

ANSWER KEY — 8 OCTOBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	D	A	C	C	A	D	C	A	B
Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20
C	C	B	D	D	A	C	A	A	B
Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26				
D	B	C	A	B	B				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 [B] Art 21 — 'law' means legislation (Kharak Singh; Madras HC on LOCs) [MED]

The passage states that a restriction on personal liberty is valid only if it rests on law enacted by a competent legislature, and that the right to travel abroad is part of personal liberty (Satwant Singh Sawhney). On facts close to Kiran's, the Madras High Court held that a letter written by a bank official to the Bureau of Immigration is not 'law', because 'law' under Article 21 means legislation. Kiran is a guarantor, no fraud is alleged, and the LOC rests on the manager's letter alone. The restriction therefore has no legislative footing and fails: option B. Option A confuses two questions; even if the bank were the State, the State too can restrict liberty only by law. Option C states a view of fairness the Court expressly rejected, holding that a civil debt binds money and property, not the debtor's body or movement. Option D overstates the right: the passage says a restriction imposed under a statute through a fair procedure may be valid, so the right is not absolute.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: whether the bank is 'State' is beside the point, because even the State can curtail personal liberty only by legislation, never by a letter.

Q2 [D] Limits of the holding — statutory restriction with a fair procedure [HARD]

The passage marks the limit of the Madras High Court's ruling: it did not hold that a defaulter can never be stopped from travelling, and it said that a restriction imposed under a statute, through a fair procedure, for example where fraud is under criminal investigation, may still be valid. Meher's case has every feature the guarantor's case lacked. The restriction rests on a statute enacted by Parliament, so the 'law' requirement of Kharak Singh is met; it was imposed after notice and a hearing, so the Maneka Gandhi requirement of a just, fair and reasonable procedure is met; and it arises from a criminal investigation into alleged forgery, not from a bare civil debt. Her argument fails: option D. Option A misreads the ruling as an absolute bar, the very over-reading the passage warns against. Option B ignores that Meher faces an allegation of crime, not merely a debt. Option C reaches the right outcome for a wrong reason: Article 21 is not forfeited; it is satisfied by a valid law and a fair procedure.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is attractive because it says 'Fails', but its reason is wrong: nobody forfeits Article 21; the restriction stands because it satisfies Article 21's conditions.

Q3 [A] Executive instruction is not 'law' (Kharak Singh applied) [HARD]

The governing rule in the passage is that personal liberty may be curtailed only by law enacted by a competent legislature; Kharak Singh held that regulations without statutory backing are not 'law' for this purpose. The circular here was issued by a government department and was 'not enacted by any legislature'. However authoritative its source, it remains an executive instrument, and an LOC resting solely on a request made under it has no legislative foundation. Since no fraud is alleged and no statute is invoked, the restriction on Farid's travel fails: option A. Option B treats the identity of the issuer as decisive, but the passage's test asks what kind of instrument it is, not who signed it; executive action is precisely what Kharak Singh excluded. Option C addresses fairness of procedure, which arises only after the 'law' requirement is met; a narrow threshold cannot turn a circular into legislation. Option D invents an objection about which officer may ask, which the passage never makes relevant.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B tempts because a government circular feels weightier than a bank's letter, but neither is legislation, and Article 21 asks for law enacted by a legislature.

Q4 [C] Scope of review — error apparent on the face of the record [HARD]

The passage defines review narrowly: it is confined to an error apparent on the face of the record or a similar sufficient reason, and it is not a re-hearing of arguments already decided. The bank raises no new fact and identifies no mistake in the record. It asks only that the judge weigh the public interest in recovering money differently, which is an invitation to re-argue the merits. That is outside the scope of review, so the application should be dismissed: option C. Option A gives the public interest a role the passage does not give it; however important recovery is, it is not an error on the face of the record. Option B states the opposite of the rule, since a better

argument available earlier is exactly what review does not allow. Option D invents a limit on who may seek review; the passage says nothing to bar a party that lost the case from applying, and on the facts the bank did apply as the losing party.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is attractive because the public interest in recovering public money sounds weighty, but weight on the merits is for an appeal, not for review.

