

ANSWER KEY — 11 OCTOBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
C	A	D	B	C	B	D	A	C	D
Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20
A	D	B	C	C	B	A	D	C	B
Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28		
A	D	B	A	C	D	A	B		

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 C Deceptive similarity: the s.29(3) presumption needs identical marks **HARD**

The goods are identical (packaged tea), but the marks are not: SURYODAYA adds a letter to SURYODAY. Section 29(3) raises a presumption of confusion only where both the mark and the goods are identical, so here the proprietor must show confusion under Section 29(2). The passage tells us how: a mark is deceptively similar if an average buyer of imperfect recollection, looking at the overall impression, is likely to be confused. A one-letter difference, the same script and the same colour on the same product point strongly that way, but the point of law is that infringement turns on that likelihood, not on a presumption. That is option C. Option A wrongly extends the presumption to marks that merely resemble each other. Option B applies the very side-by-side test the passage rejects: two marks can be distinguishable on a careful comparison and still confuse a buyer in a hurry. Option D confuses the provisions: Section 29(4) is an extra protection for marks with a reputation used on dissimilar goods; it is not the only route for a mark used on identical goods.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: the goods are identical, so students reach for the Section 29(3) presumption, but the presumption needs the marks to be identical too.

Q2 A s.29(4): reputed mark used on dissimilar goods **HARD**

Scooters and pressure cookers are dissimilar goods, so Section 29(2), which needs identical or similar goods, does not help the proprietor, and Section 29(3) needs identical goods as well as an identical mark. The passage, however, gives a separate route. Section 29(4) protects a registered mark that has a reputation in India even against use on dissimilar goods, where the use is without due cause and takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the mark's distinctive character or repute. KESARI has been known across India for forty years, so it has a reputation; Tarang has no link with the owner and so no due cause; and by copying the same saffron lettering it trades on the scooter mark's fame. Tarang is therefore liable under Section 29(4): option A. Option B tests only for confusion between products, which Section 29(4) does not require. Option C misapplies the presumption, which needs identical goods. Option D states the opposite of the rule: Section 29(4) exists precisely for dissimilar goods.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: it is right that no buyer will mistake a cooker for a scooter, but Section 29(4) protects reputation without any need to show confusion.

Q3 D s.35: bona fide use of one's own name **HARD**

Section 35, as the passage states it, prevents the proprietor from interfering with any bona fide use by a person of his own name. Kavita's surname is Mehra; she trades under her full name, 'Kavita Mehra's Sweets'; she uses plain lettering unlike the company's logo; and she tells customers that the shop is her own new venture. Each fact points to honest use of her own name rather than an attempt to borrow Mehra Foods' goodwill, so her use is bona fide and Section 35 protects it: option D. Option A assumes that Section 29(3) applies, but the presumption of confusion cannot override the specific saving in Section 35; besides, her sign is her full name, not the bare mark. Option B states the proprietor's right far too widely; the passage expressly limits it by Section 35. Option C reaches the right conclusion for a reason the passage nowhere gives: the size of the shop and the absence of measurable loss are irrelevant; what matters is whether the use is bona fide.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: 'identical word, identical goods' looks like a textbook Section 29(3) case, but Section 35 saves an honest use of one's own name.

Q4 B s.35: bona fide description of character or quality **MED**

Section 35, as described, also bars the proprietor from interfering with a bona fide description of the character or quality of another trader's goods. Nimbus sells its soap under its own brand, NIMBUS, printed large; the words 'made with herbs for a natural glow' appear in a small line below and simply tell the buyer what the soap contains and what it claims to do. They are used to describe the product, not to identify its maker, and nothing suggests bad faith. So Nimbus does not infringe: option B. Option A treats the mere presence of two ordinary words as infringement; the proprietor of HERBAGLOW cannot claim a monopoly over the words 'herbs' and 'glow' when they are used descriptively. Option C invents a presumption for parts of marks; Section 29(3) presumes confusion only where the whole

mark and the goods are identical. Option D goes beyond the passage, which says nothing about whether a mark made of ordinary words can be registered; the question asks only whether Nimbus's use infringes.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: both words of the mark appear on the rival packet, but they describe the soap rather than brand it, which Section 35 protects.

