

ANSWER KEY — 18 AUGUST 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
A	C	D	B	A	C	B	A	D	B
Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20
D	A	C	A	C	B	D	D	B	C
Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26				
A	B	D	A	C	C				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 A Coercion - unlawful detention of property (s.15) MED

Section 15 defines coercion to include the unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing that person to enter into an agreement. The transporter has no lien and is owed nothing, so its refusal to release Ravi's consignment is an unlawful detention of his property, and the detention is used precisely to make him sign away a claim. Ravi's consent was therefore not free within Section 14. Section 19 then makes the agreement voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused, that is, at Ravi's option: he may either affirm the release or avoid it and revive his damages claim. Option A states exactly this. Option D confuses voidable with void, because coercion does not make an agreement a nullity, it gives the coerced party a choice. Option C misapplies Section 16, which needs a relationship of domination and not the mere possession of goods, and option B simply reads the word 'unlawful' out of Section 15.

Examiner's note — the trap: The trap is D, which is right that the release is defective but wrong about the consequence: Section 19 makes a coerced agreement voidable at the victim's option, never void from the beginning.

Q2 C Undue influence - reversal of burden (s.16(3)) HARD

Section 16(1) treats consent as caused by undue influence where one party is in a position to dominate the will of another and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage. Section 16(2) tells us when such a position exists, and it expressly covers a party who holds real or apparent authority over the other, one who stands in a fiduciary relation to him, and one who contracts with a person whose capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by age, illness or bodily distress. Kamla, aged eighty, bedridden and dependent on Deepak for medicines, food and banking, falls squarely within the last of these. Section 16(3) then supplies the decisive rule of proof: where such a person contracts with the party who can dominate him, and the transaction appears on its face or on the evidence to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that the contract was not induced by undue influence lies on the dominant party. A sale at one-third of market value is unconscionable on its face, so the burden shifts to Deepak. Hence (C).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A states the ordinary rule that he who alleges must prove, which is why it feels safe; Section 16(3) is a statutory exception that reverses that burden once domination plus an unconscionable bargain are shown.

Q3 D Hard bargain distinguished from a vitiating factor HARD

The growers face a monopolist and a punishing price, but the Act's vitiating factors are specific and none of them fits. Section 15 requires either an act forbidden by the penal law or the unlawful detaining of property; charging a high price for one's own service is neither. Section 16 requires a relationship in which one party is in a position to dominate the will of the other, arising from real or apparent authority, a fiduciary relation, or a capacity impaired by age, illness or distress. A monopoly position in a local market is economic leverage, not that relationship, and the Act nowhere treats every strong bargaining position as domination. Nor is there any mistake as to a fact essential to the agreement, since the growers knew exactly what they were paying for and why they were paying it. The passage says so in terms: a contract that is merely a hard bargain, struck without a vitiating factor, remains binding. Hence (D). The remedy for such conduct, if any exists, lies in competition or price-control law and not in Section 19.

Examiner's note — the trap: The tempting option is B, which converts 'no practical alternative' into 'a position to dominate the will'; Section 16 demands a relationship of authority, trust or distress, not merely superior bargaining power.

Q4 B Rescission defeated by a bona fide purchaser (s.19A) ELITE

Section 19A makes an agreement whose consent was caused by undue influence voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. Voidable, not void: until the disciple exercises his option to rescind, the deed stands and title in the plot has in fact passed to the preceptor. A voidable title is a good title in the meantime, so a purchaser who buys for value, in good faith and without notice of the undue influence, before any avoidance takes place, acquires a title that the disciple's later rescission cannot disturb. What Section 19A does preserve for the disciple is a remedy against the preceptor himself, since the court may set the transaction aside absolutely or

upon such terms as seem just, and where the property has passed beyond reach that relief takes the shape of an account of the proceeds. Option B captures both halves of the position, and is therefore correct.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C weaponises the word 'absolutely' in Section 19A, reading it as a power that follows the property into a stranger's hands; it in fact describes the terms on which relief is granted between the parties, not the reach of rescission.