Q5 C Publication — communication by the defendant to a third person **MED**

The passage requires the plaintiff to prove publication, meaning communication of the statement to some person other than the plaintiff, and states that a letter sent to the plaintiff alone, and read by no one else, is not published. Arun sealed the letter and posted it to Bhola, who read it alone. Arun therefore communicated the accusation to nobody but the plaintiff. The five friends learnt of it only because Bhola himself chose to show them the letter. That is Bhola's act, not Arun's, and a plaintiff cannot manufacture publication by spreading the words himself. With no publication by the defendant, the action fails: option C. Option A treats the written form as making libel actionable without publication; the form decides only whether a published statement is libel or slander. Option B tries to shift the friends' reading onto Arun through foreseeability, but Arun did nothing that required a third person to read it, unlike the defendant in *Mahendra Ram*. Option D is wrong because an accusation of theft plainly lowers a person in others' eyes.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B tempts because the words did reach five people; but they reached them through the plaintiff's own act, and publication must be by the defendant.

Q6 A Publication where a third-party reader is known to be needed (Mahendra Ram) **HARD**

Publication means communication to a person other than the plaintiff. Ordinarily a letter addressed only to the plaintiff is not published, but the passage records the exception in *Mahendra Ram v. Harnandan Prasad*: a defendant who sends a defamatory letter in a language the plaintiff cannot read, knowing that a third person will have to read it to him, is liable, because communication to that third person was the natural and intended result. Seema knew that Ram Lal could not read English and that the postmaster read his letters to him. Her letter calling him a swindler was therefore, in law, published to the postmaster: option A. Option B states the general rule but ignores the exception that fits these facts exactly. Option C wrongly treats the postmaster's reading as a break in the chain, though it was precisely what Seema expected. Option D confuses the mode of reaching the third person with the form of the statement; a written letter is permanent, so the wrong is libel, not slander.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: it recites the correct general rule about letters to the plaintiff but misses the *Mahendra Ram* exception where the writer knows a third person must read it.

Q7 D Spousal communication — own spouse vs plaintiff's spouse **HARD**

The passage draws a precise distinction. A statement made by a husband to his own wife is not publication, because in law the spouses are treated as one for this purpose. But a statement about the plaintiff made to the plaintiff's spouse is publication, since the plaintiff's wife is a person other than the plaintiff. Vikram's remark at dinner was made to his own wife, Neha, so it was not published and cannot ground an action. His note was handed to Priya, the wife of Kunal, the plaintiff, so it was communicated to a third person; it falsely imputes a crime and is a libel because it is in writing. Vikram is liable only for the note: option D. Option A ignores the rule that a statement to one's own spouse is not publication. Option B extends that rule to every married listener, which the passage does not do. Option C reverses the rule completely, treating the plaintiff's wife as the plaintiff and the defendant's wife as a stranger.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because both statements were false imputations of crime made to someone other than Kunal; but the remark to Vikram's own wife is, in law, no publication at all.

Q8 C Stretch — fair comment covers opinion, not false assertions of fact **ELITE**

The critic's article contains two different kinds of statement. The plagiarism claim, that Mehra lifted the screenplay from his assistant's novel, is an assertion of fact, and it is false. Fair comment, as the passage defines it, protects an honest opinion on a matter of public interest based on facts that are true, and expressly does not cover an assertion of fact. Justification would cover a true statement, but this one is false. So the critic has no defence to the plagiarism claim. The second statement, that the film is a tedious, self-indulgent bore, is an opinion on a matter of public interest, honestly held, and fair comment protects it however harsh it is. Hence option C is correct. Option A stretches fair comment over a false factual allegation. Option B wrongly treats harshness as defeating fair comment; the passage protects honest opinion 'however harsh'. Option D misapplies justification, which depends on the truth of the statement, not on the honesty of the surrounding review.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: the subject is of public interest, but fair comment protects opinion only; the false plagiarism claim is a statement of fact that needed truth to defend it.

