ANSWER KEY — 24 JUNE 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
D	B	A	A	D	D	D	A	C	D
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
A	C	B	B	C	A	B	D	C	B
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**	**Q27**	**Q28**	**Q29**	**Q30**
B	A	D	C	C	A	B	D	C	B
Q31	**Q32**	**Q33**	**Q34**	**Q35**	**Q36**	**Q37**	**Q38**	**Q39**	**Q40**
A	C	B	D	A	B	C	A	D	A
Q41									
C									

SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING

Q1 D

Per Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v State of UP, promissory estoppel binds the Government; an unequivocal promise intended to be acted upon, and in fact acted upon, prevents the promisor resiling unless it discharges the burden of showing overriding public interest. Here the State announced a definite three-year holiday and pleaded no such reason, so it remains bound. The view that consideration is required misstates the doctrine, whose entire purpose is to bind a promise lacking classical consideration; the equity arises from reliance, not bargain. The claim that estoppel never binds Government is wrong after Anglo Afghan Agencies and Motilal, which expressly applied it to the State even in fiscal and incentive contexts. The requirement of proving actual financial detriment is also incorrect: Motilal held detriment is not essential — mere alteration of position in reliance suffices. The firm built the factory in reliance, satisfying the doctrine's core requirement, so it can hold the State to the promised holiday absent a demonstrated supervening public interest. Hence (D) is the correct answer.

Q2 B

A settled limit on promissory estoppel is that it cannot be invoked to compel a public authority to do something ultra vires or contrary to statute. There is no estoppel against a statute, and the equity yields wherever enforcement would force an unlawful act. Since the scheme was unauthorised by the governing legislation, the promised licence lies outside the municipality's lawful power, and no estoppel can force its grant however much the builder spent. The options asserting that reliance or detriment binds the municipality ignore this overriding limit — reliance cannot validate what the law forbids, and Motilal's rule that detriment is unnecessary does not enlarge a power the statute never conferred. Likewise, the proposition that Government promises bind 'regardless of the enabling statute' is incorrect, because the doctrine operates within, not against, the statutory framework. Anglo Afghan Agencies and Motilal both bind the State only where the promised act is intra vires. The builder's reliance, however genuine, cannot manufacture a power the statute withholds, so the refusal stands. Hence (B) is the correct answer.

Q3 A

The doctrine, as crystallised in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v State of UP, binds a promisor who, by an unequivocal promise, induces another to alter its position, even without consideration — yet it is qualified by limits: no estoppel against a statute, no compulsion of ultra vires acts, and the State may resile on demonstrated overriding public interest, the burden lying on it. The description requiring consideration and measurable loss is wrong on two counts, since the doctrine's purpose is precisely to bind promises lacking consideration, and Motilal held detriment unnecessary because alteration of position alone suffices. Calling it 'absolute' with no State defence ignores the recognised public-interest escape and the statutory limits that confine the equity. The claim that it never binds Government flatly contradicts Anglo Afghan Agencies and Motilal, which applied it squarely to the State even in incentive and revenue matters. Only the first statement captures both the binding effect on a promise inducing reliance and the equitable boundaries — statutory, ultra vires, and public-interest — that frame the doctrine accurately. Hence (A) is the correct answer.

Q4 A

The incorrect statement is that the doctrine can compel a public body to act beyond its statutory powers if reliance is shown. This is precisely what the law forbids: estoppel cannot validate an ultra vires act, and there is no estoppel against a statute, regardless of how strong the reliance may be. The other three statements are accurate restatements of settled law. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v State of UP recognises that the Government may resile where it discharges the heavy burden of showing overriding public interest. Motilal also held that detriment is not an essential ingredient — mere alteration of position in reliance suffices to raise the equity. It is equally settled that no estoppel operates against the exercise of legislative power, since the legislature cannot be fettered in making law for the future. Thus the proposition allowing reliance to override statutory limits stands alone as a misstatement of the doctrine's recognised boundaries, while the remaining three correctly state its operation and its principal exceptions. Hence (A) is the correct answer.

