

ANSWER KEY — 30 JUNE 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	B	A	A	D	D	C	C	D	B
Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20
A	B	D	B	B	C	B	C	B	D
Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	Q29	Q30
C	A	A	C	A	C	B	A	D	D
Q31	Q32	Q33	Q34	Q35	Q36	Q37			
D	A	C	A	C	C	D			

SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B

Under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, a contract becomes void when a supervening event — not attributable to either party — renders performance impossible. A statutory prohibition on private wheat sale is precisely the kind of legal impossibility the Supreme Court recognised in *Satyabrata Ghose v Mugneeram Bangur* (1954): impossibility need not be physical; legal interdiction suffices. The option stating the contract is discharged is therefore correct. The distractor suggesting statutory orders are 'foreseeable commercial risks' is wrong: a specific prohibitory order issued after formation differs from ordinary market risk. The option limiting Section 56 to physical destruction misreads the law — the section uses 'becomes impossible' broadly, not restrictively. The last distractor imports an English 'radical change of purpose' test that the Supreme Court in *Energy Watchdog* (2017) clarified is narrower than India's Section 56, which covers legal impossibility outright. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q2 B

The contract is frustrated under Section 56 because the demolition of the hall — a supervening event not caused by either party — makes performance impossible. However, Section 56 itself voids the contract going forward; it does not expressly address recovery of money already paid. Section 65 fills this gap by mandating that any person who has received a benefit under a contract that later becomes void must restore or compensate for it. The Supreme Court in *Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn* (English law) and Indian decisions consistently treat Section 65 as the restitutionary limb of Section 56. Section 73 is incorrect because it applies to breach of a valid, subsisting contract — not a frustrated one. Section 70 governs quasi-contractual claims for non-gratuitous acts done without a pre-existing contract, not refunds under voided agreements. Section 56 alone identifies the frustrating event; Section 65 provides the remedy for advance recovery. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q3 A

The statement that mere commercial hardship or increased expense frustrates a contract is incorrect and is the right answer to this 'which is INCORRECT' question. The Supreme Court in *Energy Watchdog v CERC* (2017) 14 SCC 80 unequivocally held that a rise in cost — even a dramatic one such as spike in fuel prices — does not frustrate a contract; the supervening event must strike at the root and make performance radically different, not merely more expensive. The other three statements are correct propositions: frustration is automatic (*Taylor v Caldwell*; Section 56 uses 'becomes void'), self-induced frustration does not excuse the party at fault (consistent with basic Contract Act principles), and Section 56's scope covers legal impossibility per *Satyabrata Ghose*. Identifying the 'expensive = frustrated' claim as wrong tests precise doctrinal knowledge of the *Energy Watchdog* limitation. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q4 A

Frustration under Section 56 operates prospectively — it discharges future obligations from the date of the frustrating event. It does not void the contract retrospectively (*ab initio*), unlike voidable contracts set aside for fraud or coercion. Past performances already rendered remain valid, but where one party has received a benefit without corresponding counter-performance, Section 65 provides a restitutionary remedy to prevent unjust enrichment. The correct option reflects this accurately. The '*ab initio*' distractor is wrong: Section 56 says the contract 'becomes void' on the supervening event, not from inception. The second distractor incorrectly suggests all claims vanish — Section 65 expressly survives the void to allow restitution. The last distractor is equally wrong in asserting Section 65 has no application: the Supreme Court in *Satyabrata Ghose* and subsequent decisions consistently link Sections 56 and 65 as the void-and-restore pair. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q5 D

This hypothetical applies the 'radical change of purpose' dimension of Section 56, which the Supreme Court in *Satyabrata Ghose* confirmed extends beyond mere physical impossibility. The *Krell v Henry* (1903) line of English authority — adopted in India — holds that when the foundation or purpose of a contract disappears due to a supervening event, the contract is frustrated even if literal physical performance is still possible. A living politician's biography is fundamentally different from a posthumous historical account; the subject's death strikes at the commercial and creative core. The distractor claiming the director can simply pivot to a historical film ignores the principle that the contract's subject-matter has changed radically. 'Foreseeable contingency' is a valid limiting argument (Energy Watchdog) but only where the contingency was genuinely contemplated at contracting — a specific individual's unexpected death mid-production is not a routine foreseen risk. The 'physical impossibility only' distractor misreads *Satyabrata Ghose*. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q6 D

