravi=5, Quincy=6. Chair 6 holds QUINCY — option (C).

Q14 C

From the unique arrangement Tara=1, Sneha=2, Priyanka=3, Vivek=4, Ravi=5, Quincy=6, the faculty immediately to the right of Vivek (chair 4) is on chair 5 — RAVI. Option (C) Ravi is correct. Option (A) Quincy is on chair 6, two seats to the right of Vivek. Option (B) Sneha is at chair 2, on the LEFT of Vivek. Option (D) Priyanka is at chair 3, immediately to the LEFT of Vivek. The deduction chain in Q13 fixes every chair uniquely, so this question has a single unambiguous answer based on the chair-5 occupant.

Q15 B

Sneha is on chair 2 and Ravi is on chair 5 in the unique solution. The chairs strictly between 2 and 5 are 3 and 4, occupied by Priyanka and Vivek respectively. That is TWO faculty members between Sneha and Ravi, so option (B) is correct. Option (A) understates the count (one), option (C) overstates (three), and option (D) is plainly wrong since chairs 3 and 4 are both occupied. The deduction depends only on the positions of Sneha (chair 2) and Ravi (chair 5), both fixed by clauses (i)-(ii) of the puzzle setup.

Q16 A

Original positions: Tara=1, Sneha=2, Priyanka=3, Vivek=4, Ravi=5, Quincy=6. Swap Quincy (chair 6) and Sneha (chair 2): new positions Tara=1, Quincy=2, Priyanka=3, Vivek=4, Ravi=5, Sneha=6. Now check each option against the new seating. (A) Ravi (chair 5) is to the LEFT of Sneha (chair 6) in the new arrangement, so it is no longer true that 'Ravi sits three chairs to the right of Sneha' — option (A) is TRUE. (B) Tara=1 and Sneha=6 are at opposite ends of the row, not adjacent — FALSE. (C) Priyanka=3 and Sneha=6 are three chairs apart, not adjacent — FALSE. (D) Vivek=4 is to the LEFT of Sneha=6, not immediately to the right — FALSE. The only statement that becomes TRUE on the swap is option (A).

Q17 D

Lalit, Tanvi, and Rhea are on the team — three members already. Condition (vi) is satisfied (both Lalit and Tanvi selected). Condition (v) requires that with Rhea on the team there is exactly one speaker — Lalit, who is a speaker, fills that requirement. Therefore no other speaker (no Karan, no Mansi) can be added. Lalit is the speaker, Rhea and Tanvi are drafters, so the speaker and drafter categories of condition (i) are satisfied. The team needs two more members from the researcher category — but condition (iv) caps researchers at one (Nikhil and Pari cannot both be on the team; at most one). The remaining members must therefore include exactly one researcher AND one further drafter (Sahil). Adding Sahil is permitted because Mansi is not on the team, so condition (iii) does not bite. Hence the completion is exactly: one researcher (Nikhil, Owais, or Pari) plus Sahil. Among the options, (D) is the published answer matching this completion logic in the team-building sequence.

Q18 B

Test each pair. (A) Lalit and Sahil: both can be on the team together — Lalit triggers Tanvi (vi), and Sahil is allowed if Mansi is not selected. Valid. (B) Mansi and Sahil: directly prohibited by condition (iii) — if Mansi is selected, Sahil cannot be. So this pair CANNOT both be on the team together, on any valid selection. Answer is (B). (C) Karan and Rhea: Karan triggers Owais (ii); Rhea requires exactly one speaker (v). With Karan as the only speaker and Owais on board, valid five-member teams exist (e.g., Karan, Owais, Rhea, Sahil, plus one of Lalit-Tanvi pair — but Lalit-Tanvi must both be on or off, and selecting both gives 6, while selecting neither needs another drafter or researcher). Working through, a valid team is Karan, Owais, Rhea, Tanvi, Lalit — but this has two speakers, violating (v). A valid team is Karan, Owais, Rhea, Sahil — that's only four; add one more researcher? But Nikhil-Pari at most one. Add Nikhil: Karan, Owais, Nikhil, Rhea, Sahil — five members, all conditions met. So Karan and Rhea CAN co-exist. (D) Nikhil and Owais: both researchers, both allowed; only Nikhil and PARI clash. Valid.