NAME: _____ ROLL NO: _____ BATCH: _____

Q5 D

Promissory estoppel requires a promise made within the promisor's competence; an assurance given by an officer lacking authority cannot bind the State, because estoppel cannot compel an act outside lawful power, and there is no estoppel against a statute that vests the power elsewhere. Where only the Cabinet could sanction the subsidy, the officer's unauthorised commitment falls outside his power and founds no estoppel at all. The options treating any officer's assurance or the contractor's reliance as conclusive ignore this competence requirement — reliance on an ultra vires representation gains nothing, since the doctrine never validates what the law withholds, and Motilal's relaxation of detriment does not relax the need for authority. The sweeping claim that estoppel never applies to the State in fiscal or subsidy matters is also wrong: Motilal and Anglo Afghan Agencies applied it to the Government, including incentive and revenue contexts, provided the promise was intra vires. The decisive defect here is the want of authority, not the subject-matter, so the State is not bound by the officer's assurance. Hence (D) is the correct answer.

Q6 D

It is firmly settled, and reaffirmed in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v State of UP, that there can be no estoppel against a statute or against the exercise of legislative power. Once a valid statute expressly prohibits the concession, the earlier promise cannot be enforced through estoppel, because the doctrine operates within the law and cannot override a competent legislative enactment passed for the future. The view that reliance 'freezes' the promise permanently is wrong — equity cannot fetter the legislature's continuing power to make and unmake law. The notion that a vested equity always overrides later legislation inverts the hierarchy; legislative power prevails over equitable estoppel, not the reverse. The detriment-based option also misstates the test, since Motilal held detriment unnecessary, and in any event the bar here flows directly from the prohibiting statute, not from any failure of proof by the firm. The supervening statute therefore extinguishes the estoppel claim entirely, leaving the firm without that particular remedy whatever its prior reliance. Hence (D) is the correct answer.

Q7 D

The injury A intended — a broken leg — is not, in the ordinary course of nature, sufficient to cause death, so clause (c) of Section 101 murder is not satisfied. A did not intend death, so clause (a) fails; A did not know the injury was likely to cause this particular person's death, since the haemophilia was unknown, so clause (b) fails; and an ordinary leg-strike is not so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, so clause (d) fails too. Death resulted only because of B's unknown special condition. A nonetheless intended bodily injury and death in fact ensued, so the act is culpable homicide under Section 100, but not murder under Section 101. The 'no offence' option is wrong because intended bodily injury that causes death squarely constitutes culpable homicide. The two murder classifications both fail, because liability for murder through injury requires either knowledge of the victim's special vulnerability or an injury ordinarily sufficient to kill, and neither element is present on these facts. Hence (D) is the correct answer.

Q8 A

The facts squarely attract the Exception covering culpable homicide committed without premeditation in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, where the offender takes no undue advantage and does not act in a cruel or unusual manner. Where this Exception applies, what would otherwise be murder under Section 101 is reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The two 'murder' options ignore the Exception entirely: even though the single blow was intended and caused death, the sudden-fight circumstances mitigate the offence by removing premeditation and reflecting a sudden loss of self-control. The claim that heat of passion becomes irrelevant once the accused struck the fatal blow misreads the Exception, which by its very terms presupposes that the accused did cause the death. The 'no culpable homicide' option is also wrong, because death intentionally caused remains culpable homicide; the Exception lowers the grade of the offence, it does not negate the homicide itself. Hence culpable homicide not amounting to murder is the accurate classification here. Hence (A) is the correct answer.

Q9 C

Culpable homicide is the genus and murder the aggravated species: every murder is culpable homicide, but culpable homicide becomes murder only when it satisfies one of the four clauses of Section 101 and no Exception applies to reduce it. The decisive features are the degree of intention or knowledge and the absence of any mitigating Exception, the presence of which reduces murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The statement that murder always requires premeditation is inaccurate, since clause (d) rests on knowledge of imminently dangerous, near-certain fatality rather than premeditation, and culpable homicide can plainly involve intention as well. The 'two or more persons' proposition is invented; the number of victims is not the distinguishing test at all. The claim that a weapon distinguishes the two offences is equally baseless, as either may be committed with or without a weapon. Only the description of culpable homicide as the broader category, with murder its aggravated form subject to the statutory Exceptions, correctly states the relationship that the BNS establishes between the two offences. Hence (C) is the correct answer.

Q10 D

The incorrect statement is that knowledge an act is likely to cause death always amounts to murder under all circumstances. Mere knowledge of likelihood, under Section 100, can constitute culpable homicide that is not murder; murder through knowledge requires the heightened standard of clause (d) of Section 101 — an act so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or fatal injury, committed with no excuse for incurring that risk. Ordinary likelihood is a distinctly lower threshold and does not automatically rise to murder. The other three statements are correct. Grave and sudden provocation is a recognised Exception reducing murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. An injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death falls within clause (c) of murder. Exceeding the right of private defence in good faith is another Exception that mitigates an offence below murder. Thus the absolute equation of likelihood-knowledge with murder, ignoring the elevated clause (d) standard, is the single flawed proposition among the four. Hence (D) is the correct answer.

