

**Daily Practice — Legal Reasoning · Logical Reasoning · Quantitative Techniques**

Every question is passage-based, CLAT-2026 grade. Darken one bubble. Negative marking applies. Full solutions with examiner notes are in the companion answer sheet.

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**SECTION — LEGAL REASONING**
**LEGAL PRINCIPLE — LAW OF EVIDENCE (BSA) · ELECTRONIC RECORDS AND THE AUTHENTICATION CERTIFICATE (Q1-Q4)**

The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023, which replaced the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, substantially modernises the framework governing electronic records. Section 57(1) of the BSA provides that any electronic record, if it purports to have been produced from a device belonging to or habitually used by a party, is presumed to be authentic unless the contrary is shown. Section 58 extends a rebuttable presumption that where an electronic communication is proved to have originated from a device associated with a person, that person sent it. The critical admission gate — formerly Section 65B of the Evidence Act — is now Section 63 of the BSA, which mandates a certificate signed by a responsible official confirming that the electronic record was produced in the ordinary course of the computer's operation. In *Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal* (2020), the Supreme Court held that furnishing such a certificate is a condition precedent to admissibility, not a procedural formality that can be cured at a later stage. Where no certificate is filed, the electronic record — however genuine — cannot be taken on record.

**1. The prosecution files a printout of WhatsApp messages between the accused and an alleged conspirator but fails to produce a certificate under Section 63 of the BSA. The defence objects. How should the court proceed?**

- ☐ A. Admit the printout and direct the prosecution to produce the certificate within seven days, treating the omission as a curable irregularity that does not bar admissibility
- ☐ B. Exclude the printout, as the certificate is a condition precedent to admissibility under the Khotkar principle
- ☐ C. Admit the printout provisionally and assess its weight without the certificate
- ☐ D. Remand the matter to a lower court to decide the admissibility question afresh

**2. A message traced to a mobile phone registered in Ramesh's name, but allegedly in his brother's possession at the relevant time, is produced under Section 58 of the BSA. The effect of the Section 58 presumption is that:**

- ☐ A. It does not apply, because Ramesh was not in possession of the phone at the material time
- ☐ B. It applies and shifts the evidential burden to Ramesh to rebut the presumption
- ☐ C. It applies and is conclusive — once raised, it admits of no rebuttal
- ☐ D. It does not apply unless corroborated by the testimony of two independent witnesses

**3. After Khotkar, a trial court admits an electronic record without a Section 63 certificate. On first appeal, the prosecution — for the first time — produces the certificate. On the basis of the Khotkar ruling, the appellate court should:**

- ☐ A. Accept the certificate and cure the defect, since technicalities should not defeat substantive justice and appellate courts retain plenary power to admit additional evidence in criminal proceedings
- ☐ B. Remit the matter to the trial court to evaluate the late-tendered certificate and re-decide admissibility
- ☐ C. Exclude the electronic record, as the certificate had to be filed at the stage of tendering evidence, not for the first time on appeal
- ☐ D. Admit the record but apply a reduced evidentiary weight to compensate for the procedural lapse

**4. Under Section 2(7) of the BSA, which of the following would NOT independently qualify as an electronic record?**

- ☐ A. A WhatsApp message stored on a mobile phone
- ☐ B. A PDF file saved on a company server
- ☐ C. A sworn affidavit signed in blue ink on white paper, with no digital counterpart
- ☐ D. Log entries generated automatically by a web server and retained in its system storage in the ordinary course of the computer's operation

**LEGAL PRINCIPLE — INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW · COPYRIGHT, AI-GENERATED WORKS, AND THE AUTHORSHIP THRESHOLD (Q5-Q8)**

The question of copyright in works generated wholly or substantially by artificial intelligence systems has fractured global legal discourse. Under the Copyright Act, 1957, Section 13 vests copyright in 'original' literary, artistic, dramatic, musical, and cinematograph works. The Act's definition of 'author' in Section 2(d) enumerates strictly human categories — the person who creates a literary work, the composer of a musical work, the photographer — with no provision for a non-human author. Section 17 designates the employer as first owner of copyright where a work is made by an author in the course of employment under a contract of service or apprenticeship. The US Copyright Office has consistently maintained, and Indian courts have not yet authoritatively departed from, the position that copyright subsists only in works of human authorship. However, where a human makes sufficient creative choices in directing an AI system — selecting inputs, curating outputs, refining drafts — certain jurisdictions have begun to recognise a human co-authorship claim on an 'editorial sufficiency' theory. The UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Section 9(3), goes furthest: it attributes authorship to 'the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken,' potentially covering AI operators who structure the generative process.