The compulsory acquisition order is a supervening legal event not caused by either the contractor or the owner, frustrating the construction contract under Section 56. The partially built structure represents a benefit already conferred on the owner (who will receive compensation from the government including for improvements). Section 65 mandates that a person who has received a benefit under a contract that becomes void must restore it or compensate for it; the ₹20 lakh spent and embedded is recoverable on this basis. The distractor claiming frustration kills all remedies conflates voiding the contract with extinguishing restitutionary rights — Section 65 survives as a standalone obligation. Completing on unacquired land is factually implausible and legally unsound when the core subject (the land) has been acquired. The Section 73 distractor fails because government acquisition is not the owner's breach; the owner has not defaulted, so breach-based damages are unavailable. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q7 C

The principle in *Limpus v London General Omnibus Co* (1862) — adopted consistently in Indian courts — holds that an employer is liable when an employee commits a tort while performing an authorised task in an unauthorised manner. Driving on a delivery route is authorised; the excessive speed is the unauthorised manner. The prohibition does not remove the act from 'course of employment.' The distractor claiming breach of internal rules removes liability is precisely the argument rejected in *Limpus*: employees frequently violate instructions, yet if the core activity is authorised, the employer remains liable. The 'prior knowledge' distractor imports a negligent-hiring standard that is a separate cause of action, not the test for vicarious liability. The distractor requiring the employer to have 'directly instructed' the tort confuses direct liability with vicarious liability — the latter does not require employer authorisation of the specific wrong, only of the general category of activity. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q8 C

The Supreme Court in *State Bank of India v Shyama Devi* (1978) directly addresses this fact pattern. The Court held that where an employee uses tools, documents, and position-specific access obtained by virtue of employment to commit a fraud against a customer, the employer is vicariously liable even if the physical act of fraud occurs outside office hours. The 'course of employment' test is not limited to hours and location; it encompasses acts made possible by the employment relationship itself. The distractor on time and location applies an outdated spatiotemporal test rejected by the Supreme Court. 'Actual authority' is not required — vicarious liability operates without authorisation of the wrong. The 'frolic of his own' distractor misapplies *Sitaram Motilal*: a frolic is a wholly independent venture unconnected to employment, such as a driver abandoning a route for personal errands; using employer-provided banking instruments to defraud the very customer being served is not a frolic. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q9 D

The concept of 'frolic of one's own' was articulated in *Joel v Morrison* (1834) and adopted in *Sitaram Motilal Kalal v Santanuprasad* (1966) AIR SC 1697: where an employee makes a substantial deviation from employment to pursue entirely personal purposes, the employer's liability is severed. Driving 40 km in the wrong direction to visit a girlfriend is a classic, substantial personal frolic — it bears no connection to any authorised employment activity. The lunch-detour distractor describes a minor deviation that courts consistently treat as within the course of employment (the driver must eat; a short detour does not sever the nexus). The security guard using excessive force remains within course of employment because the act — guarding premises — is authorised, even if the method is wrongful (*Limpus* principle). The salesperson punching a rival at a business meeting is within scope because attending that meeting was employment-directed; the violent act does not transform the occasion into a frolic. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q10 B

The statement that vicarious liability requires the employer's actual knowledge of the employee's propensity for the specific wrong is incorrect and is the answer to this 'which is INCORRECT' question. Vicarious liability is a form of strict or no-fault liability on the employer — it does not require proof that the employer knew, or should have known, that the particular employee would commit the particular wrong. The employer's knowledge of propensity is relevant only to a separate cause of action: negligent hiring or negligent retention, which is distinct from vicarious liability. The other three statements are correct: *Limpus* establishes liability despite prohibitions; Section 26 of the Partnership Act codifies partnership vicarious liability; and principal-agent vicarious liability within scope of authority is settled law. Confusing knowledge-of-propensity (negligent hiring) with the strict employer-liability framework of vicarious liability is a classic CLAT-level distractor. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q11 A