Q11 A

This is the classic application of clause (d) of Section 101 murder: an act so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, committed without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing it. Firing a loaded gun into a crowded marketplace, knowing death is almost certain to follow, satisfies this clause even though E aimed at no particular person. The absence of a specific target does not reduce the offence, because clause (d) operates on knowledge of near-certain fatal danger, not on intention directed at a named victim. The 'no offence' option is plainly wrong, as a death has resulted from a grievously dangerous act done without excuse. The two options reducing it to culpable homicide also misstate the law: while ordinary likelihood-knowledge yields only culpable homicide, the near-certain and inexcusable danger here elevates the act to murder. With no lawful excuse pleaded for running the risk, E is guilty of murder under Section 101. Hence (A) is the correct answer.

Q12 C

An Exception to murder under Section 101 covers a public servant, or a person aiding a public servant, who, acting in good faith for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law and causes death by an act he believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty. Where this Exception applies, the offence is culpable homicide not amounting to murder rather than murder. F acted in good faith and merely exceeded — rather than abandoned or feigned — his lawful authority, so the Exception squarely fits his case. The two 'murder' options are wrong: fatal force by a public servant is not automatically an intentional killing, and good faith is the very condition the Exception preserves, so exceeding authority does not by itself destroy the defence. The 'full immunity' option is also incorrect, because the Exception only mitigates the grade of the offence rather than conferring any complete exemption from liability. Hence the death is correctly classified as culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Hence (C) is the correct answer.

SECTION B — ANALYTICAL REASONING

Q13 B

From condition (1), Coding is on Monday. By condition (2), Design is one day after Coding, so Design is on Tuesday. Condition (3) fixes Finance on Saturday. The three remaining days — Wednesday, Thursday, Friday — must take Branding, Ethics and Marketing. Condition (4) requires Ethics immediately before Marketing, so they occupy two consecutive days among Wednesday-Thursday-Friday. Condition (5) requires Branding earlier than Ethics, so Branding must come first. The only arrangement satisfying both is Branding on Wednesday, Ethics on Thursday, Marketing on Friday. Hence Thursday is Ethics. The full unique schedule is Monday-Coding, Tuesday-Design, Wednesday-Branding, Thursday-Ethics, Friday-Marketing, Saturday-Finance. Hence (B) is the correct answer.

Q14 B

The fixed schedule is Monday-Coding, Tuesday-Design, Wednesday-Branding, Thursday-Ethics, Friday-Marketing, Saturday-Finance. Design is on Tuesday and Marketing is on Friday. The days strictly between Tuesday and Friday are Wednesday and Thursday, holding Branding and Ethics respectively. Therefore exactly two workshops fall between Design and Marketing. Counting carefully: Wednesday (Branding) is one, Thursday (Ethics) is two. The endpoints Design and Marketing are excluded as the question specifies. The answer is two. Hence (B) is the correct answer.

Q15 C

The unique schedule is Monday-Coding, Tuesday-Design, Wednesday-Branding, Thursday-Ethics, Friday-Marketing, Saturday-Finance. Testing each pair: Coding (Mon) and Branding (Wed) are separated by Tuesday, not adjacent. Design (Tue) and Ethics (Thu) are separated by Wednesday, not adjacent. Branding (Wed) and Ethics (Thu) fall on consecutive days, so they are adjacent. Coding (Mon) and Finance (Sat) are at opposite ends, not adjacent. Only the Branding-Ethics pair occupies consecutive days, so that is the correct pairing. Hence (C) is the correct answer.

Q16 A

In the determined schedule, Wednesday holds Branding and Saturday holds Finance. The hypothetical swaps the occupants of these two days only, leaving Monday-Coding, Tuesday-Design, Thursday-Ethics and Friday-Marketing untouched. After the swap, Saturday takes whatever was on Wednesday — namely Branding — and Wednesday takes Finance. Therefore the workshop on Saturday becomes Branding. The other listed options (Marketing on Friday, Ethics on Thursday, Coding on Monday) are unaffected by this swap and remain on their original days, so none of them shifts to Saturday. Hence (A) is the correct answer.