**5. Priya, a software engineer at a technology firm, uses an internal AI tool during her employment to generate marketing copy. She retains all the AI outputs without further editing. Under Section 17 of the Copyright Act, 1957, who is the first owner of copyright in the generated text?**

- ☐ A. Priya's employer, because the work was made in the course of her employment
- ☐ B. Priya personally, because she operated the AI tool that produced the work
- ☐ C. The AI system's developer, as the functional creator of the output



- ☐ D. No copyright subsists, because an AI-generated work is not an 'original' work of human authorship
- 6. An author uses a generative AI model by providing a detailed 2,000-word creative brief, iterating through forty drafts, selecting specific passages, restructuring the narrative, and rewriting the opening and conclusion. A court evaluating the 'editorial sufficiency' threshold would most likely hold that:**
- ☐ A. No copyright can vest, since the underlying text was generated by a machine regardless of the degree of human curation
- ☐ B. Copyright would vest in the AI developer because the expressive elements trace to the model's parameters
- ☐ C. Copyright could vest in the author, because the extent and nature of creative choices made in curating and directing the output may cross the editorial sufficiency threshold
- ☐ D. Copyright would vest jointly in the author and the AI developer, as the output results from the combined efforts of both and each is treated as contributing protectable original expression to a single joint work
- 7. Under the Copyright Act, 1957, which of the following is the most accurate statement about the position of AI as an 'author'?**
- ☐ A. AI can be recognised as a joint author if it contributes a substantial portion of the creative output and the human collaborator consents to shared attribution on the register
- ☐ B. The Act's definition of 'author' is confined to human categories, precluding recognition of AI as an author
- ☐ C. AI may be listed as an author if the registered owner consents to the designation
- ☐ D. AI authorship is permissible for computer-generated works under Section 2(d)(vi) of the Act
- 8. The principal distinction between the UK approach under Section 9(3) of the CDPA 1988 and the Indian position under the Copyright Act, 1957, with respect to AI-generated works is that:**
- ☐ A. The UK Act requires human authorship just as the Indian Act does, but extends a longer copyright term
- ☐ B. The UK Act allows copyright to vest in the person who makes the arrangements for the creation of the work, potentially covering AI operators, whereas Indian law ties authorship exclusively to enumerated human categories
- ☐ C. The Indian Act explicitly prohibits copyright in AI-generated works, while the UK Act extends it automatically
- ☐ D. Both statutes are functionally identical on the question of AI authorship, and Indian courts have adopted the UK position by judicial practice

## SECTION — LOGICAL REASONING

### LOGICAL REASONING — PRINCIPLE APPLICATION · EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE RATIONAL NEXUS TEST (Q9-Q12)

Principle: A state may not deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws. Any classification drawn by the state must satisfy a two-part test: first, it must rest on an intelligible differentia — a genuine factual difference between the groups treated differently — and second, that differentia must have a rational nexus with the legitimate objective the statute seeks to achieve. A classification is unconstitutional when it singles out a group for adverse treatment on the basis of a characteristic that bears no logical or empirical connection to the law's stated purpose. Fact situation: A licensing statute requires all persons holding degrees from foreign universities to pass a standardised national examination before practising as chartered engineers, while exempting holders of degrees from Indian universities from any examination. The statutory statement of objects recites only that the law seeks to 'ensure minimum professional standards for engineers practising in India,' without identifying any difference in curricula, pass rates, or professional outcomes between foreign and domestic degree-holders.

