

**ANSWER KEY — 22 JUNE 2026**

|            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |            |
|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| <b>Q1</b>  | <b>Q2</b>  | <b>Q3</b>  | <b>Q4</b>  | <b>Q5</b>  | <b>Q6</b>  | <b>Q7</b>  | <b>Q8</b>  | <b>Q9</b>  | <b>Q10</b> |
| A          | A          | D          | B          | A          | C          | A          | C          | A          | B          |
| <b>Q11</b> | <b>Q12</b> | <b>Q13</b> | <b>Q14</b> | <b>Q15</b> | <b>Q16</b> | <b>Q17</b> | <b>Q18</b> | <b>Q19</b> | <b>Q20</b> |
| C          | D          | B          | A          | C          | D          | A          | B          | C          | D          |
| <b>Q21</b> | <b>Q22</b> | <b>Q23</b> | <b>Q24</b> | <b>Q25</b> | <b>Q26</b> | <b>Q27</b> | <b>Q28</b> | <b>Q29</b> | <b>Q30</b> |
| A          | C          | B          | D          | A          | B          | C          | D          | A          | B          |
| <b>Q31</b> | <b>Q32</b> | <b>Q33</b> | <b>Q34</b> | <b>Q35</b> | <b>Q36</b> | <b>Q37</b> | <b>Q38</b> | <b>Q39</b> | <b>Q40</b> |
| D          | B          | C          | D          | B          | C          | D          | B          | C          | D          |

**SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING**
**Q1 A**

This applies the Bolam standard (*Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee*). A professional is not negligent if he acts in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of skilled opinion in that field, even if a contrary and larger body would have acted differently. Dr. Mehra followed a method endorsed by a respected minority of cardiologists, which suffices to discharge the standard of care; the law does not require a doctor to adopt the majority view, only a responsible one. Option B wrongly demands conformity with the majority. Option C confuses harm with breach: harm alone never proves negligence without a failure to meet the standard of care. Option D misstates consent, which does not absolve negligent treatment. Hence (A).

**Q2 A**

This invokes *res ipsa loquitur* (*Byrne v Boadle*, the falling-flour-barrel case). Where an accident is of a kind that does not ordinarily happen without negligence and the instrumentality was under the defendant's exclusive control, negligence may be inferred and the evidential burden shifts to the defendant to offer an innocent explanation. A falling sack from the warehouse satisfies both conditions, so the passer-by recovers absent a satisfactory rebuttal. Option B wrongly insists on proof of a specific careless act, which is precisely what *res ipsa loquitur* dispenses with. Option C denies a duty, but *Donoghue v Stevenson's* neighbour principle plainly covers passers-by below. Option D misstates the law as strict liability; negligence law permits rebuttal. Hence (A).

**Q3 D**

The question asks which statement is INCORRECT. Option D is incorrect because a learner driver is judged by the objective standard of the reasonably competent driver, not the lower standard of a nervous beginner (*Nettleship v Weston*). Inexperience affords no excuse; the standard is impersonal. Option A correctly states the objective reasonable-person standard, which disregards the defendant's personal limitations. Option B correctly states the professional standard of an ordinarily competent member of the profession. Option C correctly reflects that a greater foreseeable risk of serious harm demands greater precaution (the risk-precaution calculus). Since the question seeks the false proposition, and D alone misstates the learner-driver rule, it is the answer. Hence (D).

**Q4 B**

Remoteness of damage limits liability to harm of a reasonably foreseeable kind (*The Wagon Mound (No 1)*). Even if a breach factually causes loss, the defendant is liable only where the type of damage was a foreseeable consequence of the breach. Option B states this correctly. Option A is wrong because negligence does not require intention to cause the precise harm; intention belongs to other torts. Option C states the discredited direct-consequence test from *Re Polemis*, which *Wagon Mound* superseded with the foreseeability test, so it is incorrect. Option D conflates remoteness with contributory negligence, which are distinct doctrines; the absence of claimant fault is not the test for remoteness. The best description of remoteness is therefore the foreseeability formulation. Hence (B).

