

ANSWER KEY — 25 SEPTEMBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
C	A	D	B	A	D	B	C	B	C
Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20
A	D	D	B	C	A	A	C	B	D
Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25					
B	C	D	A	C					

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 C BNS s.101 Exception 1 - cooling time MED

Exception 1 to section 101 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (the successor to Exception 1 to section 300 of the Indian Penal Code) saves a killing only where the offender was, at the moment of the act, deprived of the power of self-control by provocation that was both grave and sudden. Suddenness is not tested by how the words felt when spoken but by whether self-control had time to return. Nakul walked home, selected an iron rod and came back forty minutes later. That interval is classic cooling time: the deprivation of self-control had ended and what followed was a considered act. The passage's clause on intention in section 101 then applies, and the killing is murder punishable under section 103, which is option C. The absence of a fight at the scene also puts Exception 4 out of reach.

Examiner's note — the trap: A is the attractive trap: the provocation really was grave, so candidates stop there. Exception 1 needs grave AND sudden, and the forty-minute walk destroys suddenness.

Q2 A BNS s.101 Exception 4 - undue advantage HARD

Exception 4 to section 101 has four limbs that must all hold: no premeditation, a sudden fight, the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and no undue advantage or cruel or unusual conduct by the offender. The first three limbs are satisfied here, because the quarrel over the parking space flared without warning and the blows were exchanged on both sides. The fourth limb defeats Iqbal. Once Manav lay unconscious he had ceased to be a combatant, and four further blows to the head of a man who cannot defend himself is precisely the taking of undue advantage and the cruel manner the Exception excludes. The plea therefore fails and the case falls back on section 101, so option A is correct.

Examiner's note — the trap: B tempts because every other limb of Exception 4 is satisfied; candidates stop counting at three limbs. The fourth limb is where a sudden-fight plea is usually lost.

Q3 D BNS s.101 third clause - objective sufficiency ELITE

The third clause of section 101 (old section 300, Thirdly) is the clause explained in the passage. It requires two findings and only two. First, did the offender intend to inflict that particular bodily injury, as opposed to inflicting it accidentally or in a struggle? A deliberate single thrust of a knife into the abdomen establishes that. Second, is that injury, judged objectively on the medical evidence and without reference to the offender's own opinion, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death? The doctors say it is. Both limbs being answered in the affirmative, the offence is murder. The passage states expressly that the offender's ignorance of the victim's peculiar frailty is then immaterial, which disposes of the enlarged spleen. Option D is therefore correct.

Examiner's note — the trap: C is the sophisticated trap: it smuggles back an intention to cause death, which is the FIRST clause of section 101, not the third. The third clause never requires intention to kill.

Q4 B BNS s.106 vs the knowledge limb of s.100 HARD

Section 100 requires intention to cause death, intention to cause an injury likely to cause death, or knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. The facts negate all three: Sunil intended to pass, not to injure, and the record shows he never adverted to the likelihood of death. Without one of those mental states there is no culpable homicide at all, so sections 103 and 105 are unavailable. What remains is a rash act, that is, an act done in conscious disregard of a risk the actor hoped would not materialise. Section 106, the successor to section 304A of the Indian Penal Code, punishes exactly that: causing death by a rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide. Option B is correct.

Examiner's note — the trap: A is the trap, borrowing the phrase imminently dangerous from the fourth clause of section 101. That clause needs knowledge that death must in all probability follow, which is far above mere rashness.

Q5 A Absolute liability - M.C. Mehta (1987) ELITE

Under *Rylands v Fletcher* (1868) the escape of a mischievous thing brought onto land for a non-natural use attracts strict liability, but the rule yields to recognised defences, and act of a stranger is one of them: a deliberate cutting of the valve by an outsider would ordinarily exonerate. The passage, however, sets out the second and stricter rule. In *M.C. Mehta v Union of India* (1987) the Supreme Court held that an enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community, and that this liability is subject to none of the *Rylands* exceptions. A chemical works storing toxic gas is such an enterprise. The plea therefore cannot avail it, which is option A.

Examiner's note — the trap: B is the trap for a candidate who has learnt the *Rylands* defences well and reads no further. Absolute liability exists precisely to remove the exception the works is pleading.