- 9. On the basis of the equal protection principle and the rational nexus test, the licensing statute is best assessed as:**
- ☐ A. Unconstitutional, because the classification of foreign degree-holders for examination lacks a rational nexus with ensuring minimum professional standards, as no empirical difference in outcomes between the two groups is identified
- ☐ B. Constitutional, because Parliament has plenary legislative competence over professional licensing regardless of classifications drawn
- ☐ C. Constitutional, because the state may always treat foreign-educated professionals differently as a matter of sovereign educational policy
- ☐ D. Unconstitutional only if a foreign degree-holder can personally prove they are as competent as their domestic counterpart, since the burden rests on each affected individual to establish parity before any classification touching them may be set aside
- 10. In the licensing statute, the 'intelligible differentia' relied upon is:**
- ☐ A. The professional fee structures charged by engineers trained at foreign versus domestic universities
- ☐ B. The geographic origin of the university that conferred the degree
- ☐ C. The average number of years taken to complete a foreign engineering degree versus a domestic one
- ☐ D. The language of instruction at the university where the degree was awarded
- 11. Suppose subsequent evidence shows that foreign degree-holders score significantly lower on standardised professional competence assessments compared to domestic degree-holders. This new evidence would most directly:**
- ☐ A. Remain legally irrelevant, because the statute must be assessed only on the text of its statement of objects
- ☐ B. Supply the rational nexus the statute presently lacks by establishing an empirical connection between foreign education and professional competence gaps, thereby potentially validating the classification
- ☐ C. Make the statute unconstitutional, because it would then be clear that the statute was motivated by discrimination rather than professional standards, and such demonstrated animus would independently vitiate the classification irrespective of any later evidence
- ☐ D. Require the statute to be struck down and re-enacted with the new evidence inserted into its preamble
- 12. The equal protection principle stated in the passage is most accurately re-stated as:**
- ☐ A. All persons must be treated identically by law, and no classification of any kind is permissible
- ☐ B. The state may classify persons differently provided the classification reflects a real difference between groups that rationally connects to the law's objective
- ☐ C. The state must obtain judicial approval before drawing any classification in a statute affecting professional licensing
- ☐ D. Classifications based on geographical origin are presumptively valid because geography is a neutral characteristic



**LOGICAL REASONING — ANALYTICAL (IN-PASSAGE) · LAWYERS, VOTING, AND THE LIMITS OF CORRELATION (Q13-Q16)**

Legal professionals consistently demonstrate higher civic participation rates than professionals in comparable income brackets. A national survey found that 78 per cent of practising lawyers voted in each of the last three general elections, compared with 61 per cent of engineers and 59 per cent of chartered accountants. Advocates of 'civic education through legal training' contend that exposure to constitutional values, rule-of-law doctrine, and democratic theory during legal study fosters lifelong democratic engagement. Critics respond that the correlation is adequately explained by professional self-interest: lawyers depend on stable legal institutions, judicial independence, and political frameworks — voting is rational career protection, not civic virtue. A third school argues that the survey's reliance on self-reported voting data undermines both camps. If respondents overreport voting — a well-documented social-desirability bias in electoral surveys — the entire magnitude of the lawyer-voting premium may be an artefact of measurement, making any causal story premature.

**13. The core disagreement between the 'civic education' advocates and the critics is whether:**

- ☐ A. Lawyers vote at higher rates than engineers or accountants
- ☐ B. The higher voting rate among lawyers is caused by normative internalisation of democratic values during training, or by rational professional self-interest
- ☐ C. Civic participation should be measured by voting rates alone or by a broader index of democratic engagement, a dispute over the proper metric that both camps must settle before any causal account can be assessed
- ☐ D. Legal education is more rigorous than engineering or accountancy training at the tertiary level

**14. The third school's argument that self-reported voting data is unreliable is best understood as a claim that:**

- ☐ A. The survey's causal story cannot be established because the foundational factual claim — that lawyers vote more — may itself be a measurement artefact
- ☐ B. Lawyers are inherently more likely to misreport their voting behaviour than members of other professions
- ☐ C. The self-interest explanation offered by the critics is more probable than the civic education explanation
- ☐ D. Electoral surveys should only use verified voter-roll data, and until such data is used all civic participation studies should be suspended, since no inference about professional voting differences can be drawn from self-reports alone