**Q5 A**

A learner driver is judged against the objective standard of the reasonably competent and experienced driver (*Nettleship v Weston*). The standard of care is impersonal and does not bend to accommodate the defendant's inexperience; doing one's incompetent best is no defence. The learner who mounts the kerb and injures a pedestrian has fallen below that single objective standard and is liable, notwithstanding her care as a beginner. Option B wrongly applies a lenient beginner's standard, which the law rejects. Option C wrongly shifts the entire duty onto instructors; the learner driver herself owes a duty to other road users. Option D wrongly adopts a subjective standard measuring only the learner's own capacity, contrary to the objective nature of the reasonable-person test. Hence (A).

**Q6 C**

A retained surgical swab is the classic *res ipsa loquitur* scenario. The injury would not ordinarily occur without negligence, and the operation was under the surgeon's exclusive control, so the unexplained presence of the swab raises an inference of negligence and shifts the evidential burden to the surgeon to explain. Option A wrongly demands direct proof of the specific negligent act, which *res ipsa loquitur* dispenses with. Option B misuses consent: a patient consents to inherent surgical risks, not to a swab being negligently left inside. Option D is wrong because *res ipsa loquitur* can operate against an individual professional in exclusive control, not only against an institution. The doctrine therefore assists the patient by inference. Hence (C).

**Q7 A**

Under the BNS, 2023 (Section 38, formerly IPC s.100), the right of private defence of the body extends to voluntarily causing death where the assault reasonably causes the apprehension that death or grievous hurt will otherwise result. An assailant levelling a loaded firearm creates exactly such apprehension, so Ravi's fatal stabbing is protected. Option B is wrong: Indian law imposes no general duty to retreat before exercising private defence where the apprehension is genuine and immediate. Option C is wrong because the right does extend to causing death in the enumerated situations. Option D misstates the law by suggesting protection turns on who struck first; what matters is the reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt, not the sequence of blows. Hence (A).

**Q8 C**

Section 35 of the BNS, 2023 provides that there is no right of private defence against an act done by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, even if the act is not strictly justifiable by law, so long as it does not cause reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt. An officer making an arrest in good faith under apparent authority, despite a technically defective warrant, falls within this protection, so Sameer's beating of the officer is not shielded. Option A wrongly treats a technical defect as stripping all authority. Option B wrongly permits resistance based on the citizen's personal belief, which the section excludes. Option D wrongly imports a proportionality saving where the very right is absent. Sameer therefore has no right of private defence here. Hence (C).

**Q9 A**

The question asks which statement is INCORRECT. Option A is incorrect: Section 38 of the BNS, 2023 caps private defence at the harm necessary for the purpose of defence; it never entitles the defender to inflict any quantum of harm merely because some apprehension of danger has arisen. Proportionality governs every exercise of the right. Options B, C and D each state the law correctly: the right defends movable and immovable property against theft, robbery and trespass (Section 34); it protects one's own body and the body of any other person (Section 34); and it is restricted against a public servant acting in good faith unless death or grievous hurt is reasonably apprehended (Section 35). The false proposition is therefore A. Hence (A).

**Q10 B**

Proportionality is the cardinal limit on private defence. Section 38 of the BNS, 2023 provides that the right in no case extends to inflicting more harm than is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence. Option B states this rule precisely and is the best description. Option A is wrong because the measure is objective necessity, not the aggressor's subjective intention. Option C overstates the limit: the defender is not obliged to suffer grievous injury rather than respond; he must use no more than necessary force, which can include substantial force when warranted. Option D is wrong because proportionality is never irrelevant; it governs every exercise of the right throughout. The necessity-bounded formulation in B is the correct description. Hence (B).

**Q11 C**

The right of private defence is a shield, not a sword, and it lasts only so long as the reasonable apprehension of danger continues. Once the thief has fled with the purse and the immediate danger has passed, the right is extinguished; pursuing and beating him an hour later is retaliation, not defence, and is unlawful. Option A wrongly converts the right into a licence to punish, but private defence is preventive, not punitive. Option B wrongly claims the right endures until the goods are recovered, ignoring the temporal limit tied to subsisting apprehension. Option D wrongly suggests her only error was excessive harm; the deeper defect is that the right had already ceased, so no quantum of harm was justified. The continuance limit defeats her claim. Hence (C).