Q9 A Stretch — qualified privilege and its loss by excessive publication **ELITE**

Qualified privilege, as the passage states, protects a statement made in discharge of a duty to a person who has a corresponding interest in receiving it, and is lost if the maker acted with malice or published it more widely than the duty required. A former employer answering a reference request has a duty to the prospective employer, who has an interest in knowing about the candidate. Ms Rao honestly, if wrongly, believed Tarun had stolen, so there was no malice, and the confidential reference is privileged. The public social-media post is different: the words were published to the world at large, which had no corresponding interest, far beyond what any duty required, so no privilege attaches; and since the statement is false, justification fails too. She is liable for the post only: option A. Option B ignores qualified privilege, whose very purpose is to protect honest but mistaken statements made in performance of a duty.

Option C treats honest belief as a free-standing defence, ignoring that privilege is lost by excessive publication. Option D inverts the analysis, since an online post is also in permanent form.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C tempts because Ms Rao's honesty saves the reference; but honesty alone is not a defence, and the public post exceeded any duty, so the privilege is lost there.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q10 **B** Must-be-true — weighted average across groups **HARD**

A must-be-true answer follows from the stated figures alone. After the change, 70 per cent of discharged patients were readmitted at 9 per cent and 30 per cent at 18 per cent, so the overall rate was $0.7 \times 9 + 0.3 \times 18 = 6.3 + 5.4 = 11.7$ per cent. Before the change it was 14 per cent, and the number of discharges was nearly the same. So the overall rate must have been lower after the change: option B. Option A claims a causal effect of five points, but the passage compares the reached group after the change with all patients before it; the reached patients may have been lower-risk to begin with, so the size of the effect cannot be read off. Option C supplies a characteristic, age, about which the passage says nothing. Option D assumes the unreached patients would have done as well as the reached ones if called, which is exactly what cannot be known from the data.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is attractive because 14 minus 9 is five; but that compares two different groups, so the passage does not establish that the calls caused a five-point fall.

Q11 **C** Inference EXCEPT — separating data from causal claims **HARD**

Three options follow directly from the figures. Thirty per cent of patients were not reached, which is more than a quarter, so A follows. The reached group's 9 per cent is lower than the unreached group's 18 per cent, so B follows. The overall rate after the change is $0.7 \times 9 + 0.3 \times 18 = 11.7$ per cent, which is below 12, so D follows. Option C is the one that cannot be concluded. It says the calls, by themselves, cut the reached patients' rate by exactly five points. The five-point figure compares the reached patients after the change with all patients before it. Those are different populations: patients who answer their phones may differ in health, age or support at home from patients who do not. The data therefore cannot isolate the effect of the calls, still less fix it at exactly five points. Option C is the exception and the correct answer.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D tempts students who do not compute the weighted average; 11.7 per cent does fall below 12, so D is a valid conclusion and not the exception.

Q12 **C** Stretch — inferring selection from an unexpected subgroup rate **ELITE**

Before the change the overall rate was 14 per cent, and the passage says the hospital made no other change to its discharge procedures. If the patients it failed to reach were a random cross-section of discharged patients, and they received no calls, their rate should have stayed near 14 per cent. Instead it was 18 per cent, markedly higher. The most strongly supported explanation is that the unreached patients were not a random cross-section and differed in some way, for example in illness, poverty or support at home, that made readmission more likely: option C. Option A proposes a mechanism, nurses diverted from the wards, for which the passage gives no evidence at all. Option B extrapolates the unreached group's rate to every patient, which the data do not support. Option D is a policy recommendation, not an inference; it also runs against the data, since the unreached group is the one most at risk.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is tempting because it explains why the unreached group did worse; but it invents a cause, whereas selection follows from the figures and the 'no other change' premise.