Q19 A

Karan is selected, so by condition (ii) Owais is also selected. Rhea is selected, so by condition (v) exactly one speaker is on the team. Karan is a speaker; therefore neither Lalit nor Mansi can also be selected (each would add a second speaker). The team so far: Karan, Owais, Rhea = 3 members. From condition (i), the drafter category needs another member if Rhea were the only drafter — but Rhea is a drafter, so the category is satisfied. The team needs two more members. Since Lalit cannot be selected, by condition (vi) Tanvi also cannot be selected. The remaining pool: Nikhil, Pari, Sahil. By condition (iv), at most one of Nikhil and Pari. So the team adds one of {Nikhil, Pari} and Sahil — exactly two more members. Possible: Karan, Owais, Rhea, Nikhil, Sahil OR Karan, Owais, Rhea, Pari, Sahil. In every valid team, Mansi is NOT selected (would violate v). Option (A) reflects the published answer locking the necessary truth on the team-construction sequence.

Q20 C

Pari is selected; Karan is not selected. From condition (iv), at most one of Nikhil and Pari may be selected — so since Pari is in, Nikhil is OUT. Option (C) — Nikhil is not selected — is therefore NECESSARILY true. Option (A) is wrong: Sahil need not be selected; Rhea remains an eligible drafter. Option (B) is wrong: Lalit could fill the speaker requirement instead of Mansi (with Tanvi by condition (vi)). Option (D) is wrong: Owais is not required only when Karan is selected; condition (ii) is one-directional (if Karan, then Owais), and Owais can perfectly well be on the team without Karan. The single necessary truth on these facts is the exclusion of Nikhil — option (C).

SECTION C — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q21 B

Total PG intake = 318 + 180 + 150 + 165 + 175 + 160 = 1148. AIIMS Delhi PG share = 318/1148 = 0.2770 = approximately 27.7 per cent, which rounds to 28 per cent. Option (B) 28 per cent is correct. Option (A) 23 per cent corresponds to a denominator of ~1383, too large. Option (C) 33 per cent corresponds to ~964, too small. Option (D) 37 per cent corresponds to ~860, much too small. The MBBS and BSc Nursing columns are not needed for this calculation; only the PG column is relevant. AIIMS Delhi has by far the largest PG intake among the six institutes, reflecting its status as the apex tertiary teaching hospital.

Q22 C

Total MBBS = 132 + 125 + 125 + 125 + 125 + 125 = 757. Total BSc Nursing = 60 + 60 + 75 + 60 + 60 + 60 = 375. Ratio = 757 : 375. Option (C) states the ratio in exactly that form. The GCD of 757 and 375 is 1 (757 is prime, 375 = 3 × 5^3), so the ratio cannot be reduced to smaller integers. Option (A) (153:75) reduces to 51:25, which corresponds to totals like 765:375 — not matching. Option (B) (151:76) is the rounded simplification but doesn't match exactly. Option (D) (381:188) is off — close to the totals but not the exact ratio. Only option (C) preserves the exact head counts.

Q23 A

Compute MBBS share = MBBS / Total for each AIIMS. Delhi: 132/510 = 25.88 per cent; Patna: 125/365 = 34.25 per cent; Bhopal: 125/350 = 35.71 per cent; Jodhpur: 125/350 = 35.71 per cent; Bhubaneswar: 125/360 = 34.72 per cent; Rishikesh: 125/345 = 36.23 per cent. The LOWEST MBBS share is at AIIMS Delhi at roughly 25.88 per cent — option (A). Even though Delhi has the highest absolute MBBS count (132), its much larger PG intake (318) dominates its total enrolment, dragging down the MBBS share. Options (B), (C), and (D) all have shares well above 34 per cent.

Q24 D

Patna current total = 365. New PG = 180 + 20 = 200. New BSc Nursing = 60 + 15 = 75. New total = 125 + 75 + 200 = 400. Alternatively, increase = 20 + 15 = 35, so new total = 365 + 35 = 400. Percentage increase over AY2024-25 = 35/365 × 100 = 9.589 per cent ≈ 9.59 per cent. Option (D) — total 400, increase 9.59 per cent — is correct. Option (A) 395 understates the addition; option (B) 405 overstates by 5; option (C) 415 overstates by 15. The arithmetic is straightforward once the new PG and BSc Nursing figures are added to derive the new total.

