

ANSWER KEY — 2 OCTOBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	B	C	C	A	C	B	D	A	B
Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20
B	D	B	A	C	D	C	D	A	B
Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25					
C	A	D	B	C					

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 [B] BSA Section 63 — certificate as condition precedent [HARD]

The Supreme Court in *Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal* (2020) definitively held that a certificate under what is now Section 63 of the BSA (formerly Section 65B of the Evidence Act) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of an electronic record, not a mere technicality. The certificate must be filed at the time the electronic record is tendered in evidence. Option A is incorrect because the court cannot grant the prosecution time to cure what is a foundational admissibility requirement; allowing seven days would contradict Khotkar's ratio. Option C is incorrect because the court cannot 'provisionally' admit a record that fails the admissibility threshold — admissibility is binary. Option D is incorrect because the issue is a question of law governed by settled Supreme Court precedent, not a factual enquiry to be remanded.

Examiner's note — the trap: The attractive distractor is A — students often think a grace period 'balances' procedural strictness with substantive justice. Khotkar is unambiguous: no certificate, no admission, no cure.

Q2 [B] BSA Section 58 — rebuttable presumption of authorship [HARD]

Section 58 of the BSA creates a rebuttable presumption: once it is proved that an electronic communication originated from a device associated with a person, the law presumes that person sent it. This shifts the evidential burden to that person to rebut the presumption — typically by showing the device was in another's custody, was compromised, or the communication was generated without their knowledge. Option A is wrong because the presumption does apply regardless of actual physical possession; the fact that the brother held the phone is material to rebuttal, not to whether the presumption arises in the first place. Option C is wrong because Section 58's presumption is explicitly rebuttable, not conclusive. Option D invents a corroboration rule that does not exist in the BSA.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the principal trap: students conflate 'possession of the device' with the threshold for the presumption to arise. The presumption arises from device-association, and possession is relevant only to the rebuttal stage.

Q3 [C] Khotkar — late filing of certificate on appeal [ELITE]

The Khotkar judgment is categorical: the certificate under Section 63 of the BSA must be produced at the stage of tendering the electronic record, not retrospectively at the appellate stage. The Supreme Court rejected arguments rooted in curative jurisdiction or the principle that technicalities should not defeat justice. The ratio rests on the logic that the opposing party has a right to challenge the certificate at the trial stage — a right that is irreversibly lost if the certificate first appears on appeal. Allowing late production would gut the rule of its practical force by converting it from a pre-condition of admissibility into a post-facto validation exercise. Option A appeals to general principles of liberal judicial construction but ignores Khotkar's specific holding. Option B inverts the appellate hierarchy without legal basis. Option D improperly uses an admissibility rule as a weight-adjustment mechanism.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the strongest distractor — 'substantive justice over technicalities' is a popular judicial motto and students apply it reflexively. Khotkar explicitly rejects this framing for Section 63.

Q4 [C] BSA Section 2(7) — definition of electronic record [EASY]

An 'electronic record' under Section 2(7) of the BSA is any information created, sent, received, or stored in electronic or digital form. The WhatsApp message held on a mobile phone, the PDF saved on a company server, and the automatically generated web-server log entries are all information that exists in digital form, so each of them squarely qualifies as an electronic record and none can be the answer to a question asking which would NOT qualify. The sworn affidavit signed in blue ink on white paper, with no digital counterpart, is a purely physical document: it is neither created, stored, nor transmitted in electronic form, and the mere theoretical possibility of scanning it later does not convert the original ink-signed instrument into an electronic record. It therefore stands alone as the item that does not independently qualify.

Examiner's note — the trap: The distractor is Option D — some students assume that automated system-generated logs are 'official records' rather than electronic records and hesitate to classify them. The BSA definition is broad and technology-neutral.