Q5 A Who may avoid a voidable contract (s.19) MED

Section 19 provides that when consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. The option belongs to the victim, and to nobody else. Nita's consent was obtained by a threat to burn down her godown, which is a threat to commit an act forbidden by the penal law and therefore coercion within Section 15. She, and she alone, may avoid the contract; she may equally choose to affirm it and sue upon it, and Section 19 expressly preserves the injured party's right to insist that the contract be performed. Sameer cannot set up his own coercion as an escape route, because he is not the party whose consent was vitiated and no one is permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. Option A is therefore correct. Coercion does not make the agreement void, which disposes of C, and Nita's present willingness to perform says nothing about the freedom of her consent then, which disposes of D.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is attractive because a threat of this kind feels as though it should poison the whole agreement; but Section 19 confers the option only on the party whose consent was caused by coercion, so the wrongdoer remains bound.

Q6 C Article 14 twin test applied MED

Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification, and Anwar Ali Sarkar lays down the twin test that the passage sets out. The first limb asks whether the classification rests on an intelligible differentia. Here the two groups are distinguished by the nature of the post held, a teaching post in a medical college as against a clinical post in a district hospital, which is a real and identifiable characteristic capable of marking off one group from the other. The second limb asks whether that differentia bears a rational nexus with the object of the rule. The declared object is continuity of specialised faculty, which takes years to build and to replace, and the differentia is precisely the presence or absence of a teaching role, so the connection is direct rather than remote or fanciful. Both limbs are satisfied and the rule survives, which makes (C) correct. Article 14 does not demand uniformity across an entire profession, which answers A, and service conditions are certainly not outside its reach, which answers B.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A restates the popular but wrong idea that Article 14 means identical treatment for all; the passage says the opposite, namely that the Article forbids class legislation while permitting classification which passes the twin test.

Q7 B Nexus limb - differentia unrelated to the stated object HARD

This classification clears the first limb and fails the second. Ownership of less than two hectares is a real, identifiable and easily verified characteristic, so there is an intelligible differentia and the difficulty does not lie there. It lies in the nexus. The scheme's own stated object is to reward the highest academic performers in the State. How much land a candidate's family owns has nothing whatever to do with how the candidate performed in the examination, so the differentia bears no rational relation to the object which the law has itself adopted. The passage flags exactly this trap: a classification founded on a perfectly clear differentia still fails if the difference has nothing to do with the statutory purpose. Hence (B). Had the State declared the object to be assistance to the economically weak, the identical criterion would have had an obvious nexus, which is precisely why D is wrong, since a scheme cannot be rescued by appealing to an object the State did not adopt. C is wrong because the differentia is plainly intelligible.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the seductive one, because helping the economically weaker is undoubtedly a legitimate aim; but nexus is tested against the object the statute actually states, and this scheme's stated object was merit and not need.

Q8 A Uncontrolled discretion / arbitrariness limb HARD

The provision hands the executive a power to send any case or class of cases to a special court with a truncated procedure and no appeal, while laying down no policy at all to guide the choice. That is the vice identified in Anwar Ali Sarkar and restated in the passage: a law which gives an authority uncontrolled discretion to single out individuals for harsher treatment, with no guiding principle, offends Article 14 because the selection then turns on caprice rather than on any ascertainable criterion. The defect lies in the statute itself and not merely in some particular exercise of the power, so the person referred need not produce a comparator who was left to the ordinary courts, which disposes of D. B is wrong because a legitimate object cannot cure an arbitrary means of selection, and the Act nowhere confines the power to cases in which speed is actually needed. C is wrong because Article 14 binds executive action as much as legislation, as E.P. Royappa confirms. Hence (A).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D sounds rigorous because equality is usually a comparative idea; but where the statute itself supplies no standard at all, the arbitrariness limb of Article 14 operates without any comparator being produced.

Q9 D Under-inclusiveness and step-by-step legislation ELITE

The petitioners' argument is that the law is under-inclusive, since it leaves untouched smaller schools causing the very same mischief. Under-inclusiveness is not by itself fatal. The passage records the rule from Ram Krishna Dalmia that a legislature may recognise degrees of harm and proceed step by step, so that a law is not bad merely because it could have gone further. The size of a school's enrolment is an intelligible differentia, since larger schools affect far more families and the burden of enforcement has to be allocated somewhere, and it bears a rational nexus with the object of restraining fee escalation where the escalation hurts most. Courts therefore permit a legislature to attack the more acute part of a problem first, provided the line drawn is not itself capricious. Hence (D). A states

the absolutist position the Court has discarded; B is wrong because enrolment is a real and measurable characteristic; and C invents a benefit-burden limitation on Article 14 which does not exist.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: it turns the true observation that some equally placed schools escape the law into an automatic rule of invalidity, ignoring the step-by-step principle that permits partial regulation.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q10 **B** Necessary assumption - materiality of the cause **MED**

