CLAT Gurukul — Daily Practice Sheet — Answers & Explanations — 3 July 2026

32 Qs · 0 Min
Answer key + detailed explanations

ANSWER KEY — 3 JULY 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
A	A	B	B	C	C	B	D	B	D
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
D	C	B	A	D	C	A	C	C	C
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**	**Q27**	**Q28**	**Q29**	**Q30**
A	D	A	D	B	D	A	C	B	B
Q31	**Q32**								
D	A								

SECTION A — LEGAL REASONING

Q1 A

The hypersensitive-plaintiff rule provides that a defendant is not liable in private nuisance where the claimant's damage results solely from the unusually sensitive nature of the claimant's own use — not from any objectively unreasonable act by the defendant. Since ordinary vegetation in the area is unaffected, the fumes do not meet the 'substantial and unreasonable interference' threshold for a standard plaintiff. Kavya's orchid-breeding is an abnormally delicate activity. Therefore she cannot recover. The choice asserting that any chemical emission amounts to nuisance is wrong — nuisance requires unreasonable interference judged by community standards, not absolute harm. The choice attributing liability because the industrial zone rule is 'irrelevant' inverts the law — locality is highly relevant and actually favours Rohan here. The choice about statutory authority misidentifies the governing rule; Rohan needs no statutory authority because the act itself is not prima facie unreasonable in this locality. The correct answer directly tracks the hypersensitive-plaintiff defence. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q2 A

The question asks which is LEAST likely to be a complete defence. Mere temporal priority — that Nirmala predated Biju — is not by itself a complete legal defence. English and Indian courts (following Sturges v Bridgman) firmly hold that 'coming to the nuisance' does not defeat a plaintiff's claim in law; it is at most a factor in denying injunctive relief. So temporal priority alone is the weakest shield. The prescriptive right choice is strong: 22 years of open, continuous, and known interference can ripen into a legal right to continue (Sturges v Bridgman / Radhey Shyam v Gur Prasad). The hypersensitive-use choice is also strong: since ordinary occupants suffer no harm, Biju's precision lab is exactly the kind of abnormally sensitive use that bars recovery under the Robinson v Kilvert principle. The coming-to-nuisance choice correctly characterises the doctrine as weakening an injunction claim — which is legally accurate, making it a partial but recognised shield. The correct answer — temporal priority alone — is the weakest and least likely to function as a complete defence. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q3 B

Standing in private nuisance extends to any person with a proprietary or possessory interest in the affected land — this includes not only freehold owners but also tenants, licensees with exclusive possession, and easement-holders. Ananya, as a tenant under a three-year lease, holds a clear possessory interest and unquestionably has standing. Prakash's argument that only freehold owners may sue is wrong as a matter of settled law. The distractor requiring over one year's residence fabricates a requirement that does not exist anywhere in the law of nuisance — no such threshold is prescribed. The distractor requiring proof of physical structural damage is also wrong; private nuisance covers both physical damage to land and substantial interference with enjoyment (noise, smell, vibration) — sensory annoyance suffices if it is substantial and unreasonable. The correct answer accurately states the possessory-interest rule that grants tenants standing. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q4 B

Statutory authority is a complete defence to nuisance only when the nuisance is an inevitable consequence of exercising the statutory power — i.e., it would unavoidably arise even if the authorised act were done with all reasonable care. The defence fails where the nuisance results from negligent or careless exercise of the power, because the statute did not authorise negligence. If the plant could be operated without odour nuisance using reasonable care but the corporation negligently failed to do so, statutory authority is unavailable. The distractor that the statute explicitly authorised the location is exactly the fact that typically makes the defence available — so this would support the defence rather than undermine it. The distractor about residents' non-consent is irrelevant; individual consent of affected parties is not required for a statute to be valid or for the defence to apply. The distractor about operating within the authorised boundary is a neutral compliance fact that supports the defence, not defeats it. Only negligent operation takes the nuisance outside the protection of the statute. Hence, option (B) is correct.

