

**Daily Practice — Legal Reasoning · Logical Reasoning · Quantitative Techniques**

Every question is passage-based, CLAT-2026 grade. Darken one bubble. Negative marking applies. Full solutions with examiner notes are in the companion answer sheet.

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**SECTION — LEGAL REASONING**

**LEGAL PRINCIPLE — FAMILY LAW · RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 9 OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 AND THE SECTION 23 BAR (Q1-Q5)**

Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides that when either spouse has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply to the District Court for restitution of conjugal rights. The section is available to either spouse. The burden of proving 'reasonable excuse' for withdrawal lies on the respondent; the petitioner need only prove the fact of withdrawal. The court will refuse relief if the petitioner is disentitled under Section 23. Section 23(1)(a) bars relief to a petitioner who takes advantage of his or her own wrong or disability; Section 23(1)(b) bars relief where the petitioner has condoned the ground alleged; and Section 23(1)(c) requires that the petition is not collusive. Where the petitioner's own conduct drove the respondent away, the petitioner cannot rely on that withdrawal to obtain a decree — doing so would allow a party to profit from their own wrong. Adultery committed by the petitioner is a 'wrong' within Section 23(1)(a) and will ordinarily bar the grant of a restitution decree.

**1. Amar and Sudha are a married Hindu couple. Amar repeatedly hurled abuses at Sudha in front of her parents, forcing her to leave the matrimonial home. Amar now files a petition under Section 9 for restitution of conjugal rights. Sudha raises no other defence. What is the most likely outcome?**

- ☐ A. The court will decree restitution, because it is Sudha who left the matrimonial home and Amar is the aggrieved party
- ☐ B. The court will refuse restitution, because Amar's abusive conduct is just and sufficient cause for Sudha's withdrawal
- ☐ C. The court will decree restitution, because verbal abuse does not meet the minimum legal threshold to justify withdrawal
- ☐ D. The court will refuse restitution, because Amar did not give Sudha prior notice before filing the petition

**2. Priya left her husband Rajan's home after he took a second wife in a void marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act. Rajan files a petition under Section 9. Priya contends that Rajan's bigamous conduct is her 'reasonable excuse' for withdrawal. How should the court rule?**

- ☐ A. Priya's plea fails, because bigamy is not listed as a specific ground for refusal under Section 9 or Section 23
- ☐ B. The court must decree restitution, because only the husband, not the wife, may plead his bigamy as his own defence
- ☐ C. Priya succeeds, because Rajan's bigamous marriage provides just and sufficient cause for her withdrawal from his society
- ☐ D. The court will decree restitution but reduce Rajan's maintenance obligation to reflect the second marriage

**3. Meena withdrew from her husband Ganesh's society after he started living openly with another woman. Six months later, Meena forgave Ganesh and the couple lived together for two weeks before Meena left again. Ganesh now files Section 9. Meena pleads Ganesh's earlier adultery. Which is the correct legal position?**

- ☐ A. Meena succeeds, because adultery by the husband is an absolute bar under Section 9 regardless of condonation
- ☐ B. Ganesh succeeds, because Meena's condonation under Section 23(1)(b) permanently destroys her plea of just cause
- ☐ C. Meena succeeds, because Ganesh's resumed conduct after condonation revives her right to treat the wrong as continuing
- ☐ D. Ganesh succeeds, because once the parties resume cohabitation the court cannot reopen any prior conduct of either spouse

**4. Who among the following is legally entitled to file a petition for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?**

- ☐ A. Only the husband, because the Act treats the matrimonial home as the husband's household and the wife as a dependent
- ☐ B. Only the wife, because the remedy was designed to protect the spouse most likely to be abandoned in the marriage
- ☐ C. Either spouse, because Section 9 uses the phrase 'aggrieved party' and is available equally to husband and wife
- ☐ D. Either spouse, but only if no matrimonial offence has been committed by either party within the preceding year

**5. Nilesch petitioned for restitution of conjugal rights against his wife Kavita. During the proceedings, evidence emerged that Nilesch had committed adultery with a neighbour after Kavita left home. Kavita had already left before the adultery occurred and did not know about it at the time of leaving. Does the post-separation adultery bar Nilesch's petition?**

- ☐ A. Yes, because courts read the advantage-of-wrong bar broadly, and post-withdrawal adultery by the petitioner bars the decree
- ☐ B. No, because Kavita's adultery post-dates her withdrawal and cannot constitute the wrong that caused Nilesch to withdraw
- ☐ C. No, because Kavita must first obtain a decree of divorce or judicial separation before Section 23 can operate
- ☐ D. Yes, because Nilesch's ongoing relationship is itself a continuing wrong, so Kavita cannot petition while committing one

