

**ANSWER KEY — 23 SEPTEMBER 2026**

| Q1  | Q2  | Q3  | Q4  | Q5  | Q6  | Q7  | Q8  | Q9  | Q10 |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| C   | D   | B   | A   | C   | B   | D   | A   | B   | C   |
| Q11 | Q12 | Q13 | Q14 | Q15 | Q16 | Q17 | Q18 | Q19 | Q20 |
| B   | C   | A   | D   | C   | D   | A   | D   | B   | C   |
| Q21 | Q22 | Q23 | Q24 | Q25 |     |     |     |     |     |
| A   | D   | A   | C   | B   |     |     |     |     |     |

**LEGAL REASONING**

**Q1 C Nemo judex - pecuniary bias** **HARD**

The passage separates two tests. A pecuniary interest, however small, disqualifies automatically; for every other kind of interest the question is whether a reasonable person would apprehend a real likelihood of bias, and proof of actual prejudice is never required. Rehan's twelve shares in Vayu Ltd are a pecuniary interest in the very company he helped select, so the automatic rule bites and the award is vitiated, which is option C. That he voted against Vayu does not save the award: A.K. Kraipak v Union of India (1969) struck down a selection even though the interested member withdrew while his own name was considered, showing that abstention does not cure participation. Option A rests on the absence of actual prejudice, which the passage expressly makes irrelevant. Option B applies the reasonable-apprehension test, which the passage reserves for non-pecuniary interests, and so asks the wrong question. Option D misstates necessity, which arises only when every available authority is disqualified.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** B is the attractive wrong answer: Rs 900 feels too trivial to matter, but the smallness of a pecuniary interest is exactly what the automatic rule refuses to weigh.

**Q2 D Legitimate expectation - overriding public interest** **HARD**

Eleven years of unbroken annual renewal at the same fee is a settled practice, and the passage says a settled practice may create a legitimate expectation. The passage is equally clear about what that expectation yields: it entitles the holder to a hearing before the authority departs from the practice, but it bows to an overriding public interest and it does not freeze policy. The Board heard the stallholders and then withdrew the scheme to build a flood-relief depot on the strength of a hazard report recorded by a court, which is an overriding public interest on any view. Option D captures both limbs and is correct. Option A converts the expectation into a vested right, which the passage denies by saying policy is not frozen. Option B claims a substantive right to renewal itself, going beyond the procedural entitlement the passage describes. Option C is wrong on the passage's own words, since a settled practice is named as a source of the expectation alongside a clear representation.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** B is the trap: it correctly identifies that an expectation exists and then overstates its content, upgrading a right to be heard into a right to be renewed.

**Q3 B Proportionality vs Wednesbury** **ELITE**

The passage assigns two standards to two situations. Wednesbury unreasonableness, asking whether a decision is so outrageous that no sensible authority could have reached it, governs ordinary administrative decisions; proportionality governs a restriction on a fundamental right, and it has four steps, namely a legitimate aim, suitability, the least restrictive alternative, and a fair balance. Ilyas challenges a blanket bar as a restriction on his Article 19(1)(g) right to carry on an occupation, so proportionality is the applicable standard and the court must ask whether a bar covering every offence, however trivial, is the least restrictive means of the aim and whether it strikes a fair balance. Option B states that enquiry. Option A applies Wednesbury to a fundamental-rights restriction, which is the classic error. Option C misstates the third prong, which asks for the least restrictive alternative and not for the only conceivable measure. Option D confines review to vires and procedure and abandons the merits review the passage describes.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** A is the trap: Wednesbury is the phrase candidates recall first, and the stem's word 'unreasonable' invites it, but the presence of a fundamental right switches the standard.

**Q4 A Doctrine of necessity** **HARD**

The alumni connection is a non-pecuniary interest, so the test is whether a reasonable person would apprehend a real likelihood of bias, and every one of the three members shares it. Ordinarily that disqualifies the tribunal. The passage supplies the exception: where every available authority is disqualified, the doctrine of necessity allows the authority to act rather than leave the matter undecided. Because the statute vests the appellate power in this tribunal and in no other body, there is no untainted forum, and necessity therefore requires the tribunal to hear the appeal. Option A is correct. Option B treats disqualification as absolute and accepts an undecided appeal, which is the very result necessity exists to prevent. Option C confines bias to proof of pecuniary gain, contradicting the passage,

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which says actual prejudice need not be proved and which applies the apprehension test to non-pecuniary interests. Option D asks a civil court to assume a jurisdiction the statute has confined to the tribunal.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** B is the attractive wrong answer: it applies the bias rule faithfully but ignores that the rule has a necessity exception precisely for a single statutory forum.

