ANSWER KEY — 11 JUNE 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	D	A	C	D	B	A	C	B	D
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
A	C	C	A	D	B	D	B	A	C
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**	**Q27**	**Q28**	**Q29**	**Q30**
B	D	C	A	B	A	C	D	B	D
Q31	**Q32**	**Q33**	**Q34**	**Q35**	**Q36**	**Q37**	**Q38**	**Q39**	**Q40**
C	A	D	B	A	C	B	D	A	C

SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B

This is the fact-pattern of Rylands v Fletcher itself. Devraj brought onto his land and kept there a large accumulation of water — a thing likely to do mischief if it escapes — and the storage of so large a reservoir is a non-natural use of land. The water escaped and damaged Hari's mine, so all the elements of strict liability are satisfied. The defining feature of the rule is that fault is irrelevant: the absence of personal negligence (option A) is no answer, and engaging a competent independent contractor does not shift the duty, because the liability is attached to the dangerous accumulation, not to careless conduct. Option C wrongly assumes the contractor alone is liable; the occupier who keeps the dangerous thing answers for its escape. Option D wrongly imports a knowledge requirement that strict liability does not contain. Hence B.

Q2 D

Under the classical rule in Rylands v Fletcher, an escape from the defendant's premises is essential, so option A correctly states the old English position — but Indian law has moved beyond it. In M.C. Mehta v Union of India (the Oleum Gas Leak case), the Supreme Court held that an enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity owes an absolute, non-delegable duty to everyone affected, including workers within the premises, and liability is not conditioned on an escape beyond the boundary. Option B is wrong because absolute liability dispenses with proof of negligence entirely. Option C invokes consent (volenti), but the Mehta doctrine admits none of the strict-liability exceptions, and employment is not consent to be gassed. The company is therefore liable absolutely even though nothing left the factory. Hence D.

Q3 A

The two doctrines differ on precisely the points captured in option A. Strict liability under Rylands v Fletcher is qualified by recognised exceptions — act of God, act of a stranger, plaintiff's default, consent, and statutory authority — and requires an escape of the dangerous thing from the defendant's land. Absolute liability under M.C. Mehta v Union of India deliberately strips away both limitations: no exception is available, and harm caused within the premises is equally actionable. Option B is false — absolute liability turns on the hazardous nature of the activity, not on whether the owner is the State or a private company. Option C inverts the law: neither doctrine requires proof of negligence; that is what distinguishes both from ordinary negligence. Option D invents categories of protected persons that exist in neither doctrine. Hence A.

Q4 C

Strict liability applies only where the defendant brings and keeps on his land something likely to do mischief, and only where the use of the land is non-natural. A tree growing naturally on land for forty years is the classic example of an ordinary, natural use: nothing was artificially accumulated, so the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is simply not attracted. Mira's remedy, if any, would lie in negligence — for instance, if Kishan knew the tree was diseased and did nothing — but that is a fault-based claim, not strict liability. Option A wrongly treats every escape as actionable regardless of the character of the use. Option B is absurd on the facts: growing a neem tree is not a hazardous enterprise. Option D states a fact that might support negligence but is irrelevant to the strict-liability analysis the question poses. Hence C.

Q5 D

An act of God — an extraordinary natural event that could not reasonably be anticipated or guarded against — is a good defence to strict liability under Rylands v Fletcher. But the plant here runs a hazardous enterprise: the manufacture and storage of chlorine. Under M.C. Mehta v Union of India, such an enterprise is absolutely liable for harm caused by the escape of the dangerous substance, and the Court expressly held that none of the exceptions to strict liability, including vis major, is available. The rationale is that the enterprise alone has the resources to discover and guard against hazards, and it must internalise the cost of the risk it profits from. Option A applies the wrong doctrine. Option B confuses regulatory compliance with tort liability — a licence is no defence. Option C invents apportionment that the doctrine does not permit. Hence D.

NAME: _____ ROLL NO: _____ BATCH: _____

Q6 B

The question asks for the INCORRECT statement. Option B is incorrect because M.C. Mehta v Union of India expressly freed absolute liability from the escape requirement: workers injured inside the premises of a hazardous enterprise may recover, so an escape beyond the boundary is not a precondition. Option A correctly reflects Mehta — the Court said compensation must have a deterrent effect and may be correlated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise. Option C is a correct statement of strict liability, where the unforeseeable act of a stranger is a recognised defence. Option D is also correct: Rylands v Fletcher applies only to a non-natural use of land, which is why naturally growing trees or ordinary domestic water pipes fall outside it. The only false proposition is B, which is therefore the answer.