NAME: ______________________ ROLL NO: __________________ BATCH: __________________

Q5 C

The remedy of abatement allows a party to take reasonable self-help steps to end a nuisance without court intervention — but it is strictly circumscribed. Where abatement requires entry onto the wrongdoer's land, reasonable prior notice must ordinarily be given (unless the nuisance constitutes an emergency). Entering without notice or permission constitutes trespass to land, regardless of whether a court has separately confirmed the nuisance or granted an injunction. The injunction provides a legal remedy through enforcement (committal for contempt) — it is not a licence to trespass. The distractor claiming the act is lawful because the court confirmed the nuisance conflates having a remedy with being authorised to act unilaterally. The distractor based on causing no permanent damage is irrelevant — trespass is actionable per se without proof of damage. The distractor requiring Devika to prove financial loss similarly misstates the law; trespass requires no damage to be actionable. The correct answer identifies the notice requirement as the key rule violated by Suresh. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q6 C

Standing in private nuisance is confined to persons who hold a proprietary or possessory interest in the affected land — typically owners, tenants with exclusive possession, and those holding easements or similar rights. A mere licensee, especially one without exclusive possession, does not hold the required interest in land. Priya's weekly non-exclusive licence gives her permission to use the space but confers no estate or possessory right in the property itself. The distractor asserting physical damage to stock always grounds nuisance ignores the standing requirement — nuisance is a tort against land, not against persons or their chattels; the correct vehicle for Priya's stock claim may be negligence, not nuisance. The distractor attributing automatic standing from the landlord-licensee relationship is incorrect — the category of relationship matters, and a bare licence does not confer tortious standing in nuisance. The distractor based on physical presence is also wrong — mere physical presence does not create a proprietary interest. The correct answer precisely applies the possessory-interest rule and its limitation to non-exclusive licensees. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q7 B

Section 25(1) of the Indian Contract Act 1872 creates a statutory exception to the requirement of consideration. An agreement made on account of natural love and affection is enforceable if: (a) expressed in writing, (b) registered under the relevant law, and (c) between parties in near relation to each other. All three conditions are satisfied here — the deed is registered, in writing, and between uncle and nephew who are near relatives. The promise is therefore binding without any further consideration. The distractor claiming unilateral property promises can never be specifically enforced is wrong — courts have ordered specific performance of registered gratuitous promises falling within Section 25(1). The distractor requiring detrimental reliance imports a promissory-estoppel condition that Section 25(1) does not contain; that doctrine operates separately. The distractor asserting pecuniary consideration is always needed for property transfers directly contradicts the express statutory language of Section 25(1), which creates a complete exception for registered instruments grounded in natural love and affection. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q8 D

Section 25(2) provides that a promise to compensate a person who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor is enforceable. Crucially, the section does NOT require that the service was performed at the promisor's prior request — it explicitly covers voluntary past services rendered for the promisor's benefit. Saving Suresh's son's life is a past voluntary act done for Suresh, and Suresh's signed written promise to compensate satisfies the statutory requirement. The distractor requiring prior explicit request imposes a condition that Section 25(2) does not contain — that restriction applies under English past-consideration doctrine, not Indian statute. The distractor that consideration must move simultaneously misstates Indian law — Section 25(2) is precisely the statutory carve-out for past acts. The distractor requiring registration is also wrong — Section 25(2) specifies a written promise, not a registered deed, for monetary promises. The correct answer accurately applies Section 25(2) to voluntary past services. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q9 B