An assumption is a premise the argument needs but never states. The officer's conclusion is about the district's average wheat yield, while all his evidence concerns resistance to one particular disease. That leap needs a bridge, and the bridge is that the blight is doing enough damage in Amravati for its removal to register in the district average at all. If the blight destroys only a negligible fraction of the crop, then a variety which resists it perfectly will leave the average yield exactly where it was, and the conclusion collapses. Option B states that bridge, and the negation test confirms it, since denying B destroys the argument outright. Option A is far stronger than the argument needs, because resistance merely as good as in the trials would serve. Option C is irrelevant, since the existence of some other resistant variety elsewhere leaves this conclusion untouched. Option D concerns past grower behaviour towards subsidies, on which a conclusion about yield does not turn. Hence (B).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the over-strong-assumption trap: it reads as supportive, so candidates accept it, but an argument assumes only what it needs, and 'even more effectively than in the trials' is more than the conclusion requires.

Q11 **D** Assumption - transferring trial conditions to the field **HARD**

The trials were run on the institute's own farm, on deep loam with assured canal irrigation. Most of Amravati's wheat grows on shallow black soil with no water but the rain. To carry a result from the first setting across to the second, the officer must assume that whatever produced the result does not depend on the features that differ between them. That is precisely option D: Ratna-9's resistance must not be contingent on deep loam and assured irrigation. Negate it, and the resistance may simply vanish on rainfed black soil, leaving the conclusion with no support at all. Option A concerns where a trial could have been run, which is beside the point once a trial has actually been run. Option B would strengthen the case for switching but is not required, because Ratna-9 can still help even if Sona-4 has some resistance of its own. Option C invents a future canal extension on which the argument nowhere relies. Hence (D).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B attracts because comparing the two varieties feels like the natural thing to establish; but a necessary assumption is what the argument cannot do without, and the conclusion survives even if Sona-4 resists the blight partially.

Q12 **A** Assumption behind a total switch of subsidy **HARD**

The recommendation is not merely that Ratna-9 be made available; it is that the entire subsidy be taken off Sona-4. That stronger step needs a further unstated premise about what the growers give up. Yield in a season is not settled by blight alone, and a variety may resist a disease while yielding less than its rival on the plots, or in the seasons, where no blight strikes at all. If Ratna-9's baseline yield were far below Sona-4's, the district average could fall even though the blight had been comprehensively defeated. Option A rules that out and is therefore assumed. Option B introduces procurement cost, which a conclusion about yield does not need. Option C overreaches, since the argument needs enough growers to switch and not every last one of them. Option D concerns the institute's motives, which bear on the credibility of the trials but are not a premise the argument requires. Hence (A).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap, because uptake genuinely does matter; but the argument assumes only that enough growers switch, and 'every grower, the moment the subsidy moves' is far stronger than anything the conclusion needs.

Q13 **C** Sufficient assumption - closing both gaps at once **ELITE**

This question asks not what the argument must assume, but what, if granted, would make the conclusion actually follow. Two separate gaps stand between the evidence and the conclusion. The first is the setting, since the trials were run on deep loam under assured irrigation while Amravati's wheat grows on shallow rainfed soil. The second is materiality, since even perfect resistance moves the district average only if the blight is a substantial cause of loss. Option C closes both in a single stroke, asserting that resistance carries over to shallow rainfed soils and that the blight is the chief cause of Amravati's winter losses. Grant both and distributing Ratna-9 does raise the district average. Option A merely repeats the trial result on the identical plot and never leaves the research farm. Option B addresses the officer's motives rather than his inference. Option D compares two soils on yield generally, which neither transfers the resistance nor establishes materiality. Hence (C).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap of the assumption that only restates the evidence: it wears the clothes of an inductive principle, but it licenses no more than a fourth trial on the same plot and never bridges the move to Amravati's rainfed fields.

Q14 **A** Flaw - proxy mistaken for the thing measured **MED**

The editorial's evidence is a fall in tickets issued; its conclusion is that drivers have slowed down. These are two different things. The number of tickets issued on a road depends on how much speeding occurs there, but it depends just as much on how much enforcement is directed there, on how many patrols are posted, and on whether drivers have simply diverted to roads that the list does not name. Publishing the list may have moved the traffic, or moved the patrols, without changing anybody's speed at all. The editorial never rules any of this out, and so it treats a proxy as though it were the quantity itself. Option A names precisely that error. Option B invents an assumption about traffic volume which the editorial does not make. Option C attacks the source rather than the inference, which is a separate objection altogether. Option D raises a point about readership on which the argument does not depend. Hence (A).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is tempting because police-supplied figures do invite suspicion; but questioning a source's honesty is not the same as identifying the logical gap, which is that fewer tickets need not mean less speeding.