**LEGAL PRINCIPLE — LAW OF TORTS · CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, THE LAST OPPORTUNITY RULE, AND APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES (Q6-Q10)**

Contributory negligence occurs when the plaintiff, by failing to take reasonable care for his own safety, contributes to the damage he suffers. Under the old common law rule, any contributory negligence by the plaintiff was a complete defence that totally defeated his claim. To mitigate this harshness, courts developed the 'last opportunity rule' from *Davies v. Mann* (1842): if the defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the accident but failed, he was held fully liable even though the plaintiff was also negligent. Indian courts — following *Bhim Singh v. Kan Singh* (1980) — moved toward apportionment instead. The court reduces the plaintiff's damages in proportion to his own contributory negligence, rather than treating it as an absolute bar. In practice, the court first assesses total damages and then applies a fraction representing the defendant's share of fault. The defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving contributory negligence. The standard of care is the objective standard of the reasonable person, though courts may consider the plaintiff's characteristics — such as age — in determining what was reasonable.

**6. Shankar drove his truck at 80 km/h on a road with a posted limit of 50 km/h. Ravi was cycling on the side of the road without any lights at night. Shankar hit Ravi. The court finds Ravi's total damages at Rs**



and holds that Ravi was 30% at fault. Applying the apportionment principle, how much can Ravi recover?

- ☐ A. Nothing, because under the old common law rule any contributory negligence by the plaintiff entirely defeats his claim
- ☐ B. Rs 10 lakh, because Shankar was the proximate cause and the last opportunity rule requires him to bear the full loss
- ☐ C. Rs 7 lakh, because the court reduces total damages in proportion to the plaintiff's 30 per cent contributory negligence
- ☐ D. Rs 3 lakh, because the court awards the plaintiff only the share of loss that arose from the defendant's own breach

7. A lorry driver, Bhola, parked his lorry without lights on a dark highway and walked away to sleep. One hour later, Jeewan, driving a car at moderate speed, failed to see the unlit lorry and collided with it, injuring himself. Bhola argues that Jeewan had the last opportunity to see the lorry and avoid the collision. Who is liable, and under what rule?

- ☐ A. Jeewan alone, because Jeewan had the last physical opportunity to avoid the collision but failed to take it
- ☐ B. Both are jointly liable in equal shares, because the last opportunity rule allocates identical blame to concurrent wrongdoers
- ☐ C. Neither is liable, because the accident was caused by the absence of adequate road lighting and not by either party
- ☐ D. Bhola alone, because the last opportunity rule is unavailable to a defendant who was himself contributorily negligent

8. Kamla, an eight-year-old child, ran across a busy road without looking. Madan, a bus driver, was driving at a lawful speed but was distracted by his mobile phone at the moment Kamla crossed. Kamla was hit. The court wants to assess contributory negligence. Which is correct?

- ☐ A. Kamla cannot be contributorily negligent, because children below ten years are categorically incapable of negligence
- ☐ B. The court should assess what standard of care was reasonable for a child of Kamla's age, not an adult's standard
- ☐ C. Kamla is contributorily negligent to the same degree as an adult pedestrian, because the road was a public highway
- ☐ D. Madan is fully liable, because using a mobile phone while driving automatically displaces contributory negligence

9. A head-on collision on a two-lane road involved three vehicles: Truck A (overtaking unsafely), Car B (also overtaking at the same point from the opposite direction), and Motorcycle C (stationary on the road shoulder with no reflectors). The rider of Motorcycle C was injured. The court finds Truck A 50% at fault, Car B 30% at fault, and Motorcycle C 20% at fault. Total damages are Rs 20 lakh. What amount should the rider of Motorcycle C recover, and from whom?

- ☐ A. Rs 16 lakh total — Rs 10 lakh from Truck A and Rs 6 lakh from Car B — each defendant paying their precise fault share
- ☐ B. Rs 20 lakh in full from Truck A alone, because as the highest-fault party Truck A must compensate the entire loss
- ☐ C. Nothing, because Motorcycle C was parked illegally and that illegal act is the dominant cause of the accident
- ☐ D. Rs 16 lakh jointly from Truck A and Car B, total damages reduced by the plaintiff's 20 per cent contribution

10. In a pedestrian-vehicle accident, the defendant claims the plaintiff was also negligent. Which party bears the burden of proving contributory negligence, and to what standard?