Indian law recognises several exceptions to the strict privity rule. One well-established exception covers family arrangements and marriage-settlement agreements where the agreement is made for the benefit of a named or identifiable third-party family member. Khwaja Muhammad Khan v Hussaini Begum (1910) is the leading authority confirming that a beneficiary under a marriage-settlement has a legal right to enforce the promise despite not being a contracting party. Sunita is the direct and intended beneficiary of the maintenance clause — squarely within this exception. The distractor denying all exceptions fundamentally misstates Indian law, which has judicially recognised multiple privity exceptions including trust, agency, and family-arrangement categories. The distractor requiring ratification on attaining majority confuses the rules on contracts with minors with the privity exception, which has no such ratification requirement. The distractor requiring spousal signature imports a formality not demanded by statute or precedent for a valid marriage-settlement. The correct answer accurately identifies the marriage-settlement exception and applies it to these facts. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q10 D

Forbearance to sue constitutes valid consideration under both English and Indian law — a promise not to exercise a legal right is a recognised form of abstinence under Section 2(d). Gopal's promise is therefore supported by good consideration (Bharati's three months' forbearance). However, the practical question is whether Gopal's promise survives once the underlying debt it was designed to secure has been extinguished by Vikram's full payment. The purpose of Gopal's surety-like promise was to ensure the debt was ultimately paid; once the debt is discharged by Vikram, requiring Gopal to also pay ₹5 lakh would give Bharati a windfall double recovery with no juridical basis — courts would construe the promise as coterminous with the debt's existence. The distractor claiming forbearance is not valid consideration under Indian law is factually wrong. The distractor endorsing double recovery ignores the principle that performance of the principal obligation typically discharges the surety-like promise. The distractor about automatic loss upon accepting Vikram's payment overstates the rule — courts look at the parties' intent rather than applying a mechanical forfeiture rule. The correct answer identifies both the valid consideration and the likely discharge consequence. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q11 D

This question asks which statement is LEAST accurately stated. The claim that a promise to pay more for performing a pre-existing duty is 'always enforceable' under Indian law is the least accurate. The existing-duty rule — that performing what one is already contractually bound to do cannot be good consideration — is well recognised, and a modification extracted under economic duress or coercion can be set aside under Sections 15 and 19 of the Indian Contract Act. Using 'always' overstates the position and directly contradicts the coercion doctrine. The distractor that Arun's argument has force is accurate: the existing-duty principle does undermine the modified promise's consideration. The distractor about economic duress is accurate — Courts applying Sections 15/19 ICA recognise that promises secured by duress or coercion are voidable. The distractor about additional services is legally sound — if Deepa went beyond her original scope, that additional work constitutes fresh consideration for the enhanced payment. The correct answer is the one that incorrectly uses 'always', which is an inaccurate overgeneralisation that ignores the coercion and duress exceptions. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q12 C

Indian courts have firmly recognised that a third-party beneficiary under a family arrangement or settlement has the right to enforce the relevant stipulation, notwithstanding the general privity rule. The Supreme Court and various High Courts have held that such a beneficiary — even without signing the deed — can maintain a suit on the family arrangement. Kamla, as the widowed mother whose maintenance was expressly provided for in the settlement, is a classic beneficiary in this mould. The distractor claiming Indian law admits no privity exceptions is factually wrong — Khwaja Muhammad Khan v Hussaini Begum and numerous subsequent decisions have entrenched the family-arrangement exception. The distractor requiring Kamla's physical presence at execution fabricates a procedural condition with no basis in law — nothing in contract law requires a beneficiary to witness execution to have enforceable rights. The distractor confining Kamla to the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act is incorrect; that Act provides a parallel statutory remedy but does not oust contractual or family-arrangement rights. The correct answer identifies the family-arrangement privity exception and applies it squarely to these facts. Hence, option (C) is correct.

