CLAT Gurukul
By Ready For Exam

Daily Practice Sheet — Answers & Explanations — 29 June 2026

32 Qs · 0 Min
Answer key + detailed explanations

ANSWER KEY — 29 JUNE 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
A	B	B	C	C	D	D	A	B	A
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
B	C	D	A	C	D	D	C	B	B
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**	**Q27**	**Q28**	**Q29**	**Q30**
A	B	D	A	B	D	C	C	A	D
Q31	**Q32**								
A	C								

SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING

Q1 A

Donoghue v. Stevenson establishes that a manufacturer owes a duty of care directly to the ultimate consumer of a product, even where no contractual relationship exists between them, because such a consumer is the manufacturer's 'neighbour' in law. The absence of a contract between the bottler and the consumer is irrelevant; the opaque bottle made intermediate inspection impossible, so the consumer fell within the class the bottler ought reasonably to have had in contemplation. The reasoning rejects the notion that duty travels only with the purchase, and it does not impose insurer-like strict liability: the claim still rests on proving negligence (the snail's presence flowing from careless bottling). The decision marks the birth of the modern law of negligence, separating tortious duty from contractual privity. Thus the bottler owes the consumer a duty and is answerable in negligence for the resulting illness, defeating any argument that contract or the chain of purchase shields the manufacturer from a third-party victim. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q2 B

Contributory negligence, as understood in modern apportionment law, no longer operates as a complete defence; instead damages are reduced to the extent the claimant's own want of care contributed to the injury. The cyclist's failure to wear lights and a helmet contributed to the collision and to the severity of the head injuries, so a deduction is justified, but the motorist's speeding remains an operative cause of the harm. The doctrine therefore divides responsibility rather than extinguishing the claim, so full recovery is wrong because the rider was partly at fault, and total denial is wrong because apportionment, not a complete bar, is the governing rule. Volenti does not apply: riding unlit is carelessness, not a free and informed acceptance of the specific risk of another's negligent driving. The court must therefore assess each party's blameworthiness and reduce the award by a just and equitable percentage reflecting the rider's contribution. The just result is recovery scaled down by the cyclist's proportionate fault. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q3 B

The Bolam test fixes the professional standard of care by reference to whether the doctor acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion skilled in that art; it is no defence to say the body is a minority, provided it is responsible and competent. Because a respectable minority endorsed the method chosen, the surgeon met the standard and did not breach the duty of care, so liability does not arise merely because most peers favoured a different technique. The occurrence of a known complication, absent carelessness, is not itself proof of breach, since negligence turns on the standard of conduct, not on outcome. Consent is a separate issue and does not by itself immunise negligent treatment. The test shields a practitioner from being condemned merely because expert opinion is divided, so long as the chosen practice is logically defensible and responsibly held. Applying Bolam, conforming to a responsible body of opinion defeats the negligence claim. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q4 C

The statement that damage is not essential is the incorrect one: damage is the very gist of the tort of negligence, and no action lies, however careless the defendant, unless the claimant suffers actual injury caused by the breach. Negligence is not actionable per se, unlike trespass; the claimant must prove duty, breach, causation, and resulting damage. The remaining propositions correctly state the law: duty is defined by reasonable contemplation of those likely to be affected under the neighbour principle; an unforeseeable intervening act can constitute a novus actus interveniens that severs legal causation and relieves the original wrongdoer; and professional conduct is judged against a responsible body of skilled opinion under the Bolam standard. A careless act that fortuitously injures no one founds no claim, because the law compensates loss rather than punishing carelessness in the abstract. Identifying the proposition that wrongly treats negligence as actionable without damage is therefore the right answer, because it contradicts the settled requirement of resulting harm. Hence, option (C) is correct.

NAME: ________________________________ ROLL NO: __________________ BATCH: __________________

Q5 C

Under the remoteness rule in The Wagon Mound (No. 1), a defendant is liable only for damage of a kind that was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the negligence, displacing the older 'direct consequences' approach of Re Polemis. Because the fire damage here was of an entirely unforeseeable type, it falls outside the scope of liability, so the factory does not answer for it even though its leak was negligent. The 'all direct consequences' and 'insurer' formulations are wrong because foreseeability of the kind of harm, not mere directness, governs remoteness. The freak reaction is not classified as a novus actus interveniens, since that doctrine concerns new intervening human or natural acts breaking causation, not the unforeseeable manner of the harm itself. Foreseeability thus operates not only to fix the existence of a duty but also to cap the extent of recoverable loss at the boundary of what a reasonable person could anticipate. The correct analysis is that unforeseeable-in-kind fire damage is too remote to be recoverable. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q6 D