**Q5 C Persistent objector and jus cogens** **HARD**

The passage gives custom two elements, a general and consistent State practice and *opinio juris*, and then supplies the exception on which this question turns: a State that objects clearly and consistently to an emerging rule from the outset is a persistent objector and is not bound once the rule crystallises. That escape is closed only against a peremptory norm, because Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 defines a *jus cogens* norm as one from which no derogation is permitted. Calvaria objected from the first proposals onward, openly and consistently, and the stem states that the rule is not peremptory, so both conditions for the exception are met and option C is correct. Option A denies the persistent-objector doctrine altogether. Option B invents a requirement that objections be recorded in a treaty, which no source in Article 38(1) supports. Option D is wrong because Article 38(1) lists sources of law, not subjects on which law may exist.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** A is the trap: the generalisation that custom binds all States is true only as a default, and the stem's careful 'not a peremptory norm' is the clue that the default is displaced.

**Q6 B Dualism, Articles 51(c) and 253** **HARD**

The passage records that India is dualist. Article 51(c) merely directs the State to endeavour to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations, and as a Directive Principle it is not enforceable by any court. Article 253 empowers Parliament to legislate to implement a treaty, which means the treaty does not itself become enforceable municipal law; it needs the enactment that Article 253 authorises. Here Parliament has not legislated and the existing statute clearly caps compensation, so the court applies the statute. The passage preserves the narrower use of an unimplemented treaty, namely to read an ambiguous statute and to give content to Article 21, and option B states exactly that position. Option A makes a Directive Principle directly enforceable, which Article 37 forbids. Option C treats Article 253 as self-executing when it is only an enabling power. Option D goes too far the other way by shutting the treaty out of interpretation altogether, which the passage does not do.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** D is the trap: it sounds like rigorous dualism, but dualism denies direct enforceability, not interpretive relevance, and the passage keeps the interpretive use alive.

**Q7 D Attribution in State responsibility** **ELITE**

The passage states two attribution rules. First, the conduct of an organ is attributable to the State even when the organ exceeds its authority or disobeys its instructions. Second, the conduct of private persons is attributable only where the State directs or controls that conduct. The coastguard officers are organs of Naurava, so the sinking is attributable notwithstanding the express order never to enter foreign waters; the order goes to the officers' internal discipline, not to attribution. The mob is expressly described as acting on its own, so there is no direction or control and its burning of the consulate is not attributable. Option D applies both rules correctly. Option A attributes the acts of nationals as such, which no rule supports. Option B misreads the *ultra vires* rule by treating disobedience as a defence. Option C inverts both rules at once, treating an organ acting beyond authority as ceasing to be an organ and a purely private mob as the State.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** B is the attractive wrong answer: 'expressly ordered not to' reads like a disclaimer, but the *ultra vires* rule exists precisely so a State cannot disown its own organs.

**Q8 A UNCLOS zones and pacta tertiis** **MED**

The passage gives the UNCLOS, 1982 distances measured from the baselines: the territorial sea extends twelve nautical miles, the contiguous zone twenty-four, and the exclusive economic zone two hundred. An interception 150 nautical miles from Sedris's baselines is therefore inside the exclusive economic zone and well beyond both the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. On the treaty point, the passage states that treaties bind only their parties while custom binds every State except a persistent objector. Calvaria, whose flag the vessel flies, is not a party to the bilateral treaty, so that treaty cannot of itself supply a justification against Calvaria. Option A states both halves correctly. Option B places the point in the contiguous zone and makes a treaty binding on a non-party. Option C wrongly puts 150 nautical miles outside every UNCLOS zone. Option D converts the exclusive economic zone into territorial sea and imports full territorial sovereignty into it.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** B is the trap: it fuses a plausible-sounding zone with the true idea that UNCLOS zones are generally recognised, sliding from that into binding a non-party to a bilateral treaty.

