

ANSWER KEY — 21 SEPTEMBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	D	C	A	C	A	B	D	C	B
Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20
A	D	C	A	D	B	C	B	D	A
Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26				
C	B	D	A	C	D				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B Wife unable to maintain herself - Chaturbhuj standard **MED**

Two limbs decide this. First, Explanation (b) to Section 144 BNSS (formerly Section 125 CrPC) extends 'wife' to a woman who has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried, so Rekha's divorce does not take her outside the section; option A misreads the definition. Second, the wife must be 'unable to maintain herself'. In Chaturbhuj v Sita Bai (2008) the Supreme Court held that this does not mean destitution: the test is whether she can maintain herself in the manner she was accustomed to in her husband's home. Rekha's Rs 9,000 buys food and a single room, far below the comfortable standard of the marital home, while Arun plainly has sufficient means. She may therefore succeed, which is option B. Option C applies exactly the destitution test that Chaturbhuj rejected. Option D invents a fault requirement: Section 144 is a measure of social justice aimed at preventing neglect, and it does not ask who caused the breakdown of the marriage, only whether the statutory conditions are met.

Examiner's note — the trap: C is the trap: it sounds commonsensical that a self-supporting woman gets nothing, but Chaturbhuj measures inability against the marital standard of living, not against bare survival.

Q2 D Just ground for refusal - husband's second marriage **HARD**

Section 144(4) BNSS disentitles a wife who 'without sufficient reason' refuses to live with her husband. The section itself supplies the answer to what counts as sufficient reason in this situation: where the husband offers to maintain her on condition that she lives with him, the Magistrate may consider her grounds of refusal, and the Explanation declares that if the husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, that shall be considered a just ground for her refusal. Vikram has gone through a marriage with Kavya, so Sunita's refusal is by statute justified, and his conditional offer, however generous, cannot defeat her claim. Option D states this. Options A and B treat the offer as decisive, ignoring that the statute makes the second marriage a just ground regardless of the terms offered, including a separate portion of the house. Option C imports a destitution test that Chaturbhuj v Sita Bai rejected and that has nothing to do with the refusal issue actually raised by Vikram.

Examiner's note — the trap: B is the trap: a separate portion looks like a reasonable accommodation, but the Explanation makes the husband's marriage to another woman a just ground for refusal whatever the offer's terms.

Q3 C Limitation for warrant to levy arrears **ELITE**

The proviso to Section 144(3) BNSS says no warrant shall issue for recovery of any amount due unless application is made within one year from the date on which that amount became due. Each instalment is tested separately against the application date, 20 August 2026. An instalment is recoverable only if it fell due on or after 20 August 2025. The unpaid instalments run from 1 June 2025 to 1 August 2026. Those due on 1 June, 1 July and 1 August 2025 fell due more than one year before 20 August 2026, so they are barred for the purpose of the warrant. The instalments due from 1 September 2025 to 1 August 2026 are recoverable: that is 12 instalments. Amount = 12 x Rs 8,000 = Rs 96,000, which is option C. Option A ignores the limitation altogether. Option B wrongly counts the 1 August 2025 instalment, which became due one year and nineteen days before the application. Option D drops one instalment too many, perhaps by excluding August 2026 itself.

Examiner's note — the trap: B is the attractive miscount: 1 August 2025 looks like 'a year ago', but it fell due more than a year before 20 August 2026 and so no warrant can issue for it.

Q4 A Adult child - abnormality requirement; HAMA s.20(3) **HARD**

Section 144(1) BNSS covers a minor child unable to maintain itself, and a child who has attained majority only where, by reason of physical or mental abnormality or injury, the child is unable to maintain itself. Pooja is nineteen and in good health, so she falls in neither category and her claim under Section 144 fails. The passage records, following Abhilasha v Prakash (2020), that an unmarried Hindu daughter who cannot maintain herself may claim maintenance from her father under Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; that is her proper route, not the summary remedy. Option A captures both halves. Option B invents a rule that an unmarried daughter is a minor until marriage; the text speaks of minority, which ends at majority. Option C invents a studying-child

category that the section does not contain. Option D overstates the position, because the 1956 Act gives an unmarried Hindu daughter an enforceable right even though Section 144 does not.

Examiner's note — the trap: D is the trap: it correctly defeats the Section 144 claim but wrongly says she has no remedy anywhere, ignoring Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.