- ☐ A. The defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving contributory negligence as part of the defence to the claim
- ☐ B. The plaintiff bears the full burden of affirmatively disproving contributory negligence before damages are assessed
- ☐ C. The burden shifts to the plaintiff once the defendant raises the issue of contributory negligence in pleadings
- ☐ D. There is no fixed allocation; contributory negligence depends entirely on whichever party adduces stronger evidence

## SECTION — LOGICAL REASONING

### LOGICAL REASONING — PRINCIPLE APPLICATION · VICARIOUS LIABILITY, PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL, AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (Q11–Q14)

Principle I — Vicarious Liability: An employer is liable for the tortious acts of an employee committed in the course of employment. An act is in the course of employment if it is (a) a wrongful act authorised by the employer, or (b) a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing an authorised act. A frolic entirely unconnected with employment falls outside the course of employment. Principle II — Promissory Estoppel: Where a party makes a clear and unequivocal promise, without consideration, that he will not enforce his strict legal rights, and the other party acts in reliance on that promise to his detriment, the promisor is estopped from resiling from the promise. The doctrine operates as a shield, not a sword — it is a defence, not an independent cause of action. Principle III — Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: No person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The privilege protects only testimonial evidence that is incriminatory. It does not extend to the production of physical objects or documents held as an agent of another.

11. Deepak is a delivery driver employed by Speedy Couriers. One afternoon, after completing his final delivery, Deepak uses the company van to drive ten kilometres off route to visit his girlfriend. On the way back, still off route, he negligently collides with a cyclist, Farhan, and injures him. Farhan sues Speedy Couriers. Apply Principle I.

- ☐ A. Speedy Couriers is liable, because the company van was in use and employer tools define the scope of employment
- ☐ B. Speedy Couriers is liable, because returning toward the depot — even from a detour — remained partly within employment
- ☐ C. Speedy Couriers is not liable, because after completing his last delivery Deepak had no remaining employment duties
- ☐ D. Speedy Couriers is not liable, because the personal detour was a frolic entirely unconnected with his delivery duties

12. The Municipal Corporation promised local shopkeepers that it would not charge increased market fees for three years if they invested in upgrading their stalls. The shopkeepers spent significant sums on renovations. Eight months later, the Corporation revoked the promise, citing a new government policy requiring enhanced revenue collection. The shopkeepers sue to hold the Corporation to its promise. Apply Principle II.

- ☐ A. The shopkeepers fail, because a statutory public body cannot be estopped from exercising a subsequently enacted revenue power
- ☐ B. The shopkeepers succeed, because the clear promise, relied upon to their financial detriment, estops the Corporation
- ☐ C. The shopkeepers succeed, because their renovations amount to part performance, independently creating binding obligations
- ☐ D. The shopkeepers fail, because promissory estoppel requires valid consideration flowing from promisee to promisor

13. Police, investigating a money laundering case, order Sunita, a company secretary, to produce original corporate board resolutions that she holds in her professional capacity as the company's officer. Sunita claiming privilege against self-incrimination. Sunita argues that handing over documents may indirectly



incriminate her. Apply Principle III.

- ☐ A. Sunita's claim fails, because Principle III does not extend to documents held in a bailee capacity — they belong to the company
- ☐ B. Sunita's claim succeeds, because the privilege covers any compelled production that could indirectly implicate the producer
- ☐ C. Sunita's claim succeeds, because once a formal production order is issued the privilege is automatically triggered
- ☐ D. Sunita's claim fails, because the constitutional privilege applies only to persons formally charged with a specific offence

**14. Suresh works as a petrol pump attendant for Green Petrol. During his shift, a regular customer whom Suresh personally dislikes argues with him. Suresh, acting on personal grudge and contrary to his employer's explicit instructions never to engage in physical altercations, punches the customer, breaking his nose. Apply Principle I.**

- ☐ A. Green Petrol is not liable, because the assault violated an explicit employer prohibition, taking it outside the course of employment
- ☐ B. Green Petrol is liable, because Suresh was clocked in and physically present at the pump when the altercation arose
- ☐ C. Green Petrol is not liable, because employers are never vicariously liable for an employee's deliberate criminal acts
- ☐ D. Green Petrol is liable, because a prohibition narrows only the mode of the task, and serving customers was an authorised task

**LOGICAL REASONING — ANALYTICAL (IN-PASSAGE) · URBAN HOUSING AFFORDABILITY AND THE LIMITS OF SUPPLY-SIDE POLICY (Q15–Q18)**

The standard prescription for urban housing crises is simple: build more homes. The underlying model assumes that housing prices rise because demand exceeds supply, so adding units will bring prices down. Several Indian cities have dramatically increased approved residential floor-space ratios over the past decade, yet median house prices have continued to climb. Proponents argue that without these measures prices would have risen even faster; critics respond that this claim is conveniently immune to empirical challenge. A more granular analysis reveals two complications. First, new supply in Indian metros is overwhelmingly in the premium and luxury segment — affordable housing stock, defined as units priced within five times the median annual household income, has declined as a share of total inventory. Second, land price appreciation in well-connected urban areas often outpaces wage growth by a factor of four to six, so the carrying cost of any new unit escalates faster than the incomes of the residents it was built to house. Supply policy alone, untethered from interventions on land speculation, income support and tenure security, is insufficient to produce affordable outcomes for median-income households.