SECTION B — ANALYTICAL REASONING

Q13 B

Farhan is placed immediately to Asha's left. Asha faces the centre at position 1; for an inward-facing person, left is the counter-clockwise direction, which is position 8. So Farhan is at position 8. The seat directly opposite any position N is position N+4 (mod 8). Opposite position 8 is position 4. Now, Dev is placed immediately to Benu's left: Benu faces outward at position 5; for an outward-facing person, left is the counter-clockwise direction of the circle, which is position 4. Therefore Dev sits at position 4. Position 4 is directly opposite position 8 (Farhan), confirming the answer is Dev. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q14 A

Asha occupies position 1. Ela occupies position 7 (directly opposite Charu at position 3; opposite of 3 is 7). Counting clockwise from Asha at position 1, the sequence is: position 2 (Hari), position 3 (Charu), position 4 (Dev), position 5 (Benu), position 6 (Gita), and then position 7 is Ela herself. The persons seated between Asha and Ela (not counting either endpoint) are Hari, Charu, Dev, Benu, and Gita — a total of five persons. This is a multi-step deduction because Ela's position must first be established from the 'opposite Charu' constraint before counting can begin. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q15 D

Gita is placed on the shorter arc between Benu (position 5) and Farhan (position 8). The positions on that arc are 6 and 7. Position 7 is already occupied by Ela. Therefore Gita occupies position 6. The immediate neighbours of position 6 are position 5 (clockwise neighbour is position 7, counter-clockwise neighbour is position 5). Specifically, the seat at position 5 is Benu and the seat at position 7 is Ela. Hence Gita's immediate neighbours are Benu (to her counter-clockwise side) and Ela (to her clockwise side). Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q16 C

The four outward-facing persons are identified as follows: Benu faces outward (given directly), Dev faces outward (given directly), Ela faces outward (given directly), and Farhan faces outward (given directly). The four inward-facing persons are Asha, Charu, Gita, and Hari — each stated in the conditions to face the centre. From the answer choices, 'Dev and Farhan' are both in the outward-facing group. The pair 'Hari and Charu' are both inward-facing. 'Gita and Benu' splits inward and outward. 'Asha and Ela' also splits inward and outward. Therefore Dev and Farhan is the only all-outward pair. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q17 A

From condition 1, Hema = rank 1. Condition 2 requires Farida to be ranked below Hema (rank > 1). Condition 3 fixes Irfan exactly 2 places below Farida. Testing Farida = rank 2 gives Irfan = rank 4. Condition 5 requires Kiran to be ranked below Irfan (rank > 4), so Kiran $\in \{5, 6\}$. Condition 4 requires Jaya immediately above Kiran: if Kiran = 5, Jaya = 4, but rank 4 is taken by Irfan — contradiction. So Kiran = 6 and Jaya = 5. The remaining rank 3 goes to Ganesh, satisfying condition 2 (Farida rank 2 outranks Ganesh rank 3) and condition 6 (Ganesh is 3rd, not last). Final order: Hema(1), Farida(2), Ganesh(3), Irfan(4), Jaya(5), Kiran(6). Irfan is ranked 4th. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q18 C

From the uniquely determined ranking — Hema(1), Farida(2), Ganesh(3), Irfan(4), Jaya(5), Kiran(6) — Farida holds rank 2 and Jaya holds rank 5. The students ranked strictly between them (ranks 3 and 4) are Ganesh and Irfan. Counting these intermediate ranks: rank 3 (Ganesh) and rank 4 (Irfan) gives exactly two students. None of the other pairs in the distractor counts (one, three, or four) correspond to any valid stretch in this arrangement. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q19 C

Original ranking: Hema(1), Farida(2), Ganesh(3), Irfan(4), Jaya(5), Kiran(6). Ganesh drops two ranks: from 3rd to 5th. All students previously ranked 4th and 5th shift up by one place to fill the gap left at 3rd. Irfan moves from rank 4 to rank 3; Jaya moves from rank 5 to rank 4; Ganesh now slots into rank 5; Kiran remains at rank 6. Hema(1), Farida(2), Irfan(3), Jaya(4), Ganesh(5), Kiran(6) is the revised order. The student at 3rd place in the revised ranking is therefore Irfan. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q20 C

In the uniquely determined ranking — Hema(1), Farida(2), Ganesh(3), Irfan(4), Jaya(5), Kiran(6) — Irfan holds rank 4. The student ranked exactly one place above Irfan holds rank 3. Rank 3 belongs to Ganesh. Farida is at rank 2 (two places above Irfan), Hema is at rank 1 (three places above), and Jaya is at rank 5 (one place below Irfan). Therefore the answer is Ganesh. This question tests whether students can correctly identify Ganesh's rank despite the multi-step deduction required to place him — Ganesh's position is the last to be determined, after all other students are placed. Hence, option (C) is correct.