Q6 D Vicarious liability - frolic of one's own **HARD**

A master answers for his servant's tort only if it is committed in the course of employment. The passage draws the two lines. An authorised act done in an unauthorised or careless manner remains inside the course of employment, so a driver who drives badly on the route he was sent along makes his employer liable. But where the servant abandons the employer's business and goes off on a frolic of his own, the employer answers for nothing done on that detour. Turning off the route and driving eighteen kilometres to visit a cousin is a departure of that kind: on that stretch the driver was serving himself only. The firm is therefore not liable, though the driver remains personally liable to the cyclist. Option D is correct.

Examiner's note — the trap: B is the attractive wrong answer because it quotes the correct rule about an unauthorised mode. That rule governs HOW the employer's work is done, not a journey that is not the employer's work at all.

Q7 B Volenti non fit injuria - Smith v Baker **HARD**

Volenti non fit injuria bars a claim only where the plaintiff freely agreed to run the risk. The passage states the controlling proposition, taken from *Smith v Baker* (1891), that mere knowledge of a danger is not assent to it. The quarry hand plainly knew that stones were swung over his head, but knowledge is the first element of the maxim and consent is the second. Repeated protest by the workman and his union is positive evidence that he did not agree; and a worker who stays because he must earn is not exercising the free choice the defence demands. The employer, who did nothing after protest, is in breach of his duty of care. The claim therefore succeeds, which is option B.

Examiner's note — the trap: A is the trap: it converts *sciens* (knowing) into *volens* (willing). The whole point of *Smith v Baker* is that those two are not the same thing.

Q8 C Contributory negligence - apportionment **MED**

At common law contributory negligence was once a complete defence, but the passage states the modern position: it no longer defeats a claim, and damages are apportioned according to the plaintiff's own share of the fault. Two findings matter here. The driver was exceeding the speed limit and so breached the duty of care every road user owes to those he can foresee being injured, which is the neighbour principle of *Donoghue v Stevenson*. The pedestrian stepped out against the signal and so failed to take reasonable care of his own safety. Both being at fault, the court assesses the full damages and then reduces the award by the pedestrian's percentage of responsibility. Option C states exactly that result.

Examiner's note — the trap: A is the trap for anyone carrying the old rule in memory, where any contributory fault wiped out the claim. Apportionment replaced that; total defeat is no longer the consequence.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q9 B Necessary assumption **HARD**

The conclusion is that extending metro hours will sharply reduce night-time collisions. The stated premises are only that most late collisions involve private vehicles carrying people home, and that buses stop at ten. Between those premises and the conclusion sits an unstated bridge: the people now driving must be able to substitute the metro for the journey they are actually making. If the metro does not go where they are going, or does not get them home from the station, the trains can run till one without a single car leaving the road. Option B states that bridge, and negating it destroys the argument, which is the test for a necessary assumption. A concerns severity, not number. C is far stronger than the argument needs. D concerns an alternative policy, which the argument nowhere rules out.

Examiner's note — the trap: C attracts candidates who look for the strongest-sounding statement. A necessary assumption is the minimum the argument needs, and an argument never needs a universal claim about every city.

Q10 C Assumption - subsidiary premise **HARD**

This question isolates the financial sub-argument, not the safety conclusion. The authority reasons that late-service costs will be recovered from fares because the people driving home late are the same people who buy tickets by day. The hidden step is one of conversion: it is not enough that these people are metro customers in the daytime; enough of them must actually board and pay for the late trains. If they continue to drive, no fare revenue arrives and the cost is not recovered. Option C states precisely that condition. Option A reverses the direction of the claim. Option B makes an assertion about operating cost per hour that the argument never needs, since recovery depends on revenue relative to cost, not on costs being equal. Option D is an accounting irrelevance.

Examiner's note — the trap: B looks like an assumption because cost is mentioned. The argument only claims that fares will cover the extra cost; it never claims that the extra cost is no higher than daytime cost.

Q11 A Assumption - negation test ELITE

The question asks which statement would falsify an assumption, so the right answer must be the direct contradiction of something the argument silently requires. The argument requires that the late-night drivers could make their journeys by metro instead. Option A says most of the cars in those collisions are on routes the network does not serve, which is exactly that requirement denied: the traffic causing the collisions cannot move underground at all, and the predicted fall disappears. Option B supports rather than undermines. Option C, if anything, helps the authority by placing the crowds on the road just as the metro would still be running. Option D concerns a different time band, two to five in the morning, that the extension would not cover and that the argument does not rely on.