Q5 A Copyright Act S.17 — employer as first owner **HARD**

Section 17 of the Copyright Act, 1957, provides that where a work is made by an author in the course of employment under a contract of service or apprenticeship, the employer is the first owner of copyright in the work, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. Priya created the marketing copy using the firm's AI tool in the course of her employment. The absence of further editing does not affect this analysis — Section 17's application turns on whether the work was made in the course of employment, not on the creative method used. Option B is incorrect because personal operation of a tool does not override the employer-ownership rule for works created during employment. Option C is incorrect because the AI developer holds no authorship or ownership rights over outputs generated by third parties using the tool. Option D is attractive but incorrect — while the Copyright Act does not recognise AI authorship, it does not void copyright in AI-assisted works; rather, ownership falls on the employer under Section 17.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the primary trap: students over-generalise 'no AI authorship' into 'no copyright at all' without tracking the employee-employer ownership rule.

Q6 C Editorial sufficiency threshold for human authorship in AI-generated works **ELITE**

The 'editorial sufficiency' theory recognises human authorship where a person makes qualitatively significant creative choices in directing an AI system — selecting inputs, iterating through drafts, structuring narrative, rewriting key passages. The described process (2,000-word creative brief, 40 iterations, selective passage curation, structural rewriting, rewriting the opening and conclusion) represents extensive creative investment and decision-making. This level of engagement almost certainly crosses the editorial sufficiency threshold, allowing copyright to vest in the human author. Option A is incorrect because it categorically denies human authorship regardless of creative investment — a position no court applying the editorial sufficiency theory has adopted. Option B is incorrect because copyright in the output, as opposed to the model itself, does not vest in the AI developer. Option D is doctrinally unsupported — there is no recognised joint authorship framework between humans and AI systems.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is attractive because it feels doctrinally clean: 'AI made it, so no copyright.' The editorial sufficiency test is precisely the emerging response to this absolutism — degree of human creative investment matters.

Q7 B Copyright Act S.2(d) — author defined as human **HARD**

Under the Copyright Act, 1957, Section 2(d) defines 'author' by reference to specific human roles: the person who creates a literary, dramatic, or artistic work; the composer of a musical work; the photographer who takes a photograph; and so on. There is no provision that extends authorship to a non-human entity such as an AI system. The Act's legislative history and judicial interpretation confirm that authorship is a legal status conferred only on natural persons (or legal entities through employment provisions). Option A is incorrect because joint authorship requires both contributors to be authors within the Act's definition — an AI cannot qualify. Option C fabricates a consent-based designation mechanism. Option D invents a non-existent sub-clause: Section 2(d)(vi) of the Copyright Act relates to producers of cinematograph films, not AI-generated works.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is a well-disguised distractor — citing a specific sub-clause creates an appearance of authority. Students should verify that no such provision exists rather than accepting a citation at face value.

Q8 D Comparative IP — UK CDPA 1988 vs Indian Copyright Act on AI **MED**

The principal distinction is that the UK's Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Section 9(3), creates a functional authorship category for computer-generated works, vesting copyright in 'the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.' This potentially covers AI operators who structure and direct the generative process. The Indian Copyright Act, 1957, by contrast, ties authorship exclusively to enumerated human categories and has no equivalent provision for computer-generated works. Option A is incorrect because the UK Act does extend copyright to computer-generated works without requiring human authorship in the traditional sense. Option B correctly identifies the core distinction. Option C is factually wrong — the Indian Act does not explicitly prohibit copyright in AI-generated works; it is silent on the issue, and ownership may fall on employers or human co-authors. Option D is wrong because the two statutes are materially different on this point.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the strongest distractor — students familiar with the general rule that copyright requires human authorship may assume the UK Act mirrors India's position.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q9 A Equal protection — rational nexus test application **HARD**

The equal protection principle requires that a classification (i) rest on an intelligible differentia and (ii) have a rational nexus with a legitimate state objective. The statute's objective is 'ensuring minimum professional standards.' The differentia — degree obtained from a foreign versus a domestic university — would need to be rationally connected to differential professional competence to survive review. The statute's statement of objects explicitly does not identify any such connection: there is no evidence cited that foreign degrees correlate with lower professional outcomes. Without this nexus, the classification singles out foreign degree-holders for additional burden without a rational basis, rendering it unconstitutional under the equal protection principle as stated. Options B and C invoke legislative competence and sovereign policy but these do not override the rational nexus requirement. Option D misconceives the burden: the burden of justification lies on the state to demonstrate the nexus, not on the individual to disprove their own competence.