Vicarious liability in the medical context is well-established: in *Dr Laxman Balkrishna Joshi v Dr Trimbak Babu Godbole* (1969) SC and subsequent consumer law cases, Indian courts have consistently held that hospitals are liable for the negligence of their employed medical staff acting in the course of employment. Administering medication is the core function of a nurse's role; a protocol violation does not transform an employment act into an independent personal act — the *Limpus* principle applies: authorised act performed in an unauthorised manner. The 'protocol violation = independent professional act' distractor has been explicitly rejected; courts do not permit employers to insulate themselves by claiming their rules were broken. Specific authorisation is irrelevant to vicarious liability as explained in earlier questions. The charitable institution distractor is a defunct 19th-century exception that Indian law has abandoned; hospitals today — charitable or otherwise — bear vicarious liability for their employees. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q12 B

The cornerstone distinction in vicarious liability is between an employee (servant) and an independent contractor. An employee's method of work is controlled by the employer; an independent contractor determines the manner of doing the work themselves, giving rise only to a contract for services (not a contract of service). The Privy Council in *Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison v Macdonald* (1952) and Indian courts have consistently used the 'control test' — supplemented by the 'economic reality' and 'integration' tests — to make this distinction. Where the contractor controls method, the hirer is not vicariously liable as a rule. The 'occupier automatically liable' distractor conflates occupier's liability under premises law with vicarious liability — they are distinct causes of action with different elements. Non-delegable duties (third distractor) are an exception that applies to specific hazardous or inherently dangerous activities, not routine roof repairs. The safety-instructions distractor incorrectly equates issuing instructions with creating employment — control over safety rules alone does not make a contractor an employee. Hence, option (B) is correct.

SECTION B — ANALYTICAL REASONING

Q13 D

Fix Farhan at seat 1. Constraint (1) places Ananya at seat 2 (immediately clockwise from Farhan). Constraint (2) places Esha at seat 3 (immediately clockwise from Ananya). Constraint (3) places Chitra directly opposite Farhan: opposite of seat 1 is seat 4, so Chitra is at seat 4. Constraint (4) places Devraj directly opposite Esha: opposite of seat 3 is seat 6, so Devraj is at seat 6. The only remaining seat is 5, so Biren sits at seat 5. The clockwise sequence is therefore Farhan(1) → Ananya(2) → Esha(3) → Chitra(4) → Biren(5) → Devraj(6). The person immediately clockwise from Esha (seat 3) is the occupant of seat 4, which is Chitra. Devraj is two seats away at seat 6; Biren is two seats away at seat 5; Ananya is two seats counter-clockwise at seat 2. None of the distractors are immediately clockwise from Esha. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q14 B

From constraint (5): Farhan and Esha face outward, and the remaining four (Ananya, Biren, Chitra, Devraj) are not all facing the same direction. From constraint (6): Biren also faces outward. This means at least one of the remaining four faces outward (Biren), so the 'not all the same' condition is satisfied if Ananya, Chitra, and Devraj face inward. Now apply constraint (7): no two outward-facing people may be adjacent. The established seating is Farhan(1), Ananya(2), Esha(3), Chitra(4), Biren(5), Devraj(6). Outward-facing: Farhan(1), Esha(3), Biren(5) — seats 1, 3, and 5, which alternate and share no adjacency. Any additional outward-facing diplomat would create an adjacent pair (e.g., Devraj at 6 is adjacent to Farhan at 1, Chitra at 4 is adjacent to Esha at 3 and Biren at 5). Therefore exactly 3 diplomats face outward. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q15 B