Examiner's note — the trap: D is the trap: rising collisions sound damaging. They fall outside the eleven-to-two window the argument is about, so they contradict no assumption the authority has made.

Q12 D Assumption - EXCEPT identification MED

Three of the options state things the argument must take for granted. Option A is the substitution assumption: people must be willing to accept the metro in place of their cars. Option B is the match assumption: the collisions counted between eleven and two must involve the very vehicles the metro would take off the road, or removing them changes nothing. Option C is the no-offsetting-harm assumption: if later trains simply generate new road traffic, feeder autos and pick-ups around stations, the net fall may not occur. Option D is different in kind. The argument predicts a result over a trial year; it nowhere assumes the year will be free of strikes, and a strike-free year is a practical hope rather than a link in the reasoning. Option D is therefore the exception.

Examiner's note — the trap: C is the option most often struck out, because it sounds like an extra worry rather than an assumption. Any argument predicting a net fall assumes no offsetting rise.

Q13 D Causal flaw - alternative explanation HARD

The central inference is from a sequence, the rule came first and better results followed, to a cause, the rule produced the results. That inference is only as good as the exclusion of other explanations, and the letter excludes none. An easier paper, a change of examiners, a new syllabus, a stronger incoming cohort or extra remedial classes would each produce the same rise with the attendance rule contributing nothing. Option D names exactly this defect. Option A raises a measurement quibble that would not help even if the average mark were used, because the same confusion of sequence with cause would remain. Option B attacks the choice of seventy-five per cent, which is a question of degree, not of causation. Option C concerns the affiliated colleges and so goes to the extension, not to the central inference.

Examiner's note — the trap: C attracts candidates because the letter does over-reach about the affiliated colleges. That is a separate flaw of generalisation; the question asks about the CENTRAL inference.

Q14 B Reversed causation ELITE

The principal observes that those who failed were also those most often absent and treats the overlap as proof that absence causes failure. Correlation of that kind is consistent with the causal arrow running the other way. Students who are already struggling, who cannot follow the lectures or have given up on the paper, are for that very reason the students who stop coming; their absence is then a symptom of impending failure rather than its cause. Option B states this reversal. Option A objects to sample size, but the objection is weak because the group of failures is simply all the failures there were. Option C asks for a detail whose absence does not wound the inference. Option D raises clerical error, which is a marginal accuracy point and not the logical defect.

Examiner's note — the trap: A is the tempting answer because the letter does say a few students. Small numbers weaken confidence; they are not the flaw. Reversed causation is.

Q15 C Argument from silence HARD

The principal treats the absence of complaints as evidence of endorsement. This is an argument from silence, and it is fallacious whenever silence has an explanation other than agreement. Teachers are subordinate to a principal who writes their confidential reports and allots their work; silence in such a setting is at least as consistent with prudence or fear as with approval. Option C names that alternative explanation and so identifies the flaw. Option A is a narrower version of the same idea but attacks only the channel of complaint, not the inference from silence to assent. Option B raises a question of institutional competence that is irrelevant to whether the staff endorse the rule. Option D makes a substantive point about the merits of the rule and leaves the inference untouched.

Examiner's note — the trap: A is close enough to feel right. It only says complaints may have gone elsewhere; C explains why there may have been no complaints at all, which is the actual gap.

Q16 A Parallel flaw HARD

The closing sentence argues that because a measure cost nothing and was followed by an improvement, it must be worth extending wherever results are poor. Its structure is: no cost, plus a subsequent improvement, therefore a cause worth reproducing elsewhere. Option A copies that structure exactly: a free signboard, sales that rose afterwards, therefore every branch should have one. Both commit the same two errors, reading a sequence as a cause and then generalising from one setting to others that may differ. Option B is a different fallacy, inferring quality from price. Option C generalises from a single failure and so reverses the direction of the original argument. Option D is an appeal to popularity. Parallel-reasoning questions are decided by matching the shape of the inference rather than the subject matter, and only A matches.