LOGICAL REASONING

**Q9 B Principle application - threshold condition** **HARD**

Principle I imposes two cumulative conditions: the building must be at least one hundred years old on the date of the application, and it must still be in use by the public. The Sarvodaya Reading Room satisfies the second condition comfortably, since it is open to the public every day, but it fails the first, being ninety-eight years old on the date of application. A principle stated as a threshold is applied as written; the Trust may not substitute the purpose behind the rule for the rule itself, and the charter expressly binds the Trust to the four principles. Option B is therefore correct. Option A does exactly what the charter forbids by reasoning from purpose against text. Option C misreads the second condition, since daily public access is the paradigm of public use. Option D treats Principle II as if

clearing it were sufficient, when the principles are cumulative and a spotless preservation record cannot supply the missing two years of age.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** A is the attractive wrong option: ninety-eight years feels close enough and the equity is sympathetic, but principle questions reward the text over the purpose behind it.

**Q10 C Principle application - exception to a bar** **HARD**

Principle II bars a grant where the applicant has, within the five preceding years, demolished any part of a protected building, and then carves out two exceptions: a demolition ordered by a court, or a demolition necessary to save life. Mira's demolition was four years ago, so it falls inside the five-year window, and the wall was part of a protected haveli, so the bar is attracted. The second exception then rescues her, because the fire service's warning that the wall was about to fall on a queue of schoolchildren makes the demolition necessary to save life. The two exceptions are alternatives, not cumulative, so the absence of a court order is immaterial. Option C is correct. Option A reads the two exceptions as one. Option B invents a same-building requirement that Principle II does not contain, since it speaks of any protected building. Option D shortens the look-back period from five years to three and would then have excused her for the wrong reason.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** A is the trap: the stem volunteers that no court had ordered the demolition, which tempts candidates to treat the court order as the only route out of the bar.

**Q11 B Principle application - preference rule and its exception** **ELITE**

Principle III applies where two eligible applications compete for a fund that can finance only one, which is exactly the situation. Its default is the larger number of daily users, which would favour the Ghosh Library with 1,400 against the Tanvi Baths with 900. The default is displaced by an express exception: unless the other building faces an imminent risk of collapse, in which case the Trust must prefer that other building. Engineers certify that the dome of the Tanvi Baths may fall at any time, which is an imminent risk of collapse, so the exception is triggered and the word 'must' leaves the Trust no discretion. Option B is correct. Option A treats the daily-user test as controlling and leaves the express exception out of account. Option C restores a discretion that 'must' removes. Option D would require both buildings to face comparable risk, which would make the exception meaningless, since it exists to break a tie in favour of the endangered building.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** A is the attractive wrong answer: the user numbers are supplied first and invite a quick comparison, so candidates apply the default rule and never reach the exception clause.

**Q12 C Principle application - revocation and its exception** **MED**

Principle IV requires revocation where the recipient changes the use of the building within three years of the sanction, subject to one exception: where the change of use is temporary and is made at the written request of the district administration. The Anandpur Pavilion changed use one year after sanction, so the revocation limb is attracted. Both limbs of the exception are then satisfied on the facts, because the change lasted four weeks before the ordinary use resumed, which makes it temporary, and it was made at the written request of the district administration. The grant therefore stands, and option C is correct. Option A applies the rule while ignoring the exception written into the same principle. Option B assumes the district administration lacks authority, but the charter itself names its written request as the trigger for the exception. Option D imports a commercial-profit requirement that appears nowhere in Principle IV, which is concerned with a change of use, not with gain.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** A is the trap: it quotes Principle IV accurately up to the comma and stops before the exception, which is the commonest way a principle question is failed.

**Q13 A Analytical - must be true** **MED**

Gauri and Neel occupy adjacent slots in the order Gauri then Neel, so the pair sits at slots 1-2, 2-3, 3-4 or 4-5. Condition 2 keeps Bina out of slots 1 and 5. Taking each placement in turn and applying Condition 3 (Farid before Karan) and Condition 4 (Karan not immediately after Bina), exactly three orders survive: Gauri, Neel, Bina, Farid, Karan; Farid, Bina, Gauri, Neel, Karan; and Farid, Karan, Bina, Gauri, Neel. Bina occupies slot 3 in the first and third and slot 2 in the second, so 'Bina speaks either second or third' holds in every case and option A must be true. Option B fails in the first order, where Gauri speaks first. Option C fails in the third order, where Neel speaks fifth. Option D fails in the second order, where Bina speaks second and Gauri third.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** C is the trap: Karan is last in two of the three orders, so a candidate who stops after finding two arrangements will call it a certainty.