Q7 A

Section 15 of the Indian Contract Act defines coercion as committing, or threatening to commit, any act forbidden by the penal law, with intent to cause a person to enter an agreement. In Chikkam Ammiraju v Chikkam Seshamma, the Madras High Court held on materially identical facts that a husband's threat to commit suicide, used to force his wife and son to execute a release deed, amounted to coercion, because attempting suicide is punishable and suicide itself is 'forbidden' by the penal law. Option B fails because there is no general presumption that a husband dominates his wife's will; undue influence requires proof of a position of domination. Option C misses the point — the test is whether the threatened act is forbidden by law, not whom it physically harms. Option D substitutes fraud, which concerns deception, not threats. Hence A.

Q8 C

Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act provides that undue influence arises where one party is in a position to dominate the will of the other — including where he holds real or apparent authority, or stands in a fiduciary relation — and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage. In Mannu Singh v Umadat Pande, a gift of his entire property by an aged disciple to his spiritual guru, induced by promises of benefits in the next world, was set aside on exactly this ground: the guru's spiritual authority placed him in a dominant position, and a gift of everything the disciple owned was an unfair advantage. Option A fails because no act forbidden by penal law was threatened, so Section 15 is not attracted. Option B states a rule that does not exist — devotion does not immunise a transaction. Option D mislabels a doctrinal category. Hence C.

Q9 B

Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act states the consequence directly: when consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. The aggrieved party may elect to rescind the contract or to affirm and enforce it; the wrongdoer has no such election. Option A overstates the position — the contract is not void ab initio, because the innocent party may choose to uphold it, and third-party rights may intervene before avoidance. Option C invents a precondition: civil consequences under Section 19 do not await a criminal conviction for the threatened offence. Option D is wrong because coercion under Section 15 covers any act forbidden by the penal law, not merely those acts that would amount to extortion. Hence B.

Q10 D

Coercion under Section 15 requires the threat of an act forbidden by the penal law or the unlawful detention of property. Filing a civil suit to recover a lawful debt is the very opposite of an act forbidden by law — it is the exercise of a legal right, and the settled position is that a threat to resort to ordinary legal proceedings to enforce a lawful claim does not amount to coercion. Nor is there undue influence: an ordinary creditor-debtor relationship does not by itself place the bank in a position to dominate the borrower's will, and nothing suggests an unfair advantage beyond lawful security for an admitted debt. Option A mistakes commercial pressure for legal coercion. Option B asserts a presumption the law does not recognise. Option C mislabels a demand for security as detention of property. Hence D.

Q11 A

Section 16(3) of the Indian Contract Act creates a statutory shift in the burden of proof: where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another enters into a contract with him, and the transaction appears, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that the contract was not induced by undue influence lies upon the person in the dominating position. Here both statutory triggers are present — the moneylender's dominance over an illiterate, necessitous borrower, and a 60 per cent interest rate secured against the borrower's only land, which is unconscionable on its face. The lender must therefore affirmatively prove the absence of undue influence. Option B reverses the statutory rule. Options C and D import irrelevant notions of criminal prosecution and a presumption of fairness that Section 16(3) displaces. Hence A.

Q12 C

Section 16(2)(a) provides that a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another where he holds real or apparent authority over him. A police officer conducting an investigation, dealing with an accused in his custody, is the textbook illustration of real authority. When such an officer obtains the accused's land at one-fourth of its market value, the transaction is unconscionable on its face, and under Section 16(3) the burden falls on the officer to disprove undue influence — a burden he could scarcely discharge on these facts. The sale is therefore voidable for undue influence. Option A ignores the reality that custody extinguishes free bargaining. Option B overreaches: not every transaction with an accused is forbidden by penal law, so Section 15 coercion is not the correct label. Option D misstates the gist, which is domination, not deception. Hence C.

