

**ANSWER KEY — 1 JULY 2026**

| Q1  | Q2  | Q3  | Q4  | Q5  | Q6  | Q7  | Q8  | Q9  | Q10 |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| D   | B   | C   | C   | D   | C   | D   | D   | B   | B   |
| Q11 | Q12 | Q13 | Q14 | Q15 | Q16 | Q17 | Q18 | Q19 | Q20 |
| D   | C   | A   | C   | C   | B   | A   | B   | A   | A   |
| Q21 | Q22 | Q23 | Q24 | Q25 | Q26 | Q27 | Q28 | Q29 | Q30 |
| D   | C   | B   | B   | D   | A   | D   | D   | C   | A   |
| Q31 | Q32 | Q33 | Q34 |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| C   | A   | B   | A   |     |     |     |     |     |     |

**SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING**

**Q1 D**

The twin-test requires two findings: an intelligible differentia (mall restaurants vs. roadside eateries is a real, discernible distinction based on location, infrastructure, clientele, and commercial scale) and a rational nexus to a legislative object (taxing premium commercial establishments differently to raise revenue or level the competitive playing field is a legitimate policy aim). Both prongs are satisfied, so the law survives Article 14 scrutiny under Anwar Ali Sarkar. The option calling all restaurant differentiation per se unconstitutional misreads Article 14 — the guarantee forbids arbitrary discrimination, not all classification. The 'absolute legislative discretion' option is wrong: Royappa held that arbitrariness itself violates Article 14, so legislative discretion is not unlimited. The last distractor internally contradicts itself — calling the differentia 'intelligible' and then asserting 'no conceivable nexus' is logically incoherent and legally wrong on these facts. Hence, option (D) is correct.

**Q2 B**

The Supreme Court in *State of Bombay v F.N. Balsara* (1951) and subsequent cases consistently held that a classification does not fail merely because it draws a line that leaves similarly situated persons on opposite sides. Line-drawing is inherent in legislation; what Article 14 demands is that the line not be arbitrary. If the government used legitimate criteria — infrastructure deficits, connectivity gaps, employment data — to designate X over Y, a rational nexus exists even if neighbouring Y has similar aggregate indicators on some metrics. Constitutional equality does not demand numerical parity or exact matching across all parameters; it demands non-arbitrariness. Requiring the legislature to record reasons in the statute text itself is not a constitutional mandate — the reasons must be discernible and justifiable, not necessarily inscribed in the enactment. The 'identical treatment for similar districts' option imports a standard of perfect equality that Article 14 expressly rejects. Hence, option (B) is correct.

**Q3 C**

The twin-test fails at both prongs. 'Agrarian family' is undefined — without a crisp, discernible criterion, the differentia is vague and arbitrary, not 'intelligible' in the Anwar Ali Sarkar sense. Even if a definition were supplied, there is no rational nexus between agrarian background and banking service: banking skills, financial acumen, and fiduciary responsibility bear no connection to agricultural lineage. The Supreme Court in *D.S. Nakara v Union of India* (1983) emphasised that socio-economic goals are valid objects only when the classification actually serves that goal with a discernible link — vague invocations of Directive Principles cannot cure a classification that lacks a rational nexus to the specific duty the recruited person must perform. Post-hoc performance parity is not the test — nexus must exist at the point of classification. Unlimited State power over public recruitment is expressly curtailed by Article 14 since Royappa (1974). Hence, option (C) is correct.

**Q4 C**

The statement that Article 14 prohibits all legislative distinctions is a classic and demonstrably incorrect proposition — it is therefore the answer to this 'which is INCORRECT' question. The Supreme Court from the very earliest cases (*Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v Union of India* 1950; *Anwar Ali Sarkar* 1952) established that Article 14 does not prohibit classification per se; it prohibits arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory classification. Differential treatment grounded in an intelligible differentia with rational nexus is constitutionally permissible. The other three options are all correct legal positions: Royappa's arbitrariness doctrine (correct); classification review extending even to sub-class reclassification (correct per subsequent jurisprudence); and the rational-nexus prong of the twin-test (correct per Anwar Ali Sarkar). Identifying the 'all distinctions = unconstitutional' claim as wrong is a core doctrinal precision tested at CLAT level. Hence, option (C) is correct.