**15. If it were established by verified voter-roll data — not self-reports — that lawyers vote at significantly higher rates than engineers even in jurisdictions where the legal system is unstable and lawyers face no professional benefit from political stability, this finding would most directly undermine:**

- ☐ A. The claim that higher voting rates among lawyers are caused by professional self-interest, since the benefit assumed by that account would be absent
- ☐ B. The claim that legal education fosters civic values, since the finding would show lawyers vote even when institutions are unreliable
- ☐ C. The third school's methodological objection, since it would demonstrate that the voting premium persists across measurement methods
- ☐ D. Both the self-interest and the civic education explanations, since neither accounts for voting in contexts of institutional instability

**16. The phrase 'normative internalisation of civic duty' in the passage most nearly refers to:**

- ☐ A. A statutory obligation placed on legal professionals to vote, backed by professional licence penalties
- ☐ B. The process by which individuals come to personally value and act on civic principles as a result of education, rather than acting merely from external compulsion or self-interest
- ☐ C. The formal inclusion of democratic theory in law school curricula as part of accreditation requirements
- ☐ D. An empirical measurement technique used to assess whether civic participation rates have increased over time

**SECTION — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES**

**QUANT — TECHNOLOGY & STARTUPS · PERCENTAGE CHANGE · STARTUP FUNDING SHIFTS: FY 2023-24 VS FY 2024-25 (Q17-Q21)**

India's startup funding landscape saw considerable shifts between FY 2023-24 and FY 2024-25. The Fintech and SaaS sectors maintained investor confidence, posting robust year-on-year increases, while Edtech — which had attracted record valuations during the pandemic era — witnessed a sustained funding contraction as learners returned to classrooms and discretionary ed-spend normalised. Deeptech emerged as the fastest-growing segment by percentage, driven by global semiconductor and AI-adjacent investments and a wave of government-backed innovation grants. Healthtech posted steady institutional inflows. Total unicorn additions across the five tracked sectors rose to eight in FY 2024-25.

| Sector     | FY 2023-24 (₹ Cr) | FY 2024-25 (₹ Cr) | Unicorns Added (FY25) |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Fintech    | 12,400            | 14,880            | 3                     |
| Edtech     | 3,200             | 2,240             | 0                     |
| Deeptech   | 2,800             | 4,200             | 2                     |
| Healthtech | 4,500             | 5,400             | 1                     |
| SaaS       | 6,800             | 8,160             | 2                     |

**17. By what percentage did total Fintech funding increase from FY 2023-24 to FY 2024-25?**

- ☐ A. 15%
- ☐ B. 18%
- ☐ C. 20%
- ☐ D. 25%

**18. The Edtech sector experienced a funding decline between the two years. What was the approximate percentage decline?**

- ☐ A. 20%
- ☐ B. 25%
- ☐ C. 28%
- ☐ D. 30%

**19. Which sector recorded the highest absolute increase in funding between FY 2023-24 and FY 2024-25?**

- ☐ A. Fintech
- ☐ B. Deeptech
- ☐ C. SaaS
- ☐ D. Healthtech



20. What was the total funding raised across all five sectors in FY 2024-25 (₹ Crore)?

- ☐ A. 33,280 ☐ B. 34,880  
☐ C. 35,640 ☐ D. 36,200

21. The combined funding of the top two sectors by FY 2024-25 amount (Fintech and SaaS) as a percentage of the total FY 2024-25 funding across all five sectors is approximately:

- ☐ A. 58% ☐ B. 62%  
☐ C. 66% ☐ D. 70%

**QUANT — ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE · PROFIT-LOSS-INTEREST · CARBON CREDIT TRADING AND SIMPLE INTEREST (Q22-Q25)**

The Greencell Foundation operates a carbon credit trading scheme. It purchases carbon credits from tribal forest communities and sells them to corporate buyers seeking to offset their emissions. Each credit offsets one metric tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent. In Year 1, Greencell purchased credits at ₹180 per credit and sold them at ₹270 per credit, completing 4,000 transactions. In Year 2, rising global carbon prices caused the purchase price to increase by 20% and the selling price to increase by 10%, with transaction volumes growing to 5,500. Separately, the foundation deposited ₹3,00,000 in a fixed account at 8% per annum simple interest at the start of Year 1 for a two-year term.