**15. Which of the following, if true, would most directly support the critics' challenge to the 'supply solution' proponents' claim that prices would have risen faster without the additional floor-space?**

- ☐ A. A study finding cities without expanded floor-space ratios saw median prices rise at the same annual rate as cities that did expand them
- ☐ B. A survey showing buyers of premium units are mainly high-net-worth investors purchasing a second or third property, not owner-occupiers
- ☐ C. Data confirming construction costs across Indian metros rose 18% over the decade, raising the minimum achievable floor price of any unit
- ☐ D. A report showing the proportion of rental housing in total stock declined in cities that expanded floor-space ratios

**16. The passage states that affordable housing stock 'has actually declined as a share of total housing inventory' in cities that expanded floor-space ratios. What is the most accurate inference about the absolute number of affordable units in those cities?**

- ☐ A. The absolute number of affordable units must have fallen, because a declining share within a growing total is impossible otherwise
- ☐ B. The absolute number is unresolvable — a declining share is consistent with an absolute decline or a slower-growing absolute count
- ☐ C. The absolute count must have remained constant, because the passage asserts only that the share declined and no more
- ☐ D. The absolute count must have risen, because any floor-space expansion produces proportionate new construction across all segments

**17. According to the passage, what is the logical flaw the critics identify in the supply-expansion proponents' argument?**

- ☐ A. The proponents' claim that prices would have risen faster without the policy is unfalsifiable by any observable evidence
- ☐ B. The proponents rely on data from expansion cities only, ignoring comparable cities where prices fell without supply-side intervention
- ☐ C. The proponents conflate increased supply with improved affordability, treating any new construction as accessible to median-income buyers
- ☐ D. The proponents ignore land price appreciation outpacing wages by four to six times, which the passage calls the more fundamental problem

**18. The passage concludes that supply expansion is 'insufficient to produce affordable outcomes for median-income households' without additional interventions. Which of the following conclusions is best supported by the passage as a whole?**

- ☐ A. Supply policies should be reversed because evidence shows they worsened affordability by directing new investment toward premium segments
- ☐ B. The failure to reduce prices proves housing costs are driven by investor speculation rather than demand-supply dynamics
- ☐ C. Effective policy must combine supply expansion with measures on land speculation, income support, and tenure security for renters
- ☐ D. Floor-space increases work only when accompanied by a legally mandated fixed percentage of affordable units per development

**SECTION — QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES**

**QUANT — ENERGY & POWER · PERCENTAGE CHANGE · INDIA'S RENEWABLE ENERGY INSTALLED CAPACITY: 2024 AND 2025 (Q19–Q22)**

India's Ministry of New and Renewable Energy tracks installed capacity in gigawatts (GW) for each renewable source. The table presents capacity figures for the calendar years 2024 and 2025. Solar energy saw the steepest absolute addition driven by large scale parks commissioned in Rajasthan and Gujarat. Wind capacity grew more modestly due to land acquisition delays in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Hydroelectric capacity (large hydro only) registered a small increase reflecting completion of the Suban



project in the North-East. The government's target is 500 GW of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030. Percentage change is calculated as:  $((\text{New Value} - \text{Old Value}) \div \text{Old Value}) \times 100$ . All figures are rounded to two decimal places where relevant.

| Source          | Installed Capacity 2024 (GW) | Installed Capacity 2025 (GW) |
|-----------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Solar           | 75.0                         | 96.0                         |
| Wind            | 46.0                         | 51.75                        |
| Hydro (large)   | 47.0                         | 49.88                        |
| Total Renewable | 168.0                        | 197.63                       |

19. What is the percentage increase in Solar installed capacity from 2024 to 2025?

- ☐ A. 24%
 ☐ B. 18%
- ☐ C. 21 GW
 ☐ D. 28%

20. Which renewable source recorded the highest percentage growth in installed capacity between 2024 and 2025?

- ☐ A. Wind, because it added 5.75 GW which is the largest absolute addition among all three sources
 ☐ B. Hydro, because large hydro projects are the most capital-intensive and any addition represents proportionately higher investment
- ☐ C. Solar, because its percentage growth of 28% exceeds Wind (12.5%) and Hydro (6.13%)
 ☐ D. All three sources grew at exactly the same percentage rate, as the total renewable capacity grew uniformly

21. Between 2024 and 2025, what was the combined percentage increase in Wind and Hydro installed capacity taken together?