Q5 C Stretch: unregistered medicine mark, passing off and the strict Cadila test ELITE

MALAREN has never been registered, so Section 27(1) bars Ojas from suing for infringement; long use does not turn an unregistered mark into a registered one, which rules out option B. But Section 27(1) is not the end of the matter: Section 27(2) preserves the action for passing off, which protects an unregistered mark where the owner proves goodwill, a misrepresentation likely to make buyers take the defendant's goods for its own, and damage. Twelve years of sales give Ojas a strong claim to goodwill, which is why option A, which says no relief at all is available, is wrong. On how confusion is judged, the passage says the court looks at the overall impression on a buyer of imperfect recollection, and that in *Cadila Health Care v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals* (2001) the Supreme Court required this test to be applied more strictly to medicines, because confusing two drugs can endanger health. Both products are anti-malarials, so the stricter approach applies: option C. Option D gets the cause of action right but uses the side-by-side comparison the passage rejects.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: it correctly limits Ojas to passing off, then applies the side-by-side comparison that the passage rejects in favour of overall impression, applied strictly to drugs.

Q6 B s.21(2)-(3): endorser's first contravention MED

Arjun is the endorser of a misleading advertisement: the claim that the oil regrows hair in thirty days is false, so the advertisement falsely describes the product. Under Section 21(2), the CCPA may impose on an endorser a penalty of up to ten lakh rupees; the higher cap of fifty lakh rupees applies only to a subsequent contravention. Under Section 21(3), it may also prohibit him from making any endorsement for up to one year, rising to three years only for a subsequent contravention. This is his first-ever advertisement, so the first-contravention limits apply. Nor can he use the Section 21(5) defence, because relying on the maker's oral assurance without seeking any evidence is not due diligence to verify the claim. The maximum is therefore a penalty of up to ten lakh rupees and a one-year bar: option B. Option A applies the repeat-offender limits. Option C wrongly confines penalties to makers; Section 21(2) names endorsers expressly. Option D misreads Section 89, which applies to a manufacturer or service provider, not to an endorser.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: Section 89 sounds like the toughest consequence, but it reaches only manufacturers and service providers, not endorsers like Arjun.

Q7 D s.21(6): publisher's defence lost by prior knowledge of the order HARD

Section 21(6), as the passage describes it, protects a publisher that published the advertisement in the ordinary course of its business, but the proviso removes that protection if the publisher had previous knowledge of a CCPA order directing the advertisement's withdrawal or modification. *Dainik Prabhat's* advertising manager read the withdrawal order on 3 March. When the paper printed the advertisement again on 10 March, it therefore had previous knowledge of the order, and the defence is unavailable: option D. Option A focuses on when the advertisement was booked, but the defence turns on what the publisher knew when it published; a booking made in the ordinary course cannot shield a publication made after the paper knew of the order. Option B overstates the protection: the passage says a publisher may be penalised and gives it a qualified defence, not a blanket immunity. Option C goes too far the other way: if the paper had printed the advertisement without knowing of any order, Section 21(6) would have protected it, so knowledge does matter.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: an advance booking looks like the ordinary course of business, but the defence is lost once the publisher knew of the withdrawal order.

Q8 A s.21(5) due diligence for endorsers; s.89 for manufacturers HARD

The advertisement is misleading because its claim rests on a fabricated report. Riya, however, did not merely repeat the claim: before endorsing it she obtained and read a laboratory report confirming it and checked the laboratory's accreditation. That is due diligence to verify the veracity of the claim, so under Section 21(5) she is not liable to the penalties in Sections 21(2) and 21(3). Glowmint is in a different position. As the manufacturer, it may be penalised under Section 21(2), and because it caused a misleading advertisement that is prejudicial to consumers' interests, it may also be prosecuted under Section 89. Option A captures both points. Option B ignores Section 21(5), which exists precisely to spare a diligent endorser even though the advertisement is misleading. Option C wrongly extends Riya's protection to Glowmint; the defence belongs to the endorser alone, and a report fabricated by the maker cannot protect the maker. Option D understates the CCPA's powers, which include penalties and criminal prosecution under Section 89, not only a withdrawal direction.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: the advertisement is misleading, but Section 21(5) relieves an endorser who took real steps to verify the claim.