**Q14 D Analytical - conditional deduction** **HARD**

The three possible orders are Gauri, Neel, Bina, Farid, Karan; Farid, Bina, Gauri, Neel, Karan; and Farid, Karan, Bina, Gauri, Neel. Karan speaks second only in the third of these, so that order is forced: Farid first, Karan second, Bina third, Gauri fourth, Neel fifth. One can reach the same result directly. If Karan is second, Condition 3 puts Farid first, and Condition 4 then keeps Bina out of the first slot anyway; Bina cannot be fifth by Condition 2, so Bina takes the third slot, leaving slots four and five for the adjacent Gauri-Neel pair in that order. Neel therefore speaks fifth, which is option D. Option A is false because Karan holds the second slot. Option B is false because Gauri speaks fourth. Option C is false because Farid speaks first.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** B is the attractive wrong option: Gauri must be adjacent to Neel and candidates who place the pair at slots three and four without testing Bina's position pick it.

**Q15 C Analytical - could be true** **HARD**

The complete set of orders is Gauri, Neel, Bina, Farid, Karan; Farid, Bina, Gauri, Neel, Karan; and Farid, Karan, Bina, Gauri, Neel. A 'could be true' question is answered by the statement that holds in at least one of them. In the first order Farid speaks fourth and Karan fifth, so Farid speaks in the slot immediately before Karan's slot, and option C could be true. The others are false in all three orders. Gauri speaks first, third and fourth across the three orders, never second, so option A fails. Neel speaks second, fourth and fifth, never third, so option B fails. Karan speaks fifth, fifth and second, never third, so option D fails. Note that Condition 3 only requires Farid before Karan, not immediately before, which is why option C is possible without being necessary.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** B is the trap: Neel is never first and candidates who only check that constraint assume any later slot is available to him, without testing Gauri's adjacency.

**Q16 D Analytical - altered constraint** **ELITE**

With Condition 3 reversed to Karan before Farid, the Gauri-Neel block is again placed at slots 1-2, 2-3, 3-4 or 4-5, Bina is kept from slots 1 and 5, and Karan must not sit immediately after Bina. Working through the placements gives five orders: Gauri, Neel, Karan, Bina, Farid; Karan, Gauri, Neel, Bina, Farid; Karan, Bina, Gauri, Neel, Farid; Karan, Bina, Farid, Gauri, Neel; and Karan, Farid, Bina, Gauri, Neel. Each satisfies all four conditions, and no sixth arrangement does, because in every rejected case either Bina falls at an end slot or Karan lands immediately after Bina. The answer is therefore five, which is option D. Reversing the order condition loosens the puzzle because Karan, now free to take the first slot, is thereby taken further from the slot immediately after Bina, which is what Condition 4 forbids.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** A is the attractive wrong answer: candidates assume that reversing a condition simply mirrors the earlier count of three, without re-testing Condition 4 against the new placements.

## QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

**Q17 A Discount and profit per cent** **MED**

Selling price after a discount is marked price multiplied by one minus the rate of discount. Substituting, selling price equals 720 multiplied by 0.90, which is Rs 648. Profit equals selling price minus cost price, so 648 minus 480 gives Rs 168 on each lantern. Profit per cent is profit divided by cost price, multiplied by one hundred, because the passage states that profit is always reckoned on cost. Substituting, 168 divided by 480 equals 0.35, and multiplying by one hundred gives 35 per cent. The answer is option A. A common slip is to divide the profit by the selling price, which gives 168 divided by 648, or about 25.9 per cent, and another is to divide by the marked price, giving about 23.3 per cent. A third is to subtract the ten per cent discount from the mark-up of fifty per cent on cost and report forty per cent, which is option D.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** D is the trap: the marked price is exactly 50% above cost, so subtracting the 10% discount from 50 gives a tidy-looking 40%, but the discount is taken on the marked price, not on cost.

**Q18 D Working back from a target profit to a discount** **ELITE**

Work backwards from the required profit. The selling price that yields a profit of twenty per cent on cost equals cost multiplied by 1.20, so substituting gives 250 multiplied by 1.20, which is Rs 300. The discount is the difference between marked price and selling price, expressed as a percentage of the marked price. Substituting, the discount equals 400 minus 300, which is 100, divided by 400, which gives 0.25, or 25 per cent. The answer is option D. Option A is what a candidate reports who assumes the discount per cent must equal the profit per cent. Option B comes from taking the Rs 100 gap as a percentage of some other base or from confusing the mark-up with the discount. Option C, 37.5 per cent, is the answer to a different question, namely the discount that would reduce the selling price to the cost price of Rs 250.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** C is the attractive wrong option: 37.5% is the discount that wipes the profit out entirely, so a candidate who solves for break-even instead of for 20% profit lands on it.