Q17 B

From (3) and (7), T and S are in Alpha. By (2), since S is in Alpha, R is in Beta; by (5) V joins R in Beta. Now Beta already has R and V. Consider P and Q (same team, by (1)). By (4) U is opposite P, and by (6) W is with U. Suppose P, Q were in Beta — Beta would then hold R, V, P, Q = four, leaving U and W out, but U must be opposite P meaning U in Alpha with W (by 6), giving Alpha T, S, U, W = four. That works only if P, Q are in Beta. Check: Beta = R, V, P, Q (4); Alpha = T, S, U, W (4). All conditions hold. Hence Alpha = T, S, U, W. Hence (B) is the correct answer.

Q18 D

The unique solution gives Alpha = {T, S, U, W} and Beta = {R, V, P, Q}. Evaluating each option: P and U are on different teams (U in Alpha, P in Beta), so not together. T (Alpha) and R (Beta) are split. P and Q are both in Beta and condition (1) forces them together, so they are guaranteed Beta members. S (Alpha) and V (Beta) are split. Only the pair P and Q are guaranteed to be in Beta together, confirmed both by the derived solution and directly by the same-team constraint combined with the deduction that P is in Beta. Hence (D) is the correct answer.

Q19 C

U is in Team Alpha (since U is opposite P, and P turns out to be in Beta). Team Alpha consists of T, S, U and W. The question asks how many students share U's team — this means the other members in U's team apart from U. Those are T, S and W, which is three students. If one were to count the total team size including U it would be four, but 'in the same team as U' refers to the companions of U, giving three. Therefore three students are in the same team as U: T, S and W. Hence (C) is the correct answer.

Q20 B

Condition (4) explicitly states that U and P are in different teams. The hypothetical rule forces U into the same team as P, which directly contradicts this requirement. Conditions (1) P-Q together, (2) R-S apart, (3) T in Alpha, (5) V with R, and (7) S in Alpha are all about other students and are not touched by placing U with P. Only the U-versus-P separation rule is broken. Therefore the condition that would be violated is condition (4), which mandates that U and P sit on opposite teams. Hence (B) is the correct answer.

SECTION C — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q21 B

StreamX earned 120 in Q1 and 180 in Q3. Percentage increase = ((new - old) / old) x 100 = ((180 - 120) / 120) x 100 = (60 / 120) x 100 = 0.5 x 100 = 50%. So the revenue rose by 50% from Q1 to Q3. The distractor 40% would arise from dividing by 150, 60% from dividing the change by 100, and 33.3% from computing the change as a fraction of 180 instead of 120. The correct base for a percentage increase is always the original (Q1) value of 120, giving exactly 50%. Hence (B) is the correct answer.

Q22 A

FlixIn's quarterly figures are 160, 200, 240 and 200. Their sum = 160 + 200 + 240 + 200 = 800. Average = total / number of quarters = 800 / 4 = 200. Therefore the average quarterly revenue of FlixIn is Rs. 200 crore. A common error is to add only three values or to misread Q3 as 200 instead of 240, which would yield 190; including all four correct values gives an annual total of 800 and a mean of exactly 200 crore per quarter. Hence (A) is the correct answer.

Q23 D

In Q4, VidCast earned 120 and PlayNow earned 260. The ratio is 120 : 260. Dividing both terms by their common factor 20 gives 6 : 13. Therefore the ratio of VidCast to PlayNow in Q4 is 6 : 13. Checking the distractors: 1 : 2 would need 130 against 260, 3 : 7 would need roughly 111 against 260, and 5 : 11 does not divide 120 : 260 evenly. Only 6 : 13 reduces exactly from 120 : 260, confirming it as the correct simplified ratio. Hence (D) is the correct answer.

Q24 C

Compute each annual total. StreamX = 120 + 150 + 180 + 150 = 600. PlayNow = 200 + 220 + 240 + 260 = 920. VidCast = 90 + 120 + 150 + 120 = 480. FlixIn = 160 + 200 + 240 + 200 = 800. Comparing 600, 920, 480 and 800, the largest is 920, belonging to PlayNow. Therefore PlayNow recorded the highest annual revenue. FlixIn at 800 is second, so a quick glance at single quarters where FlixIn and PlayNow tie at 240 in Q3 can mislead; only the full-year sum, dominated by PlayNow's consistently rising quarters, settles the comparison. Hence (C) is the correct answer.