Q9 C Stretch: misleading by deliberate concealment though every statement is true ELITE

Section 2(28) lists four ways in which an advertisement may mislead, and the last is that it deliberately conceals important information. The passage adds that an advertisement can therefore mislead even when every sentence in it is literally true. FinZip's statement is true, since no interest is charged, but a 12% upfront fee is plainly important to anyone deciding whether the EMI is cheap. The fee was not left out by accident: the marketing head removed it because it 'hurt sign-ups', which makes the concealment deliberate. The advertisement is therefore misleading: option C. Option A relies on literal truth, which the passage says is not a defence. Option B treats disclosure in terms behind a link as enough; but the definition looks at what the advertisement itself conceals, and FinZip deliberately kept the fee out of it. Option D adds a requirement the passage rejects: the CCPA can act on misleading advertisements without waiting for any consumer to complain, and whether an advertisement is misleading does not depend on a complaint.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: disclosure somewhere in the terms sounds fair, but the advertisement itself deliberately hid the fee, and that concealment is what Section 2(28) catches.

Q10 D s.21 (2)-(3): subsequent contravention; CCPA acts suo motu HARD

Three points decide this. First, the CCPA does not need a complaint: the passage says it can act against misleading advertisements without waiting for any consumer to complain, so option A fails. Second, SlimTea's claim is false, so the advertisement falsely describes the product and is misleading under Section 2(28). Kavita is its endorser, and Section 21(2) names endorsers expressly alongside manufacturers, so option C is wrong. She cannot use the Section 21(5) defence either, because relying only on the maker's word is not due diligence to verify the claim. Third, this is not her first contravention: she was already sanctioned last year for endorsing a misleading advertisement. For every subsequent contravention, Section 21(2) raises the penalty cap from ten lakh to fifty lakh rupees, and Section 21(3) extends the possible endorsement bar from one year to three years. Option B wrongly treats each new advertisement as a fresh first offence, which would make the higher limits meaningless. The CCPA may therefore, on its own motion, impose a penalty of up to fifty lakh rupees and a bar of up to three years: option D.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: students who remember the ten-lakh, one-year limits from the first question apply them again and miss that Kavita is a repeat endorser facing the higher caps.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q11 A Strengthen: a control group rules out a common cause HARD

Dr Rao's evidence is a before-and-after comparison in the four painted wards: admissions fell 30 per cent between the summers of 2024 and 2025. The weakness of such evidence is that something else that changed between the two summers, a milder season, a public-health campaign, better weather warnings, could explain the fall in every ward of the city. Option A supplies the missing comparison: in other low-income wards, which lacked painted roofs but shared the same summer, admissions did not change. Since the main difference between the two groups is the painting, the case that the roofs caused the fall becomes much stronger. Option B tells us other cities chose the same paint, which shows its popularity, not its effect in Rajnagar. Option C reports residents' satisfaction, which says nothing about hospital admissions. Option D explains why the four wards were a sensible place to start, since tin roofs carry higher risk, but it does not show that painting those roofs reduced the risk.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: it links tin roofs to heat illness, which sounds relevant, but it does not show that painting them is what lowered admissions.

Q12 D Strengthen the mechanism: evidence for the causal pathway MED

The question asks for support for the mechanism Dr Rao proposes: the roofs reflect sunlight and so keep homes cooler in the hottest hours, which is when residents fall ill. Option D measures that very link: painted homes were about 4°C cooler inside in the afternoons than similar unpainted homes. It confirms the step between 'painted roof' and 'fewer heat admissions'. Option A cuts the other way: if admissions for illnesses unrelated to heat also fell, the drop may reflect something general, such as fewer people using those hospitals, rather than cooler homes. Option B also weakens the account, because if many adults were away from home in the afternoons, cooler homes could not have protected them during the hottest hours. Option C shows only that residents knew about the programme; publicity might even suggest another route, such as heightened awareness of heat, but it does not support the claim that cooler homes did the work.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: a fall in admissions sounds helpful, but a fall in unrelated illnesses points to a general cause, not to cooler homes.