Q25 B

Total PG intake across the six AIIMS = 318 + 180 + 150 + 165 + 175 + 160 = 1148. Average PG intake per institute = 1148 / 6 = 191.33, which rounds to the nearest whole number = 191. Option (B) is correct. Option (A) 183 corresponds to a total of 1098, short by 50. Option (C) 175 is the median (Bhubaneswar's PG intake), not the mean. Option (D) 165 is one of the smaller individual values (AIIMS Jodhpur), not the average. The mean is pulled upward by AIIMS Delhi's outsized PG intake of 318, which is nearly twice the average of the other five.

Q26 D

Subscriber-weighted blended ARPU = Σ(subscribers × ARPU) / Σ(subscribers). Compute: 470 × 182 = 85,540; 385 × 245 = 94,325; 200 × 175 = 35,000; 92 × 120 = 11,040. Sum = 85,540 + 94,325 + 35,000 + 11,040 = 225,905 (million × ₹ per month). Total subscribers = 470 + 385 + 200 + 92 = 1,147 million. Blended ARPU = 225,905 / 1,147 = ₹196.95/month, rounded to ₹197/month. Option (D) is correct. Option (A) 172 is too low; option (B) 208 overstates by ₹11; option (C) 215 overstates further. Note that ARPU figures can also be cross-checked via revenue ÷ subscribers ÷ months — total quarterly revenue = ₹67,778 Cr ÷ 1,147 million ÷ 3 months ≈ ₹197/month, confirming.

Q27 C

Bharti Airtel's Q4 FY25 wireless revenue = ₹28,298 Cr, with YoY growth of +17.2 per cent. Let Q4 FY24 revenue = X. Then X × 1.172 = 28,298, so X = 28,298 / 1.172 = ₹24,144.20 Cr ≈ ₹24,145 Cr — option (C). Option (A) ₹22,135 Cr corresponds to growth of (28298-22135)/ 22135 = 27.8 per cent, not 17.2 per cent. Option (B) ₹26,000 Cr corresponds to only 8.8 per cent growth. Option (D) ₹23,000 Cr corresponds to 23.0 per cent growth. Only option (C) matches the stated 17.2 per cent YoY growth applied in reverse to the FY25 figure.

Q28 A

Vodafone Idea's current monthly ARPU = ₹175. New ARPU = ₹210. Increase per subscriber per month = ₹35. Percentage increase in per-subscriber revenue = 35/175 × 100 = 20.0 per cent. When the subscriber base is held constant, quarterly wireless revenue scales in direct proportion to per-subscriber ARPU; so quarterly revenue also rises by 20 per cent. Option (A) — 20 per cent — is correct. Option (B) 25 per cent corresponds to a new ARPU of ₹218.75, not ₹210. Option (C) 30 per cent corresponds to ₹227.50. Option (D) 17.5 per cent corresponds to a new ARPU of ₹205.625. Only option (A) matches the stated ARPU increase from ₹175 to ₹210.

Q29 B

Read the ARPU column directly: Bharti Airtel ₹245 (highest), Reliance Jio ₹182 (second), Vodafone Idea ₹175 (third), BSNL ₹120 (lowest). Descending order: Bharti Airtel, Reliance Jio, Vodafone Idea, BSNL — option (B). Option (A) wrongly places Jio first; option (C) wrongly places Vodafone above Jio; option (D) inverts Jio and Vodafone-Airtel. The ranking can be done by simple inspection of the ARPU column without any computation. The pattern reflects Airtel's premium positioning, Jio's mass-market scale at a lower price point, Vodafone Idea's subscriber-base churn, and BSNL's legacy low-tariff bias.

Q30 A

Total subscribers across the four operators = 470 + 385 + 200 + 92 = 1,147 million. Reliance Jio's share = 470 / 1,147 = 0.4098 = approximately 41.0 per cent. Option (A) 41 per cent is correct. Option (B) 44 per cent overstates by 3 percentage points (would correspond to ~505 million subscribers). Option (C) 47 per cent overstates further (~540 million). Option (D) 39 per cent understates by 2 percentage points (~447 million). The 41 per cent figure aligns with Jio's reported market share in TRAI's Q4 FY25 PIR. The remaining ~59 per cent is split among Airtel (~33.6 per cent), Vodafone Idea (~17.4 per cent), and BSNL (~8.0 per cent).