**Q12 D**

Proportionality under Section 38 of the BNS, 2023 forbids inflicting more harm than necessary, and the right extends to causing death only in enumerated grave situations such as apprehension of death, grievous hurt, rape, or acid attack. A harmless simple trespasser posing no threat to the body does not fall within any category permitting lethal force, so shooting him dead is grossly disproportionate and unlawful. Option A wrongly licenses any degree of force to protect property. Option B wrongly asserts that trespass always justifies death; the right to defend property extends to death only against robbery, house-breaking by night, or arson causing apprehension, not simple trespass. Option C wrongly implies a prior warning could legitimise lethal force against a harmless trespasser. Killing here exceeds the necessity and enumerated-situation limits. Hence (D).

SECTION B – ANALYTICAL REASONING

**Q13 B**

Test each option against all seven rules. Option A, P,R,S,V, fails Rule 7, because S and V can never both appear on the panel together. Option C, Q,R,U,V, fails Rule 6: Q is present but T is absent, so the requirement that Q implies T is broken, and it is invalid regardless of the other seats. Option D, P,S,T,V, fails Rule 4, since V is present but R is absent, violating V implies R. Option B, P,R,U,V, is now checked in full. Rule 1 holds because Q is absent, so P and Q are not both in. Rule 2 holds because R is present. Rule 3 holds because only U, not T, is chosen. Rule 4 holds because both V and R are present. Rule 5 holds because R and U are both present. Rule 6 is vacuously satisfied since Q is absent. Rule 7 holds because S is absent. Every condition is simultaneously met, so B is the unique valid panel. Hence (B).

**Q14 A**

Suppose V is selected for the panel. By Rule 4, the presence of V immediately forces R onto the panel. By Rule 5, the presence of R then forces U onto the panel as well. So V, R and U already occupy three of the four available seats, and we must determine the fourth. That seat cannot be Q, because Rule 6 would then demand T, yet Rule 3 forbids T from sitting alongside U. It cannot be S, because Rule 7 bars S from appearing together with V. It cannot be T, because Rule 3 again forbids T together with U. The only candidate left for the fourth seat is P, giving the forced panel exactly as {P, R, U, V}. Therefore, whenever V is chosen, candidates S, T and Q are each impossible, while R is not merely possible but actually compelled by the chain of implications. The candidate that must necessarily also be selected is R. Hence (A).

**Q15 C**

There are exactly two valid four-member panels, namely {P,R,S,U} and {P,R,U,V}, as established by checking the seven rules against every four-element subset. We test each listed pair for the possibility of co-service. P and R appear together in both valid panels, so that pair can serve together. R and U appear together in both panels, so that pair is fine as well. P and U also appear together in both panels, so they too can co-serve without trouble. Now consider Q and U. If Q were ever selected, Rule 6 would force T onto the panel, but Rule 3 expressly forbids T and U from sitting together; hence Q and U can never coexist on any valid panel. This is corroborated by direct enumeration, since Q does not appear in either of the two valid panels at all. The pair that can never serve together is therefore Q and U. Hence (C).

**Q16 D**

Suppose S is selected for the panel. Rule 2, which requires at least one of R and S, is immediately satisfied by S. Rule 7 now excludes V from the panel, since S and V can never both appear. We next ask whether R is present. If R is selected, Rule 5 forces U as well, yielding the partial panel {S, R, U} plus one remaining seat. That fourth seat cannot be V (excluded by Rule 7), cannot be T (Rule 3 forbids T alongside U), and cannot be Q (Rule 6 would demand T, which is blocked), leaving only P. This produces {P, R, S, U}. If instead R were absent, exhaustive enumeration shows that no valid four-member panel containing S but lacking R exists, so that branch is impossible. Hence selecting S forces exactly one complete panel, {S, P, R, U}, which coincides precisely with the enumerated valid panel {P, R, S, U}. Hence (D).

**Q17 A**

From Rule 1, Asha is in Delhi, and from Rule 4, Biren is in Surat, so the cities Mumbai, Pune and Kochi must be distributed among Chetan, Devi and Esha. Rule 8 keeps Chetan out of Mumbai, and Rule 9 keeps Esha out of Kochi. The Mumbai analyst speaks Marathi by Rule 2; since Chetan speaks Bengali by Rule 3, Chetan cannot occupy Mumbai, which is also consistent with Rule 8. Esha, being barred from Kochi, must therefore take Mumbai and speak Marathi, leaving Chetan and Devi to fill Pune and Kochi between them. Rule 7 bars Devi from Pune, so Devi must take Kochi while Chetan takes Pune. The Kannada speaker works in Kochi by Rule 6, and the only language still available for Devi is indeed Kannada, which fits perfectly. Therefore Devi works in Kochi. No alternative arrangement survives every condition, so the grid is unique. Hence (A).