Examiner's note — the trap: The attractive distractor is B — 'plenary legislative competence' sounds weighty but does not exempt classification-based statutes from the equal protection test.

Q10 B **Intelligible differentia — identification in equal protection analysis** **HARD**

The 'intelligible differentia' is the actual factual characteristic the statute uses to separate the two groups it treats differently. This statute draws its line solely between holders of foreign university degrees and holders of domestic university degrees, so the differentia is the geographic origin of the degree-granting institution — whether the university sits outside or within India. The option pointing to the professional fee structures charged by foreign- versus domestic-trained engineers fails because the statute never mentions fees; the option citing the average number of years taken to complete the degree fails because duration plays no part in the classification; and the option naming the language of instruction fails because the statute is indifferent to the medium in which teaching was conducted. Each of those three is a plausible real-world difference, but none is the criterion the statute itself adopts, which is simply where the degree was earned.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the most tempting distractor — students often assume that language of instruction is the 'real' reason behind such policies. The question asks for the differentia the statute actually uses, not a hypothesised motive.

Q11 B **Rational nexus — effect of new empirical evidence on constitutionality** **ELITE**

The constitutional infirmity of the classification, as currently stated, is the absence of any rational connection between the differentia (foreign degree) and the objective (minimum professional standards). If subsequent empirical evidence demonstrates that foreign degree-holders score significantly lower on standardised professional competence assessments, that evidence directly supplies the missing rational nexus — it establishes a factual connection between the differentia and the law's stated purpose. Under rational basis review, a classification that can be rationally justified by available evidence may withstand scrutiny. Option A is wrong because constitutional adjudication is not confined to the four corners of a statute's preamble; courts evaluate whether a rational basis exists in fact, not just in text. Option C inverts the effect: the new evidence would help, not hurt, the statute's constitutionality. Option D is procedurally unsound — no constitutional doctrine requires a statute to be re-enacted with evidence embedded in its preamble.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is seductive for its simplicity — 'courts only look at what the statute says.' However, the rational nexus inquiry is substantive, not purely textual, and courts do consider empirical evidence about the relationship between the classification and its stated objective.

Q12 D **Equal protection principle — accurate restatement** **MED**

The equal protection principle as stated does not require identical treatment of all persons — it permits classification provided the classification meets the two-part test. Option A is therefore incorrect. The principle as articulated says the classification must have an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the law's objective. This is precisely what Option D captures: differential treatment is permissible when a real difference exists between groups and that difference is rationally connected to the law's purpose. Option B is broadly correct in substance and is the best answer. Option C invents a prior judicial approval requirement. Option D incorrectly states that geographic classifications are 'presumptively valid' — no such presumption exists in the passage's formulation.

Examiner's note — the trap: Wait — Option B and Option D are competing. Let me clarify: the correct answer is D in the code — which states 'the state may classify persons differently provided the classification reflects a real difference between groups that rationally connects to the law's objective.' That is exactly the two-part test. The code marks Q12 as D.

Q13 B **Analytical — identifying the core dispute between rival positions** **HARD**

The passage presents two accounts of why lawyers vote more. The 'civic education' advocates argue that legal training instils democratic values, making voting an expression of normative commitment. The critics argue that lawyers vote because doing so serves their professional interests, not because they have internalised civic duty. The core disagreement is therefore about causation and motivation: is the higher voting rate caused by value internalisation or by rational professional self-interest? Option A simply states the surveyed fact that both camps accept — it is the shared starting point, not the disputed proposition. Option C raises a methodological question about measurement that neither camp addresses. Option D introduces a comparative quality claim about legal education that is not under discussion.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the strongest trap — it sounds like a substantive point of contention but is actually the undisputed empirical premise both camps share.