Q13 **B** Stretch — recovering a hidden baseline from a weighted average **ELITE**

On the stated assumption, the unreached group, 30 per cent of discharges, was readmitted at 18 per cent before the change as well. The overall rate before the change was 14 per cent. Let x be the reached group's usual rate. Then $0.7x + 0.3 \times 18 = 14$, so $0.7x = 14 - 5.4 = 8.6$ and $x = 8.6 / 0.7 = 12.29$ per cent, about 12.3. After the change that group was readmitted at 9 per cent, so the calls lowered its rate by about $12.3 - 9 = 3.3$ percentage points, roughly three: option B. Option A compares the reached group with the whole hospital's old rate and so overstates the effect at five points. Option C ignores the fall in the reached group altogether. Option D miscomputes the overall rate after the change, which is $0.7 \times 9 + 0.3 \times 18 = 11.7$ per cent; the overall fall is therefore 2.3 points, not four.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: subtracting 9 from 14 compares the reached group with all patients, whose old rate included the higher-risk unreached group.

Q14 **D** Paradox — resolve by a change in reporting **MED**

Two facts seem to clash: inspectors see less open urination, yet helpline complaints have more than doubled. A resolving option must make both true at once. Option D does: if every new toilet displays the helpline number and invites people to report open urination nearby, far more citizens now know of the helpline and are prompted to use it. Complaints can then rise even while actual incidents fall, because the share of incidents that get reported has grown sharply. That is why D is correct. Option A explains only the inspectors' observation, that fewer people urinate in the open; it does nothing to explain why complaints rose. Option B is about the budget and road repairs, which bear on neither fact. Option C explains where the toilets were placed and supports the fall in incidents, but again leaves the rise in complaints untouched. A paradox answer must account for the side of the discrepancy that is surprising, here the doubled complaints.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because it is plainly true-sounding and relevant; but it explains only the fall in incidents, not the doubling of complaints, which is the surprising half.

Q15 D Paradox EXCEPT — spotting the option that explains only one side **HARD**

Three options explain how complaints could rise while incidents fall. Option A makes complaining much easier, through photographs on a messaging app instead of a little-known landline, so more incidents are reported. Option B adds a new set of regular reporters, the attendants, who log every case they see through the helpline. Option C changes the counting itself: complaints about the same spot that were once merged are now recorded separately, inflating the total without any rise in incidents. Option D does not help. Knowing that the toilets are busiest in the morning tells us when they are used, but says nothing about the volume of complaints or why it doubled; at most it adds colour to the fall in incidents. It is therefore the exception and the correct answer. Note that the question asks for the option that fails to explain the rise in complaints, so an option that is merely true or relevant to the toilets is not enough.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C may look irrelevant because it is about bookkeeping, but a change in how complaints are counted directly explains a rise in recorded complaints; D is the true non-explainer.

Q16 A Paradox — deepening the discrepancy **HARD**

To make the discrepancy hardest to explain, an option must close off the likeliest routes to resolving it. The most obvious resolution is a change in reporting: new channels, new publicity or a new way of counting complaints. Option A shuts that door. If the helpline received complaints through the same channels, recorded them the same way in both years, and the toilets carried no notice about it, then a doubling of complaints is hard to square with fewer incidents observed by inspectors. So A deepens the puzzle and is correct. Option B actually helps to resolve it in part, since inspectors on different, longer routes are no longer comparing like with like. Option C reports satisfaction, which fits the inspectors' account but does not touch the complaint figures. Option D removes one alternative explanation, a rise in footfall, but leaves the reporting explanation fully open, so it deepens the paradox far less than A does.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is attractive because it rules out more visitors as a cause; but it leaves the main resolution, a change in reporting, open, which option A closes.