The seating clockwise is Farhan(1), Ananya(2), Esha(3), Chitra(4), Biren(5), Devraj(6). In a 6-seat circular arrangement, opposite pairs are seats whose numbers differ by 3: (1,4), (2,5), and (3,6). Devraj occupies seat 6, and the seat directly opposite seat 6 is seat 3. Seat 3 is occupied by Esha; this is also confirmed directly by constraint (4), which states that Devraj and Esha sit exactly opposite each other. Farhan is opposite Chitra (seats 1 and 4 per constraint 3); Ananya at seat 2 is opposite Biren at seat 5. None of the distractors — Farhan, Ananya, or Chitra — share the (3,6) opposite pair with Devraj. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q16 C

After the swap, Farhan moves to seat 4 (Chitra's original seat) and retains his outward-facing direction; Chitra moves to seat 1 (Farhan's original seat) and retains her inward-facing direction. The new arrangement: Chitra(1, IN), Ananya(2, IN), Esha(3, OUT), Farhan(4, OUT), Biren(5, OUT), Devraj(6, IN). Now examine each person's immediate neighbours. Esha(3): neighbours are Ananya(2, IN) and Farhan(4, OUT) — only one neighbour faces out. Farhan(4): neighbours are Esha(3, OUT) and Biren(5, OUT) — both neighbours face outward. Biren(5): neighbours are Farhan(4, OUT) and Devraj(6, IN) — only one neighbour faces out. Therefore Farhan is the unique diplomat seated between two outward-facing neighbours. Devraj's neighbours are Biren(OUT) and Chitra(IN), so only one neighbour faces outward. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q17 B

Condition (7) mandates exactly one of Arjun or Bhavna. Test Arjun-in: condition (5) then bars Elan. Condition (2): if Disha is in, Elan must be in — contradiction, so Disha is out. Condition (6) then forces Chirag in. The team so far is Arjun and Chirag, needing two more from Bhavna(barred by cond.1), Elan(barred), Disha(barred) — only Farida and Gaurav remain. But condition (3) bars both Farida and Gaurav together, yet we need both. Contradiction — Arjun cannot be selected. Therefore Bhavna must be selected. Condition (4): Bhavna in forces Farida in. So Bhavna and Farida are both definitely on the team. 'Arjun and Elan' is impossible (Arjun is excluded, and Elan requires Arjun's absence — though Elan can be in, Arjun cannot). 'Disha and Gaurav' and 'Arjun and Chirag' are both impossible given Arjun's exclusion and Disha's exclusion (shown below). Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q18 C

The selected team consists of exactly four members. Work through the constraints: Arjun is excluded (shown in full in Q1's explanation). Bhavna and Farida are in (conditions 7 and 4). Condition (3): since Farida is selected, Gaurav must be excluded. Condition (5): since Arjun is excluded, Elan may be selected. Condition (2): if Disha is selected, Chirag and Elan must also be in — that would require Bhavna, Farida, Disha, Chirag, and Elan (five members), which exceeds the limit of four. So Disha is excluded. Condition (6): since Disha is out, Chirag must be in. The team is therefore Bhavna, Farida, Chirag, and Elan. The three excluded candidates are Arjun, Disha, and Gaurav — exactly 3 out of 7 are not selected, leaving 4 selected. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q19 B

Trace the causal chain carefully. Bhavna is selected (from condition 7, since Arjun must be excluded as proved). Condition (4) then compels Farida's selection because Bhavna is on the team. Now, with Farida confirmed selected, condition (3) — which states Farida and Gaurav cannot both be on the team — directly and immediately forces Gaurav out. This is a one-step deduction: Farida in $\rightarrow$ Gaurav out. The exclusion of Arjun follows from a different chain (conditions 1, 5, 3 applied together to Case A, not from Farida's presence per se). The exclusion of Disha follows from the team-size constraint and condition (2), not directly from Farida. Bhavna is selected, not excluded. Therefore Gaurav is the candidate whose exclusion is directly and uniquely caused by Farida's inclusion under condition (3). Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q20 D