Q5 C Stepmother's claim - Kirtikant Vadodaria exception **HARD**

Section 144 BNSS lets a 'father or mother' unable to maintain himself or herself claim from a child of sufficient means. In *Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v State of Gujarat* (1996) the Supreme Court held that 'mother' does not include a stepmother, but carved out an exception: a childless stepmother who is a widow, or whose husband is himself unable to support her, may claim from her stepson. Lata satisfies the widowhood condition but not the childlessness condition, because she has a daughter of her own, and a well-settled doctor at that, to whom she can look. The exception therefore does not reach her and her claim against Ajay fails. Option C states the rule and applies it correctly. Option A turns a narrow exception into a universal rule for every widowed stepmother. Option B assumes a general duty of an adult son to support his father's widow, which is not what the provision provides. Option D reaches the right result but for the wrong reason, because it ignores the exception.

Examiner's note — the trap: D is the trap: it reaches 'she fails' but on an absolute rule the Court rejected; a childless widowed stepmother can claim, and Lata fails only because she has a daughter.

Q6 A Confession in police custody - s.23(2) BSA **MED**

Section 23(1) of the BSA (formerly Section 25 of the Evidence Act) bars confessions made to a police officer, and Section 23(2) (formerly Section 26) separately bars proof of a confession made by any person while in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Deepak confessed to his uncle, not to a police officer, so Section 23(1) is not engaged; but he was in the police lock-up, and no Magistrate was present. Section 23(2) therefore bars proof of the confession through the uncle. The rationale is that custody itself carries a risk of pressure, whoever the listener is, which is why the only safeguard the section accepts is a Magistrate's immediate presence. Option A is correct. Option B stops at Section 23(1) and forgets Section 23(2). Option C treats the absence of inducement as decisive, but Section 23(2) does not depend on inducement at all. Option D overstates: post-arrest confessions are not all irrelevant, for example one made before a Magistrate.

Examiner's note — the trap: B is the trap: it is right that Section 23(1) does not apply because the uncle is not a police officer, but it overlooks Section 23(2), which bars custodial confessions made to anyone.

Q7 B Discovery proviso to s.23 - Pulukuri Kottaya **HARD**

The proviso to Section 23 of the BSA (formerly Section 27 of the Evidence Act) permits proof of so much of the information given by an accused in police custody as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. In *Pulukuri Kottaya v Emperor* (1947) the Privy Council held that the fact discovered is not the object alone but the place from which it is produced and the accused's knowledge of it; words describing the past history or use of the object are not admissible under this provision. Applying that, 'I buried the gold chain under the tulsi plant in my courtyard' relates distinctly to the discovery, because it shows Salim's knowledge of where the chain lay. The words 'that I snatched from Meena' describe the chain's history and are a confession of the offence, so they remain barred by Section 23. Option B is correct. Option A wrongly treats recovery as confirming the whole statement. Option C is too narrow, since the proviso exists precisely to admit part of the words. Option D ignores the proviso altogether.

Examiner's note — the trap: A is the trap: the recovery does corroborate the statement, but the proviso admits only what relates distinctly to the fact discovered, never the confessional history of the object.

Q8 D Inducement fully removed; secrecy proviso - s.22 BSA **HARD**

The first confession was caused by a promise from a person in authority, the regional manager, with reference to the charge, namely that the bank would not report the matter; under Section 22 of the BSA (formerly Section 24) it is irrelevant. The second confession stands differently. The first proviso to Section 22 (formerly Section 28) makes a confession relevant if it is made after the impression caused by the inducement has, in the court's opinion, been fully removed. The manager withdrew the promise in writing and Harish knew the matter would be reported whatever he said, so the impression was removed. The manager's later assurance of confidentiality does not revive the taint: the next proviso (formerly Section 29) says a relevant confession does not become irrelevant merely because it was made under a promise of secrecy. Option D is correct. Option A contradicts the removal proviso. Option B treats secrecy as an inducement, which the statute expressly rejects. Option C invents a requirement to repeat the confession before a Magistrate.

Examiner's note — the trap: B is the trap: an assurance of confidentiality feels like an inducement, but the statute expressly provides that a promise of secrecy alone does not make a relevant confession irrelevant.