**Q18 B**

Construct the grid step by step. Asha is in Delhi and Biren is in Surat by Rules 1 and 4. Esha cannot be in Kochi by Rule 9, and Chetan cannot be in Mumbai by Rule 8, so among the remaining cities Mumbai, Pune and Kochi the Mumbai seat must fall to Esha, who is then fluent in Marathi by Rule 2. Devi cannot be in Pune by Rule 7, so Devi takes Kochi and Chetan takes Pune. Turning to languages, Asha is Gujarati by Rule 5, Chetan is Bengali by Rule 3, Esha is Marathi as just shown, and the Kannada speaker works in Kochi by Rule 6, which is Devi; the only language left over, Tamil, goes to Biren. The analyst posted in Pune is therefore Chetan, whose language is Bengali. Hence (B).

**Q19 C**

Resolve the complete assignment first. Rules 1 and 4 fix Asha in Delhi and Biren in Surat. Esha is excluded from Kochi by Rule 9, and Chetan is excluded from Mumbai by Rule 8. Since only Chetan, Devi and Esha remain for Mumbai, Pune and Kochi, Esha must take Mumbai and is therefore Marathi by Rule 2. Devi is barred from Pune by Rule 7, so Devi takes Kochi and Chetan takes Pune. For languages, Chetan is Bengali by Rule 3, Esha is Marathi, the Kochi analyst Devi is Kannada by Rule 6, and Asha is Gujarati by Rule 5. The single remaining language, Tamil, is assigned to Biren. With every cell now fixed, Asha, who works in Delhi, is fluent in Gujarati. Every other candidate language is already claimed, so Gujarati is the only possibility that keeps the whole grid consistent. Hence (C).

**Q20 D**

From the fully locked grid we have Asha in Delhi with Gujarati, Biren in Surat with Tamil, Chetan in Pune with Bengali, Devi in Kochi with Kannada, and Esha in Mumbai with Marathi. The crucial step turns on Rule 9, which keeps Esha out of Kochi, and Rule 8, which keeps Chetan out of Mumbai. With Asha and Biren already fixed in Delhi and Surat, the Mumbai seat among Chetan, Devi and Esha can only be Esha: Chetan is barred by Rule 8, and placing Devi in Mumbai would leave Esha for Kochi, violating Rule 9. So Esha holds Mumbai, and by Rule 2 the Mumbai analyst is fluent in Marathi. Consequently the analyst who works in Mumbai, and is therefore fluent in Marathi, is Esha. No other analyst can occupy Mumbai without breaking Rule 8 or Rule 9. Hence (D).

## SECTION C – QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

**Q21 A**

Conversion rate = (Buyers / Footfall) x 100. For Belmont, buyers = 1600 and footfall = 5000. Substituting:  $(1600 / 5000) \times 100 = 0.32 \times 100 = 32\%$ . So nearly a third of all visitors to Belmont made a purchase. Comparing with other outlets confirms this is among the strongest conversion figures in the table. The distractors arise from common slips: 30% comes from using a footfall of 5333 or rounding loosely, 28% from misreading buyers as 1400, and 36% from dividing 1600 by an incorrect 4444. The correct, exact computation gives  $1600/5000 = 0.32$ , hence 32%. Hence (A).

**Q22 C**

Revenue = Buyers x Average Bill. Computing each: Aster =  $1200 \times 850 = 10,20,000$ ; Belmont =  $1600 \times 750 = 12,00,000$ ; Crest =  $900 \times 1100 = 9,90,000$ ; Dale =  $1350 \times 920 = 12,42,000$ ; Elm =  $1800 \times 700 = 12,60,000$ . The largest of these is Elm at Rs. 12,60,000, even though Elm has the lowest average bill, because its buyer count is highest. Dale (12,42,000) is a close near-miss, and Belmont (12,00,000) is the next contender, which is why both appear as distractors. Aster, with the smallest revenue among the leaders, is the trap for hasty readers. The maximum, Rs. 12,60,000, belongs to Elm. Hence (C).