The common law draws a sharp line between misfeasance and nonfeasance: there is no general duty to take positive steps to rescue a stranger, and the neighbour principle defines the persons to whom care is owed when one acts, not a free-standing obligation to intervene. Because the lifeguard was off duty, had no prior relationship with the swimmer, and did nothing to create or assume responsibility for the peril, no duty to rescue arose, so failing to act is not actionable negligence. Mere capacity or training to rescue does not generate a duty, and the neighbour principle does not convert proximity into a positive rescue obligation. While creating the danger is one route to a duty for omissions, it is not the only one—assumption of responsibility and special relationships also qualify—so the absolute 'only ever' formulation overstates the law. The accurate conclusion is that no duty to rescue a stranger existed here. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q7 D

Section 38 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 provides that the right of private defence of the body extends to voluntarily causing death where the offence occasioning the right is an assault reasonably causing the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence. The knife-armed lunge and threat to kill generated exactly such a reasonable apprehension of death, and Section 34 declares that nothing done in lawful exercise of private defence is an offence, so the fatal blow is justified. It is wrong to say the right can never extend to death, as Section 38 expressly permits it in enumerated grave situations. There is no general duty to flee where, as here, there was no time to seek the protection of public authorities. Nor may one kill a mere trespasser: lethal defence of property requires the aggravated circumstances of Section 41. The reasonable apprehension of death is what makes the killing no offence. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q8 A

Section 43 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 fixes that the right of private defence of property commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property arises and continues only so long as that apprehension of danger continues. Once the snatching was complete and the thief was fleeing far away, no reasonable apprehension of ongoing danger remained, so the right had ceased and beating him to death was retaliation, not defence, making it an offence. It is wrong to say the right always extends to a fleeing thief's death; death in defence of property is confined to aggravated offences such as robbery or night house-breaking under Section 41, and even then only while apprehension subsists. The desire to recover property does not revive an expired right, and although the right can extend to death in narrow situations, it had already lapsed here. The cessation of apprehension is what converts the act into a punishable offence. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q9 B

The incorrect statement is the claim of unlimited harm, because the right of private defence is governed by proportionality: under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita the right in no case extends to inflicting more harm than is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence. A defender who exceeds necessity loses the protection of Section 34 and answers for the excess. The other propositions correctly state the law: the right is generally unavailable against acts of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of office, subject to the statutory provisos; Section 35 extends defence of the body to the body of any other person against offences affecting the human body; and the right does not arise where there is time to seek the protection of public authorities, since private defence rests on necessity. Identifying the proposition that wrongly asserts a power to inflict unlimited harm is therefore correct, as it contradicts the proportionality limit. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q10 A

Section 37 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 provides that there is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or grievous hurt, if done by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, even though that act may not be strictly justifiable by law. Because the constable acted in good faith under colour of office and the man knew this, no right of private defence arose, so resisting by beating him is an offence. A merely technical defect in the warrant does not revive the right where the officer acts bona fide; the section protects exactly such good-faith but imperfectly authorised conduct. A subjective belief that an arrest is unjustified does not license forcible resistance. The statement that the right is never available against any police officer overstates the law, since defence is permitted where the officer acts in bad faith or causes apprehension of death or grievous hurt. The good-faith colour-of-office bar is what makes the resistance an offence. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q11 B

Section 41 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 provides that the right of private defence of property extends to voluntarily causing death where the offence occasioning the right is house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise, among other enumerated grave offences. A forcible night-time break-in of a dwelling falls squarely within this category, and combined with the occupant's reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt, the killing is no offence under the protection of Section 34. It is wrong to require an actual prior attack, because the statute permits lethal defence on the occurrence of the specified property offences accompanied by reasonable apprehension. There is no rigid duty to retreat and telephone where the danger is immediate and the apprehension reasonable. Equally, an occupant may not kill every mere entrant; lethal force is confined to the aggravated offences listed in Section 41. The fact of night house-breaking raising apprehension of grievous hurt is what makes the killing no offence. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q12 C

The right of private defence under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita is founded on reasonable apprehension of danger rather than on the danger being objectively real; Section 38 speaks of an assault reasonably causing the apprehension that death will be the consequence. Because the man's apprehension of death was both genuine and reasonable in the circumstances of darkness and a realistic-looking weapon, the right arose and his act is no offence, even though no actual danger existed. It is wrong to insist on actual danger, since the law keys the right to reasonable apprehension. A reasonable mistaken belief does support the plea, so a blanket denial for any mistake misstates the law. However, mere sincere fear is insufficient; the apprehension must be reasonable, so a purely subjective standard is also wrong. The reasonableness of the apprehension of death, notwithstanding the absence of real danger, is what makes the shooting no offence. Hence, option (C) is correct.