Q9 C Confession of co-accused - s.24 BSA 'same offence' **ELITE**

Section 24 of the BSA (formerly Section 30 of the Evidence Act) lets the court take a confession into consideration against a co-accused only when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence. Both conditions must be met. Anil and Bhola are tried jointly, but not for the same offence: Anil faces a murder charge, whereas Bhola is charged only with causing the disappearance of evidence, a distinct offence. Section 24 is therefore not attracted against Bhola at all, and Anil's statement that Bhola helped plan the killing cannot be used against him under that section. Option C is correct. Option A treats a joint trial as sufficient and drops the same-offence requirement. Option B is wrong twice over: Bhola is not charged with murder, and even where Section 24 applies, Kashmira

Singh (1952) and Haricharan Kurmi (1964) hold that a co-accused's confession is not substantive evidence and cannot found a conviction by itself. Option D overstates the rule, because such confessions can be considered where Section 24 applies.

Examiner's note — the trap: A is the trap: a joint trial is only half of Section 24; the section also requires that the accused be tried for the same offence, which Anil and Bhola are not.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q10 **B** Inference - chained contrapositives **MED**

Chain the conditionals backwards. Premise 2: no branch with an increase in active borrowers reduced its stock of new titles; so a branch that reduced stock did not record an increase. Premise 1: every branch that abolished fines recorded an increase; by contraposition, a branch without an increase did not abolish fines, that is, it kept them. Premise 4: every old-city branch abolished fines; by contraposition, a branch that kept its fines is not in the old city. So the branch kept its fines and lies outside the old city, which is option B. Option A may be true, but nothing forces the branch to have extended its hours. Option C over-reads 'no increase' as 'a decrease'; the number of borrowers could have stayed the same. Option D takes the auditor's second finding, that no fine-keeping branch recorded a fall in late returns, and converts 'no fall' into 'a rise'; late returns could equally have stayed level. Only B follows necessarily from the stated premises.

Examiner's note — the trap: D is the trap: the branch did keep its fines and so recorded no fall in late returns, but 'no fall' is not 'a rise' - the figure could have stayed flat.

Q11 **A** Inference - what cannot be true **HARD**

Test each option against the chain. An old-city branch abolished its fines (premise 4), so it recorded an increase in active borrowers (premise 1), so it did not reduce its stock of new titles (premise 2). Option A, an old-city branch that reduced its stock, therefore contradicts the premises and cannot be true. Option B is possible: premise 3 tells us some branches extended hours without abolishing fines, and nothing says such a branch must have gained borrowers. Option C is possible: premise 1 links abolition to borrowers, not to hours, and only old-city branches are said to have done both; an abolishing branch outside the old city may have kept its hours unchanged. Option D is possible: the premises say that abolishing fines is sufficient for an increase, not necessary, so a branch that kept its fines may still have gained borrowers. Only A is ruled out, so A is the answer.

Examiner's note — the trap: D is the trap: it feels ruled out because abolition 'produces' more borrowers, but the premise states a sufficient condition only, and other branches may gain borrowers too.

Q12 **D** Inference - aggregate to individual (some) **ELITE**

Combine the auditor's findings. The total number of late returns across the same twenty-four branches fell between 2024 and 2025. A total can fall only if at least one component fell. The second finding says that no branch that kept its fines recorded a fall. Every branch either kept or abolished its fines, so the fall must have occurred at one or more branches that abolished them. Therefore at least one abolishing branch recorded a fall in late returns, which is option D. Note the importance of the 'same twenty-four branches' detail: without it, the fall could have come from a branch closing. Option C upgrades 'at least one' to 'every'; some abolishing branches may have seen no change, or even a rise, offset by bigger falls elsewhere. Option B draws a causal conclusion that the review expressly declines to make. Option A asserts a distribution of the fall across branches, but no branch-level figures are reported.

Examiner's note — the trap: C is the trap: the logic proves the fall happened somewhere among the abolishing branches, not at every one of them; 'some' cannot be upgraded to 'all'.

Q13 **C** Inference - must be true EXCEPT **HARD**

Check each option. A restates premise 3 in other words: some branches extended hours without abolishing fines, that is, they kept them; so A must be true. B: every old-city branch abolished its fines (premise 4), so each recorded an increase in active borrowers (premise 1), and a branch with an increase cannot have recorded a fall; B must be true. D is the contrapositive of the auditor's second finding: if no fine-keeping branch recorded a fall in late returns, then any branch that recorded a fall was not a fine-keeping branch; D must be true. C, however, does not follow. We know from the auditor's findings only that at least one abolishing branch recorded a fall in late returns; nothing ties that fall to the old city in particular, let alone to every old-city branch. Old-city branches abolished fines, but abolition is not stated to reduce late returns anywhere. C need not be true, so C is the exception.