22. What was Greencell's profit per carbon credit in Year 1?

- ☐ A. ₹90 ☐ B. ₹75  
☐ C. ₹110 ☐ D. ₹60

23. What was Greencell's total profit from carbon credit trading in Year 2?

- ☐ A. ₹3,85,500 ☐ B. ₹4,12,000  
☐ C. ₹4,25,000 ☐ D. ₹4,45,500

24. What was Greencell's combined profit from carbon credit trading across both Year 1 and Year 2?

- ☐ A. ₹7,65,000 ☐ B. ₹8,05,500  
☐ C. ₹8,25,000 ☐ D. ₹8,40,000

25. How much simple interest did the foundation earn on its ₹3,00,000 deposit over the two-year term?

- ☐ A. ₹24,000 ☐ B. ₹36,000  
☐ C. ₹48,000 ☐ D. ₹54,000

**RAPID FIRE — ONE-LINE RECALL**

34 quick questions · not negatively marked

- Under the BSA, who bears the evidential burden once Section 58 raises the presumption of authorship of an electronic communication?
- Name the Supreme Court case that held the Section 63 certificate is a condition precedent to admissibility.
- Under the Copyright Act, 1957, which section makes the employer the first owner of a work made by an employee?
- What two-part test must a state satisfy when drawing a classification under the equal protection principle?
- In the startup data, which sector had the highest percentage increase in funding between FY24 and FY25?
- What was Greencell's profit per carbon credit in Year 1?
- What does 'rebuttable presumption' mean in evidentiary law?
- Name the UK statute that potentially extends copyright to AI operators through Section 9(3).
- What is social-desirability bias in surveys?
- What does 'intelligible differentia' mean in constitutional law?
- If simple interest is earned at 8% per annum on ₹1,00,000 for 3 years, how much interest is earned?
- What is the BSA's equivalent of the former Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act?
- What does 'condition precedent' mean in procedural law?
- Under what theory can a human claim copyright in an AI-generated work?
- A sector's funding was ₹5,000 crore in Year 1 and ₹6,500 crore in Year 2. What is the percentage increase?
- What is the 'rational nexus' requirement in equal protection analysis?
- Can a court admit an electronic record without a Section 63 certificate under the BSA?
- If purchase price rises 20% from ₹150, what is the new purchase price?
- Name one type of work in which copyright can subsist under Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957.
- What is the difference between an 'absolute presumption' and a 'rebuttable presumption'?
- In the Analytical passage, which camp relies on professional self-interest to explain the lawyer-voting correlation?
- If a sector's funding falls from ₹8,000 cr to ₹5,600 cr, what is the percentage decline?
- What is 'editorial sufficiency' as a copyright doctrine?
- Under Section 17 of the Copyright Act, when does the employer NOT become first owner of copyright?
- Name the logical archetype of an argument that presents a general rule and asks whether a fact situation falls within it.
- What is the 'editorial sufficiency' threshold?
- In simple interest, what does 'T' represent in the formula  $SI = PRT/100$ ?
- Which BSA section creates a presumption of authenticity for electronic records produced from a party's device?
- What was the combined Fintech and SaaS funding in FY 2024-25 (₹ Crore)?
- What does 'normative internalisation' mean in social science?
- What is the total FY 2024-25 funding across all five startup sectors in the table?
- Under the Copyright Act, can a photograph of a handwritten document itself be an electronic record?
- What was Greencell's combined 2-year profit from carbon credit trading?
- Name one quant skill tested in today's paper that involves a year-on-year change.