- ☐ A. Approximately 18.5%, because 5.75 GW Wind plus 2.88 GW Hydro equals 8.63 GW and that divided by 46 GW gives 18.5%
 ☐ B. Approximately 9.28%, calculated on the combined 2024 base of 93 GW rising to 101.63 GW in 2025
- ☐ C. Approximately 12.5%, because Wind grew at 12.5% and Hydro grew at 6.13% and these two rates must be averaged
 ☐ D. Approximately 4.37%, because the combined addition of 8.63 GW divided by the total 2025 renewable capacity of 197.63 GW gives the combined contribution share

22. If Solar capacity continues to grow at the same percentage rate observed from 2024 to 2025, what will be India's Solar installed capacity at the end of 2026 (rounded to two decimal places)?

- ☐ A. 117.0 GW
 ☐ B. 114.48 GW
- ☐ C. 122.88 GW
 ☐ D. 119.0 GW

**QUANT — AGRICULTURE & FOOD · PROFIT-LOSS-INTEREST · WHOLESALE FRUIT TRADER'S PROCUREMENT AND SELLING PRICE — MUMBAI APMC, OCTOBER 2026 (Q23-Q26)**

Nilesh runs a wholesale fruit stall at the Mumbai APMC (Agricultural Produce Market Committee) yard. He procures five commodities and sells them at the prices shown in the table above. Profit percentage is computed on cost price:  $\text{Profit \%} = ((\text{SP} - \text{CP}) \div \text{CP}) \times 100$ . Loss percentage is also on cost price:  $\text{Loss \%} = ((\text{CP} - \text{SP}) \div \text{CP}) \times 100$ . Where  $\text{SP} < \text{CP}$  the transaction records a loss; where  $\text{SP} > \text{CP}$  it records a profit. Overall profit or loss for the entire stock is calculated by summing total revenue across all commodities and deducting total procurement cost; the net is then expressed as a percentage of total procurement cost. Note that off-season Alphonso mangoes are a high-cost luxury commodity and are often sold at a loss to attract premium buyers to the stall.

| Commodity                   | Quantity (kg) | Procurement Cost per kg (Rs) | Selling Price per kg (Rs) |
|-----------------------------|---------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Alphonso Mango (off-season) | 200           | 180                          | 153                       |
| Pomegranate                 | 500           | 80                           | 96                        |
| Banana (Robusta)            | 1000          | 22                           | 26.40                     |
| Papaya                      | 800           | 30                           | 24                        |
| Watermelon                  | 1200          | 12                           | 14.40                     |

23. What is the loss percentage on Alphonso Mangoes, and what is the profit percentage on Pomegranates?

- ☐ A. Alphonso loss = 17%; Pomegranate profit = 16%
 ☐ B. Alphonso loss = 15%; Pomegranate profit = 20%
- ☐ C. Alphonso loss = 15%; Pomegranate profit = 15%
 ☐ D. Alphonso loss = 20%; Pomegranate profit = 20%

24. Nilesh sold all his Papaya stock but realises he wants a 20% profit on cost instead of the current loss. At what selling price per kg must he sell the Papaya to achieve exactly a 20% profit on cost?

- ☐ A. Rs 33 per kg
 ☐ B. Rs 24 per kg
- ☐ C. Rs 38 per kg
 ☐ D. Rs 36 per kg

25. What is the total procurement cost for all five commodities, and what is the total revenue if all stock is sold at the given selling prices?

- ☐ A. Total Cost = Rs 1,36,400; Total Revenue = Rs 1,41,480 (net profit of Rs 5,080)
 ☐ B. Total Cost = Rs 1,38,200; Total Revenue = Rs 1,43,720 (net profit of Rs 5,520 approx.)
- ☐ C. Total Cost = Rs 1,34,000; Total Revenue = Rs 1,39,200 (net profit of Rs 5,200 approx.)
 ☐ D. Total Cost = Rs 1,36,400; Total Revenue = Rs 1,39,600 (net profit of Rs 3,200 approx.)

26. Considering all five commodities sold at the given prices, what is the overall net profit or loss percentage on Nilesh's entire procurement cost? (Use the total cost and revenue figures you computed.)

- ☐ A. Approximately 3.72% net profit
 ☐ B. Approximately 1.47% net loss on total cost
- ☐ C. Approximately 4.18% net profit on total cost
 ☐ D. Approximately 2.63% net loss on total cost