**Q19 B Compound interest minus simple interest** **HARD**

Compound interest for two years equals principal multiplied by one plus the rate, raised to the power two, minus the principal. Substituting, 8,00,000 multiplied by 1.12 squared equals 8,00,000 multiplied by 1.2544, which is Rs 10,03,520, so the compound interest is Rs 2,03,520. Simple interest equals principal multiplied by rate multiplied by time, so substituting gives 8,00,000 multiplied by 0.12 multiplied by 2, which is Rs 1,92,000. The difference is 2,03,520 minus 1,92,000, that is Rs 11,520. The shortcut confirms it: for two years the difference equals principal multiplied by the rate squared, so 8,00,000 multiplied by 0.12 multiplied by 0.12 is again Rs 11,520. The answer is option B. Option A is the interest for one year on the first year's interest computed at ten per cent, and option C and option D arise from applying the rate to the wrong base.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** D is the trap: Rs 10,240 is what a candidate gets by taking the difference as the rate applied once to the simple interest of a single year rather than to the compounded amount.

**Q20 C Successive percentage change on marked price** **HARD**

Apply the two changes in sequence to the marked price. The raised marked price equals 2,100 multiplied by 1.10, which is Rs 2,310. The selling price equals that raised marked price multiplied by one minus the discount, so 2,310 multiplied by 0.80 gives Rs 1,848. Profit equals selling price minus cost price, so 1,848 minus 1,500 equals Rs 348. Profit per cent equals profit divided by cost price, multiplied by one hundred, that is 348 divided by 1,500, which is 0.232, or 23.2 per cent. The answer is option C. The single equivalent factor is 1.10 multiplied by 0.80, which is 0.88, so the burner sells at 88 per cent of its original marked price, namely Rs 1,848, confirming the

figure. Option B, 26.4 per cent, results from applying the raise and the discount in the reverse sense or from neglecting to compound the two factors.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** A is the attractive wrong option: a rise of 10% followed by a fall of 20% looks like a net 10% fall, which tempts candidates to expect a loss without checking the mark-up over cost.

**Q21 A Simple interest - solving for time MED**

Simple interest equals amount minus principal, so substituting gives 3,30,000 minus 2,50,000, which is Rs 80,000. Simple interest also equals principal multiplied by rate multiplied by time, so time equals interest divided by the product of principal and rate. The interest for one year equals 2,50,000 multiplied by 0.08, which is Rs 20,000. Substituting, time equals 80,000 divided by 20,000, which is four years. The answer is option A. Option B follows from taking the target interest as Rs 60,000, and option C from taking it as Rs 1,00,000, both of which are misreadings of the amount. Option D arises if the interest for one year is computed on the final amount of Rs 3,30,000 rather than on the principal. Note that the deposit pays simple and not compound interest, so no compounding factor enters the calculation at any stage.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** D is the trap: computing the annual interest on the maturity amount instead of on the principal gives a smaller number of years and a plausible-looking fractional answer.

**Q22 D Percentage change on a base MED**

Percentage change equals the change divided by the original value, multiplied by one hundred, and the original value here is the 2024 tally. Substituting, the change equals 60 minus 48, which is 12 goals, and 12 divided by 48 equals 0.25, so the tally rose by 25 per cent. The answer is option D. Option C, 12.5 per cent, comes from dividing the change by a wrong base or from halving the change before dividing. Option B, a rise of 20 per cent, comes from dividing the change of 12 by the 2025 tally of 60 instead of by the 2024 tally of 48, which is the commonest error in percentage-change questions and always understates a rise. Option A reverses the direction of the change altogether. The table also shows attendance rising from 12,500 to 14,000, a rise of 12 per cent, which is not what this question asks about.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** B is the trap: dividing by the later figure rather than the earlier one gives 20%, a number that also appears as Harbour United's goal fall, so it feels familiar.