Q25 C

PlayNow's annual revenue = 200 + 220 + 240 + 260 = 920. StreamX's annual revenue = 120 + 150 + 180 + 150 = 600. The excess = 920 - 600 = 320. Therefore PlayNow exceeds StreamX by Rs. 320 crore. A miscalculation of StreamX's total as 580 (dropping 20 somewhere) would give 340, and treating PlayNow as 900 would give 300; careful summation of all eight quarterly figures yields totals of 920 and 600, whose difference is exactly Rs. 320 crore. Hence (C) is the correct answer.

Q26 A

Add the 2025 figures: Coal 525 + Hydro 165 + Nuclear 88 + Solar 90 + Wind 60. Step by step: 525 + 165 = 690; 690 + 88 = 778; 778 + 90 = 868; 868 + 60 = 928. Therefore total generation in 2025 was 928 BU. The distractor 830 corresponds to the 2024 total (500 + 150 + 80 + 60 + 40), and 918 or 828 arise from dropping or misreading one source. Summing all five 2025 values carefully gives exactly 928 billion units. Hence (A) is the correct answer.

Q27 B

Solar and Wind in 2025 are 90 and 60, summing to 150 BU. The 2025 total (computed earlier) is 928 BU. The required percentage = (150 / 928) x 100. Dividing, 150 / 928 is approximately 0.1616, which is about 16.2%. Therefore Solar and Wind together contribute roughly 16.2% of 2025 generation. Using the 2024 total of 830 by mistake would give about 18.1%, and using only Solar (90) would give about 9.7%; the correct combined renewable share against the proper 928 BU base is approximately 16.2%. Hence (B) is the correct answer.

Q28 D

Compute absolute increases: Coal 525 - 500 = 25; Hydro 165 - 150 = 15; Nuclear 88 - 80 = 8; Solar 90 - 60 = 30; Wind 60 - 40 = 20. Comparing 25, 15, 8, 30 and 20, the largest absolute rise is 30 BU, belonging to Solar. Although Coal has the biggest base, its absolute gain of 25 BU is smaller than Solar's 30 BU. This illustrates the difference between high growth rate and large base: Solar grew 50% on a small base yet still added the most units in absolute terms, so Solar recorded the largest absolute increase. Hence (D) is the correct answer.

Q29 C

Coal grows at +5% YoY. Its 2025 value is 525 BU. Applying another 5% growth for 2026: 525 x 1.05 = 525 + (5% of 525) = 525 + 26.25 = 551.25 BU. Therefore projected Coal generation in 2026 is 551.25 BU. A frequent error is to apply 5% on the 2024 figure of 500 (giving 525 again) or to add a flat 25 (giving 550); the correct compounding applies the 5% rate to the latest 2025 base of 525, yielding 551.25 billion units. Hence (C) is the correct answer.

Q30 B

In 2025 Hydro is 165 BU and Nuclear is 88 BU. The ratio is 165 : 88. Both terms share a common factor of 11: 165 / 11 = 15 and 88 / 11 = 8. So the simplified ratio is 15 : 8. Checking distractors: 2 : 1 would need 176 against 88, 5 : 3 would need 165 against 99, and 11 : 6 would need 165 against 90. Only 15 : 8 reduces exactly from 165 : 88, making it the correct ratio of Hydro to Nuclear generation in 2025. Hence (B) is the correct answer.

SECTION D — RAPID-FIRE MIXED REASONING & GK

Q31 A

Trace the relationship step by step. Riya's mother's only brother is Riya's maternal uncle (mama). The person in the photograph is the son of that maternal uncle. The child of one's uncle is one's cousin, so the man is Riya's cousin. He cannot be her brother, since a brother would be her own mother's son, not her uncle's son. He is not her nephew, which would mean the child of Riya's own sibling. He is certainly not her uncle, who belongs to the previous generation. The deduction fixes the answer as cousin. Hence (A) is the correct answer.

Q32 C

Track each leg as displacement on a grid. He starts facing North and walks 5 km North, reaching a point 5 km up. A right turn from North makes him face East, and he walks 4 km East. A second right turn from East makes him face South, and he walks 5 km South. The southward 5 km exactly cancels the original northward 5 km, leaving zero net north-south offset. What remains is the 4 km eastward leg, untouched. So his final position is purely 4 km East of the start, meaning he is due East of his starting point. Hence (C) is the correct answer.