The established team is Bhavna, Farida, Chirag, Elan. If Elan is removed, the remaining three members are Bhavna, Farida, Chirag, and a fourth must come from the excluded pool: Arjun, Disha, or Gaurav. Test Arjun: condition (1) bars both Arjun and Bhavna — but Bhavna is already on the team, so adding Arjun violates condition (1). Arjun cannot replace Elan. Test Disha: condition (2) states Disha's selection requires both Chirag AND Elan. Elan is now unavailable, so adding Disha immediately violates condition (2). Disha cannot replace Elan. Test Gaurav: condition (3) bars both Farida and Gaurav; Farida is on the team, so Gaurav cannot be added. Gaurav cannot replace Elan. All three unselected candidates fail at least one condition. There is therefore no valid replacement for Elan, and a compliant team of four is impossible without Elan. Hence, option (D) is correct.

SECTION C — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q21 C

To find the percentage change in combined export revenue, first total each year separately. FY24 total: $320 + 450 + 280 + 510 + 390 = 1950$ crore. FY25 total: $384 + 414 + 336 + 561 + 429 = 2124$ crore. Percentage change = $[(\text{FY25 total} - \text{FY24 total}) / \text{FY24 total}] \times 100 = [(2124 - 1950) / 1950] \times 100 = [174 / 1950] \times 100 = 8.923\%$, which rounds to 8.92%. A common error is using FY25 as the base ($174/2124 \times 100 = 8.19\%$), yielding the distractor 9.45% through a similar slip with a different incorrect base. Another trap is summing only three or four firms and computing on that partial total. Always anchor percentage change to the earlier (FY24) base year. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q22 A

Operating profit margin = $(\text{Export Revenue} - \text{Operating Cost}) / \text{Export Revenue} \times 100$ for FY25. Alpha: $(384 - 276) / 384 \times 100 = 108 / 384 \times 100 = 28.125\%$. Beta: $(414 - 345) / 414 \times 100 = 69 / 414 \times 100 = 16.667\%$. Gamma: $(336 - 235) / 336 \times 100 = 101 / 336 \times 100 = 30.060\%$. Delta: $(561 - 449) / 561 \times 100 = 112 / 561 \times 100 = 19.965\%$. Epsilon: $(429 - 360) / 429 \times 100 = 69 / 429 \times 100 = 16.084\%$. Gamma's margin of 30.06% is the highest. Alpha's 28.13% is the closest distractor and catches students who stop comparing after Alpha. Always divide operating profit by the revenue figure, not the cost figure. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q23 A

Average operating cost for FY24 = Sum of all five FY24 operating costs $\div 5$. Summing: Alpha 240 + Beta 360 + Gamma 196 + Delta 408 + Epsilon 312 = 1516 crore. Average = $1516 / 5 = 303.2$ crore. The distractor 310.4 arises from an arithmetic slip in the addition (e.g., recording Gamma's cost as 206 instead of 196). The distractor 295.8 comes from mistakenly dividing the sum of only four firms' costs by 5. The distractor 324.0 is the FY25 average: $(276 + 345 + 235 + 449 + 360) / 5 = 1665 / 5 = 333$ — slightly different, but 324.0 mimics a year-confusion error. Verify each row's value against the correct column before summing. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q24 C

Beta's FY25 export revenue = 414 crore. Gamma's FY25 export revenue = 336 crore. Ratio = 414 : 336. To simplify, find the GCF of 414 and 336. $414 = 2 \times 3 \times 3 \times 23$; $336 = 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 3 \times 7$. GCF = $2 \times 3 = 6$. Dividing both: $414 / 6 = 69$; $336 / 6 = 56$. Final ratio = 69 : 56. This cannot be simplified further because $69 = 3 \times 23$ and $56 = 2^3 \times 7$ share no common factor. The distractor 45 : 28 comes from using FY24 values ($450 : 280 = 45 : 28$). The distractor 23 : 16 arises from dividing by 18 instead of 6. The distractor 3 : 2 is a rough approximation error. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q25 A