**Q23 B**

Revenue = Buyers x Average Bill. For Aster, buyers = 1200 and average bill = Rs. 850. Substituting:  $1200 \times 850 = 10,20,000$ . So Aster generated Rs. 10,20,000 over the week. The distractors are revenues of other outlets used as foils: Rs. 9,90,000 is Crest's revenue ( $900 \times 1100$ ), Rs. 11,20,000 is a fabricated near value, and Rs. 12,42,000 is Dale's revenue ( $1350 \times 920$ ). Only Rs. 10,20,000 matches the exact product  $1200 \times 850$ . Hence (B).

**Q24 D**

The ratio of buyers = Crest buyers : Belmont buyers =  $900 : 1600$ . To simplify, divide both terms by their greatest common divisor, 100, giving  $9 : 16$ . Since 9 and 16 share no further common factor, 9:16 is the ratio in lowest terms. The distractors test simplification errors: 3:5 would arise from incorrectly using 900:1500, 5:8 from using 1000:1600, and 8:15 from an unrelated reduction. The exact reduction of 900:1600 is 9:16. Hence (D).

**Q25 A**

Combined conversion rate = (total buyers / total footfall) x 100 for the two outlets together. Aster + Dale buyers =  $1200 + 1350 = 2550$ . Aster + Dale footfall =  $4000 + 4500 = 8500$ . Substituting:  $(2550 / 8500) \times 100 = 0.30 \times 100 = 30\%$ . The key is to pool the totals first rather than averaging the two separate rates. Distractors of 31%, 28% and 32% come from mis-adding the buyers or footfalls. The exact value  $2550/8500 = 0.30$  gives 30%. Hence (A).

**Q26 B**

Average loan size = Amount disbursed / Number of accounts, with attention to units. For MSME, amount = Rs. 3600 crore and accounts = 600 thousand. Computing:  $3600 \text{ crore} / 600 \text{ thousand} = (3600 \times 10^7) / (600 \times 10^3) = 6 \times 10^5 \text{ rupees} = \text{Rs. } 6.0 \text{ lakh per account}$ . The distractors Rs. 4.0, Rs. 5.0 and Rs. 7.2 lakh come from pairing the wrong amount or account figure. The exact result is Rs. 6.0 lakh. Hence (B).

**Q27 C**

Percentage share = (sector amount / total amount) x 100. Total disbursed =  $2400 + 3600 + 4800 + 1200 + 2000 = 14000$  crore. Housing = 4800 crore. Substituting:  $(4800 / 14000) \times 100 = 0.342857... \times 100 = 34.29\%$ , which rounds to about 34.3%. The distractors reflect wrong totals: 28.6% uses a total of 16800, 30% uses 16000, and 40% uses 12000. With the correct total of 14000, the share is  $4800/14000 = 34.3\%$ . Hence (C).

**Q28 D**

The ratio of amounts = Agriculture : Personal =  $2400 : 2000$ . Divide both terms by their greatest common divisor, 400:  $2400/400 = 6$  and  $2000/400 = 5$ , giving  $6 : 5$ . Since 6 and 5 are coprime, this is fully reduced. The distractors invert or mis-simplify: 5:6 is the reciprocal, 4:5 comes from using 1600:2000, and 12:11 is an unrelated reduction. The correct lowest-terms ratio of 2400:2000 is 6:5. Hence (D).

**Q29 A**

Percentage increase = ((new - old) / old) x 100. Personal-loan disbursement rose from Rs. 1600 crore in FY24 to Rs. 2000 crore in FY25. Substituting:  $((2000 - 1600) / 1600) \times 100 = (400 / 1600) \times 100 = 0.25 \times 100 = 25\%$ . The distractors come from dividing by the wrong base: 20% divides 400 by 2000 (the new figure), 30% mis-states the gap, and 16% divides by an incorrect base. The increase must be measured against the prior figure 1600, giving  $400/1600 = 25\%$ . Hence (A).

**Q30 B**

Average accounts per sector = (total accounts across sectors) / (number of sectors). Total accounts =  $800 + 600 + 400 + 300 + 500 = 2600$  thousand. Number of sectors = 5. Substituting:  $2600 / 5 = 520$  thousand accounts per sector. The distractors test arithmetic slips: 500 would require a total of 2500, 540 a total of 2700, and 480 a total of 2400. The accurate sum is 2600, so dividing by 5 gives exactly 520 thousand. Hence (B).