**Q5 D**

Age below 18 is among the most well-established intelligible differentiae in Indian law — it corresponds to the constitutional and statutory definition of minority, underlies the Juvenile Justice Act, the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, and numerous protective enactments. Child safety at night is an unimpeachable legislative object. The rational nexus between restricting minor vendors' nightly activity and protecting children from harm is self-evident. The classification therefore satisfies both prongs of the twin-test with ease. The 'invidious discrimination' distractor confuses benign protective classification (protecting a vulnerable class) with hostile discrimination — the two are doctrinally opposite. Requiring statistical proof inverts the presumption of constitutionality: the State need not adduce empirical evidence for every regulatory distinction; the nexus must be discernible, not proved by data. The 'least restrictive means' distractor imports an American proportionality standard that Indian Article 14 jurisprudence has not adopted as a general rule — the twin-test does not require the government to choose the least restrictive option. Hence, option (D) is correct.

**Q6 C**

Religion is an explicitly protected ground under Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution; a classification based solely on the owner's religion for a commercial trade licence has no rational nexus to any legitimate regulatory object of commercial licensing — issuing licences concerns trade capacity, compliance ability, and public interest, none of which correlate with the owner's faith. Such a classification fails the twin-test at the nexus stage and also independently triggers Articles 15 and 25. The three distractors each describe valid classifications: pollution-output differentiation has a direct rational nexus to environmental protection (a core legislative object); income-bracket differentiation has a direct nexus to ability to pay and progressive taxation policy; and zone-based licensing fees have a nexus to infrastructure costs, congestion control, and local administration. The religion-based commercial licence is therefore the option that does NOT satisfy the twin-test, making it the correct answer to this 'does NOT' question. Hence, option (C) is correct.

**Q7 D**

Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC provides that culpable homicide is not murder if the offender deprives himself of the power of self-control by reason of grave and sudden provocation and thereby causes death. The Supreme Court in *K.M. Nanavati v State of Maharashtra* (1962) clarified three conditions: the provocation must be grave, it must be sudden (no cooling-off period), and the act must be committed while deprived of self-control. Discovering a spouse in infidelity can constitute grave provocation if it operates immediately on the mind — it is not categorically excluded, though courts examine whether any time elapsed. Using a heavy weapon establishes intention to cause bodily injury likely to cause death but does not in itself negate the exception; the exception operates on the mental state at the moment, not solely on the choice of instrument. Critically, the exception does not acquit — it reduces murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I, which carries imprisonment up to ten years. The exception never provides a complete defence. Hence, option (D) is correct.

**Q8 D**

Exception 5 to Section 300 provides that culpable homicide is not murder when the deceased, being above 18 years of age, consented to suffer death or take the risk of death. The elements are satisfied: the patient was 25 (above 18), gave full informed written consent, and Dr Kapoor acted with the knowledge that death was the probable result. The act therefore falls within Exception 5 — culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304. Patient consent, while reducing the offence, is not a complete defence under IPC (unlike in some jurisdictions) — the law still treats the act as a criminal offence, just a lesser one. Section 300 Clause 4 (imminently dangerous act with knowledge it must in all probability cause death) would otherwise apply, but Exception 5 overrides it. The *Aruna Shanbaug* judgment (2011) addressed passive euthanasia for persons in a permanent vegetative state via withdrawal of treatment — it does not create a blanket exemption from IPC liability for active drug-induced euthanasia by a doctor. Hence, option (D) is correct.

**Q9 B**

Section 300 Clause 4 covers acts that are so imminently dangerous that the offender must be taken to know they will in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, without any excuse for incurring such risk. The Supreme Court in *Reg v Govinda* and subsequent Indian cases make clear that Clause 4 does not require intention to kill a specific named person — it requires knowledge (not intention) that the act must in all probability cause death. Firing into a dense crowd from a rooftop satisfies this test unequivocally; the actor knows that bullets entering a crowd will kill. The Section 299 distractor is wrong: while Section 299 uses 'likely to cause death,' Clause 4 of Section 300 sets a higher threshold of 'must in all probability cause death,' and the dense-crowd firing clearly meets the elevated Section 300 Clause 4 standard, not the lower Section 299 standard. Requiring the offender to know victims' names confuses Clause 2's 'that particular person' requirement with Clause 4's generalised danger test. Section 304A (rash and negligent act) applies to accidents without criminal knowledge; firing into a crowd is not accidental. Hence, option (B) is correct.