Delta's operating profit for each year = Export Revenue - Operating Cost. FY24: $510 - 408 = 102$ crore. FY25: $561 - 449 = 112$ crore. Change in operating profit = $112 - 102 = 10$ crore (increase). The distractor 51 is the change in Delta's export revenue alone ($561 - 510 = 51$), ignoring cost. The distractor 41 is the change in Delta's operating cost ($449 - 408 = 41$), not profit. The distractor 22 likely arises from computing the difference of differences incorrectly: $(561 - 510) - (449 - 408)$ is indeed $51 - 41 = 10$, but misapplying the order of operations or misreading the table gives 22. Always compute profit at each year first, then take the difference. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q26 C

Total students who passed in 2023-24 = $180 + 252 + 315 + 120 + 231 = 1098$. Total students who passed in 2024-25 = $240 + 196 + 252 + 170 + 288 = 1146$. Percentage change = $[(1146 - 1098) / 1098] \times 100 = [48 / 1098] \times 100 = 4.370\%$, rounded to 4.37%. The distractor 5.17% is obtained if 2024-25 total (1146) is mistakenly used as the base ($48 / 1146 \times 100 \approx 4.19\%$) — or from a wrong addition of passed students. The distractor 3.64% comes from summing pass counts incorrectly (e.g., omitting one stream). The distractor 6.25% matches the naive percentage change in a subset of streams. The base must always be the earlier year's value (1098). Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q27 B

First, identify streams where pass count increased from 2023-24 to 2024-25. Law: $240 - 180 = +60$ (increase). Medical: $196 - 252 = -56$ (decrease). Engineering: $252 - 315 = -63$ (decrease). Commerce: $170 - 120 = +50$ (increase). Arts: $288 - 231 = +57$ (increase). Three streams improved: Law (+60), Commerce (+50), Arts (+57). Combined increase = $60 + 50 + 57 = 167$. The distractor 110 arises from adding only Law and Commerce ($60 + 50 = 110$), omitting Arts. The distractor 154 comes from adding Law and Arts only ($60 + 57 = 117$) or from an arithmetic error. The distractor 172 is a common addition slip. Carefully check the sign of each stream's change before summing. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q28 A

Average enrolment per stream in 2024-25 = Total enrolment in 2024-25 $\div$ Number of streams. Total 2024-25 enrolment = $300 + 280 + 360 + 200 + 360 = 1500$ students. Number of streams = 5. Average = $1500 / 5 = 300$ students. The distractor 280 arises from misreading Medical's 2024-25 enrolment (280) as the overall average, a classic single-row anchoring error. The distractor 320 stems from a wrong total (e.g., recording Arts as 400 instead of 360). The distractor 310 comes from incorrectly summing the enrolment column. The passage states total enrolment was 1,500 in both batches, so this can be confirmed directly from context. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q29 D

Pass percentage of Law in 2023-24 = $(180 / 240) \times 100 = 75\%$. Pass percentage of Medical in 2024-25 = $(196 / 280) \times 100 = 70\%$. Ratio of these two percentages = 75 : 70. Dividing both by 5: $75 / 5 = 15$; $70 / 5 = 14$. Final ratio = 15 : 14. The distractor 9 : 7 comes from incorrectly simplifying 75 : 70 by dividing by a wrong factor. The distractor 180 : 196 results from comparing the raw pass counts directly without converting to percentages, which ignores the different enrolment bases. The distractor 3 : 2 is a rough approximation error. Always convert to percentages using the respective enrolment figures before forming the ratio. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q30 D

Engineering enrolment in 2024-25 = 360 students. Target pass rate = 75%. Target number of passes = $75\% \times 360 = 0.75 \times 360 = 270$ students. Actual passes in 2024-25 = 252. Shortfall = $270 - 252 = 18$ additional students needed. The distractor 36 arises from computing 10% of 360 = 36, confusing the shortfall with a benchmark percentage. The distractor 27 comes from applying 75% to the wrong enrolment figure (perhaps the 2023-24 enrolment of 420: $75\% \times 420 = 315$; $315 - 252 = 63$ — or a partial arithmetic slip giving 27). The distractor 108 is the number who did not pass in 2024-25 ($360 - 252 = 108$), a direct wrong-inference error. Always first compute the target count, then subtract the actual count. Hence, option (D) is correct.