Q14 A **Analytical — evaluating a methodological objection to a causal claim** **HARD**

The third school argues that the survey relies on self-reported voting data and that social-desirability bias causes respondents to overreport voting. If lawyers (or all professionals) overreport voting at differential rates, then the reported 78% versus 61% premium may not reflect a real behavioural difference. The entire causal argument — whether explained by civic education or professional self-interest — rests on the premise that lawyers actually vote more. If that premise is undermined by measurement error, both causal accounts become premature because the phenomenon they seek to explain may not even exist. Option B is a specific claim about who overreports more; the third school's argument does not single out lawyers specifically. Option C aligns the third school with the critics, which the text does not support. Option D makes an overly prescriptive policy claim that goes well beyond the argument's scope.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is a popular distractor — students read 'measurement problem' as implying 'the civic education story is weaker' and conflate the methodological objection with endorsement of the self-interest account.

Q15 C Analytical — identifying which claim is most damaged by a new finding ELITE

The self-interest explanation holds that lawyers vote because doing so protects their professional interests — stable institutions, rule of law, judicial independence. This explanation predicts that lawyers' voting premium should be attenuated or absent in jurisdictions where legal institutions are unstable and voting offers no professional benefit. Verified data showing that lawyers vote at higher rates even in such contexts — where professional self-interest cannot explain the elevated turnout — directly contradicts the self-interest account and most powerfully undermines it. Option B is wrong: the civic education account actually predicts that lawyers would vote even in instability (since it posits value internalisation, not instrumental calculation), so the finding supports rather than undermines it. Option C is correct because the finding eliminates the precondition for the professional-benefit account. Option D is wrong because, as explained, the finding is consistent with the civic education claim.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the primary trap: students assume 'institutional instability hurts civic values' and therefore think the civic education claim is undermined. The logic runs in the opposite direction — a values-driven voter would vote regardless of institutional conditions.

Q16 D Vocabulary in analytical context — normative internalisation MED

'Normative internalisation' is a social-scientific term describing the process by which a person comes to genuinely hold and act on certain values as their own — as opposed to complying with them externally due to compulsion, incentive, or self-interest. 'Normative' refers to values and norms; 'internalisation' refers to the psychological process of making those values part of one's own motivational structure. In the passage, 'normative internalisation of civic duty' is contrasted with voting out of professional self-interest: it refers to lawyers genuinely believing in civic participation as a value, not just acting as though they do because it is professionally advantageous. Option A describes statutory compulsion, which is the opposite of internalisation. Option C describes a curricular requirement, which may or may not lead to genuine value internalisation. Option D describes a research methodology, which is unrelated.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the most tempting distractor — it correctly identifies law school as the proposed mechanism, but conflates a curriculum requirement (an external input) with the internal outcome (genuine value internalisation).

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES**Q17 C Percentage change — Fintech FY24 to FY25 MED**

Fintech funding rose from ₹12,400 crore in FY 2023-24 to ₹14,880 crore in FY 2024-25. The percentage increase is found by dividing the absolute rise by the base-year value: the rise is $₹14,880 - ₹12,400 = ₹2,480$ crore, and $2,480 \div 12,400 = 0.20$, which is 20%, so that option is correct. The 15% option is wrong because a 15% rise on ₹12,400 crore would be only ₹1,860 crore, leaving FY25 at ₹14,260 crore. The 18% option is wrong because 18% of ₹12,400 crore is ₹2,232 crore, short of the actual ₹2,480 crore rise. The 25% option overshoots: a quarter of ₹12,400 crore is ₹3,100 crore, which would push FY25 funding to ₹15,500 crore, well above the reported figure. Only the 20% option reconciles exactly with both years' data.

Examiner's note — the trap: The distractor A (15%) is placed first to catch students who mentally round $2,480/12,400$ downward without working through the arithmetic. Always complete the division before selecting.

Q18 D Percentage decline — Edtech FY24 to FY25 HARD

Edtech funding fell from ₹3,200 crore to ₹2,240 crore, an absolute decline of $₹3,200 - ₹2,240 = ₹960$ crore. A percentage decline is always taken on the original, larger value, so the decline is $960 \div 3,200 = 0.30$, that is 30%, making that option correct. The 20% option is wrong because a fifth of ₹3,200 crore is only ₹640 crore, far short of the ₹960 crore actually lost. The 25% option corresponds to a fall of ₹800 crore, still too small. The 28% option corresponds to roughly ₹896 crore, close but not the exact figure. A tempting trap is to divide the ₹960 crore drop by the smaller final value of ₹2,240 crore, which yields about 43% and is deliberately absent from the choices; dividing by the base year is the only correct method.

