

ANSWER KEY — 2 JULY 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
A	A	C	C	C	D	C	A	B	B
Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20
D	D	C	C	A	D	C	C	C	C
Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	Q29	Q30
D	B	A	B	D	D	D	A	C	D
Q31	Q32	Q33	Q34	Q35	Q36	Q37	Q38	Q39	Q40
A	B	A	B	D	B	B	B	D	B
Q41	Q42	Q43	Q44						
B	A	A	A						

SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING

Q1 A

Section 53A requires a contract in writing signed by the transferor from which the terms can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. A purely oral agreement, however clearly acted upon, cannot attract the doctrine. Taking possession and building a wall are relevant only once a valid written contract exists; they cannot cure the absence of the foundational writing. The option protecting Sunil for possession, the one relying on acts in furtherance, and the one resting on intended consideration each ignore the mandatory written-and-signed requirement, so all three are wrong. Only the answer denying protection for lack of a signed writing correctly states the law under Section 53A. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q2 A

The whole purpose of Section 53A is to protect a transferee where the transfer was NOT completed by a registered instrument; registration is therefore not a requirement but the very defect the doctrine cures. The genuine statutory conditions are a written contract signed by the transferor, the taking or continuing of possession (or an act in furtherance), and the transferee's willingness to perform his part. Because those three genuinely are essential, they cannot be the correct 'not a requirement' answer. Only the demand for a duly registered instrument misstates the doctrine, making it the option that is not a requirement. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q3 C

Section 53A is a defensive equity: it prevents the transferor from enforcing, against the transferee in possession, any right other than one the contract provides. It therefore bars the eviction suit. It does not confer title, so the option claiming automatic ownership is wrong; passing of ownership still requires a registered conveyance. It is a shield, not a sword, so the option letting the transferee affirmatively sue for title misuses the section. It also creates no positive duty to register, so the option compelling registration is incorrect. Only barring the seller's eviction correctly captures the doctrine's protective operation. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q4 C

Willingness to perform one's own obligations is an indispensable condition of Section 53A; a transferee who defaults and refuses to pay forfeits the equity. Hence the correct answer denies protection for want of continuing willingness. The option resting on lawful possession ignores that possession must be coupled with willingness to perform. The option relying on the contract's validity overlooks that a valid contract does not save a defaulting transferee. The last option overstates the law, since possession does count when joined with the other conditions. Only the loss of willingness correctly defeats the claim here. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q5 C

In *Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi (2002)* the Court confirmed that Section 53A is available as a defence to protect a transferee's possession even where the transfer was never registered, provided the conditions are met. The option treating it as an offensive route to registered title contradicts the shield-not-sword character of the doctrine. The option tying it to expiry of limitation misstates the ruling, which did not condition the defence on a time-barred contract. The option requiring a delivered deed defeats the purpose, since the doctrine exists precisely where no registered deed completed the transfer. Only the defensive-protection answer is correct. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q6 D

The proviso to Section 53A expressly saves the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or its part performance. A bona fide purchaser like Bipin, taking a registered deed without notice, is therefore not bound by Aman's equity. The option favouring Aman on mere priority of possession ignores this proviso. The option claiming the doctrine defeats all later transfers overstates it, since the without-notice purchaser is protected. The option requiring Bipin to take physical possession first adds a condition the section does not impose. Only the answer protecting the bona fide purchaser without notice is correct. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q7 C

Following *Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club* (1933), a spectator who attends a sporting event impliedly consents to risks inherent in that sport, so *volenti non fit injuria* bars the claim. The option demanding a signed waiver is wrong because consent may be implied from the circumstances and need not be written. The option that the defence fails merely because harm was foreseeable is wrong, since foreseeable inherent risk is exactly what the spectator accepts. The option limiting the defence to drivers is wrong because spectators too voluntarily assume inherent risks. Only the answer recognising acceptance of inherent sporting risk is correct. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q8 A

The incorrect statement is that mere knowledge always equals consent; the maxim *scienti non fit injuria* is not the law, and knowledge of danger is not by itself agreement to bear it, as *Smith v. Baker* (1891) confirms. The requirement of free agreement to accept the risk is a correct statement of the law. That consent extracted under compulsion does not help the defendant is also correct, since consent must be voluntary. That consent to an unlawful act cannot found the defence is likewise accurate. Because those three are correct statements, only the equation of mere knowledge with consent is the incorrect proposition sought. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q9 B