SECTION B — ANALYTICAL REASONING

Q13 C

Fix the pairs first. P (India) sits in the middle of Row 1, and X (France) faces the Indian delegate, so X is in the middle of Row 2. Y does not face P, and the Japanese delegate faces the Kenyan one; since R is in Row 1 and R is not Japan, the Japan-Kenya facing pair must be Y facing R, making Y Japanese and R Kenyan. The remaining pair is Q facing Z. Of the two countries left, Brazil and Chile, Q is not Chile, so Q is Brazil and Z is Chile. The Chilean delegate Z faces Q, who represents Brazil. Options A and D name countries whose delegates face other partners (Japan faces Kenya), and option B fails because the six clues yield one fully determinate arrangement. Hence option C.

Q14 A

From the deduction chain: P is the middle seat of Row 1, and X, who faces P, occupies the middle seat of Row 2. The facing pairs are P-X (middle), R-Y and Q-Z (the two end columns). Examining the four names offered: Q, R and Z all occupy end seats of their respective rows, while X occupies a middle seat. Three of the four are therefore alike in being end-sitters, and X is the odd one out as the only middle-sitter in the list. Option A is correct; choosing Q, R or Z would leave the grouping inconsistent because each of those three shares the end-seat property with the other two.

Q15 D

The facing pairs follow from three anchors. First, P sits in the middle of Row 1 and X (France) faces the Indian delegate P, so P-X is one pair. Second, the Japan-Kenya pair must be Y facing R: Y cannot face P (given), and R, who is not Japan, is the only Row 1 person available for Kenya opposite Japanese Y. That accounts for R-Y. The only delegates left are Q in Row 1 and Z in Row 2, so Q faces Z by elimination. Option D states exactly this pair and is correct. Option A is wrong because Y faces R; option B is wrong because X faces P; option C is wrong because P faces X, not Z.

Q16 B

Before the swap, the facing pairs are P-X, R-Y and Q-Z, and Y is the Japanese delegate (established from the Japan-Kenya clue with R as Kenya). If Q and R interchange seats while countries travel with the persons, Q moves into R's old seat — the seat that faces Y — and R moves into Q's old seat, which faces Z. After the interchange, therefore, the person facing the Japanese delegate Y is Q. Option B is correct. Option A fails because R no longer faces Y after vacating that seat; option C fails because P never moves and continues to face X; option D fails because Z sits in Row 2 with Y and cannot face a member of the same row.

Q17 D

Work through the grid. Bela lives in Kochi and was born in December (clue 3). Aman was born in March and cannot live in Pune, Noida or Jaipur (clue 2); with Kochi taken by Bela, Aman must live in Surat. Chirag was born neither in July nor September (clue 4); March and December are taken, so Chirag was born in January and, by clue 1, lives in Pune. The months left for Divya and Esha are July and September; Divya was not born in July (clue 5), so Divya is September and Esha is July. The cities left are Noida and Jaipur; Esha does not live in Jaipur (clue 6), so Esha lives in Noida and Divya lives in Jaipur. Hence Divya is the Jaipur resident — option D.

Q18 B

From the completed arrangement: Bela-December-Kochi; Aman-March-Surat; Chirag-January-Pune; Divya-September-Jaipur; Esha-July-Noida. The Noida resident is Esha. Esha's month follows from elimination: January, March and December were fixed for Chirag, Aman and Bela respectively, leaving July and September for Esha and Divya; since Divya was not born in July (clue 5), Divya takes September and Esha takes July. The friend living in Noida was therefore born in July, which is option B. September (option A) belongs to the Jaipur resident Divya, January (option C) to Pune's Chirag, and March (option D) to Surat's Aman.

Q19 A

Test each combination against the solved grid: Aman-March-Surat, Bela-December-Kochi, Chirag-January-Pune, Divya-September-Jaipur, Esha-July-Noida. Option A says Chirag-January-Pune, which matches exactly: Chirag's months were narrowed to January after July and September were excluded by clue 4 and March and December were taken, and clue 1 then ties the January-born friend to Pune. Option B is wrong because Aman lives in Surat, not Kochi. Option C is doubly wrong: Divya was born in September, not July, although she does live in Jaipur. Option D is also doubly wrong: Esha was born in July, not September, although she does live in Noida. Hence A.

Q20 C

Aman was born in March and Divya in September. Considering the calendar order of the five birth months used in the puzzle — January, March, July, September, December — the months falling strictly between March and September are April through August, of which only July is among the five birth months. Exactly one friend, Esha, was born in July, so exactly one person was born in a month strictly between Aman's and Divya's birth months. Option C (One) is correct. Option A (None) overlooks Esha's July; option B (Two) would require another birth month inside the April-August window, but January and December lie outside it; option D (Three) is impossible with only five friends and three of them anchored to January, March and December.