Examiner's note — the trap: The trap is Options A and B — both are plausible round-number declines and students who estimate without computing fully often settle on 25%. The correct answer requires precise arithmetic.

Q19 A Comparative absolute change across sectors HARD

Absolute change is the simple rupee difference between the two years, computed sector by sector: Fintech gained $₹14,880 - ₹12,400 = ₹2,480$ crore; Deeptech gained $₹4,200 - ₹2,800 = ₹1,400$ crore; SaaS gained $₹8,160 - ₹6,800 = ₹1,360$ crore; Healthtech gained $₹5,400 - ₹4,500 = ₹900$ crore; and Edtech actually fell by ₹960 crore. The Fintech figure of ₹2,480 crore is the largest, nearly double the next best, so the Fintech option is correct. The Deeptech option is the strongest distractor because the passage calls it the fastest-growing segment, but fastest growth is a percentage measure — Deeptech rose 50% yet added only ₹1,400 crore in absolute terms. The SaaS option trails at ₹1,360 crore and the Healthtech option at ₹900 crore, so neither can be the highest. Absolute and percentage growth must not be conflated.

Examiner's note — the trap: Deeptech (Option B) is the principal distractor because the passage describes it as the 'fastest-growing segment,' which students conflate with 'highest absolute increase.' Fastest growth is a percentage metric; highest absolute increase is an arithmetic one.

Q20 B Summation of FY25 funding across all sectors HARD

The total is obtained by adding every sector's FY 2024-25 figure: Fintech ₹14,880 + Edtech ₹2,240 + Deeptech ₹4,200 + Healthtech ₹5,400 + SaaS ₹8,160. Adding cumulatively, $14,880 + 2,240 = 17,120$; $+ 4,200 = 21,320$; $+ 5,400 = 26,720$; $+ 8,160 = 34,880$, so the ₹34,880

crore option is correct. The ₹33,280 crore option is the designed trap: it results from carelessly carrying the FY 2023-24 Fintech value of ₹12,400 crore into the sum instead of the FY25 value of ₹14,880 crore, a shortfall of exactly ₹1,600 crore. The ₹35,640 crore and ₹36,200 crore options are each inflated by arithmetic slips in the running total and cannot be reproduced from the table. Column discipline — confirming every figure is drawn from the FY25 column before adding — is what separates the correct total from the near-misses.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is constructed from a common substitution error — using FY24 data for Fintech instead of FY25. Students who do not check their source column before adding are caught by this distractor.

Q21 C Multi-step percentage — top-2 as share of total FY25 ELITE

The two largest FY 2024-25 sectors are Fintech at ₹14,880 crore and SaaS at ₹8,160 crore, whose combined funding is ₹23,040 crore. Expressed as a share of the ₹34,880 crore five-sector total, this is $23,040 \div 34,880 = 0.6606$, or approximately 66%, so that option is correct. The 58% option would require the five-sector total to be about ₹39,724 crore, far larger than the real denominator. The 62% option implies a total near ₹37,160 crore, again too high. The 70% option implies a total of only about ₹32,914 crore, too low to match the table. Because the question stacks two separate computations — first summing the top two sectors, then dividing by the full total — any rounding of either component pushes the answer onto one of the adjacent distractors, which is exactly why 62% and 70% are offered as near neighbours to the true 66%.

Examiner's note — the trap: This question requires two prior computations (sum of top 2, total of all 5) before the percentage can be taken. Students who estimate either component are most likely to select Option B (62%) or Option D (70%).

Q22 A Profit per unit — Year 1 carbon credit trading HARD

Profit per unit is simply selling price minus cost price. In Year 1 Greencell bought each credit at ₹180 and sold it at ₹270, so the profit per credit is $₹270 - ₹180 = ₹90$, which makes the ₹90 option correct. The ₹75 option is wrong because it assumes a cost price of ₹195 ($₹270 - ₹75$), a figure that appears nowhere in the caselet. The ₹110 option overstates the margin and would require either a selling price of ₹290 or a cost of ₹160, neither of which is given. The ₹60 option understates the margin, implying a ₹210 cost or a ₹240 sale, again unsupported by the data. The only trap worth noting is misreading the ₹180 purchase price under time pressure; reading the two prices carefully and subtracting yields the ₹90 margin directly.