On the facts of *Smith v. Baker* (1891), a worker's continuing in dangerous employment with knowledge of the risk is not, without more, a free and voluntary acceptance of it, so *volenti* does not bar the claim. The option relying on his knowledge confuses knowledge with consent, which the case rejects. The option resting on his choosing to remain ignores the economic compulsion negating free agreement. The absolute option that employers can never plead *volenti* is too broad and legally wrong, since the defence can apply where genuine free consent exists. Only the answer denying free consent from mere continuance is correct. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q10 B

Under the rescue principle recognised in cases like *Haynes v. Harwood* (1935), a person who intervenes under a legal or moral duty to save life is not a free volunteer, so *volenti non fit injuria* does not defeat his claim against the negligent defendant. The option that he knowingly chose danger conflates knowledge and compulsion of duty. The option that no one forced him ignores the moral compulsion created by the peril. The option distinguishing trained professionals is unfounded, as the rescue principle protects ordinary rescuers too. Only the answer that a duty-bound rescuer is not truly *volens* correctly states the law. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q11 D

Where a patient with full knowledge of the disclosed risks freely consents to the procedure, *volenti non fit injuria* bars a claim for a materialised risk occurring without negligence. The option treating any surgical injury as actionable ignores that consent to a lawful, non-negligent procedure defeats the claim. The option that consent cannot cover bodily harm is wrong, since valid consent to lawful medical treatment is a recognised defence. The last option is self-contradictory, because if the surgeon were negligent the defence would fail, not succeed. Only the answer resting on free and informed consent to the disclosed risk is correct. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q12 D

It is settled that the defence of *volenti non fit injuria* cannot be pleaded to defeat a claim founded on breach of a statutory duty imposed for the workers' protection, since parties cannot contract out of such duties. The option that the worker's agreement saves the employer ignores this bar. The option relying on the worker's knowledge that the statute was flouted confuses knowledge with valid consent and still cannot override statutory protection. The option requiring an express statutory prohibition inverts the rule, which excludes *volenti* by default for protective statutory duties. Only the answer that *volenti* cannot excuse the statutory breach is correct. Hence, option (D) is correct.

SECTION B — ANALYTICAL REASONING

Q13 C

Umang is fixed on floor 6. Rehan must be above Qadir, and three floors separate them, so their difference is four; the only pair with Rehan higher is Qadir on 3 and Rehan on 7. Prakash sits on an odd floor below Qadir, forcing Prakash to floor 1. Tarun avoids the ground floor with Suman just above, giving Tarun 4 and Suman 5. Vivek, below Rehan, takes the remaining floor 2. Hence Rehan alone occupies floor 7, the top. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q14 C

Deriving the full order: Umang is on 6, Qadir on 3 and Rehan on 7 (difference four, Rehan higher). Prakash, odd and below Qadir, takes floor 1. Tarun is not on the ground and Suman sits directly above him, so Tarun is 4 and Suman is 5; Vivek fills floor 2. Suman on 5 and Umang on 6 are adjacent, so no floor lies between them. The count of intervening floors is therefore zero. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q15 A

The fixed arrangement is Prakash 1, Vivek 2, Qadir 3, Tarun 4, Suman 5, Umang 6, Rehan 7. Prakash occupies the ground floor 1 because he must be odd and below Qadir, who is pinned to 3. The floor immediately above Prakash is floor 2, which Vivek occupies as the only remaining resident placed below Rehan. Qadir is two floors up, not immediately above, so Vivek is the correct neighbour directly over Prakash. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q16 (D)

The uniquely determined order is Prakash 1, Vivek 2, Qadir 3, Tarun 4, Suman 5, Umang 6, Rehan 7. Floor 3 is therefore Qadir's, fixed because Rehan on 7 and the four-floor gap force Qadir to 3, which also lies above Prakash on 1 as required. Vivek is on 2, Tarun on 4 and Suman on 5, so none of them occupies floor 3. Qadir on floor 3 is the only correct answer for the settled arrangement. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q17 (C)