## SECTION D — RAPID-FIRE MIXED REASONING &amp; GK

**Q31 D**

The phrase 'the only daughter of my mother' must refer to Reena herself, because the only daughter that Reena's mother has is Reena. Therefore the man's mother is Reena, which makes Reena the man's mother. A common trap is to read 'only daughter' as a sister, but a sister would require the mother to have more than one daughter, which the clue explicitly rules out. Working the relationship backward from the innermost phrase outward is the reliable method. Hence (D).

**Q32 B**

Set up a coordinate grid with the start at the origin. The man first walks 4 km north, reaching (0, 4). A right turn from facing north points east, so 3 km east brings him to (3, 4). A second right turn from east points south, so 4 km south brings him to (3, 0). The northward and southward legs of 4 km each cancel exactly, leaving a net displacement of 3 km due east of his starting point. Hence (B).

**Q33 C**

First decode the rule from the example. Comparing FROG with GSPH letter by letter: F to G, R to S, O to P, and G to H — each letter advances by exactly one position in the alphabet. Apply the same +1 shift to TOAD: T becomes U, O becomes P, A becomes B, and D becomes E, giving UPBE. Distractors such as UPBF or UQBE introduce a wrong shift on a single letter, so careful position-by-position substitution is essential. Hence (C).

**Q34 D**

Examine the pattern in two ways. The successive differences are 4, 6, 8, 10, which increase by 2 each time, so the next difference is 12 and the next term is  $30 + 12 = 42$ . Equivalently, each term is the product of consecutive integers:  $1 \times 2 = 2$ ,  $2 \times 3 = 6$ ,  $3 \times 4 = 12$ ,  $4 \times 5 = 20$ ,  $5 \times 6 = 30$ , so the sixth term is  $6 \times 7 = 42$ . Both methods agree. Hence (D).

**Q35 B**

Represent the statements with sets. 'All pens are books' places the entire set of pens inside the set of books; converting this universal affirmative gives 'Some books are pens', so Conclusion II follows necessarily. 'Some books are red' tells us only that part of the books overlap with red things, but those red books need not be among the pens, so Conclusion I, 'Some pens are red', is merely a possibility, not a certainty. Hence (B).

**Q36 C**

Use a convenient cost price of Rs. 100. Marking up 40% gives a marked price of Rs. 140. A 25% discount on the marked price means the customer pays 75% of 140, which is  $140 \times 0.75 = \text{Rs. } 105$ . The profit is the selling price minus the cost price:  $105 - 100 = \text{Rs. } 5$ , so the profit percentage is 5%. A frequent error is to subtract 25% from 40% to get 15%, ignoring that the discount applies to the larger marked price. Hence (C).

**Q37 D**

Article 17 of the Constitution abolishes 'untouchability' and forbids its practice in any form, making its enforcement a punishable offence; it is one of the rights to equality. The distractors test confusion among the equality and liberty provisions: Article 14 guarantees equality before law and the equal protection of laws, Article 21 protects life and personal liberty, and Article 19 lists the six fundamental freedoms such as speech and assembly. Only Article 17 deals specifically with untouchability. Hence (D).

**Q38 B**

To cross a pole, a train must travel a distance equal to its own length, since a pole is effectively a point. Speed = distance / time =  $150 \text{ m} / 15 \text{ s} = 10 \text{ m/s}$ . Convert to kilometres per hour by multiplying by 18/5:  $10 \times 18/5 = 36 \text{ km/h}$ . The tempting distractor of 10 km/h forgets to convert from metres per second, while values like 45 km/h come from using a wrong length or time. Hence (B).

**Q39 C**

Article 32 guarantees the Right to Constitutional Remedies, empowering a citizen to move the Supreme Court directly for the enforcement of fundamental rights through writs such as habeas corpus and mandamus. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar famously called it the 'heart and soul' of the Constitution. Article 226, though it also confers writ jurisdiction, belongs to the High Courts and is not itself a fundamental right, while Article 44 is a Directive Principle on a uniform civil code. Hence (C).

**Q40 D**

A triangle, a square and a pentagon are all polygons, that is, closed plane figures bounded entirely by straight line segments and possessing a definite number of vertices and angles. A circle, by contrast, is bounded by a single continuous curved line and has no straight sides and no vertices at all. On the defining property of being made of straight edges, the circle stands apart from the other three figures, making it the odd one out. Hence (D).