Q17 C Stretch — resolution through a measurement gap, not reporting **ELITE**

The question adds a constraint: the resolution must not depend on any change in how readily citizens complain about a given incident. That rules out every reporting-based explanation. Options A, B and D all work by making citizens more willing or more able to complain: greater hygiene awareness, quicker and anonymous filing, and weekly publicity for the helpline. Each would resolve the paradox, but each implies a change in complaining behaviour, so each breaks the constraint. Option C resolves it differently. If inspectors walk only between 10 am and 5 pm, while the toilets shut at 9 pm and most open urination now happens late at night, then inspectors simply do not see the incidents that have shifted to the night. Incidents may not have fallen at all, and complaints from people who witness them at night can rise. The inspectors' reports measure only daytime behaviour, so the discrepancy dissolves without any change in reporting: option C.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: it neatly explains the rise in complaints, but it does so by making complaining easier, which is exactly what the question excludes.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES**Q18 A Percentage growth from a bar graph** **MED**

Growth from 2022-23 to 2024-25 = (traffic in 2024-25 - traffic in 2022-23) / traffic in 2022-23 x 100. Airport P: $(180 - 120) / 120 \times 100 = 60 / 120 \times 100 = 50$ per cent. Airport Q: $(108 - 80) / 80 \times 100 = 28 / 80 \times 100 = 35$ per cent. Airport R: $(93 - 60) / 60 \times 100 = 33 / 60 \times 100 = 55$ per cent. Airport S: $(42 - 40) / 40 \times 100 = 2 / 40 \times 100 = 5$ per cent. The highest percentage growth is R's 55 per cent, so the answer is Airport R, option A. Option D wrongly treats P and R as tied. Check: R added 33 lakh on a base of 60, which is more than half the base, while P added 60 on a base of 120, exactly half. A grouped bar graph makes P's bars look as if they grew most, because its absolute increase of 60 lakh is the largest, but percentage growth depends on the size of the starting bar as well.

Examiner's note — the trap: Airport P is the trap: it has the largest absolute increase (60 lakh) and the tallest bars, but its percentage growth of 50 is below R's 55.

Q19 A Growth of a combined total **HARD**

First add the four airports for each year. 2023-24 total = $150 + 96 + 66 + 48 = 360$ lakh. 2024-25 total = $180 + 108 + 93 + 42 = 423$ lakh. The increase is $423 - 360 = 63$ lakh. Growth = increase / starting value x 100 = $63 / 360 \times 100 = 17.5$ per cent, so the answer is option A. Check: 10 per cent of 360 is 36, 5 per cent is 18, and 2.5 per cent is 9; $36 + 18 + 9 = 63$, confirming 17.5 per cent. Option B, 14.89 per cent, divides the increase by the closing value, $63 / 423$, instead of the opening one. Option C, 15.2 per cent, is the simple average of the four airports' individual growth rates (20, 12.5, 40.9 and -12.5 per cent), which ignores that the airports differ greatly in size. Option D, 20.0 per cent, is the combined growth of the previous year (300 to 360 lakh), or P's growth alone.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the classic base error: dividing 63 by the 2024-25 total of 423 instead of the 2023-24 total of 360.

Q20 B Combining a bar series with a percentage line **HARD**

International passengers at each airport = 2024-25 traffic x international share. P: 180×20 per cent = 36 lakh. Q: 108×25 per cent = 27 lakh. R: 93×10 per cent = 9.3 lakh. S: 42×5 per cent = 2.1 lakh. Total = $36 + 27 + 9.3 + 2.1 = 74.4$ lakh, so the answer is option B. Check: $36 + 27 = 63$; $63 + 9.3 = 72.3$; $72.3 + 2.1 = 74.4$. Option A, 63.45 lakh, applies the simple average of the four shares, $(20 + 25 + 10 + 5) / 4 = 15$ per cent, to the total of 423 lakh; that is wrong because the shares must be weighted by each airport's own traffic. Option C, 63.0 lakh, applies the 2024-25 shares to the 2023-24 traffic figures ($30 + 24 + 6.6 + 2.4$). Option D, 84.6 lakh, applies P's 20 per cent share to the whole state's 423 lakh.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is attractive because averaging the four percentages feels natural; but shares must be weighted by traffic, and the large airports carry the higher shares.