Q15 C Flaw - appeal to ignorance **HARD**

The editorial observes that critics have produced no evidence that publication fails to reduce speeding, and treats that silence as settling the matter in the scheme's favour. This is the appeal to ignorance, the argumentum ad ignorantiam. The absence of proof that a proposition is false is not proof that it is true; it leaves the question exactly where it stood before. The burden of establishing that the scheme works rests on whoever asserts that it works, and it cannot be discharged by pointing out that nobody has established the contrary. Option C states this, and states it as a shifting of the burden of proof, which is the standard name for the move. Option A raises the anonymity of the critics, which is beside the point. Option B speculates about what the critics may in fact have done. Option D calls the step redundant, but redundancy is not the defect here; invalidity is. Hence (C).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the near-miss: it notices that the editorial has already offered a causal argument and mistakes redundancy for the fault, whereas the real defect is that no-evidence-against has been treated as evidence-for.

Q16 B Flaw - false dilemma **HARD**

The closing sentence allows a district exactly two characters: either it adopts the scheme, or it is indifferent to the lives of its residents. That is a false dilemma, sometimes called the black-and-white fallacy or the fallacy of the excluded middle. A district might decline the scheme because it doubts the evidence, because it has adopted some different and better road-safety measure, because it has no newspaper of general circulation in which a list could be published, or because its roads carry almost no fast traffic. Each of these is a live third possibility which the sentence simply refuses to acknowledge, and that refusal is what makes the step unsound. Option B describes this exactly. Option A names hasty generalisation, which is a genuine flaw in the preceding step about every district in the state, but it is not the flaw in the sentence quoted. Option C invents a comparison of values. Option D raises cost, which is a practical objection and not a logical one. Hence (B).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap because it names a real fallacy that the editorial really does commit, but one clause earlier; the question quotes the indifference clause, and the fault inside that clause is the false dilemma.

Q17 D Parallel flaw - recorded proxy plus a confounder **ELITE**

The editorial's inference runs: the recorded count fell, therefore the underlying behaviour changed. Its fault has two parts. The record is only a proxy for the behaviour, and something else changed over the very same period which could move the record on its own. Option D reproduces both parts. Recorded offences are a proxy for crime, and the station cut its staff across the same period, which is an independent reason for fewer offences to be recorded even if crime itself is unchanged. The two structures match step for step. Option A is a straight appeal to popularity, with sales standing in for quality and no proxy-and-confounder structure at all. Option B is a selection problem, since only the patients who complete the course are asked how they feel. Option C is an appeal to ignorance, an inspection that found nothing being read as establishing soundness. Hence (D).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B attracts because it too draws an unsound inference from reported data; but its defect is self-selection of the respondents, whereas the editorial's is a proxy measure moved by an independent change in how the measuring itself is done.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q18 D Column total from a data table **EASY**

Read down the generation column and add the five entries: coal-fired thermal 15,000, large hydro 2,500, solar 1,500, wind 750 and gas-fired 250 million units. Take them in order. 15,000 plus 2,500 is 17,500; plus 1,500 is 19,000; plus 750 is 19,750; plus 250 is 20,000. The board therefore generated 20,000 million units over the year. The temptation on a table of this shape is to stop once the figures being added have become small, and 19,000 and 19,750 are precisely the running subtotals that dropping the two smallest sources, or the smallest alone, produces; both are offered among the options for exactly that reason. Neither the capacity column nor the cost column is needed here, because a column total draws upon one column only. Hence (D).

Examiner's note — the trap: The distractors 19,750 and 19,000 are the running subtotals left by omitting the smallest source, or the two smallest; on a five-row table always count the addends before trusting the sum.