Q13 B Strengthen EXCEPT: spotting the rival cause HARD

Three options strengthen the causal claim; one introduces a rival explanation. Option A strengthens it: if 2025 was hotter, admissions should have risen, so a 30 per cent fall despite more heat is harder to credit to luck with the weather. Option C rules out two alternative explanations for fewer admissions, namely fewer people living in the wards and the loss of a hospital that used to record them. Option D shows a dose-response pattern: the more roofs painted in a street, the larger the fall, which is what we would expect if the paint mattered. Option B does the opposite. Shaded drinking-water kiosks, opened only in the four wards and in the same year, are a second intervention that could themselves have cut heat illness. It gives a competing cause confined to exactly the wards that were painted, so it weakens Dr Rao's conclusion. Option B is therefore the exception.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: a hotter summer sounds like a complication, but a fall in admissions despite more heat actually strengthens the case for the roofs.

Q14 C Stretch: strengthening a recommendation by closing the generalisation gap ELITE

Dr Rao's recommendation moves from four wards to twenty. Even if the roofs caused the fall in the four wards, the plan works only if the remaining wards are relevantly similar, that is, if their homes have the same kind of heat-trapping roofs and their residents face the same exposure. Option C supplies exactly that: the twenty wards mostly have the same tin and asbestos roofs and similar heat. It closes the gap between the pilot and the proposal. Option B looks attractive because the recommendation mentions cost, but a cheaper rate makes the plan less expensive, not more effective; and Dr Rao already claims the cost is trivial, so a discount adds little to the case. Option A tells us who benefited most in the pilot, which is interesting but does not show that the remaining wards will benefit. Option D identifies another risk factor, homes without fans or coolers, and if anything suggests that cooling appliances, not roofs, may be the better target.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: it supports the cost side of the plan, but the real gap is whether the other twenty wards resemble the four where the roofs worked.

Q15 C Strengthen: rule out a shift in where patients were counted ELITE

Dr Rao's evidence counts admissions at government hospitals only. That leaves a gap: the 30 per cent fall could reflect a change in where sick residents went for treatment, not a fall in how many fell ill. If people from the four wards had moved to private hospitals or clinics in 2025, government admissions would drop even if heat illness was as common as before. Option C closes that gap: private hospitals and clinics serving the same wards also saw fewer heat-illness admissions. The fall is then real across the whole system, and the roofs remain the likeliest cause. Option A, if anything, weakens the argument, because wards picked for unusually bad earlier summers may improve on their own the next year. Option B concerns the cost of the recommendation, not whether painting caused the fall. Option D also opens an alternative explanation: if more patients were treated without admission, admissions could fall while illness did not, so it weakens rather than strengthens her conclusion.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: it is about the same hospital records and sounds technical, but a shift to outpatient care explains the fall without the roofs, so it weakens the claim.

Q16 B Weaken: an alternative cause in the same period HARD

Farhan attributes the 20 per cent rise to the redesign. To weaken that, we want something else that happened in the same quarter and could have produced the rise on its own. Option B does this: in July, Haatbazaar's largest rival stopped delivering in Haatbazaar's three biggest cities for the whole quarter. Customers stranded by the rival would naturally have turned to Haatbazaar, raising its orders whatever its app looked like. That is a strong rival cause, timed exactly with the redesign. Option A records complaints about colours, but some dissatisfaction is compatible with a net increase in orders and does not explain the rise away. Option C concerns the cost of the redesign, which bears on whether it was good value, not on whether it caused more orders. Option D is neutral as stated: it tells us the website is a small channel, but not whether website orders also rose; only that information would have served as a useful comparison.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: it mentions an unchanged channel, which sounds like a control group, but it says nothing about whether orders there rose too.