Examiner's note — the trap: D is the trap: its double negative makes it look unsupported, but it is simply the contrapositive of the auditor's second finding and so must be true.

Q14 **A** Paradox - resolve the discrepancy **MED**

The puzzle has two sides that must both be explained: reported fires rose by forty per cent with no change in the number of flats or people, yet deaths halved and the average claim fell by nearly a third. Option A explains both at once. If alarms reveal small fires early, many fires that previously went unnoticed, burnt out, or were quietly put out by occupants now get reported, so the count rises without any real increase in fires starting. And because fires are caught while small, fewer of them grow into the large, deadly and costly blazes that used to dominate the statistics, so deaths and the average claim fall. This is the chief officer's mechanism. Option B could explain more calls attended but not why more fires are reported, nor why each is less harmful. Option C at most reduces the number of claims, not the average claim, and says nothing about deaths. Option D is a general fact about fatal fires that explains neither trend.

Examiner's note — the trap: C is the trap: fewer insured tenants would reduce the number of claims, but the passage reports a fall in the average claim, which C does not touch, and it says nothing of deaths.

Q15 D Paradox - EXCEPT (non-explainer) HARD

Three options help explain why reports rose while harm fell. Option A: if alarms are linked to the fire service and every activation is logged as a reported fire, the reported count rises mechanically, including small incidents, and the average harm per reported fire falls. Option B: if tenants previously hid small fires they had put out themselves, the pre-rule figures were undercounts; once alarms bring such fires to notice, the reported number rises without any real increase. Option C supplies the link between early detection and reduced harm: fires tackled in the first minutes rarely kill or cause heavy damage, which explains the halving of deaths and the fall in average claims. Option D points the other way. Closing three stations and lengthening response times would, other things equal, make fires more deadly and more damaging, so it deepens the puzzle of falling deaths and claims rather than resolving it. D is therefore the exception and the correct answer.

Examiner's note — the trap: A is the trap: it may look like a cynical reporting artefact that 'explains away' the data, but a mechanical rise in logged minor incidents genuinely accounts for more reports with lower average harm.

Q16 B Paradox - weaken a causal explanation (control group) HARD

The chief officer claims that the rule, by making someone know about a fire sooner, is responsible for the favourable figures, especially the fall in deaths. The strongest attack is a control comparison. Option B says deaths fell just as steeply in owner-occupied houses, which the rule did not cover at all. If homes without the mandated alarms saw the same improvement, the fall in deaths is better explained by some city-wide factor, such as better building materials or faster emergency response, than by the rule, and the chief officer's attribution loses its support. Option C suggests partial non-compliance, but that would at most reduce the rule's effect; it does not show the observed improvement came from elsewhere. Option A concerns the cost of the alarms, which is irrelevant to whether they work. Option D is an attack on the councillor's motives and has no bearing on the chief officer's causal reply, which must be judged on the evidence.

Examiner's note — the trap: C is the trap: disconnected alarms sound like proof the rule fails, but partial non-compliance only dilutes the effect; it does not show the improvement came from something else.

Q17 C Paradox - evaluate the explanation ELITE

The chief officer's explanation makes two testable predictions. If the rule is working by early detection, the extra reported fires should be concentrated in the rented flats where alarms were mandated, and those fires should be small at the moment the fire service is called, because the alarm has flagged them early. Option C asks exactly this, so its answer would either confirm or undercut the explanation: if the extra fires were in owner-occupied homes, or were large when reported, the early-detection account fails. Option D is tempting, but the total paid out depends on both the number of claims and their size; since the number of reported fires has risen and the average claim fallen, the total could move either way without telling us whether early detection is the cause. Option A concerns the future population and has no bearing on the past three years. Option B concerns the consistency of the councillor, which cannot show whether the chief officer is right.