Constitution is fixed on Wednesday. Property comes before Wednesday and sits two days from Jurisprudence, so Property is Monday and Jurisprudence Thursday. Torts is not Monday, is before Evidence, and Contracts follows Evidence immediately; the free days Tuesday, Friday, Saturday must take Torts, Evidence, Contracts. Torts on Tuesday, Evidence on Friday and Contracts on Saturday is the only fit, since Evidence and Contracts must be adjacent. Contracts therefore falls on Saturday, the last day of the schedule. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q18 (C)

Constitution is on Wednesday, and Property must precede it while lying exactly two days from Jurisprudence. Testing placements, Property on Monday with Jurisprudence on Thursday is the only pairing that keeps Property before Wednesday and preserves the two-day gap. Torts cannot be Monday by rule, and Evidence must be immediately followed by Contracts, which is impossible starting Monday given the remaining slots. Hence Property alone occupies Monday, anchoring the rest of the timetable uniquely. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q19 (C)

The settled timetable is Property Monday, Torts Tuesday, Constitution Wednesday, Jurisprudence Thursday, Evidence Friday, Contracts Saturday. Torts on Tuesday and Jurisprudence on Thursday have Wednesday sitting between them, which is exactly two days apart when counting inclusively from Tuesday to Thursday. This follows because Property and Jurisprudence are two days apart, fixing Jurisprudence to Thursday, while Torts must be Tuesday to stay before Evidence and off Monday. The gap between Torts and Jurisprudence is therefore two days. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q20 (C)

In the unique order - Property Monday, Torts Tuesday, Constitution Wednesday, Jurisprudence Thursday, Evidence Friday, Contracts Saturday - Evidence lands on Friday. The day immediately before Friday is Thursday, which holds the Jurisprudence seminar. Contracts cannot be the answer because it follows Evidence rather than preceding it. Torts sits on Tuesday and Property on Monday, both far earlier. Thus Jurisprudence is the seminar held on the day directly before Evidence, consistent with every scheduling constraint given. Hence, option (C) is correct.

SECTION C — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q21 (D)

Bihar had 8000 total applicants and 1200 shortlisted. Shortlisting percentage = $(1200 / 8000) \times 100 = 15\%$. Dividing 1200 by 8000 gives 0.15, and multiplying by 100 yields 15 percent. The distractor 12.5% comes from $1000/8000$, 18% from $1440/8000$, and 20% from $1600/8000$, none of which match the given shortlisted figure of 1200. Hence the correct shortlisting rate for Bihar is exactly 15 percent. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q22 (B)

UP female applicants = $12000 - 7200 = 4800$. Delhi female applicants = $9000 - 4950 = 4050$. The ratio is 4800 : 4050. Dividing both terms by their HCF of 150: $4800 / 150 = 32$ and $4050 / 150 = 27$, giving 32 : 27 in lowest terms. The distractor 27 : 32 simply inverts the ratio, while 16 : 9 and 4 : 3 come from wrong subtractions of the male figures. Hence the correct ratio of UP female applicants to Delhi female applicants is exactly 32 : 27. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q23 (A)

Total applicants = $8000 + 12000 + 6000 + 5000 + 9000 = 40000$. There are 5 states. Average = $40000 / 5 = 8000$. Adding the five totals: 8000 plus 12000 is 20000, plus 6000 is 26000, plus 5000 is 31000, plus 9000 is 40000. Dividing 40000 by 5 gives exactly 8000. The distractors 7500 ($37500/5$), 9000 ($45000/5$) and 8500 ($42500/5$) correspond to incorrect totals, so the correct average is 8000 applicants per state. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q24 (B)

UP applicants = 12000, Maharashtra applicants = 6000. Excess = $12000 - 6000 = 6000$. Percentage excess over Maharashtra = $(6000 / 6000) \times 100 = 100\%$. Since UP's total is exactly double Maharashtra's, it exceeds it by 100 percent. The distractor 50% would apply if measured the other way, 75% and 120% arise from wrong bases. Because the excess of 6000 equals Maharashtra's own total of 6000, the correct percentage excess is precisely 100 percent. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q25 (D)

Compute each rate: Bihar $1200/8000 = 15\%$, UP $1800/12000 = 15\%$, Maharashtra $900/6000 = 15\%$, Rajasthan $750/5000 = 15\%$, Delhi $1620/9000 = 18\%$. Dividing 1620 by 9000 gives 0.18, i.e. 18 percent, the highest among all five states which otherwise all sit at 15 percent. Therefore Delhi has the highest shortlisting rate at 18 percent, exceeding every other state, making Delhi the correct answer. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q26 D