Q17 A Weaken EXCEPT: separating a weakener from a consistent fact HARD

Options B, C and D each weaken the causal claim. B offers a seasonal explanation: the quarter includes the festival season, when orders everywhere rise by about a fifth, which alone could account for a 20 per cent increase. C offers a second change made at the same time: dropping the delivery fee is a direct incentive to order more. D is the strongest weakener of all: customers still using the old app, who never saw the redesign, increased their orders by the same 20 per cent, so the redesign cannot explain the rise. Option A does not weaken the claim. It confirms that the redesign did what it was meant to do, reducing taps per order, which is consistent with Farhan's story, and if anything gives it modest support. It does not tell us that the rise had some other cause. Option A is therefore the exception.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap for anyone hunting for the 'odd one out': it looks unusual, but it is in fact the most damaging weakener on the list.

Q18 D Weaken a prediction: the analogy between two apps fails MED

Farhan's prediction rests on an analogy: what worked for groceries will work for medicines. It assumes the pharmacy app suffers from the same obstacle, too many taps, and that customers' ordering is held back by that obstacle. Option D breaks both links. Medicine orders follow prescriptions, so demand is set by doctors and illness, not by how easy the app is to use; and the pharmacy app already allows reordering in two taps, so there is little friction left to remove. A Rs 40 crore redesign is therefore unlikely to produce a similar rise. Option A and option B show that the pharmacy app is smaller, but the prediction is about a similar percentage rise, which a smaller user base does not rule out. Option C, if anything, supports the plan, since the same team will repeat the approach. Only option D shows that the reason for the grocery rise cannot operate in the pharmacy app.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: a smaller user base sounds like a reason to expect less, but the forecast concerns a similar proportional rise, which size alone does not refute.

Q19 C Stretch: data that contradict the proposed mechanism ELITE

Farhan does not merely say the redesign raised orders; he says how: customers had abandoned carts because ordering took too long, and the redesign removed that obstacle. If that were right, more of the visits to the app should have ended in completed orders. Option C shows the opposite: visits rose 20 per cent, but the share of visits ending in an order did not change. All of the increase therefore came from more people opening the app, not from fewer abandoned carts. The mechanism Farhan relies on did not operate, and the extra visits point to some outside cause, such as a season, a rival's exit or marketing. Option A describes the pattern of a novelty effect, but a rise that levels off is still a rise and is fully consistent with the redesign causing it. Option B strengthens the claim by reporting a positive pilot. Option D is irrelevant to a change in app orders between two quarters.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: a rise that levels off sounds like a novelty effect, but it does not show that something other than the redesign caused the increase.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q20 B Combining ratios by converting to actual numbers HARD

Ratios from different blocks cannot be added term by term, because each ratio describes a different total. Convert each block to numbers. Amarpur: $32 + 33 = 65$ parts; $1,95,000 / 65 = 3,000$, so men 96,000 and women 99,000. Bela: $9 + 7 = 16$ parts; $2,40,000 / 16 =$

15,000, so men 1,35,000 and women 1,05,000. Chandni: $10 + 9 = 19$ parts; $2,85,000 / 19 = 15,000$, so men 1,50,000 and women 1,35,000. Devgarh: $11 + 9 = 20$ parts; $1,80,000 / 20 = 9,000$, so men 99,000 and women 81,000. Total men = $96,000 + 1,35,000 + 1,50,000 + 99,000 = 4,80,000$. Total women = $99,000 + 1,05,000 + 1,35,000 + 81,000 = 4,20,000$. Check: $4,80,000 + 4,20,000 = 9,00,000$, the district population. Ratio = $4,80,000 : 4,20,000 = 8 : 7$, option B. Option A, $31 : 29$, adds the ratio terms directly ($32 + 9 + 10 + 11 = 62$ and $33 + 7 + 9 + 9 = 58$), which is wrong because the parts are of different sizes in each block.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: adding the ratio terms block by block gives $62 : 58 = 31 : 29$, but a 'part' is 3,000 people in Amarapur and 15,000 in Bela.