Examiner's note — the trap: D is the trap: total payout sounds like a direct measure of harm, but it mixes the number of claims with their size and so cannot isolate the early-detection mechanism.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q18 B Percentage growth with a filter condition MED

Step 1, filter by surplus in 2024-25 (exports > imports): Engineering 92 > 60, Textiles 40.5 > 12, Chemicals 54 > 50 and Gems 36 > 28 are in surplus; Electronics 32.5 < 75 is in deficit and is excluded. Step 2, growth % = (2024-25 exports - 2023-24 exports) / 2023-24 exports x 100. Engineering: (92 - 80) / 80 = 12/80 = 15%. Textiles: (40.5 - 36) / 36 = 4.5/36 = 12.5%. Chemicals: (54 - 45) / 45 = 9/45 = 20%. Gems: (36 - 40) / 40 = -10%. Step 3, the highest among the surplus groups is Chemicals at 20%, option B. Electronics actually grew fastest of all five, (32.5 - 25) / 25 = 7.5/25 = 30%, but it fails the surplus filter because its imports are more than double its exports. Engineering goods has the largest absolute rise (US\$ 12 billion) but a smaller percentage rise than Chemicals, since its base of 80 is much larger.

Examiner's note — the trap: A is the trap: Electronics has the highest growth (30%) of all five groups, but it ran a deficit in 2024-25 and so is excluded by the question's filter.

Q19 D Trade balance with adjustments MED

Actual 2024-25 totals: exports = 92 + 40.5 + 54 + 32.5 + 36 = 255; imports = 60 + 12 + 50 + 75 + 28 = 225; actual surplus = 255 - 225 = US\$ 30 billion. Adjustment 1: gems and jewellery exports at the 2023-24 level of 40 instead of 36 adds 40 - 36 = 4 to exports, so exports become 259. Adjustment 2: electronics imports 20% lower means 75 x 0.8 = 60, a reduction of 15, so imports become 225 - 15 = 210. Revised surplus = 259 - 210 = US\$ 49 billion, option D. Check by increments: 30 + 4 + 15 = 49. Option C (19) is only the change in the surplus, not the surplus itself. Option A (45) applies the import cut but forgets the export restoration, and option B (34) applies the export restoration but forgets the import cut. The question asks for the level of the combined surplus, so both adjustments must be added to the actual surplus of 30.

Examiner's note — the trap: C is the trap: 19 is the increase in the surplus (4 + 15); the question asks what the surplus would have been, which is 30 + 19 = 49.

Q20 A Share of total - percentage points **HARD**

Share = group exports / total exports x 100. Totals: 2023-24 = 80 + 36 + 45 + 25 + 40 = 226; 2024-25 = 92 + 40.5 + 54 + 32.5 + 36 = 255. Textiles share 2023-24 = 36 / 226 x 100 = 15.929%. Textiles share 2024-25 = 40.5 / 255 x 100 = 15.882%. Change = 15.882 - 15.929 = -0.047, that is, a fall of about 0.05 percentage point, option A. The reason is that textile exports grew 12.5% (4.5/36) while total exports grew slightly faster, (255 - 226) / 226 = 29/226 = 12.83%. A component growing more slowly than the whole loses share even as its value rises. Option B has the right size but the wrong direction, the typical error of assuming a rising value means a rising share. Option D rounds both shares to 15.9% and calls them equal, missing the small fall. Option C has no basis in the data.

Examiner's note — the trap: B is the trap: textile exports rose, so their share 'must' rise - but the total grew faster (12.83% vs 12.5%), so the share actually slipped.

Q21 C Growth projection and deficit **HARD**

Step 1, electronics export growth in 2024-25 = (32.5 - 25) / 25 x 100 = 30%. Step 2, projected 2025-26 exports = 32.5 x 1.30 = 42.25. Step 3, projected 2025-26 imports = 75 x (1 - 0.10) = 75 x 0.90 = 67.5. Step 4, deficit = imports - exports = 67.5 - 42.25 = US\$ 25.25 billion, option C. Check the distractors: option A (35.00) applies the import cut but leaves exports at 32.5 (67.5 - 32.5); option B (32.75) grows exports but leaves imports at 75 (75 - 42.25); option D (29.25) would require exports of 38.25, that is, growth of about 17.7%, which does not match the 30% recorded rate. Only when both changes are applied together does the deficit narrow from the 2024-25 level of 75 - 32.5 = 42.5 to 25.25, a reduction of 17.25 billion. The group remains in deficit even after two strongly favourable movements.

Examiner's note — the trap: B is the trap: it grows exports by 30% but forgets to cut imports by 10%, giving 75 - 42.25 = 32.75 instead of 67.5 - 42.25.