Legal Reasoning earned 1750000 rupees from 5000 units. Average price per unit = $1750000 / 5000 = 350$ rupees. Dividing 1750000 by 5000: first 1750000 divided by 5 is 350000, then divided by 1000 gives 350. The distractor Rs 300 would need revenue 1500000, Rs 250 needs 1250000, and Rs 400 needs 2000000, none matching the actual 1750000. Hence the correct per-unit price for the Legal Reasoning guide is exactly Rs 350. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q27 D

Total revenue = $1200000 + 1750000 + 1200000 + 850000 = 5000000$ rupees. Constitution contributed 1200000. Share = $(1200000 / 5000000) \times 100 = 24\%$. Adding the four revenues: 1200000 plus 1750000 is 2950000, plus 1200000 is 4150000, plus 850000 is 5000000. Dividing 1200000 by 5000000 gives 0.24, i.e. 24 percent. The distractors 20%, 30% and 35% correspond to wrong numerators or totals, so the Constitution guide's exact share of total revenue is 24 percent. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q28 A

Total units = $4000 + 5000 + 6000 + 2500 = 17500$. There are 4 guides. Average = $17500 / 4 = 4375$ units. Adding units: 4000 plus 5000 is 9000, plus 6000 is 15000, plus 2500 is 17500. Dividing 17500 by 4 gives exactly 4375. The distractors 4000 ($16000/4$), 4500 ($18000/4$) and 3750 ($15000/4$) come from incorrect totals, so the correct average units sold per guide is 4375. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q29 C

Legal Reasoning revenue = 1750000, Logical Reasoning revenue = 850000. Difference = $1750000 - 850000 = 900000$ rupees. Subtracting 850000 from 1750000 leaves 900000. The distractor Rs 850000 mistakes Logical Reasoning's own revenue for the gap, Rs 950000 and Rs 750000 come from arithmetic slips. The precise excess of Legal Reasoning revenue over Logical Reasoning revenue is therefore exactly Rs 900000. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q30 D

Constitution price = $1200000 / 4000 = 300$ rupees per unit. Current Affairs price = $1200000 / 6000 = 200$ rupees per unit. Ratio = $300 : 200 = 3 : 2$ after dividing both by 100. Since both guides earned the same 1200000 rupees but Current Affairs sold more units (6000 vs 4000), its per-unit price is lower. The reduced ratio 300:200 simplifies to 3:2, making 3 : 2 the correct answer; 2:3 inverts it and the others are wrong. Hence, option (D) is correct.

SECTION D — RAPID-FIRE MIXED REASONING & GK

Q31 A

Reena's mother's only son is Reena's own brother. The man is described as the son of that brother, so the man is the son of Reena's brother. The son of one's brother is one's nephew. He cannot be Reena's brother because he belongs to a younger generation, nor her son since no such link is stated, nor her cousin since a cousin is a parent's sibling's child, not a brother's child. Therefore the man is correctly Reena's nephew. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q32 B

Starting at origin, walking 5 km North reaches a point directly north. A right turn from North faces East, so 3 km East moves him rightward. Another right turn from East faces South, so 5 km South cancels the earlier 5 km North, bringing his north-south position back to the start line. He remains 3 km East of the origin with no net vertical shift. Hence his final position lies purely to the East of the starting point, making East the only correct direction. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q33 A

The statement 'All roses are flowers' means roses form a subset of flowers, so it is certainly true that some flowers are roses, since every rose is a flower. 'All flowers are roses' reverses the given inclusion and is unsupported. Whether some roses fade quickly cannot be concluded because the flowers that fade may be non-rose flowers. Similarly, we cannot assert that no rose fades quickly. Only the converse-particular 'Some flowers are roses' logically and necessarily follows from the premises. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q34 B

Examine the ratio between consecutive terms: 6 divided by 3 is 2, 12 divided by 6 is 2, and 24 divided by 12 is 2. The series therefore doubles each time, a geometric progression with common ratio two. To continue, multiply the last term 24 by 2, which gives 48. The alternatives 36, 42 and 30 arise from mistakenly adding a constant difference instead of multiplying, which does not match the consistent doubling pattern already established across every earlier step. Hence 48 is correct. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q35 D