Q33 B

This is a straightforward syllogism resting on transitivity of the universal 'all' relation. The first statement places the entire set of pens inside the set of books. The second statement places the entire set of books inside the set of red things. Chaining the two, every pen lies inside books, which lies inside red things, so every pen must also be red. The inference pens implies books implies red is unbroken and admits no exceptions. Because both premises are universal and overlap perfectly, the conclusion that all pens are red is logically valid and definitely follows. Hence (B) is the correct answer.

Q34 D

First decode the rule from the example. Compare FACE with GBDF letter by letter: F becomes G, A becomes B, C becomes D, E becomes F. Each letter advances exactly one place forward in the alphabet, so the cipher is a uniform +1 shift. Now apply the identical rule to HAND. H advances to I, A advances to B, N advances to O, and D advances to E. Reading the shifted letters in order gives I, B, O, E. Therefore HAND is coded as IBOE, the only option consistent with a strict +1 alphabetical shift on every letter. Hence (D) is the correct answer.

Q35 A

Examine the gaps between successive terms: 6 minus 2 is 4, 12 minus 6 is 6, 20 minus 12 is 8, 30 minus 20 is 10. These differences are 4, 6, 8, 10, rising by 2 each time, so the next difference must be 12, giving 30 plus 12 equals 42. A second, cleaner view confirms it: each term is the product n times (n plus 1), namely 1x2, 2x3, 3x4, 4x5, 5x6, so the sixth term is 6x7, which is 42. Both methods agree the next number is 42. Hence (A) is the correct answer.

Q36 B

Test each number against the pattern of perfect cubes. 8 is 2 cubed, 27 is 3 cubed, 64 is 4 cubed, and 125 is 5 cubed, so four of the five values are cubes of consecutive integers 2, 3, 4 and 5. The remaining value, 100, is 10 squared, a perfect square, but it is not the cube of any whole number, since 4 cubed is 64 and 5 cubed is 125 with nothing in between. Because 100 alone fails the cube rule that the others share, it is the odd one out. Hence (B) is the correct answer.

Q37 C

First find the absolute profit: selling price minus cost price equals 460 minus 400, which is Rs. 60. Profit percentage is always measured against the cost price, not the selling price, using the formula profit divided by cost price times 100. Substituting, that is 60 divided by 400 times 100. Now 60 divided by 400 is 0.15, and multiplying by 100 gives 15. So the profit is 15 percent. Dividing by 460 instead would wrongly give about 13 percent; the correct base is the Rs. 400 cost, yielding a clean 15 percent gain. Hence (C) is the correct answer.

Q38 A

Average speed is defined as total distance divided by total time taken, regardless of any variation during the journey. Here the distance is 240 km and the time is 4 hours, so the calculation is 240 divided by 4. Performing the division, 4 goes into 240 exactly 60 times, giving 60 km per hour. This means that on average the train advances 60 kilometres in each hour of travel. The other options arise from arithmetic slips such as dividing 240 by 5 or by 6; the correct quotient of 240 over 4 is exactly 60 km/h. Hence (A) is the correct answer.

Q39 D

Article 17 of the Indian Constitution abolishes untouchability and forbids its practice in any form, making its enforcement a punishable offence under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955. It sits within the right against exploitation and equality cluster and is one of the few fundamental rights enforceable even against private individuals. The distractors guard different ground: Article 14 guarantees equality before the law, Article 19 protects freedoms such as speech and movement, and Article 21 secures life and personal liberty. The specific provision that ends untouchability is therefore Article 17. Hence (D) is the correct answer.

Q40 A

Article 32 confers the Right to Constitutional Remedies, allowing a citizen to approach the Supreme Court directly for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, and it empowers the Court to issue writs such as habeas corpus, mandamus and certiorari. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar famously called it the 'heart and soul' of the Constitution because the other rights would be hollow without a guaranteed means of enforcement. Article 226 grants High Courts a wider but separate writ jurisdiction and is not itself a Fundamental Right, while Articles 14 and 21 cover equality and life. The answer is Article 32. Hence (A) is the correct answer.

Q41 C

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar served as independent India's first Law Minister in the Nehru cabinet from 1947 and simultaneously chaired the Drafting Committee that prepared the Constitution, which is why he is also called its chief architect. The distractors held other firsts: Dr. Rajendra Prasad was the first President and earlier presided over the Constituent Assembly, Jawaharlal Nehru was the first Prime Minister, and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was the first Home Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. Distinguishing these top offices is a common exam trap. The first Law Minister of independent India was B. R. Ambedkar. Hence (C) is the correct answer.