Q21 A Proportional allotment, then a second ratio split **HARD**

Step 1, seats per block. The district population is $1,95,000 + 2,40,000 + 2,85,000 + 1,80,000 = 9,00,000$, so one seat corresponds to $9,00,000 / 60 = 15,000$ people. Amarapur gets $1,95,000 / 15,000 = 13$ seats, Bela $2,40,000 / 15,000 = 16$, Chandni $2,85,000 / 15,000 = 19$, Devgarh $1,80,000 / 15,000 = 12$; total 60. Step 2, the rural-urban split within each block. Bela, $3 : 1$, splits 16 seats into 12 rural and 4 urban. Amarapur, $8 : 5$, splits 13 into 8 and 5. Chandni, $12 : 7$, splits 19 into 12 and 7. Devgarh, $2 : 1$, splits 12 into 8 and 4. Rural seats = $8 + 12 + 12 + 8 = 40$; urban seats = $5 + 4 + 7 + 4 = 20$. District ratio = $40 : 20 = 2 : 1$. So Bela has 4 urban seats and the district ratio is $2 : 1$: option A. Option B copies Bela's own $3 : 1$ ratio as if it applied to the whole district. Option C gives Bela's rural seats, not its urban ones, and option D misreads both figures.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: Bela's 4 urban seats are right, but its own $3 : 1$ split is not the district-wide ratio, which pools all four blocks.

Q22 D Merging two groups: add actual numbers, not ratio terms **MED**

Use actual numbers. Amarapur: 1,95,000 in the ratio $32 : 33$, so one part = $1,95,000 / 65 = 3,000$; men 96,000 and women 99,000. Devgarh: 1,80,000 in the ratio $11 : 9$, so one part = $1,80,000 / 20 = 9,000$; men 99,000 and women 81,000. Merged block: men = $96,000 + 99,000 = 1,95,000$; women = $99,000 + 81,000 = 1,80,000$. Check: the merged block has 3,75,000 people, which equals Amarapur's 1,95,000 plus Devgarh's 1,80,000. Ratio = $1,95,000 : 1,80,000$; dividing both by 15,000 gives $13 : 12$, option D. Option A, $43 : 42$, adds the ratio terms ($32 + 11$ and $33 + 9$), ignoring that a part is 3,000 people in one block and 9,000 in the other. Option C inverts the correct ratio, giving women to men. Option B is the ratio for the whole district, not for the merged block, and would be reached only by confusing the two questions.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: the arithmetic is right but the order is reversed; the question asks for men to women, and the merged block has more men.

Q23 B Ratio of votes to find a percentage **HARD**

From the table, Chandni has 2,85,000 people in the ratio $10 : 9$; one part = $2,85,000 / 19 = 15,000$, so there are 1,50,000 men and 1,35,000 women. Men who voted = 60% of 1,50,000 = 90,000. Votes cast by women = three-fourths of the votes cast by men = $3/4 \times 90,000 = 67,500$. Percentage of women who voted = $67,500 / 1,35,000 \times 100 = 50\%$. Check by another route: if women's turnout were $60\% \times 3/4 = 45\%$, women's votes would be 45% of 1,35,000 = 60,750, which is less than three-fourths of 90,000; the shortfall arises because there are fewer women than men. Since women number $9/10$ of men, their turnout must be $(3/4) / (9/10) \times 60\% = (5/6) \times 60\% = 50\%$. Option B is correct. Option A, 45% , applies the three-fourths to the turnout percentage instead of to the number of votes, which would be right only if men and women were equal in number.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: taking three-fourths of 60% treats 'votes' as 'turnout', which works only if Chandni had as many women as men.