Q22 B Ratio projection across groups **ELITE**

Projected exports = 2024-25 exports x (1 + own growth rate); projected imports = 2024-25 imports x 1.10. Engineering: growth 15%, exports 92 x 1.15 = 105.8, imports 60 x 1.1 = 66, ratio 105.8/66 = 1.603, above 1.25. Textiles: growth 12.5%, exports 40.5 x 1.125 = 45.5625, imports 13.2, ratio 3.452, above 1.25. Chemicals: growth 20%, exports 54 x 1.2 = 64.8, imports 55, ratio 1.178, below 1.25. Electronics: growth 30%, exports 42.25, imports 82.5, ratio 0.512, below. Gems: growth -10%, exports 36 x 0.9 = 32.4, imports 30.8, ratio 1.052, below. So exactly two groups, Engineering goods and Textiles, exceed 1.25: option B. The trap is Gems and jewellery, whose current ratio is 36/28 = 1.286, above 1.25; but its exports shrink by 10% while imports rise by 10%, dragging the ratio down to 1.052. Chemicals, at 1.08 today, stays below the mark even with 20% export growth, since 1.08 x 1.2 / 1.1 = 1.178.

Examiner's note — the trap: C is the trap: using today's ratios gives three groups (Gems at 1.286 qualifies), but Gems' falling exports and rising imports push it to 1.052 in the projected year.

Q23 D Unit cost with return leg **MED**

Loaded run cost per truck = distance x rate = 600 km x Rs 90 = Rs 54,000. Empty return run cost = 60% of the loaded rate over the same distance = 600 x (0.60 x 90) = 600 x 54 = Rs 32,400. Total cost per truck trip = 54,000 + 32,400 = Rs 86,400. Each truck carries 2 TEU, so cost per TEU = 86,400 / 2 = Rs 43,200, option D. Check the distractors: option A (Rs 27,000) is the loaded run alone divided by 2, ignoring the return; option B (Rs 54,000) is the loaded run per truck, ignoring both the return and the two-TEU load; option C (Rs 86,400) is the correct round-trip cost but per truck rather than per TEU. The question specifies both 'per TEU' and 'counting the empty return run', so both adjustments are required. This per-TEU figure is the baseline against which the rail option is compared in the questions that follow.

Examiner's note — the trap: C is the trap: Rs 86,400 is the right round-trip cost, but for the whole truck; each truck carries 2 TEU, so the per-TEU cost is half of that.

Q24 A Break-even with fixed cost - ceiling **HARD**

With no return cost, road cost per TEU = loaded run / 2 = (600 x 90) / 2 = 54,000 / 2 = Rs 27,000. Rail cost per TEU with n TEU on a rake = fixed charge / n + per-TEU charge + haulage = 3,60,000 / n + 1,200 + 2,500 = 3,60,000 / n + 3,700. Rail is cheaper when 3,60,000 / n + 3,700 < 27,000, that is, 3,60,000 / n < 23,300, so n > 3,60,000 / 23,300 = 15.45. The smallest whole number is n = 16, option A. Check: at n = 16, rail = 22,500 + 3,700 = Rs 26,200 < 27,000; at n = 15, rail = 24,000 + 3,700 = Rs 27,700 > 27,000. Option B (10) is the break-even against the original road cost of Rs 43,200, where n > 3,60,000 / 39,500 = 9.11. Option C (15) truncates 15.45 instead of rounding up. Option D (14) omits the Rs 2,500 terminal haulage: 3,60,000 / 25,800 = 13.95.

Examiner's note — the trap: B is the trap: 10 TEU is the break-even against the original road cost of Rs 43,200; once the return leg is free, road costs only Rs 27,000 and the rake needs 16 TEU.

Q25 C Capacity planning and mixed-mode cost **ELITE**

Truck cycle = load 3 h + loaded run 600/40 = 15 h + unload 3 h + empty return 15 h = 36 h. Whole round trips in 168 h = floor(168/36) = floor(4.67) = 4. Road capacity = 40 trucks x 4 trips x 2 TEU = 320 TEU. Road cost = 320 x Rs 43,200 = Rs 1,38,24,000. Remaining = 540 - 320 = 220 TEU by rail; rakes needed = ceiling(220/90) = ceiling(2.44) = 3. Rail cost = 3 x 3,60,000 + 220 x (1,200 + 2,500) = 10,80,000 + 8,14,000 = Rs 18,94,000. Total = 1,38,24,000 + 18,94,000 = Rs 1,57,18,000, option C. Option A (Rs 1,55,18,000) charges the fixed cost pro rata for 2.44 rakes, but a rake's fixed charge is incurred in full for each trip. Option B allows 5 round trips per truck, which breaks the whole-trip rule. Option D uses 4 rakes, one more than needed, since three rakes can carry up to 270 TEU.