SECTION B — ANALYTICAL REASONING

Q13 D

Aditya is placed at position 1 and faces inward. For an inward-facer, the right neighbour is the person seated immediately anti-clockwise, which is position 8. Working through the constraints: constraint (1) places Bhavna at Aditya's left (position 2, clockwise). Constraint (4) fixes Bhavna opposite Farida, so Farida is at position 6. Constraint (3) puts Eshan clockwise of Devika; constraint (6) confirms Devika is Eshan's right, placing Devika at position 4 and Eshan at position 5. Constraint (2) puts Gaurav opposite Chetan; constraint (5) makes Gaurav Hema's left. With Gaurav at position 7 and Chetan at position 3, Hema falls at position 8 — directly anti-clockwise of Aditya. Hence Aditya's right neighbour is Hema. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q14 A

The unique clockwise arrangement is Aditya(P1)–Bhavna(P2)–Chetan(P3)–Devika(P4)–Eshan(P5)–Farida(P6)–Gaurav(P7)–Hema(P8). In an eight-seat circle, directly opposite pairs are four seats apart: Aditya(P1)↔Eshan(P5), Bhavna(P2)↔Farida(P6), Chetan(P3)↔Gaurav(P7), and Devika(P4)↔Hema(P8). Aditya(P1) and Gaurav(P7) are only two seats apart in the anti-clockwise direction (P1 to P7 = 2 steps anti-clockwise) or six steps clockwise — they are not four seats apart and therefore do NOT face each other directly. All three distractors list genuine opposite pairs confirmed by the arrangement. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q15 C

In the established clockwise order — Aditya(P1), Bhavna(P2), Chetan(P3), Devika(P4), Eshan(P5), Farida(P6), Gaurav(P7), Hema(P8) — counting clockwise from Bhavna (P2) to Eshan (P5): we pass Chetan (P3) and Devika (P4) before arriving at Eshan. That gives exactly two people seated between them in the clockwise arc. Any anti-clockwise count would pass five people, confirming clockwise yields two. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q16 D

In the original arrangement, Aditya sits at position 1 (inward) and Gaurav sits at position 7 (inward). After the swap, Aditya moves to position 7, still facing inward; Gaurav moves to position 1, still facing inward. Everyone else stays put: Bhavna(P2), Chetan(P3), Devika(P4), Eshan(P5), Farida(P6), Hema(P8). For an inward-facer, the immediate right neighbour is the person seated anti-clockwise. Aditya is now at position 7; the anti-clockwise position from P7 is P6, which holds Farida. Therefore Farida is Aditya's immediate right neighbour after the swap. Hema (P8) would be Aditya's left neighbour at P7, not his right. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q17 D

From constraint (1), Fiction is at position 1. Constraint (2) places Algebra at position 2. Constraint (3) requires History to be at an odd position; constraint (4) requires History–Chemistry–Biology in consecutive order. Positions 1 and 2 are taken. The only available odd position where three consecutive slots follow (odd, odd+1, odd+2) that fall within 3–8 is position 3: History at 3, Chemistry at 4, Biology at 5. Constraint (7) places Drama immediately left of Grammar (position 7), so Drama is at position 6. Ethics fills position 8 per constraint (6). This leaves no ambiguity — Chemistry is at position 4. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q18 C

Ethics occupies position 8 (constraint 6). The book immediately to the left of Ethics is the one at position 7. Constraint (5) explicitly places Grammar at position 7. Therefore Grammar is the book immediately to the left of Ethics. The full right-end sequence is confirmed as Drama(6)–Grammar(7)–Ethics(8), which follows from constraints (5), (6), and (7) together. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q19 B