**Q10 B**

The statement that all culpable homicide is murder and they are synonymous is demonstrably incorrect — it is therefore the answer to this 'which is INCORRECTLY describes' question. The Supreme Court in *Reg v Govinda* (1876 Bombay) and reiterated in numerous decisions used the precise formulation: 'culpable homicide is the genus; murder is the species.' All murder is culpable homicide, but not all culpable homicide is murder. The two are distinguished by the mental states prescribed in Section 300's four clauses and by the five exceptions that push even a Section 300 act back to non-murder culpable homicide. The three distractors are all correct statements of law: the genus-species relationship (correct per *Govinda*); the possibility that Section 299 is satisfied without Section 300 being engaged (correct — this yields culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part II); and the effect of Exception 1 reducing murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder (correct per *K.M. Nanavati*). The synonymy claim is the false proposition. Hence, option (B) is correct.

**Q11 D**

Exception 4 to Section 300 provides that culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion, without the offender taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner. A spontaneous fist-fight over a trivial dispute, with no weapon and no prior enmity, squarely fits this exception: the fight was sudden, the punch was in the heat of passion, and bare-fist punching is not cruel or unusual. The result is culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I. The 'not liable at all' distractor invokes the eggshell-skull argument incorrectly: the thin-skull rule (a tortious concept adopted in criminal law) holds that a wrongdoer takes the victim as found — Ajay's act caused the death even if a healthy skull might have survived, so he is causally responsible. Section 300 Clause 3 requires intention to cause a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death — a bare-fist punch is not ordinarily so, and Exception 4 further removes it from murder. Section 304A requires no mens rea (rash or negligent acts) and applies to accidents; a deliberate punch in a fight is not an accident but also is not mere negligence. Hence, option (D) is correct.

**Q12 C**

Section 300 Clause 3 requires that the offender intend to cause a specific bodily injury and that such injury must be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Both elements — the intention to cause the specific injury and the objective sufficiency of that injury to cause death — must be established. A light shoulder push intends only minor contact; it does not intend to cause any significant bodily injury, let alone one sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The victim's death from an unforeseen cardiac arrest is a completely unforeseeable consequence of a trivial act. Neither the intention to cause lethal injury nor the ordinary-course-of-nature sufficiency of a shoulder push is present — Clause 3 is therefore not satisfied. This is the answer to the 'does NOT satisfy' question. The three distractors all satisfy Clause 3: abdominal stab wounds (intended deep injury, sufficient in ordinary course to cause death), a point-blank chest shot (clearly intended lethal injury), and a full-force blow to the head with a bat (intended severe head injury, sufficient in ordinary course to cause death) — all meet both the intent and the objective-sufficiency requirements. Hence, option (C) is correct.

**SECTION B — ANALYTICAL REASONING****Q13 A**

Dev and Esha are on the same floor with Dev in a Left flat. Farhan occupies Floor 2 Right, so if Dev and Esha were on Floor 2, Esha would collide with Farhan. Charu is on Floor 3, and placing Dev and Esha there alongside Charu would fill three slots on a two-flat floor — impossible. Therefore Dev and Esha are on Floor 1 (Dev Left, Esha Right). The remaining residents — Aditi and Biren — fill Floor 2 and Floor 3. Since Aditi must live directly above Biren, Biren cannot be on Floor 3 (no floor above it), so Biren is on Floor 2 and Aditi is on Floor 3. Hence, option (A) is correct.

**Q14 C**

From the full solution, Biren lives on Floor 2, directly below Aditi on Floor 3, and a constraint states that Biren occupies a Left flat. Floor 2 already has Farhan fixed in the Right flat, so the only slot left on that floor is the Left flat. Therefore Biren occupies Floor 2 Left, which is the sole remaining position consistent with every clue about his floor and flat. Hence, option (C) is correct.

**Q15 C**

Charu lives on the topmost floor, which is Floor 3. Aditi, established earlier to be on Floor 3, occupies the Right flat of her floor. Since each floor has exactly two flats, a Left and a Right, and Aditi has taken the Right flat, the only remaining flat on Floor 3 is the Left one. Charu must therefore occupy Floor 3, Left flat, the single position left for her once Aditi's flat is fixed. Hence, option (C) is correct.