Q21 D Compound growth projection **HARD**

P grew from 150 lakh in 2023-24 to 180 lakh in 2024-25, a growth of $30 / 150 \times 100 = 20$ per cent. Growing at 20 per cent every year means multiplying the previous year's traffic by 1.2. 2025-26: $180 \times 1.2 = 216$ lakh. 2026-27: $216 \times 1.2 = 259.2$ lakh. 2027-28: $259.2 \times 1.2 = 311.04$ lakh. The traffic first exceeds 300 lakh in 2027-28, so the answer is option D. Check: 259.2 is below 300, so 2026-27 does not qualify, while 311.04 is above 300. Option B, 2026-27, is the year reached by students who stop one step early or round 259.2 loosely towards 300. Option C, 2028-29 or later, is what a student gets by adding a fixed 30 lakh a year instead of compounding (210, 240, 270, 300) and then treats reaching 300 lakh in 2028-29 as exceeding it; simple addition understates compound growth. Option A, 2025-26, takes just one year of growth. The key is to apply the 20 per cent each year to the latest value.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B tempts students who stop at the second step; 259.2 lakh in 2026-27 is still below 300, so the threshold is crossed only in 2027-28.

Q22 B Unit-rate multiplication **EASY**

Annual generation = plant capacity $\times$ generation per kW per year. The plant's capacity is 40 kW and each kW generates 1,500 units a year, so generation = $40 \times 1,500 = 60,000$ units, which is option B. Check: $1,500 \times 4 = 6,000$, so $1,500 \times 40 = 60,000$. The other options are numbers that appear elsewhere in the caselet and are easily confused with generation. Option A, 48,000 units, is the maximum number of solar units the society can use directly; it is a cap on direct use, not the plant's output, and the remaining 12,000 units of output are exported to the grid. Option C, 78,000 units, is the society's annual consumption, which the plant does not fully meet. Option D, 6,00,000 units, is a slip of one zero, multiplying 40 by 15,000 instead of 1,500. Keeping capacity (kW), generation (units) and consumption (units) distinct is the foundation for every later question in this set.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because 48,000 is the solar figure most prominent in the caselet; but it is the direct-use cap, and the plant actually generates 60,000 units.

Q23 C Two-rate valuation of output **HARD**

Generation is 60,000 units a year. The society uses 48,000 units directly, each replacing a grid unit costing Rs 8, so avoided purchases = $48,000 \times 8 = \text{Rs } 3,84,000$. The remaining $60,000 - 48,000 = 12,000$ units are exported at Rs 4, earning $12,000 \times 4 = \text{Rs } 48,000$. Total benefit = $3,84,000 + 48,000 = \text{Rs } 4,32,000 = \text{Rs } 4.32$ lakh, option C. Check: $3.84 + 0.48 = 4.32$. Option A, Rs 4.80 lakh, values every one of the 60,000 units at the grid tariff of Rs 8, ignoring that exported units fetch only Rs 4. Option B, Rs 3.84 lakh, counts only the avoided grid purchases and forgets the export earnings. Option D, Rs 2.40 lakh, values all 60,000 units at the export rate of Rs 4. The point of the caselet is that the same unit of solar power is worth twice as much when used on site as when sold back to the grid.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: it treats all 60,000 units as replacing grid power at Rs 8, though 12,000 of them are exported at only Rs 4.