Q24 A Simple average of six monthly values **MED**

The average equals the total divided by the number of months. Total exports from April to September = $48 + 52 + 45 + 60 + 57 + 62$. Add in steps: $48 + 52 = 100$; $100 + 45 = 145$; $145 + 60 = 205$; $205 + 57 = 262$; $262 + 62 = 324$. So the six months together exported goods worth Rs 324 lakh. Average monthly value = $324 / 6 = \text{Rs } 54$ lakh, option A. A quick check: deviations from 54 are -6, -2, -9, +6, +3 and +8, which sum to $(-17) + 17 = 0$, confirming that 54 is the mean. Option B, Rs 53.5 lakh, is the midpoint of the lowest and highest months, $(45 + 62) / 2$, which ignores the other four months entirely. Option C, Rs 55.8 lakh, is the average after leaving out June, which belongs to the next question. Option D, Rs 64.8 lakh, divides the total of Rs 324 lakh by five instead of six, as though one month were missing from the count.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: dividing the six-month total by five instead of six inflates the average by a fifth.

Q25 C Average after removing one observation **HARD**

The six-month total is Rs 324 lakh ($48 + 52 + 45 + 60 + 57 + 62$). Removing June's Rs 45 lakh leaves $324 - 45 = \text{Rs } 279$ lakh spread over five months. Average = $279 / 5 = \text{Rs } 55.8$ lakh, option C. Direct check: $48 + 52 + 60 + 57 + 62 = 279$, and $279 / 5 = 55.8$. The result makes sense: June was Rs 9 lakh below the six-month average of Rs 54 lakh, so removing it should raise the average by $9 / 5 = \text{Rs } 1.8$ lakh, from 54 to 55.8. Option D, Rs 46.5 lakh, divides the five-month total by six, keeping June in the count while removing its value. Option A, Rs 54 lakh, assumes that dropping a month leaves the average unchanged. Option B, Rs 57.6 lakh, counts the Rs 1.8 lakh adjustment twice.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: it removes June's value but keeps June in the count, dividing 279 by six instead of five.

Q26 D Required average for a target over a full period **HARD**

For a twelve-month average of Rs 60 lakh, the year's total must be $60 \times 12 = \text{Rs } 720$ lakh. The first six months have already produced Rs 324 lakh ($48 + 52 + 45 + 60 + 57 + 62$). The remaining six months, October to March, must therefore produce $720 - 324 = \text{Rs } 396$ lakh. Required average = $396 / 6 = \text{Rs } 66$ lakh a month, option D. Check: the first half averages 54, which is 6 below the target of 60; because

the two halves are of equal length, the second half must be 6 above the target, at 66, and $(54 + 66) / 2 = 60$. Option A, Rs 60 lakh, assumes that matching the target in the second half is enough, ignoring the shortfall already built up in the first half. Option C, Rs 79.2 lakh, divides the Rs 396 lakh by five instead of six, miscounting the months from October to March. Option B, Rs 63 lakh, makes up only half of the shortfall.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: hitting the target average from now on cannot pull up a first half that is already Rs 6 lakh a month below it.

Q27 A Weighted average: total value over total containers **HARD**

The average value per container over the six months must be found from the totals, not by averaging the monthly ratios. Total value = $48 + 52 + 45 + 60 + 57 + 62 = \text{Rs } 324$ lakh. Total containers = $8 + 10 + 9 + 12 + 10 + 11 = 60$. Average value per container = $324 / 60 = \text{Rs } 5.4$ lakh, option A. Option B, Rs 5.42 lakh, is the tempting shortcut: work out each month's value per container ($48/8 = 6.00$, $52/10 = 5.20$, $45/9 = 5.00$, $60/12 = 5.00$, $57/10 = 5.70$, $62/11 = \text{about } 5.64$) and take the simple average of those six figures, about $32.54 / 6 = 5.42$. That gives each month equal weight, whereas months that shipped more containers should count for more. Option D, Rs 9.00 lakh, divides the average monthly value of 54 by six, which mixes up months and containers. Option C, Rs 5.00 lakh, is merely the figure shared by June and July.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: averaging the six monthly per-container figures ignores that July's 12 containers should weigh more than April's 8.