Examiner's note — the trap: A is the trap: it spreads the fixed charge over $220/90 = 2.44$ rakes, but the passage says each rake trip costs Rs 3,60,000 however many containers it carries, so three full charges apply.

Q26 D Timeline with cut-off and schedules **HARD**

Road: loading 3 h, so departure is 21:00 Monday; transit = $600/40 = 15$ h, arrival 12:00 Tuesday; unloading 3 h, delivery complete 15:00 Tuesday. Rail: to catch a 22:00 rake the container must reach the terminal by 22:00 - 6 h = 16:00. Arriving at 18:00 Monday, it misses Monday's rake and leaves on Tuesday's at 22:00. Transit = $600/30 = 20$ h, arrival 18:00 Wednesday; depot handling 6 h, ready 00:00 Thursday; final haulage 2 h, delivery 02:00 Thursday. Gap = from 15:00 Tuesday to 02:00 Thursday = 9 h (to midnight Tuesday) + 24 h (Wednesday) + 2 h = 35 hours, option D. Option C (38) measures road delivery at the truck's arrival (12:00 Tuesday) and forgets the 3-hour unloading the question includes. Option A (11) assumes the container catches Monday's 22:00 rake, ignoring the 16:00 cut-off. Option B (17) simply subtracts the two transit times, $32 - 15$, ignoring every schedule constraint.

Examiner's note — the trap: C is the trap: 38 hours measures road delivery at the truck's arrival, but the question counts road delivery as complete only after the 3-hour unloading, at 15:00 Tuesday.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Which BNSS section provides maintenance for wives, children and parents? — **Section 144 (formerly s.125 CrPC)**
2. Does 'wife' under s.144 BNSS include a divorced woman? — **Yes, if she has not remarried**
3. 'Unable to maintain herself' does not mean destitute - which case? — **Chaturbhuj v Sita Bai (2008)**
4. Husband's second marriage and the wife's refusal to live with him? — **A just ground for refusal (Explanation to s.144(3))**
5. Time limit to seek a warrant for maintenance arrears? — **Within one year of each amount falling due**
6. Which stepmother may claim maintenance from a stepson? — **A childless widow, or one whose husband cannot support her (Kirtikant Vadodaria, 1996)**
7. BSA section barring confessions to a police officer? — **Section 23(1) (old s.25)**
8. BSA provision on discovery of facts from an accused in custody? — **Proviso to Section 23 (old s.27)**
9. Leading case on the meaning of 'fact discovered'? — **Pulukuri Kottaya v Emperor (1947)**
10. BSA section on the confession of a co-accused? — **Section 24 (old s.30) - joint trial, same offence**
11. From 'All A are B', can you infer 'All B are A'? — **No - that is the converse**
12. In a paradox question, what must the correct answer do? — **Explain both facts without denying either**
13. Can a Magistrate order interim maintenance during a s.144 BNSS proceeding? — **Yes - s.144 permits interim maintenance and expenses of the proceeding**
14. Within how long should an interim maintenance application ordinarily be disposed of? — **Sixty days from service of notice (proviso to s.144)**
15. Is a wife living in adultery entitled to maintenance under s.144? — **No (s.144(4))**
16. Can a Hindu father claim maintenance from his son under the HAMA, 1956? — **Yes - an aged or infirm parent under s.20 HAMA**
17. BSA section making a confession caused by inducement, threat or promise irrelevant? — **Section 22 (old s.24)**
18. Confession while in police custody is admissible only if made before whom? — **A Magistrate (s.23(2), old s.26)**
19. Is a confession of a co-accused substantive evidence? — **No - it can only lend assurance to other evidence (Kashmira Singh)**
20. What does 'Some A are B' permit you to conclude about 'Some B are A'? — **It is valid - particular affirmatives convert**
21. Contrapositive of 'If P then Q'? — **If not Q, then not P**