SECTION D — RAPID-FIRE MIXED REASONING & GK

Q31 D

Trace the chain step by step. A is the father of B. B is the sister of C, so A is also the father of C (B and C share the same parent A). C is the son of D, meaning D is C's mother. Since A is C's father and D is C's mother, A and D are a couple (husband and wife). D is the mother of E, so E is D's child. Since A is D's husband and D is E's mother, A is E's father. Therefore, A is related to E as Father. The relationship chain is: A father-of C, D mother-of C, D mother-of E, hence A father-of E. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q32 A

Starting at origin: Ravi walks 5 km north — reaches (0, 5). Turns right (now facing east) and walks 3 km — reaches (3, 5). Turns right again (now facing south) and walks 5 km — reaches (3, 0). Turns left (now facing east) and walks 2 km — reaches (5, 0). His starting point was (0, 0). His final position is (5, 0), which is 5 km due east of the starting point. The straight-line distance is 5 km in the east direction. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q33 C

Using standard syllogism rules: 'All roses are flowers' gives us roses $\subset$ flowers. 'Some flowers are red' means the set of red things intersects with the set of flowers. However, we cannot definitively conclude anything about the specific intersection of roses and red things — roses may or may not be among the red flowers. Therefore, 'All roses are red' is false, 'No rose is red' is also not a valid deduction. The only valid inference is that some red things may be roses, since roses are a subset of flowers and some flowers are red, creating a possible overlap. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q34 A

Identify the rule by comparing MANGO with LZMFN: M(13) $\rightarrow$ L(12) = -1; A(1) $\rightarrow$ Z(26) = -1 (wrapping around); N(14) $\rightarrow$ M(13) = -1; G(7) $\rightarrow$ F(6) = -1; O(15) $\rightarrow$ N(14) = -1. Every letter is shifted back by exactly 1 position in the alphabet, with A wrapping to Z. Apply the same -1 rule to GRAPE: G(7) $\rightarrow$ F(6); R(18) $\rightarrow$ Q(17); A(1) $\rightarrow$ Z(26); P(16) $\rightarrow$ O(15); E(5) $\rightarrow$ D(4). Result: F-Q-Z-O-D = FQZOD. The distractor HSBOT uses +1; GRAQE changes only one letter; HRBPF uses +1 inconsistently. This is a standard Caesar-cipher -1 shift with alphabet wrap-around. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q35 C

Examine the differences between consecutive terms: $6-3=3$, $11-6=5$, $18-11=7$, $27-18=9$. The first differences are 3, 5, 7, 9 — an arithmetic progression increasing by 2 each step. The next difference should therefore be $9+2=11$. Adding 11 to 27 gives $27+11=38$. This is a classic second-order sequence where the second differences are constant (all equal to 2), making it a quadratic sequence. The general formula confirms the next term is 38. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q36 C

Chlorophyll, Haemoglobin, and Melanin are all pigments — substances that impart colour. Chlorophyll gives plants their green colour, Haemoglobin gives blood its red colour, and Melanin is responsible for the brown/black pigmentation in skin and hair. Insulin, by contrast, is a hormone — a biochemical messenger secreted by the beta cells of the pancreas to regulate blood glucose levels. It has no role as a pigment. Therefore Insulin is the odd one out on the basis that it is the only hormone, not a pigment. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q37 D

Cost price = Rs. 800. Marked price = 800×1.50 = Rs. 1200. Discount of 20% on marked price = 1200×0.20 = Rs. 240. Selling price = $1200 - 240$ = Rs. 960. Profit = Selling price – Cost price = $960 - 800$ = Rs. 160. Profit percentage = $(160 / 800) \times 100$ = 20%. The key insight is that a 50% markup followed by a 20% discount yields $1.50 \times 0.80 = 1.20$, which is exactly a 20% net profit over cost. Hence, option (D) is correct.