Examiner's note — the trap: C attracts candidates because it also generalises from one college. The original argues from success to wider adoption; C argues from failure to wider failure, so the shapes do not match.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q17 **A** Percentage of a quantity **MED**

Anaemic children at a centre equal (percentage found anaemic) $\times$ (children screened) / 100. For Alaknanda this is $25 \times 12,000 / 100 = 3,000$. For Chandan it is $20 \times 15,000 / 100 = 3,000$. The two centres together therefore yield $3,000 + 3,000 = 6,000$ children found anaemic, which is option A. Note that the percentages cannot be added and then applied to the combined total unless the two centres had screened equal numbers, so the safe method is always to convert each percentage into an absolute figure first and only then add. Here the two absolute figures happen to coincide at 3,000, because the higher percentage at Alaknanda works on a smaller base and the lower percentage at Chandan works on a larger one.

Examiner's note — the trap: D, 27,000, is the trap: it is $12,000 + 15,000$, the children SCREENED at the two centres, picked up by a candidate who reads the wrong column.

Q18 **C** Rate per unit comparison **MED**

Children screened per health worker = children screened / health workers posted. Alaknanda: $12,000 / 60 = 200$. Brahmi: $9,000 / 50 = 180$. Chandan: $15,000 / 60 = 250$. Dhruva: $18,000 / 90 = 200$. The greatest value is 250 at Chandan, so option C is correct. Two of the four centres, Alaknanda and Dhruva, tie at 200 even though Dhruva screens half as many children again, because it also has half as many workers again; a ratio is unaffected when numerator and denominator are scaled together. The question rewards a candidate who computes all four quotients rather than reasoning from the single largest number in either column, since the largest numerator and the largest denominator both belong to Dhruva.

Examiner's note — the trap: D, Dhruva, is the trap: it screens the most children and a candidate who scans only the screening column picks it. Its worker count is the largest too, so its rate is only 200.

Q19 **B** Percentage excess over a base **HARD**

Percentage excess = (larger - base) $\times$ 100 / base, and the base is whatever the comparison is made with, here Alaknanda. Anaemic at Dhruva = $35 \times 18,000 / 100 = 6,300$. Anaemic at Alaknanda = $25 \times 12,000 / 100 = 3,000$. The excess is $6,300 - 3,000 = 3,300$. Expressed as a percentage of the Alaknanda figure this is $3,300 \times 100 / 3,000 = 110$ per cent, which is option B. The instruction exceed means the difference, not the whole, so the answer must be built on 3,300 and not on 6,300; and the phrase exceed the number at Alaknanda fixes 3,000 as the denominator, not 6,300.

Examiner's note — the trap: A, 210%, is the trap: it is $6,300 \times 100 / 3,000$, the ratio of the whole to the base rather than of the excess to the base. C uses the wrong denominator.

Q20 **D** Weighted average of percentages **HARD**

An overall rate is a weighted average and must be built from totals, not by averaging the four percentages. Anaemic children: Alaknanda $25 \times 12,000 / 100 = 3,000$; Brahmi $30 \times 9,000 / 100 = 2,700$; Chandan $20 \times 15,000 / 100 = 3,000$; Dhruva $35 \times 18,000 / 100 = 6,300$. Their sum is 15,000. Children screened: $12,000 + 9,000 + 15,000 + 18,000 = 54,000$. The overall rate is $15,000 \times 100 / 54,000 = 27.78$ per cent, which to the nearest whole number is 28 per cent, option D. The simple average of the four percentages is $(25 + 30 + 20 + 35) / 4 = 27.5$ per cent, and it differs because the centres screened unequal numbers.

Examiner's note — the trap: C, 27.5%, is the deliberate trap: it is the unweighted mean of the four percentages, which is only correct when every centre screens the same number of children.

Q21 **B** Change when base and rate both move **ELITE**

Both the base and the rate change, so the new absolute figure must be recomputed from scratch. New number screened at Brahmi = $9,000 + 3,000 = 12,000$. New anaemic share = 24 per cent. New number found anaemic = $24 \times 12,000 / 100 = 2,880$. This year's figure was $30 \times 9,000 / 100 = 2,700$. The change is $2,880 - 2,700 = +180$, that is, a rise of 180, which is option B. The point of the question is that a falling percentage does not entail a falling count: the rate drops by one fifth, from 30 to 24, while the base rises by one third, from 9,000 to 12,000, and since $4/5 \times 4/3 = 16/15$, which exceeds 1, the product rises.