SECTION C — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q21 A

Compute SC/ST count per NLU by applying the SC/ST percentage to total seats. NLU-A: 120 × 20% = 24. NLU-B: 200 × 25% = 50. NLU-C: 100 × 20% = 20. NLU-D: 150 × 24% = 36. NLU-E: 60 × 20% = 12. Summing: 24 + 50 + 20 + 36 + 12 = 142. The distractor 148 arises if a student mistakenly uses 25% for NLU-A (the earlier draft figure); 148 would equal 30+50+20+36+12. The distractor 138 results from using 22% for NLU-D. The distractor 156 results from double-counting NLU-E as 22 students instead of 12. The correct total is 142. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q22 D

Weighted average fee = (Σ seats × fee) ÷ total seats. Contributions: NLU-A: 120 × 80 = 9,600. NLU-B: 200 × 75 = 15,000. NLU-C: 100 × 90 = 9,000. NLU-D: 150 × 70 = 10,500. NLU-E: 60 × 105 = 6,300. Sum = 9,600 + 15,000 + 9,000 + 10,500 + 6,300 = 50,400. Total seats = 120 + 200 + 100 + 150 + 60 = 630. Weighted average = 50,400 ÷ 630 = 80 (₹ thousand). The distractor 84 is the simple unweighted average of the five fee values: (80+75+90+70+105)/5 = 420/5 = 84, a common error when weights are ignored. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q23 A

Absolute OBC counts: NLU-A: 120 × 25% = 30. NLU-B: 200 × 30% = 60. NLU-C: 100 × 25% = 25. NLU-D: 150 × 28% = 42. NLU-E: 60 × 30% = 18. NLU-B is the clear leader with 60 OBC students owing to its large intake of 200 seats. NLU-D has a higher OBC percentage (28%) than NLU-A but fewer absolute seats, yielding only 42. The distractor '54' arises from applying NLU-B's 30% to the wrong base of 180 instead of 200. The answer is NLU-B with 60 OBC students. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q24 D

Current NLU-A seats = 120. After 25% expansion: 120 × 1.25 = 150 seats. SC/ST seats before expansion: 120 × 20% = 24. SC/ST seats after expansion: 150 × 20% = 30. Additional SC/ST seats = 30 − 24 = 6. The distractor 7 is a common error from rounding 150 × 25% = 37.5 upward (which uses the wrong SC/ST percentage of 25% from NLU-B). The distractor 8 arises from wrongly computing the increase as 25% of 30 (i.e., current SC/ST count × expansion rate). The correct answer is 6 additional SC/ST seats. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q25 B

General students in NLU-B: 200 × 45% = 90. General students in NLU-D: 150 × 48% = 72. Ratio = 90 : 72. Dividing both by the GCD (18): 90 ÷ 18 = 5, 72 ÷ 18 = 4. Required ratio = 5 : 4. The distractor 3 : 2 arises from incorrectly using the percentage figures (45 vs 30) rather than absolute counts. The distractor 9 : 7 comes from comparing raw seat figures (200 : ~155). The distractor 45 : 48 is simply the percentage values taken as a ratio before applying seat counts, which is incorrect. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q26 D

Percentage growth = (Revenue 2023-24 − Revenue 2021-22) / Revenue 2021-22 × 100. Bihar: (65−40)/40 × 100 = 62.5%. UP: (130−80)/80 × 100 = 62.5%. Rajasthan: (50−35)/35 × 100 ≈ 42.9%. Delhi: (180−120)/120 × 100 = 50%. Maharashtra: (50−25)/25 × 100 = 100%. Maharashtra doubled its revenue in two years, the highest growth rate among all five states, driven by premium centre expansion. Bihar and UP both grew at 62.5%, making them plausible distractors. The key computation is always relative to the base year, not absolute increase. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q27 A