**Q16 B**

Farhan is fixed on Floor 2 Right. Dev and Esha share a floor, and they cannot be on Floor 2 (Esha would clash with Farhan in the Right flat) nor on Floor 3 (Charu already occupies Floor 3, and three residents cannot share two flats). By elimination, Dev and Esha are on Floor 1 — Dev in the Left flat and Esha in the Right flat. Hence, option (B) is correct.

**Q17 A**

Pooja is barred from Alpha and Delta, so she must belong to either Beta or Gamma. Ritu already occupies Gamma College, which leaves only Beta for Pooja. The clue that the Criminal Law topper is from Beta College then fixes Pooja as the Criminal Law topper. This is fully consistent with the separate constraint that Pooja did not top Constitutional Law, so Criminal Law is her subject beyond doubt. Hence, option (A) is correct.

**Q18 B**

Pooja is from Beta and Ritu is from Gamma, so the remaining colleges for Qadir and Sumit are Alpha and Delta. Qadir topped Evidence, and the student from Alpha topped Torts — since Evidence ≠ Torts, Qadir cannot be from Alpha. Therefore Qadir is from Delta and Sumit is from Alpha. This is also consistent with the constraint that Sumit is not from Beta. Hence, option (B) is correct.

**Q19 A**

Qadir topped Evidence and Pooja topped Criminal Law. Sumit belongs to Alpha College, and the clue that the Alpha topper took Torts means Sumit topped Torts. Three of the four subjects — Evidence, Criminal Law, and Torts — are thus assigned, leaving only Constitutional Law, which must belong to the remaining student, Ritu. This is consistent with the clue that Pooja is barred from Constitutional Law, so Ritu is the Constitutional Law topper. Hence, option (A) is correct.

**Q20** **A**

Pooja is assigned to Beta College and Ritu to Gamma College. Sumit is identified as the Alpha College topper because he topped Torts, the subject tied to Alpha. That leaves Delta as the only unassigned college, which must therefore go to Qadir. This is confirmed independently: Qadir topped Evidence rather than Torts, so he cannot be from Alpha, leaving Delta as the sole college consistent with all of Qadir's clues. Hence, option (A) is correct.

## SECTION C – QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

**Q21** **D**

Adding Alpha's four quarterly figures gives 1200 plus 1500 plus 1800 plus 2100, which equals 6,600. The figure of ₹6,600 crore is therefore the correct annual total. The distractor 6,400 drops 200 from the true sum, 6,800 adds a spurious 200, and 5,400 confuses Alpha's row with Gamma's yearly total, so careful column addition confirms that only ₹6,600 crore matches Alpha's four audited quarters. Hence, option (D) is correct.

**Q22** **C**

Delta rose from 800 in the first quarter to 1400 in the fourth, an absolute increase of 600. Expressed as a percentage of the Q1 base, 600 divided by 800 equals 0.75, or 75 per cent. The value 57.1 per cent wrongly uses 1400 as the denominator, while 80 and 62.5 per cent come from arithmetic slips on either the increase or the base, so 75 per cent is the correct growth figure. Hence, option (C) is correct.

**Q23** **B**

The four annual totals are Alpha 6,600, Gamma 5,440, Beta 4,950, and Delta 4,400, obtained by summing each platform's row across the year. Alpha's 6,600 is clearly the largest, so Alpha with ₹6,600 crore is correct. Gamma opened strongest in the first quarter at 1600 but declined every quarter thereafter, so its yearly total falls well short of Alpha's despite that early lead, which is the trap the distractors exploit. Hence, option (B) is correct.

**Q24** **B**

Gamma's four quarters are 1600, 1440, 1280, and 1120, which sum to 5,440. Dividing 5,440 by the four quarters yields an average of 1,360, so the answer ₹1,360 crore is correct. The distractor 1,280 is merely Gamma's third-quarter figure mistaken for the mean, while 1,340 and 1,400 arise from mis-adding the four values, so only 1,360 is Gamma's true quarterly average. Hence, option (B) is correct.