**Q23 A Comparing percentage changes across rows HARD**

Compute each club's attendance change as change divided by the 2024 figure, multiplied by one hundred. Meridian FC rises from 12,500 to 14,000, a change of 1,500, and 1,500 divided by 12,500 is 0.12, or 12 per cent. Harbour United falls from 18,000 to 16,200, a change of 1,800, and 1,800 divided by 18,000 is 0.10, or 10 per cent. Crestline Rovers rises from 9,600 to 11,520, a change of 1,920, and 1,920 divided by 9,600 is 0.20, or 20 per cent. Ironvale SC rises from 22,000 to 24,200, a change of 2,200, and 2,200 divided by 22,000 is 0.10, or 10 per cent. Ignoring direction, the largest magnitude is Crestline Rovers at 20 per cent, so the answer is option A. Ironvale shows the largest absolute rise, 2,200 spectators, but on the largest base, which is why its percentage is the joint smallest.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** D is the attractive wrong option: Ironvale SC adds the most spectators in absolute terms, and a candidate who scans the columns for the biggest gap never divides by the base.

**Q24 C Successive percentage change and its reversal HARD**

Ironvale SC's tally fell from 55 in 2024 to 44 in 2025, a fall of 11 on a base of 55, which is 20 per cent. A rise of 25 per cent on the 2025 tally gives 44 multiplied by 1.25, which equals 55 goals in 2026. Comparing with 2024, the change equals 55 minus 55, which is zero, so the 2026 tally is exactly equal to the 2024 tally and the answer is option C. The arithmetic is exact because 0.80 multiplied by 1.25 equals 1 precisely: a fall of 20 per cent is undone only by a rise of 25 per cent, not by a rise of 20 per cent, which is the warning the league handbook gives in the passage. Option A and option B come from adding or subtracting the two percentages, and option D from taking a quarter of the five percentage points of apparent difference between them.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** A is the trap: subtracting 20 from 25 suggests a net gain of 5%, but percentage changes multiply rather than add, and here the two factors cancel exactly.

**Q25 B Percentage points against percentage change ELITE**

The win rate moves from 40 per cent to 55 per cent. The difference between two percentages is measured in percentage points, so the movement is 55 minus 40, that is 15 percentage points. The percentage change is that movement divided by the original rate, multiplied by one hundred, so substituting gives 15 divided by 40, which is 0.375, or a rise of 37.5 per cent. Both statements in option B are therefore correct, and it is the answer. Option A calls the movement a rise of 15 per cent, conflating the point difference with the proportional change, which is exactly what the league handbook warns against in the passage. Option C swaps the two figures, describing 37.5 as points and 15 as a percentage. Option D divides the 15 points by the later rate of 55 instead of by the earlier rate of 40, giving about 27.3 per cent, which is the usual wrong-base error.

**Examiner's note — the trap:** A is the attractive wrong answer: in ordinary speech a move from 40% to 55% is described as a rise of 15%, and the option repeats that everyday usage as if both halves were equivalent.

1. Which 1964 House of Lords decision buried the view that natural justice applied only to 'judicial' functions? — **Ridge v Baldwin.**
2. In A.K. Kraipak (1969), what vitiated the selection? — **A candidate sat on the very board that selected him.**
3. State the Wednesbury test in one line. — **A decision so outrageous that no sensible authority could have reached it.**
4. Name the four prongs of the proportionality test. — **Legitimate aim, suitability, least restrictive alternative, fair balance.**
5. Which Article of the ICJ Statute lists the sources of international law? — **Article 38(1).**
6. What are the two elements of customary international law? — **General and consistent State practice, and opinio juris.**
7. Which Article of the Vienna Convention, 1969 voids a treaty conflicting with a peremptory norm? — **Article 53.**
8. Which Article empowers Parliament to legislate to implement a treaty? — **Article 253 of the Constitution.**
9. Under UNCLOS, 1982, how far do the territorial sea, contiguous zone and EEZ extend from the baselines? — **Twelve, twenty-four and two hundred nautical miles.**
10. Is the conduct of a State organ that exceeds its authority attributable to the State? — **Yes; an organ's ultra vires conduct is still attributable.**
11. Which 1978 Supreme Court decision accepted a post-decisional hearing after a passport was impounded? — **Maneka Gandhi v Union of India.**
12. Name the maxim that forbids a person from being a judge in his own cause. — **Nemo iudex in causa sua.**
13. What does 'audi alteram partem' require? — **That no one be condemned unheard - notice and an opportunity to be heard**
14. Two limbs of natural justice? — **No one a judge in his own cause; hear the other side**