Examiner's note — the trap: A, fall by 180, is the trap for a candidate who sees the percentage drop from 30 to 24 and assumes the count must drop with it, ignoring the larger base.

Q22 **C** Difference between groups of sectors **HARD**

Each group's value = (its percentage share / 100) $\times$ total exports, the total being 9,000 crore rupees. Textiles = $28 \times 9,000 / 100 = 2,520$ and processed food = $18 \times 9,000 / 100 = 1,620$, so the first pair comes to 4,140 crore. Engineering goods = $24 \times 9,000 / 100 = 2,160$ and chemicals = $15 \times 9,000 / 100 = 1,350$, so the second pair comes to 3,510 crore. The excess is $4,140 - 3,510 = 630$ crore rupees, which is option C. The shares give the same answer in one step and with less arithmetic: the first pair holds $28 + 18 = 46$ per cent and the second holds $24 + 15 = 39$ per cent, a gap of 7 percentage points, and $7 \times 9,000 / 100 = 630$. Working in percentage points first is the safer habit whenever a pie chart is involved.

Examiner's note — the trap: B, 3,510, is the trap: it is the quantity that was to be subtracted, chosen by a candidate who computes the second group and stops one step early. D is the first group for the same reason.

Q23 D Sector angle from a share MED

A pie chart shares out the 360 degrees at the centre of the circle in proportion to the shares, so any sector's angle = (share / 100) x 360 degrees. Gems and jewellery hold 10 per cent, so the angle = $10 \times 360 / 100 = 36$ degrees, which is option D. The quick check is that one percentage point is worth 3.6 degrees, so 10 points must be $10 \times 3.6 = 36$. Applying the same conversion to the rest gives textiles 100.8 degrees, engineering goods 86.4, processed food 64.8, chemicals 54 and other goods 18, and those six angles sum to exactly 360, which confirms that the table is exhaustive. The total export value of 9,000 crore rupees plays no part whatever in this calculation, since an angle depends on the share alone.

Examiner's note — the trap: A, 18 degrees, is the trap: it is the processed-food share of 18 read straight off as though a percentage were an angle, and it ignores the factor of 3.6.

Q24 A Ratio of combined shares HARD

Because every sector is a share of one and the same total, a ratio between groups may be taken directly between their percentages, with no need to convert into crore rupees. Processed food, chemicals and gems and jewellery together hold $18 + 15 + 10 = 43$ per cent of the export value, while textiles hold 28 per cent. The ratio asked for is therefore 43 : 28, which is option A. Converting first gives the same result and shows why: the three groups are worth $43 \times 9,000 / 100 = 3,870$ crore and textiles are worth $28 \times 9,000 / 100 = 2,520$ crore, and $3,870 : 2,520$ divides throughout by 90 to give 43 : 28. Since 43 is prime and does not divide 28, the ratio is already in its lowest terms.

Examiner's note — the trap: C, 129 : 84, is the trap: it is the correct ratio multiplied by three and never reduced, and it catches a candidate who forgets that a ratio must be given in lowest terms.

Q25 C Change when total and share both move ELITE

This year engineering goods = $24 \times 9,000 / 100 = 2,160$ crore rupees. Next year the total is 10,000 crore and the engineering share is 30 per cent, so next year's engineering exports = $30 \times 10,000 / 100 = 3,000$ crore. The increase is $3,000 - 2,160 = 840$ crore rupees, which is option C. Both factors move here, the total rising by one ninth and the share by six percentage points, so neither movement can be used on its own. The share must be applied to the total it is a share of: 30 per cent is meaningless until the year it belongs to is fixed. Note also that a rise of six percentage points in the share produces a rise of well under six per cent of the total, because the base itself has changed.