Total 2022-23 revenue = Bihar + UP + Rajasthan + Delhi + Maharashtra = 52 + 100 + 42 + 150 + 36 = 380 crore. Step-by-step: 52 + 100 = 152; 152 + 42 = 194; 194 + 150 = 344; 344 + 36 = 380. The distractor ₹370 crore is obtained if a student confuses Maharashtra's 2022-23 revenue as ₹26 crore (misreading the table). ₹395 crore would result from adding Rajasthan's 2023-24 value (50) instead of its 2022-23 value (42). The correct aggregate for 2022-23 is ₹380 crore. Hence, option (A) is correct.

Q28 C

Total revenue 2023-24 = 65 + 130 + 50 + 180 + 50 = 475 crore. Delhi's revenue = ₹180 crore. Delhi's share = 180 ÷ 475 × 100 = 37.89% (rounded to two decimal places). The distractor 31.58% results from incorrectly using Delhi's 2022-23 revenue (150) over the 2022-23 total (380): 150/380 × 100 ≈ 39.47% — itself not among the options, confirming 37.89% is unique to 2023-24 data. The distractor 40% is the share if the total were mistakenly taken as 450 (omitting Bihar's ₹65 crore and using 25 for Maharashtra). The correct answer is 37.89%. Hence, option (C) is correct.

Q29 B

UP revenue: Start (2021-22) = ₹80 crore; End (2023-24) = ₹130 crore; n = 2 years. CAGR = (130/80)^(1/2) − 1 = (1.625)^0.5 − 1 = 1.2748 − 1 = 0.2748 ≈ 27.5%. The distractor 31.25% is the simple average annual growth: total growth 62.5% ÷ 2 years = 31.25%, which overstates CAGR by ignoring compounding. The distractor 25% comes from miscomputing √1.5 (using 80 as base but end value mistakenly taken as 120). The distractor 22.5% results from applying the growth of the first year only (100−80)/80 = 25%, then averaging with 30%, giving ~27.5% versus the incorrect 22.5% from the wrong pair. Hence, option (B) is correct.

Q30 B

Bihar 2023-24 revenue = ₹65 crore. Rajasthan 2023-24 revenue = ₹50 crore. Combined = 65 + 50 = ₹115 crore. Delhi 2023-24 revenue = ₹180 crore. Required percentage = 115 ÷ 180 × 100 = 6,380/180 = 63.89% (to two decimal places; exact fraction = 23/36). The distractor 70.56% results from using Bihar's and Rajasthan's 2022-23 values (52 + 42 = 94) as percentage of Delhi's 2022-23 value (150): 94/133.33 — an error mixing years. The distractor 58.33% comes from dividing 115 by 180+17 = 197, adding UP incorrectly. The distractor 75% arises from taking 135/180 (adding 20 to Bihar instead of Rajasthan's correct value). The correct answer is 63.89%. Hence, option (B) is correct.

SECTION D — RAPID-FIRE MIXED REASONING & GK

Q31 D

Trace the chain step by step: A is B's brother; B is C's sister, meaning A and C are siblings — A is C's brother. C is D's father, so C's brother is D's paternal uncle. Therefore A is D's uncle. Blood-relation chains require careful gender tracking at every link; the key rule is that a sibling of a parent is always an aunt or uncle depending on that sibling's gender. Hence, option (D) is correct.

Q32 A

Resolve displacement on each axis independently. North-South axis: 5 km North and 5 km South cancel completely, leaving zero net vertical displacement. East-West axis: 3 km East remains unchanged. Net displacement = 3 km due East of the starting point. The straight-line distance is therefore 3 km. The distractor √34 km would apply if the northward and southward distances did not cancel, which they do here because they are equal. Hence, option (A) is correct.