The unique arrangement is: Fiction(1)–Algebra(2)–History(3)–Chemistry(4)–Biology(5)–Drama(6)–Grammar(7)–Ethics(8). History is at position 3 and Grammar is at position 7. The books between them — occupying positions 4, 5, and 6 — are Chemistry, Biology, and Drama. Counting those three books gives the answer three. A count of four would require Grammar to be at position 8, but Ethics holds that spot; a count of two would require Grammar at position 6, contradicting constraint (5). Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q20 B

In the original arrangement, Fiction is at position 1 and Biology is at position 5. After the swap, Fiction moves to position 5 and Biology moves to position 1. All other books remain in place: Algebra(2), History(3), Chemistry(4), Drama(6), Grammar(7), Ethics(8). Therefore position 5 is now occupied by Fiction. Biology moves to position 1 (the leftmost), not staying at position 5, so Biology as an answer would be incorrect. Hence, option (B) is correct.

SECTION C — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q21 A

Percentage change = ((New − Old) / Old) × 100. Here, New = ₹1,150 crore, Old = ₹1,000 crore. Change = 1,150 − 1,000 = ₹150 crore. Percentage increase = (150 / 1,000) × 100 = 15%. A common error is dividing by the new value instead of the old: 150/1,150 × 100 ≈ 13.04%, which is wrong. Another error is using an approximate difference (100 instead of 150) to arrive at 10%. The correct base is always the earlier (FY24) figure, giving exactly 15%. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q22 B

Trade Balance = Exports FY25 − Imports FY25 = 2,475 − 1,620 = ₹855 crore (surplus, since exports exceed imports). A frequent mistake is computing the FY24 balance instead: 2,250 − 1,800 = ₹450 crore — that is the correct FY24 answer but wrong for FY25. Another slip is using the FY24 export with the FY25 import: 2,250 − 1,620 = ₹630 crore. Yet another error is subtracting imports from a wrong export figure to get ₹975 crore. The FY25 row values must be used: 2,475 minus 1,620 = ₹855 crore. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q23 D

Total Imports FY24 = 2,400 + 1,800 + 3,600 + 5,200 + 1,000 = ₹14,000 crore. Total Exports FY24 = 3,150 + 2,250 + 2,800 + 6,400 + 4,200 = ₹18,800 crore. Ratio = 14,000 : 18,800. Dividing both by 400 gives 35 : 47. The distractor 7:9 comes from rounding 35:47 incorrectly (47 ≈ 45, 45/5=9, 35/5=7 — invalid shortcut). Using 35:48 results from a column-addition slip in exports (adding 4,400 instead of 4,200 for Pharmaceuticals). The ratio 35:47 is exact. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q24 A

Percentage increase in exports: Iron Ore = (3,465 − 3,150)/3,150 × 100 = 315/3,150 × 100 = 10%. Cotton = (2,475 − 2,250)/2,250 × 100 = 225/2,250 × 100 = 10%. Chemicals = (3,080 − 2,800)/2,800 × 100 = 280/2,800 × 100 = 10%. Gems & Jewellery = (6,080 − 6,400)/6,400 × 100 = −5% (a decline). Pharmaceuticals = (4,830 − 4,200)/4,200 × 100 = 630/4,200 × 100 = 15%. Only Pharmaceuticals achieves 15%, clearly the highest. Iron Ore, Cotton, and Chemicals are plausible distractors because all three are exactly 10% — students may stop checking after finding a high figure among the first three. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q25 B

Total Exports FY25 = 3,465 + 2,475 + 3,080 + 6,080 + 4,830 = ₹19,930 crore. Pharmaceutical exports FY25 = ₹4,830 crore. Share = (4,830 / 19,930) × 100 = 24.23% ≈ 24.2%. The distractor 21.1% arises from using FY24 Pharma exports (₹4,200) over FY25 total: 4,200/19,930 ≈ 21.1%. The distractor 25.7% comes from using FY24 total exports (₹18,800) as denominator: 4,830/18,800 ≈ 25.7%. The distractor 22.3% results from a column-addition slip in total exports (e.g., omitting part of the Gems row). The correct calculation uses both FY25 figures: 4,830 ÷ 19,930 ≈ 24.2%. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q26 D

Law-stream aspirants = 60% of 1,200 = 720. Coached among them = 75% of 720 = 540. Of these, 80% appeared, so 20% did NOT appear. Non-appearing coached aspirants = 20% of 540 = 0.20 × 540 = 108. The distractor 135 comes from taking 25% of 540 (confusing the coaching proportion with the non-appearance rate). The distractor 144 results from applying 20% to the total Law cohort (20% of 720 = 144) instead of only the coached subset. The distractor 90 uses an incorrect 15% non-appearance rate (90 = 15% × 600, mixing different bases). Correct chain: 720 → 540 coached → 20% absent = 108. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q27 C