SECTION C — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q21 B

Astra's market share in 2025 equals Astra's 2025 shipments divided by total 2025 shipments. Formula: share = (40 / 120) x 100. Substituting: 40 divided by 120 is one-third, and one-third expressed as a percentage is 33.33 per cent (33 and one-third per cent). Hence option B. Option A (30%) would require shipments of 36 million on the 120-million base; option C (35%) would require 42 million; option D (40%) would require 48 million — none of which matches Astra's actual 40 million units. The single-step trap here is using the 2024 base of 100 million by mistake, which would give 40 per cent and lure the careless solver to option D.

Q22 D

Compute the percentage growth for each brand using growth = (2025 minus 2024) divided by 2024, times 100. Astra: (40-32)/32 = 8/32 = 25%. Bolt: (20-25)/25 = -20%, a decline. Crest: (26-20)/20 = 6/20 = 30%. Dyno: (18-15)/15 = 3/15 = 20%. Ember: (16-8)/8 = 8/8 = 100%. Ember's shipments doubled, giving it by far the highest percentage growth even though its absolute increase of 8 million units equals Astra's. The trap is to confuse absolute growth with percentage growth: Astra added the same 8 million units but from a base four times larger. Hence option D (Ember), not option A (Astra) or option B (Crest, the second-fastest grower at 30%).

Q23 C

Combined share of Bolt and Dyno in 2024 = (Bolt 2024 + Dyno 2024) divided by total 2024 shipments, times 100. Substituting: (25 + 15) / 100 = 40/100, which is exactly 40 per cent. Hence option C. The arithmetic is deliberately clean because the 2024 total is 100 million units, so each brand's 2024 shipments in millions equals its percentage share directly: Bolt holds 25 per cent and Dyno holds 15 per cent, summing to 40 per cent. Option A (35%) would correspond to 35 million combined units, option B (38%) to 38 million, and option D (42%) to 42 million; none matches the true combined figure of 40 million units.

Q24 A

The required ratio is Crest's 2025 shipments to Bolt's 2024 shipments. Reading the table: Crest shipped 26 million units in 2025 and Bolt shipped 25 million units in 2024. The ratio is therefore 26 : 25, and since 26 and 25 share no common factor greater than one, it is already in lowest terms. Hence option A. Option B (25 : 26) inverts the ratio — the classic ordering error when a question names the second quantity from an earlier year. Option C (13 : 10) would arise from wrongly pairing Crest's 26 with Bolt's 2025 figure of 20 million. Option D (5 : 4) is a rounded distortion matching no pair of values in the table.

Q25 B

Step one: project the 2026 total. Growth of 15 per cent over the 2025 total of 120 million units gives 120 x 1.15 = 138 million units. Step two: find the excess over the 2024 total. The 2024 total is 100 million units, so the difference is 138 - 100 = 38 million units. Hence option B. Option A (35) comes from mistakenly applying 15 per cent to a 100-million base and then comparing with 2025 partway through. Option C (40) would require a 2026 total of 140 million, that is, growth of 16.67 per cent. Option D (42) would require 142 million. The question tests careful sequencing of a two-step computation: first compound, then compare against the correct base year.

Q26 A

Percentage growth in total enrolment = (2024-25 total minus 2023-24 total) divided by the 2023-24 total, times 100. Substituting the table values: (46 - 40) / 40 = 6/40 = 0.15, which is 15 per cent. Hence option A. Option B (12.5%) is the trap for dividing the increase of 6 lakh by 48 instead of 40, or for halving carelessly. Option C (17.5%) would correspond to an increase of 7 lakh on the 40-lakh base. Option D (20%) would require the total to have risen to 48 lakh. The computation is a single clean step, but the question rewards checking that the denominator is the earlier year's figure, not the later one — dividing 6 by 46 gives roughly 13 per cent and matches no option exactly, signalling the error.