Q28 B Stretch: value needed to lift a weighted average **ELITE**

Over seven months the number of containers will be $60 + 15 = 75$. For the average value per container to be Rs 5.6 lakh, total value must be $5.6 \times 75 = \text{Rs } 420$ lakh. April to September already account for Rs 324 lakh ($48 + 52 + 45 + 60 + 57 + 62$). October must therefore contribute $420 - 324 = \text{Rs } 96$ lakh across its 15 containers, an average of $96 / 15 = \text{Rs } 6.4$ lakh per container: option B. Check: $(324 + 96) / 75 = 420 / 75 = 5.6$. Another way to see it: the first 60 containers average 5.4, which is 0.2 below the target, a total shortfall of $60 \times 0.2 = 12$ lakh; October's 15 containers must make this up, at $12 / 15 = 0.8$ above the target, so $5.4 + 0.8 = 6.2$. Option A, Rs 5.60 lakh, simply sets October equal to the target, which leaves the earlier shortfall untouched. Option C, Rs 6.20 lakh, adds the 0.8 to the old average of 5.4 instead of to the target. Option D, Rs 5.76 lakh, spreads the shortfall over all 75 containers instead of October's 15.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: matching the target in October alone keeps the seven-month average below Rs 5.6 lakh, because the first 60 containers averaged only Rs 5.4 lakh.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Which Act governs trade marks in India? — **The Trade Marks Act, 1999**
2. Which section bars an infringement action for an unregistered mark? — **Section 27(1)**
3. Which body can act against misleading ads without a consumer complaint? — **Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA)**
4. Average value per container, April to September? — **Rs 5.4 lakh (324 / 60)**
5. Which section preserves the action for passing off? — **Section 27(2)**
6. Three elements of passing off? — **Goodwill, misrepresentation, damage**
7. Which section defines infringement by a similar mark on similar goods? — **Section 29(2)**
8. When must the court presume confusion under s.29(3)? — **Identical mark on identical goods or services**
9. Whose view decides deceptive similarity? — **An average buyer of imperfect recollection**
10. Does the test compare marks side by side? — **No, it looks at overall impression**
11. Which case asks for a stricter test for medicines? — **Cadila Health Care v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals (2001)**
12. Why a stricter test for drugs? — **Confusing two drugs can endanger health**
13. Which section protects reputed marks on dissimilar goods? — **Section 29(4)**
14. Must confusion be shown under s.29(4)? — **No; unfair advantage or detriment, without due cause**
15. Which section saves bona fide use of one's own name? — **Section 35**
16. Does s.35 also save honest description of goods? — **Yes, of their character or quality**
17. Does long use make an unregistered mark registered? — **No**
18. Which Act created the CCPA? — **Consumer Protection Act, 2019**
19. Which section defines a misleading advertisement? — **Section 2(28)**
20. Can a literally true advertisement mislead? — **Yes, by deliberately concealing important information**
21. CCPA power to order an ad withdrawn or modified? — **Section 21(1)**
22. Maximum penalty on an endorser, first contravention? — **Rs 10 lakh**
23. Maximum penalty for a subsequent contravention? — **Rs 50 lakh**
24. Longest endorsement ban for a first contravention? — **One year**
25. Longest endorsement ban for a subsequent contravention? — **Three years**
26. Endorser's defence under s.21(5)? — **Due diligence to verify the claims**
27. Publisher's defence under s.21(6)? — **Publication in the ordinary course of business**
28. When is the publisher's defence lost? — **Prior knowledge of a CCPA withdrawal or modification order**
29. Who can be prosecuted under s.89? — **A manufacturer or service provider**
30. Maximum punishment under s.89, first offence? — **Two years' jail and Rs 10 lakh fine**
31. Fall in heat admissions in Rajnagar's painted wards? — **30 per cent**
32. Strongest control in the Rajnagar argument? — **Unpainted wards in the same summer**
33. A fall that grows with the dose of the cause is called? — **A dose-response pattern**
34. What gap does extending a pilot city-wide open? — **Whether the other wards are similar**
35. Taps per order before and after Haatbazaar's redesign? — **Eleven before, four after**
36. Rise in Haatbazaar's app orders in July-September? — **20 per cent**
37. Strongest weakener: old-app users' orders rose by? — **The same 20 per cent**
38. Unchanged order share per visit undercuts which claim? — **That fewer carts were abandoned**
39. Sonbhadra: population per seat? — **15,000 (9,00,000 / 60)**