Coached Law qualifiers: Coached = 540; appeared = 80% of 540 = 432; qualified = 62.5% of 432 = 0.625 × 432 = 270. Self-study Law qualifiers: Self-study = 180; appeared = 60% of 180 = 108; qualified = 1/3 of 108 = 36. Total Law qualifiers = 270 + 36 = 306. The distractor 270 ignores the self-study group entirely. The distractor 288 arises from incorrectly using 2/3 (≈ 66.7%) as the self-study qualifier rate instead of 1/3: 108 × 2/3 = 72, giving 270 + 72 = 342 — actually that yields 342, so 288 comes from a different slip: taking 60% of 480 (wrong base) = 288. The distractor 324 uses 75% as the qualification rate for coached aspirants: 0.75 × 432 = 324, ignoring self-study. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q28 C

Total Law-stream aspirants = 720. Total Law qualifiers = 306 (established above: 270 coached + 36 self-study). Qualification rate = (306 / 720) × 100 = 42.5%. The distractor 37.5% comes from dividing only the coached qualifiers (270) by the total Law cohort (720): 270/720 × 100 = 37.5% — this omits the self-study qualifiers. The distractor 45% results from dividing 306 by 680 (a wrong Law-cohort figure) or from rounding the coached qualification rate (62.5%) applied to a wrong base. The distractor 50% would imply 360 qualifiers, which is not supported by the data. The exact answer is 306 ÷ 720 × 100 = 42.5%. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q29 A

Coached Law qualifiers = 270 (computed above). Self-study Law qualifiers = 36 (computed above). Ratio = 270 : 36. Dividing both by 18: 270/18 = 15 and 36/18 = 2. So the ratio is 15 : 2. The distractor 7:1 is an approximation obtained by rounding 15:2 to 7.5:1 and then further to 7:1. The distractor 9:2 results from using an incorrect coached-qualifier figure of 324 (if 75% of 432 were applied): 324:36 = 9:1, or from a miscalculation of self-study qualifiers as 72 rather than 36: 270:72 = 15:4, which when further mishandled gives 9:2. The distractor 5:1 (i.e., 180:36) uses the total self-study group count instead of the qualifier count. Correct: 270 ÷ 18 : 36 ÷ 18 = 15 : 2. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q30 D

Non-Law aspirants = 480. Commerce = 50% of 480 = 240. Of these, 45% subscribed to a paid mock-test series: 45% of 240 = 0.45 × 240 = 108 took mocks. Of those who took mocks, 2/3 cleared their target exam: (2/3) × 108 = 72. The distractor 108 is the number who took the mock series — the student forgets to apply the 2/3 clearance rate. The distractor 80 results from incorrectly computing 2/3 of 240 directly (skipping the 45% filter): (2/3) × 240 = 160, or alternatively from using a 75% clearance rate on the wrong base: 0.75 × 108 = 81 ≈ 80. The distractor 48 comes from using 1/3 instead of 2/3 of 108: (1/3) × 108 = 36, then perhaps adding an incorrect buffer — or from applying 20% of 240 = 48. Correct chain: 240 → 108 mock-takers → 72 cleared. Hence, option (D) is correct.

SECTION D — RAPID-FIRE MIXED REASONING & GK

Q31 A

Riya's father's only sister is Riya's paternal aunt. The son of a paternal aunt is always a cousin — not a sibling, because the connection runs through the aunt rather than directly through Riya's parents. 'Brother' would require sharing a common parent with Riya; 'Uncle' denotes an older male relative of the previous generation; 'Nephew' would mean Riya is the elder, which reverses the relationship since the photo shows Riya pointing to someone else's child. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q32 C

The northward and eastward legs form two sides of a right-angled triangle, with the straight-line return path as the hypotenuse. Applying the Pythagorean theorem: distance = $\sqrt{(6^2 + 8^2)} = \sqrt{(36 + 64)} = \sqrt{100} = 10$ km. Adding the two legs (14 km) gives the total path travelled, not the straight-line shortest distance. The individual leg distances (6 or 8 km) are only partial measures. Hence, option (C) is correct.