The Latin maxim 'audi alteram partem' translates as 'hear the other side' and is a core principle of natural justice requiring that a person be given a fair opportunity to be heard before an adverse decision is taken against them. The option about a prior decision binding courts describes stare decisis, the double-jeopardy option describes autrefois acquit, and ignorance of law being no excuse is 'ignorantia juris'. Only the requirement that no one be condemned unheard captures the true meaning of the maxim. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q36 B

A triangle, square and rectangle are all polygons, meaning closed figures bounded entirely by straight line segments, and each therefore possesses a definite number of corners or vertices. A circle, by contrast, is a curved closed figure with no straight sides and no vertices at all, being defined by a constant distance from a central point. Because the circle is the only shape lacking straight edges and angles, it does not belong with the three rectilinear figures. Hence the circle is the odd one out. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q37 B

In the code each letter of the original word is shifted forward by exactly one position in the alphabet: F becomes G, R becomes S, I becomes J, and so on for FRIEND to GSJFOE. Applying the same rule to MOTHER, M becomes N, O becomes P, T becomes U, H becomes I, E becomes F, and R becomes S, producing NPUIFS. The distractors either fail to shift one letter correctly or leave a letter unchanged, so they break the uniform plus-one pattern. NPUIFS is the correct coded form. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q38 B

The maxim 'res judicata' literally means 'a thing adjudged' and expresses the principle that once a competent court has finally decided a dispute between parties on its merits, the same parties cannot bring the same matter before a court again. This promotes finality and prevents endless litigation. 'The thing speaks for itself' is res ipsa loquitur, 'let the buyer beware' is caveat emptor, and immunity from suit is a separate doctrine. Only the bar on re-litigating an already-decided matter correctly captures res judicata. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q39 D

Sita is stated to be the daughter of Mohan, so Mohan is Sita's parent. Ravi is the brother of Sita, meaning Ravi and Sita share the same parents. Therefore Mohan is also Ravi's parent, and since Ravi is male he is Mohan's son. Ravi cannot be Mohan's brother or father because those relationships belong to Mohan's own generation or above, and he is not a nephew because a nephew is a sibling's child, not one's own child. Hence Ravi is Mohan's son. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q40 B

Looking at the positions in the alphabet, A is first, C is third, E is fifth and G is seventh, so each term advances by two positions, skipping exactly one letter every time. The pattern selects successive odd-numbered letters. Continuing from G at position seven, adding two gives position nine, which is the letter I. The option H sits at position eight and would require a step of one, while J and K jump too far ahead, breaking the consistent gap of two. Therefore I correctly continues the series. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q41 B

'Stare decisis' is Latin for 'to stand by things decided' and refers to the judicial practice of following established precedents so that like cases are decided alike. This doctrine gives the legal system predictability, stability and consistency, allowing people to order their affairs with confidence in how courts will rule. Trial by jury concerns fact-finding, separation of powers concerns the distribution of governmental authority, and compensation concerns remedies. None of these captures the precedent-following idea, so consistency through following precedent is the correct meaning. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q42 A

The transformation rotates the compass so that South-East is relabelled as North, a movement of 135 degrees anticlockwise. Applying the identical rotation to every direction, North-East, which lies 90 degrees clockwise from South-East, must shift by the same 135 degrees anticlockwise. Starting from North-East and rotating 135 degrees anticlockwise lands on West. The alternatives East, South and North-West correspond to different rotation amounts and do not preserve the fixed angular shift established by the first mapping. Hence North-East consistently becomes West under this rotation. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q43 A

The first premise tells us at least some cats belong to the category of black things. The second premise states that everything black is visible, so those black cats must also be visible. Combining the two, the cats that are black are necessarily visible, which guarantees that some cats are visible. We cannot say all cats are visible because non-black cats are not covered, nor that all visible things are cats, and clearly not that no cat is visible. Therefore 'Some cats are visible' correctly follows. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q44 A

The differences between consecutive terms are 3, then 5, then 7, increasing by two each time as consecutive odd numbers. Following this pattern, the next difference should be 9, so adding 9 to the last term 17 yields 26. Alternatively, each term equals a perfect square plus one: $1+1$, $4+1$, $9+1$, $16+1$ and next $25+1$, which again gives 26. The distractors 24, 25 and 28 do not fit either the increasing-odd-difference rule or the square-plus-one rule, so 26 is the correct missing term. Hence, option (A) is correct.