Q19 B Cost per unit from rupees crore and million units **MED**

Cost per unit is the cost of generation divided by the units generated, and the only care needed is with the units of measurement. One rupee crore is ten million rupees, and one million units is one million kilowatt-hours, so a figure in rupees crore divided by a figure in million units gives rupees per unit multiplied by ten. For solar the table shows Rs 375 crore of cost against 1,500 million units of generation. Dividing, 375 by 1,500 is 0.25, and multiplying by ten gives Rs 2.50 per unit. Checking the other way confirms it, since 1,500 million units at Rs 2.50 each comes to Rs 3,750 million, which is Rs 375 crore exactly. The Rs 3.75 offered among the options is what a candidate arrives at by dividing 375 by 100 and so mishandling that factor of ten. Hence (B).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D, Rs 3.75, is the unit-conversion trap: it comes from dividing 375 by 100 rather than dividing by 1,500 and scaling by ten, so always convert crore to rupees and million units to kilowatt-hours before dividing.

Q20 C Cost per unit compared across rows **HARD**

Compute the cost per unit for every row, remembering that rupees crore divided by million units must then be multiplied by ten. Coal-fired thermal: 5,100 divided by 15,000 is 0.34, so Rs 3.40. Large hydro: 500 divided by 2,500 is 0.20, so Rs 2.00. Solar: 375 divided by

1,500 is 0.25, so Rs 2.50. Wind: 225 divided by 750 is 0.30, so Rs 3.00. Gas-fired: 200 divided by 250 is 0.80, so Rs 8.00. The dearest source is therefore gas-fired at Rs 8.00 a unit, the cheapest is large hydro at Rs 2.00 a unit, and the ratio between them is 8.00 to 2.00, that is exactly four to one. Option C states both halves correctly. Option A misnames the dearest source, option B misnames the cheapest, and option D is wrong about the ratio and about which source is cheapest. Hence (C).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap of reading the largest number in the cost column instead of the largest cost per unit: coal does spend by far the most rupees in total, but it also produces sixty times as many units as gas-fired generation does.

Q21 A Weighted average cost after a shift in the mix ELITE

Total generation is unchanged at 20,000 million units, so only the mix changes, and with it the cost. Coal falls from 15,000 to 13,000 million units, and at Rs 3.40 a unit that costs 13,000 times 0.34, which is Rs 4,420 crore. Solar rises from 1,500 to 3,500 million units, and at Rs 2.50 a unit that costs 3,500 times 0.25, which is Rs 875 crore. Hydro, wind and gas are untouched at Rs 500 crore, Rs 225 crore and Rs 200 crore. The new total is 4,420 plus 875 plus 500 plus 225 plus 200, which is Rs 6,220 crore, and 6,220 divided by 20,000 and multiplied by ten gives Rs 3.11 a unit. The shortcut confirms it: each transferred unit saves 3.40 less 2.50, that is 90 paise, and 2,000 units out of 20,000 is a tenth of the whole, so the overall figure falls by nine paise from Rs 3.20 to Rs 3.11. Hence (A).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap for the candidate who notices that total generation is unchanged and concludes that the average must be unchanged too; an average of differently priced sources moves whenever the weights move, even when the total does not.

Q22 B Percentage of a total (pie slice) MED

The 2025-26 combined budget is Rs 720 crore, and primary health centres take an eighteen per cent slice of that year's chart. Substituting, the allocation is 0.18 multiplied by 720, which gives Rs 129.6 crore. The recurring danger in a two-chart question of this kind is to apply one year's share to the other year's total, and both such mismatches are offered among the options: eighteen per cent of Rs 600 crore is Rs 108 crore, and sixteen per cent of Rs 720 crore is Rs 115.2 crore. The passage warns about exactly this when it observes that the size of the whole has itself changed between the two years, so a slice must always be read against the total belonging to its own chart. A useful check is that eighteen per cent is a little under a fifth, and a fifth of 720 would be 144, so a figure a little below 144 is the one to look for. Hence (B).

Examiner's note — the trap: Options A and C are the cross-year mismatches, being 2024-25's sixteen per cent applied to the new total and 2025-26's eighteen per cent applied to the old total; always pair a slice with the total of its own chart.

Q23 D Share change versus rupee change MED

Convert every slice into rupees before comparing anything. In 2024-25 the total was Rs 600 crore, so the six heads received 120, 192, 96, 84, 60 and 48 crore respectively. In 2025-26 the total was Rs 720 crore, so they received 158.4, 216, 129.6, 108, 64.8 and 43.2 crore. Comparing head by head, five of the six rose. Training and administration is the single exception: its slice fell from eight per cent to six per cent, a two-point drop steep enough to outweigh the twenty per cent growth in the budget, so the head fell from Rs 48 crore to Rs 43.2 crore. Teacher salaries also lost two points of share but still rose from Rs 192 crore to Rs 216 crore, which disposes of option A, and medicines rose from Rs 60 crore to Rs 64.8 crore despite losing a point, which disposes of option B. Option C is simply false. Hence (D).