Q24 A Payback period net of subsidy and running cost **HARD**

Installed cost = $40 \text{ kW} \times \text{Rs } 50,000 = \text{Rs } 20,00,000$. The subsidy is 20 per cent of that, Rs 4,00,000, so the society's own investment = $20,00,000 - 4,00,000 = \text{Rs } 16,00,000$. Annual benefit is Rs 4,32,000; net of maintenance of Rs 32,000 it is $4,32,000 - 32,000 = \text{Rs } 4,00,000$. Payback period = own investment / net annual benefit = $16,00,000 / 4,00,000 = 4$ years, option A. Option B, 3 years 8 months, divides 16 lakh by the gross benefit of 4.32 lakh (about 3.70 years, or 3 years 8 months), forgetting maintenance. Option C, 5 years, divides the full installed cost of 20 lakh by 4 lakh, forgetting the subsidy. Option D, 4 years 6 months, mixes errors and matches no consistent method. The two adjustments, subtracting the subsidy from the cost and the maintenance from the benefit, must both be made.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: it uses the full Rs 20 lakh cost, though the question asks how long the society takes to recover its own investment after the subsidy.

Q25 B Percentage reduction in net expenditure **HARD**

Before the plant, the society bought all 78,000 units from the grid: expenditure = $78,000 \times 8 = \text{Rs } 6,24,000$. After the plant it uses 48,000 solar units directly, so it buys $78,000 - 48,000 = 30,000$ grid units, costing $30,000 \times 8 = \text{Rs } 2,40,000$, and earns $12,000 \times 4 = \text{Rs } 48,000$ from exports. Net expenditure = $2,40,000 - 48,000 = \text{Rs } 1,92,000$. Reduction = $6,24,000 - 1,92,000 = \text{Rs } 4,32,000$, which equals the annual benefit, as it should. Percentage reduction = $4,32,000 / 6,24,000 \times 100 = 69.23$, or 69.2 per cent, option B. Option A, 61.5 per cent, is $48,000 / 78,000$, the share of consumption met directly, ignoring export earnings. Option C, 76.9 per cent, is $60,000 / 78,000$, treating every generated unit as replacing a grid unit. Option D, 64.1 per cent, deducts maintenance ($4,00,000 / 6,24,000$), which the question says to ignore.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because it is the share of consumption met by solar; but the export earnings also cut the net bill, raising the reduction to 69.2 per cent.

Q26 B Stretch — solving for capacity to reach a target **ELITE**

With direct use capped at 48,000 units, the society still buys $78,000 - 48,000 = 30,000$ grid units, paying $30,000 \times 8 = \text{Rs } 2,40,000$. For net expenditure to be zero, export earnings must also be Rs 2,40,000, which at Rs 4 a unit needs $2,40,000 / 4 = 60,000$ exported units a year. It already exports 12,000 units, so it needs $60,000 - 12,000 = 48,000$ more exported units. Each additional kW generates 1,500 units, all of them exported, so the extra capacity = $48,000 / 1,500 = 32 \text{ kW}$, option B. Check: with 72 kW the plant generates 1,08,000 units; 48,000

are used and 60,000 exported for Rs 2,40,000, exactly matching the grid bill. Option A, 40 kW, forgets the 12,000 units already exported (60,000 / 1,500). Option C, 20 kW, values the extra units at Rs 8, needing only 30,000 extra units. Option D, 12 kW, values exports at Rs 8 and also subtracts the existing exports.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: it computes the 60,000 export units needed but forgets that 12,000 are already being exported by the existing 40 kW plant.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Which case held that the right to travel abroad is part of personal liberty? — **Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam (1967)**
2. Defamation in a permanent form, such as print, is called what? — **Libel**
3. Is a defamatory remark made by a husband to his own wife a publication? — **No**
4. Airport R's traffic rose from 60 to 93 lakh. Percentage growth? — **55%**
5. Which case held police regulations without statutory backing are not 'law'? — **Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1962)**
6. Maneka Gandhi (1978) — what must the procedure under Article 21 be? — **Just, fair and reasonable**
7. Under Article 21, 'law' means what, as the Madras High Court read it? — **Legislation enacted by a competent legislature**