Q27 C

Women enrolled in Science in 2024-25 = (percentage of women in Science) x (Science enrolment in 2024-25). From the table, Science enrolment in 2024-25 is 12.0 lakh and women constitute 50 per cent of it. Substituting: 0.50 x 12.0 = 6.0 lakh. Hence option C. Option A (5.4 lakh) is 45 per cent of 12 — the result of misreading Commerce's percentage against Science's enrolment. Option B (5.6 lakh) matches no clean combination and penalises guesswork. Option D (6.6 lakh) is 55 per cent of 12, or alternatively 50 per cent of a misread 13.2 (the Arts figure). The question is a one-step percentage-of-quantity computation that rewards reading the correct row twice — once for the enrolment and once for the percentage.

Q28 D

Compute each discipline's growth rate as (later year minus earlier year) divided by the earlier year. Arts: (13.2-12.0)/12.0 = 1.2/12 = 10%. Science: (12.0-10.0)/10.0 = 20%. Commerce: (8.8-8.0)/8.0 = 10%. Engineering: (7.5-6.0)/6.0 = 1.5/6 = 25%. Medicine: (4.5-4.0)/4.0 = 12.5%. The highest percentage growth is Engineering's 25 per cent, so option D is correct. The trap is absolute versus relative growth: Science added the largest absolute number of students (2 lakh) and tempts the solver towards option B, but on the smaller Engineering base of 6 lakh, an increase of 1.5 lakh translates into the steepest rate. Arts (option A) and Medicine (option C) grew at only 10 and 12.5 per cent respectively.

Q29 B

The ratio of Commerce to Medicine enrolment in 2024-25 is read directly from the second-year column: Commerce 8.8 lakh and Medicine 4.5 lakh, giving 8.8 : 4.5. Clear the decimals by multiplying both terms by 10 to get 88 : 45. Since 88 = 8 x 11 and 45 = 9 x 5 share no common factor, the ratio 88 : 45 is already in lowest terms. Hence option B. Option A (44 : 25) wrongly halves only one term correctly (44 is half of 88 but 25 is not half of 45). Option C (22 : 9) would require Medicine enrolment of 3.6 lakh. Option D (8 : 5) comes from using the 2023-24 figures of 8.0 and 4.0... in fact 8 : 4 reduces to 2 : 1, so 8 : 5 matches no year at all and punishes approximation.

Q30 D

Women enrolled in Engineering in 2024-25 = (percentage of women in Engineering) x (Engineering enrolment in 2024-25). From the table, Engineering enrolment in 2024-25 is 7.5 lakh and women constitute 28 per cent. Substituting: 0.28 x 7.5 = 2.1 lakh. A quick way to verify: 28 per cent of 7.5 equals 28 x 7.5 = 210, and dividing by 100 gives 2.10. Hence option D. Option A (1.8 lakh) is 24 per cent of 7.5, or 28 per cent of a misread 6.5. Option B (1.9 lakh) rewards sloppy rounding of an estimate. Option C (2.0 lakh) is the tempting round number a solver reaches by approximating 28 per cent as roughly a quarter and then padding upward — close, but the exact computation says 2.1.

SECTION D — RAPID-FIRE MIXED REASONING & GK

Q31 C

Break the phrase from the inside out. 'My grandfather's only son' must be Rohan's own father — if the grandfather has only one son, that son is necessarily Rohan's father (Rohan being a grandchild through a son). The woman is 'the daughter of' that man, in other words the daughter of Rohan's father, which makes her Rohan's sister. Hence option C. She is not a cousin (option A), because a cousin would be the daughter of an uncle, and the grandfather has no other son; not a niece (option B), which would require her to be the daughter of Rohan's sibling; and not Rohan's daughter (option D), since she is his father's daughter, one generation above that.

Q32 A

Trace the path on coordinates with the start at the origin. Walking 4 km north reaches (0, 4). Turning right while facing north means facing east; walking 3 km reaches (3, 4). Turning right again means facing south; walking 4 km reaches (3, 0). Turning left while facing south means facing east; walking 2 km reaches (5, 0). The finishing point (5, 0) lies due east of the origin at a straight-line distance of 5 km, so Tara is 5 km east of her start — option A. The northward and southward legs of 4 km cancel exactly, leaving only the two eastward legs of 3 km and 2 km, which sum to 5 km east.

Q33 D

Conclusion II, 'some mirrors are books', is the simple converse of the given particular statement 'some books are mirrors', and a particular affirmative always converts validly — if at least one book is a mirror, that same object is a mirror that is a book. So II follows. Conclusion I, 'some pens are mirrors', does not follow: all pens lie inside the set of books, but the books that are mirrors may be entirely different books from the ones that are pens. A Venn diagram with the pen-circle inside the book-circle and the mirror overlap placed away from the pens satisfies both statements while falsifying I. Hence only II follows — option D.