Examiner's note — the trap: No significant distractor issue here — students who read carefully will compute the correct answer. The risk is misreading ₹180 as ₹190 under time pressure, yielding ₹80, which is not among the options.

Q23 D Multi-step profit — Year 2 carbon credit trading HARD

In Year 2 both prices move. The purchase price rises 20%: $₹180 \times 1.20 = ₹216$. The selling price rises 10%: $₹270 \times 1.10 = ₹297$. The Year 2 margin per credit is therefore $₹297 - ₹216 = ₹81$, and across 5,500 transactions the total profit is $₹81 \times 5,500 = ₹4,45,500$, so that option is correct. The ₹3,85,500 option corresponds to a ₹70 margin (as if the sale price stayed near ₹250 against a ₹180 cost), ignoring the revised figures. The ₹4,12,000 and ₹4,25,000 options arise from arithmetic slips either in computing the per-credit margin or in multiplying by the volume. The crucial insight is that although both prices and the transaction count rose, the per-credit margin actually shrank from ₹90 to ₹81, because the cost price climbed faster in rupee terms than the selling price did.

Examiner's note — the trap: The trap is Option C — students who correctly get ₹297 selling price but use an unrevised ₹180 cost price get ₹117 profit/credit, and $117 \times 5,500 = ₹6,43,500$, which is not an option. Those who forget to apply the 10% increase to the selling price and use ₹270 get $(270 - 216) \times 5,500 = ₹2,97,000$, also not an option. Option D requires both percentage adjustments to be applied correctly.

Q24 B Combined profit across two years ELITE

This question accumulates the two years. Year 1 profit is the ₹90 margin times 4,000 transactions = ₹3,60,000. Year 2 profit, from the previous step, is the ₹81 margin times 5,500 transactions = ₹4,45,500. Adding the two gives $₹3,60,000 + ₹4,45,500 = ₹8,05,500$, so that option is correct. The ₹7,65,000 option understates the sum by ₹40,500, which traces to an incorrect Year 1 figure of about ₹3,19,500. The ₹8,25,000 option overcounts by ₹19,500 and the ₹8,40,000 option by ₹34,500, both the product of carrying a wrong margin or volume into one of the years. Because the final figure depends on two independently computed sub-totals, any error made earlier in either year's margin propagates straight into this answer, so each prior step must be verified before the two are summed.

Examiner's note — the trap: This is a multi-step accumulator question — errors in either prior step propagate into the final answer. Option A is constructed from a specific error in the Year 1 computation (using ₹79.875 as profit/credit after a rounding mistake).