Examiner's note — the trap: Options A and B are the classic share-versus-rupee confusion: both heads did lose share, but the twenty per cent growth in the whole budget more than compensated, so their actual allocations rose.

Q24 A Grouped shares across two totals HARD

Group the three health heads, namely primary health centres, the district hospital, and medicines and vaccines. In 2024-25 they take 16 plus 14 plus 10, that is 40 per cent of Rs 600 crore, which comes to Rs 240 crore. In 2025-26 they take 18 plus 15 plus 9, that is 42 per cent of Rs 720 crore, which comes to 0.42 multiplied by 720, or Rs 302.4 crore. The increase is 302.4 minus 240, that is Rs 62.4 crore, and as a percentage of the base it is 62.4 divided by 240, which equals 0.26, a rise of twenty-six per cent. Option A states both figures correctly. Option B treats the two-percentage-point rise in the group's share as though it were the rise in money. Option C applies only the twenty per cent growth of the overall budget and ignores the shift in share entirely. Option D miscalculates the base year. Hence (A).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the seductive shortcut of reading a two-percentage-point gain in share as a five per cent rise in money; the budget itself grew twenty per cent, so share change and total change must be combined, never substituted.

Q25 C Ratio across two years HARD

Convert to rupees in each year before forming any ratio. Teacher salaries take 32 per cent of 600, that is Rs 192 crore in 2024-25, and 30 per cent of 720, that is Rs 216 crore in 2025-26. The district hospital takes 14 per cent of 600, that is Rs 84 crore, and then 15 per cent of 720, that is Rs 108 crore. The 2024-25 ratio is 192 to 84, which reduces by twelve to 16 : 7, roughly 2.29. The 2025-26 ratio is 216 to 108, which is exactly 2 : 1. The ratio has therefore fallen. The reason is that hospital spending grew from 84 to 108, a rise of about 28.6 per cent, while teacher salaries grew from 192 to 216, a rise of only 12.5 per cent. Option C states both the movement and its cause correctly. Option B denies any movement, and option D has the direction right but invents a doubling of hospital spending. Hence (C).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is a straight reversal, reporting the same two ratios in the wrong order, so a candidate who computes both correctly but fails to check which ratio belongs to which year will be drawn to it.

Q26 C Required share of a projected total MED

First find the projected total. The 2025-26 budget is Rs 720 crore, and a rise of 12.5 per cent gives 720 multiplied by 1.125, which is Rs 810 crore for 2026-27. The council wants medicines and vaccines to receive Rs 90 crore out of that sum. The required share is 90 divided

by 810, which is 1 divided by 9, that is 0.1111, or about 11.1 per cent. It is worth seeing what this means in context: the head's slice was ten per cent in 2024-25 and nine per cent in 2025-26, so restoring it to Rs 90 crore would push its share above where it began, even though the budget as a whole has grown. Working from the wrong base is the usual error here, since 90 divided by 720 gives 12.5 per cent and 90 divided by 1,000 gives nine per cent, which is why those two figures appear among the options. Hence (C).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D, at 12.5 per cent, comes from dividing Rs 90 crore by the current Rs 720 crore instead of by the projected Rs 810 crore, and it wears the same numeral as the growth rate, which makes it look reassuringly familiar.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Which section of the Contract Act defines coercion? — **Section 15**
2. A contract caused by coercion is void or voidable? — **Voidable, at the coerced party's option (s.19)**
3. Which sub-section shifts the burden in undue influence? — **Section 16(3)**
4. Which section makes an undue-influence contract voidable? — **Section 19A**
5. Which case settled the Article 14 twin test? — **State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali Sarkar**
6. Name the two limbs of that twin test. — **Intelligible differentia; rational nexus with the object**
7. Which case held equality is antithetical to arbitrariness? — **E.P. Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu**
8. Which case allows a legislature to proceed step by step? — **Ram Krishna Dalmia**
9. What does the negation test identify? — **A necessary assumption**
10. Name the flaw: no proof against, so it must be true. — **Argument from ignorance**
11. Name the flaw: adopt the scheme or you do not care. — **False dilemma**
12. One million units equals how many kilowatt-hours? — **One million kWh**