**Q25** **D**

Alpha's first-quarter GMV is 1200 and Delta's first-quarter GMV is 800. Dividing both quantities by their common factor of 400 reduces the ratio to 3 to 2. The option 2 : 3 simply inverts the correct order, while 4 : 3 and 5 : 3 arise from choosing a wrong common factor or misreading the two figures, so 3 : 2 correctly captures how much larger Alpha's opening quarter was than Delta's. Hence, option (D) is correct.

**Q26** **A**

Court S disposed of 72 thousand cases while only 60 thousand were filed. Dividing 72 by 60 gives 1.2, or 120 per cent, meaning the court cleared more cases than it received and therefore reduced its backlog during the year. The value 83.3 per cent inverts the fraction as 60 over 72, 72 per cent reads the disposed figure as a raw percentage, and 20 per cent uses only the 12-thousand gap, so 120 per cent is correct. Hence, option (A) is correct.

**Q27** **D**

A court whose disposals equal its fresh filings leaves its net backlog unchanged for the year. Court R filed 150 thousand and disposed of exactly 150 thousand, so its filings and disposals match precisely. Court P disposed fewer than it filed and added to pendency, whereas Courts Q and S each disposed of more than they filed and cut their backlogs, so only Court R satisfies the equal-filing-and-disposal condition. Hence, option (D) is correct.

**Q28 D**

Court P filed 120 thousand cases and disposed of 90 thousand. Dividing 90 by 120 gives 0.75, or 75 per cent, so the court cleared three-quarters of what it received and its pendency grew during the year. The distractor 133.3 per cent inverts the ratio, 70 per cent is a rounding error, and 30 per cent wrongly uses the 30-thousand shortfall rather than the disposal figure, so 75 per cent is correct. Hence, option (D) is correct.

**Q29** **C**

Summing the Filed column across all four courts gives 120 plus 80 plus 150 plus 60, which equals 410 thousand fresh cases instituted during the year, so the answer 410 thousand is correct. The distractors 412, 390, and 420 thousand each arise from dropping, adding, or mis-reading one court's filing figure, so only 410 thousand reflects the exact combined institutions of Courts P, Q, R, and S. Hence, option (C) is correct.

**Q30** **A**

A court reduces its backlog by the amount its disposals exceed its filings. Court Q disposed of 100 thousand against 80 thousand filed, a net reduction of 20 thousand, while Court S's excess was only 12 thousand and Courts P and R added to or merely held their pendency. Since 20 thousand exceeds 12 thousand, Court Q cut its backlog by the largest margin, making 'Court Q, by 20 thousand' the correct answer. Hence, option (A) is correct.

**Q31 C**

Article 14 embodies the twin guarantees of 'equality before the law', a negative concept borrowed from British common law meaning no person is above the law, and 'equal protection of the laws', a positive concept drawn from the American Constitution requiring equal treatment in equal circumstances. It permits reasonable classification but forbids class legislation, and forms the bedrock of the right-to-equality cluster running from Articles 14 to 18. Hence, option (C) is correct.

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**Q32 A**

In *Kesavananda Bharati* (1973), a thirteen-judge bench, the largest ever, held that while Parliament's amending power under Article 368 is wide, it cannot alter the Constitution's 'basic structure' or essential features. Elements such as judicial review, federalism, secularism and the rule of law are unamendable. The doctrine reconciled parliamentary sovereignty with constitutional supremacy and has since been repeatedly invoked to strike down amendments that damage these core features. Hence, option (A) is correct.

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**Q33 B**

Part IV, spanning Articles 36 to 51, houses the Directive Principles of State Policy, inspired by the Irish Constitution. They set social and economic goals for the State, such as securing a living wage, equal pay, and the promotion of international peace, but Article 37 makes them non-justiciable. Part III contains Fundamental Rights, Part IVA the Fundamental Duties, so only Part IV correctly locates the Directive Principles. Hence, option (B) is correct.

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**Q34 A**

The 42nd Amendment of 1976 inserted Part IVA and Article 51A, listing ten Fundamental Duties on the advice of the Swaran Singh Committee. An eleventh duty, requiring parents to provide educational opportunities to children, was added later by the 86th Amendment. The duties are non-justiciable but serve as constitutional reminders of citizens' obligations; the 42nd Amendment is often called the 'mini-Constitution' for its sweeping changes. Hence, option (A) is correct.