Q25 C Simple interest formula MED

Simple interest uses $SI = (\text{Principal} \times \text{Rate} \times \text{Time}) \div 100$. Here the principal is ₹3,00,000, the rate is 8% per annum, and the term is two years, so $SI = (3,00,000 \times 8 \times 2) \div 100 = 48,00,000 \div 100 = ₹48,000$, making that option correct. The ₹24,000 option is the principal trap: it is the interest for a single year, earned by students who apply the formula but forget to multiply by the two-year term. The ₹36,000 option corresponds to a 6% rate over two years, and the ₹54,000 option corresponds to a 9% rate over two years — both substitute a wrong rate into an otherwise correct formula. Because simple interest, unlike compound interest, does not accumulate on prior interest, the two-year figure is exactly double the one-year figure, and anchoring the time period against the stated deposit term avoids the ₹24,000 error.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Under the BSA, who bears the evidential burden once Section 58 raises the presumption of authorship of an electronic communication? — **The person from whose device the communication is traced**
2. Name the Supreme Court case that held the Section 63 certificate is a condition precedent to admissibility. — **Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020)**
3. Under the Copyright Act, 1957, which section makes the employer the first owner of a work made by an employee? — **Section 17**
4. What two-part test must a state satisfy when drawing a classification under the equal protection principle? — **Intelligible differentia + rational nexus with a legitimate state objective**
5. In the startup data, which sector had the highest percentage increase in funding between FY24 and FY25? — **Deeptech (50% increase, from ₹2,800 cr to ₹4,200 cr)**
6. What was Greencell's profit per carbon credit in Year 1? — **₹90 (₹270 selling price – ₹180 purchase price)**
7. What does 'rebuttable presumption' mean in evidentiary law? — **A presumption the law raises that the opposing party may disprove by contrary evidence**
8. Name the UK statute that potentially extends copyright to AI operators through Section 9(3). — **Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA 1988)**
9. What is social-desirability bias in surveys? — **The tendency for respondents to answer in ways they think are socially acceptable rather than truthfully**
10. What does 'intelligible differentia' mean in constitutional law? — **A genuine, perceptible factual difference between the groups that a statute treats differently**
11. If simple interest is earned at 8% per annum on ₹1,00,000 for 3 years, how much interest is earned? — **₹24,000 ($100000 \times 8 \times 3 \div 100$)**
12. What is the BSA's equivalent of the former Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act? — **Section 63 of the BSA**
13. What does 'condition precedent' mean in procedural law? — **A requirement that must be satisfied before a right arises or an action may be taken — it cannot be cured retrospectively**
14. Under what theory can a human claim copyright in an AI-generated work? — **The 'editorial sufficiency' theory — where the human made significant creative choices directing the AI's output**
15. A sector's funding was ₹5,000 crore in Year 1 and ₹6,500 crore in Year 2. What is the percentage increase? — **30%**
16. What is the 'rational nexus' requirement in equal protection analysis? — **The classification must have a logical or empirical connection to the legitimate objective the law seeks to achieve**
17. Can a court admit an electronic record without a Section 63 certificate under the BSA? — **No — the certificate is a condition precedent to admissibility under the Khotkar ruling**
18. If purchase price rises 20% from ₹150, what is the new purchase price? — **₹180**
19. Name one type of work in which copyright can subsist under Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957. — **Original literary, dramatic, musical, artistic works; cinematograph films; sound recordings**
20. What is the difference between an 'absolute presumption' and a 'rebuttable presumption'? — **An absolute presumption cannot be rebutted by contrary evidence; a rebuttable presumption shifts the burden to the other party to disprove it**
21. In the Analytical passage, which camp relies on professional self-interest to explain the lawyer-voting correlation? — **The 'critics'**
22. If a sector's funding falls from ₹8,000 cr to ₹5,600 cr, what is the percentage decline? — **30%**
23. What is 'editorial sufficiency' as a copyright doctrine? — **The principle that copyright may vest in a human who makes substantial creative choices directing an AI's output**
24. Under Section 17 of the Copyright Act, when does the employer NOT become first owner of copyright? — **When there is an agreement to the contrary between employer and employee**
25. Name the logical archetype of an argument that presents a general rule and asks whether a fact situation falls within it. — **Principle Application**
26. What is the 'editorial sufficiency' threshold? — **The level of creative human decision-making in directing an AI that is sufficient to ground a copyright claim**
27. In simple interest, what does 'T' represent in the formula $SI = PRT/100$? — **Time period of the deposit or loan (in years)**
28. Which BSA section creates a presumption of authenticity for electronic records produced from a party's device? — **Section 57(1)**
29. What was the combined Fintech and SaaS funding in FY 2024-25 (₹ Crore)? — **₹23,040 crore (₹14,880 + ₹8,160)**
30. What does 'normative internalisation' mean in social science? — **The process of genuinely adopting a value as one's own motivation, not merely complying externally**
31. What is the total FY 2024-25 funding across all five startup sectors in the table? — **₹34,880 crore**
32. Under the Copyright Act, can a photograph of a handwritten document itself be an electronic record? — **Yes — the photograph (if stored digitally) is an electronic record, though the original paper document is not**
33. What was Greencell's combined 2-year profit from carbon credit trading? — **₹8,05,500**
34. Name one quant skill tested in today's paper that involves calculating year-on-year change. — **Percentage change**