Examiner's note — the trap: A, 3,000, is the trap: it is next year's engineering exports rather than the increase the stem asks for. D, 540, applies the new share of 30 per cent to this year's old total.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Which section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 defines culpable homicide? — **Section 100. It replaces section 299 of the Indian Penal Code.**
2. Which section of the BNS states when culpable homicide is murder? — **Section 101, the successor to section 300 IPC.**
3. Under which section is murder punished? — **Section 103 BNS - death or imprisonment for life, and fine.**
4. Under which section is culpable homicide not amounting to murder punished? — **Section 105 BNS, the successor to section 304 IPC.**
5. Which BNS section punishes causing death by a rash or negligent act? — **Section 106, the successor to section 304A IPC.**
6. What are the two elements the third clause of section 101 requires? — **Intention to inflict that particular injury, and objective sufficiency of that injury to cause death.**
7. Does the offender's ignorance of the victim's frailty defeat the third clause? — **No. Once both limbs are made out, that ignorance is immaterial.**
8. State the two adjectives that qualify provocation in Exception 1. — **Grave and sudden. Both must be present.**
9. What is cooling time and why does it matter? — **The interval in which self-control can return; if it has, Exception 1 fails.**
10. Can a man rely on provocation he engineered himself? — **No. Provocation sought as a pretext for killing is excluded.**
11. List the four limbs of Exception 4. — **No premeditation; sudden fight; heat of passion on a sudden quarrel; no undue advantage or cruelty.**
12. Which limb of Exception 4 is most often lost in practice? — **The fourth - undue advantage or cruel or unusual conduct.**
13. Does the knowledge limb of section 100 require intention? — **No. Knowledge that the act is likely to cause death suffices.**
14. What does imminently dangerous mean in the fourth clause of section 101? — **That the act must in all probability cause death, known to the doer.**

15. If no mental state under section 100 is made out, what remains? — **At most an offence under section 106, if the act was rash or negligent.**
16. Name the three elements of the tort of negligence. — **Duty of care, breach of that duty, and consequent damage not too remote.**
17. Which case gives the neighbour principle? — **Donoghue v Stevenson (1932).**
18. State the neighbour principle in one line. — **Take reasonable care to avoid acts you can foresee would injure those closely and directly affected.**
19. When is an employer vicariously liable? — **When the servant's tort is committed in the course of employment.**
20. Is an authorised act done in an unauthorised manner within the course of employment? — **Yes. Careless performance of the master's work still binds the master.**
21. What is a frolic of one's own? — **A departure on the servant's own business; the employer is not liable for it.**
22. Does a frolic exonerate the servant as well? — **No. The servant remains personally liable to the injured party.**
23. State the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. — **One who brings and keeps a thing likely to do mischief if it escapes keeps it at his peril.**
24. In what year was Rylands v Fletcher decided? — **1868.**
25. What use of land does the rule in Rylands require? — **A non-natural use of the land.**
26. Name the five defences to strict liability. — **Act of God, act of a stranger, plaintiff's own default, consent, and statutory authority.**
27. Which case laid down absolute liability in India? — **M.C. Mehta v Union of India (1987).**
28. What is the key difference between strict and absolute liability? — **Absolute liability admits none of the Rylands exceptions.**
29. To whom is the absolute duty owed and is it delegable? — **To the community, and it is non-delegable.**

30. Translate volenti non fit injuria. — **To one who is willing, no injury is done.**
31. Is knowledge of a danger the same as consent to it? — **No. Smith v Baker (1891) holds that sciens is not volens.**
32. What effect does contributory negligence have today? — **It reduces damages in proportion to the plaintiff's fault; it no longer defeats the claim.**
33. What is a necessary assumption? — **An unstated premise the argument cannot do without; negating it destroys the argument.**
34. What is the negation test? — **Negate the candidate assumption; if the argument collapses, it was necessary.**
35. Why is the strongest-sounding option usually wrong on assumption questions? — **A necessary assumption is the minimum the argument needs, not the most it could use.**
36. What must an EXCEPT assumption question be answered by? — **The one option the argument can be true without.**
37. Name the flaw of treating a sequence as a cause. — **Post hoc ergo propter hoc - the alternative-explanation flaw.**
38. What is reversed causation? — **Treating the effect as the cause; the correlation holds with the arrow the other way.**
39. Why is an argument from silence weak? — **Silence may be explained by fear, ignorance or indifference, not only by agreement.**
40. How is a parallel-reasoning question decided? — **By matching the shape of the inference, never the subject matter.**
41. How do you convert a percentage share into a pie-chart angle? — **Multiply the share by 3.6, since one percentage point equals 3.6 degrees.**
42. What angle corresponds to a 15 per cent share? — **54 degrees.**