Q34 B

Decode the pattern from the given pair. L to N, A to C, W to Y, Y to A, E to G, R to T: every letter of LAWYER moves forward by two places in the alphabet, with wrap-around at the end (Y + 2 = A). Apply the same shift of +2 to JUDGE: J becomes L, U becomes W, D becomes F, G becomes I, and E becomes G. The coded word is therefore LWFIG — option B. Option A (LWFIH) errs on the final letter (E + 2 is G, not H); option C (LVFIG) shifts U by only one place; option D (KWFIG) shifts J by only one place. Consistency of the +2 shift across all five letters settles the answer.

Q35 A

Inspect the gaps between consecutive terms: 12 - 7 = 5, 22 - 12 = 10, 42 - 22 = 20, 82 - 42 = 40. The differences 5, 10, 20, 40 double at every step, so the next difference is 80, and the next term is 82 + 80 = 162 — option A. An equivalent check: each term satisfies the recurrence next = 2 x current - 2 (for instance 2 x 42 - 2 = 82), and applying it once more gives 2 x 82 - 2 = 162, confirming the answer by a second route. Options B, C and D (164, 158, 172) each break both the doubling-difference pattern and the recurrence.

Q36 C

Use a base of 100. After a 25 per cent increase, the price becomes 100 x 1.25 = 125. A subsequent decrease of 20 per cent applies to the new price of 125, not the original: 125 x 0.80 = 100. The final price equals the starting price, so the net change is exactly zero — option C. The classic error is adding the percentages (+25 - 20 = +5) to choose option A; successive percentage changes multiply rather than add, because the second change acts on an altered base. The shortcut formula gives the same result: net change = a + b + ab/100 = 25 - 20 + (25 x -20)/100 = 5 - 5 = 0.

Q37 B

When a train crosses a signal pole, the distance covered equals the train's own length, because a pole is effectively a point. Speed = distance / time = 240 metres / 12 seconds = 20 metres per second. Convert to kilometres per hour by multiplying by 18/5: 20 x 18/5 = 72 km/h — option B. Option A (64) would correspond to roughly 17.8 m/s; option C (80) to 22.2 m/s, which would need a crossing time of 10.8 seconds; option D (84) to 23.3 m/s. The two standard facts tested are the pole-crossing distance rule and the m/s-to-km/h conversion factor of 18/5.

Q38 D

To chain the ratios, make the common term B equal in both. A : B = 3 : 4 and B : C = 6 : 7. The least common multiple of 4 and 6 is 12, so scale the first ratio by 3 to get A : B = 9 : 12, and the second by 2 to get B : C = 12 : 14. With B aligned at 12, the combined ratio is A : B : C = 9 : 12 : 14, so A : C = 9 : 14. Option A (3 : 7) wrongly multiplies first terms and last terms without aligning B; option B (6 : 7) merely copies the second ratio; option C (9 : 13) miscomputes 7 x 2 as 13 instead of 14. Hence option D.

Q39 A

Article 32 guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights and empowers the Court to issue writs — habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari — for that purpose. In the Constituent Assembly, Dr Ambedkar called Article 32 the very heart and soul of the Constitution, reasoning that rights without remedies are worthless and that this Article makes every other fundamental right enforceable. Hence option A. Article 21 (option B) protects life and personal liberty; Article 14 (option C) guarantees equality before the law; Article 19 (option D) protects the six freedoms — all substantive rights, but none of them the remedial provision Ambedkar singled out for that famous description.

Q40 C

Ganga, Yamuna and Brahmaputra are all Himalayan rivers: they rise in or beyond the Himalayan ranges (the Brahmaputra rises in Tibet near Lake Manasarovar as the Tsangpo), are fed substantially by snow and glacier melt, and are perennial in the strong sense of carrying meltwater through the dry season. The Godavari, by contrast, is a peninsular river: it rises in the Western Ghats at Trimbakeshwar in Maharashtra, depends almost wholly on monsoon rainfall, and flows east across the Deccan plateau to the Bay of Bengal. The classification Himalayan versus peninsular is the way in which three of the four are alike, and Godavari, option C, is the odd one out. Hence option C.