

ANSWER KEY — 12 OCTOBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
C	A	D	B	C	A	D	B	C	D
Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20
A	B	C	B	D	A	C	A	D	B
Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26				
D	B	C	A	D	B				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 C Promissory estoppel: reliance binds; revenue need is not public interest **HARD**

All the ingredients of the doctrine stated in Motilal Padampat (1979) are present. The State made a clear and unequivocal promise, a five-year exemption for factories set up before March 2024, and it intended investors to act on it. Sangam acted on it by building a mill and starting production, which is an alteration of position. The State is therefore bound unless it can show an overriding public interest, and the passage says in terms that a mere wish to raise more revenue is not, by itself, enough. A bare statement that finances are under strain is exactly that wish, so option C is correct. Option A is wrong because the doctrine rests on equity, not contract, so the absence of Article 299 form does not matter. Option B is wrong because the promisee need not prove a loss; altering his position is sufficient. Option D overstates the rule: a promise can be withdrawn where the government shows, and the court accepts, an overriding public interest. The answer must therefore combine reliance with the inadequacy of the stated reason.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: it reaches the right result (the State is bound) for the wrong reason, because the passage expressly allows withdrawal on proven overriding public interest.

Q2 A No estoppel against a statute **HARD**

The passage sets the first limit on the doctrine plainly: promissory estoppel cannot compel the government to do what a statute forbids, or what the authority had no power to do, because there is no estoppel against a statute. The State Excise Act levies duty on all liquor and allows no exemption. The Deputy Commissioner's letter therefore promised something the law does not permit, and no amount of reliance by Madhuban can turn that promise into a binding one. Option A is correct. Option B is attractive because Madhuban did alter its position by doubling its plant, and in an ordinary case that would be decisive, but reliance cannot override a statutory prohibition. Option C states a true proposition (consideration is not needed) but applies it where the doctrine is excluded altogether. Option D invents a rule: nothing in the passage confines the doctrine to promises made by ministers; the defect here is the absence of legal power to exempt, not the rank of the officer who wrote the letter. The question tests whether the student applies the limit before the general rule.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: reliance is normally the heart of the doctrine, but it cannot defeat a statute that permits no exemption.

Q3 D Reliance as a precondition of estoppel **HARD**

The passage ends with the third limit: the doctrine protects reliance alone, so a person who has not altered his position on the strength of the promise cannot complain of its withdrawal. Kalyani read the notice and discussed the idea at a board meeting, but it bought no land, signed nothing and took no step before the concession was withdrawn in May. A discussion of a possible warehouse is not an alteration of position. Kalyani therefore fails, and option D gives the correct reason. Option A is wrong because a clear promise intended to be acted upon is only half the doctrine; the promisee must also act on it. Option B is the most tempting: it is true that the State gave no reasons and showed no public interest, but the State needs to justify a withdrawal only when the promisee has relied on the promise. Where there is no reliance, the question of public interest never arises. Option C invents an exception for taxation; the Motilal case itself concerned a promised sales tax exemption, and the passage contains no such exclusion.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: the State's silence about public interest matters only once the promisee has relied; without reliance there is nothing to justify.

Q4 B Estoppel needs neither Article 299 form nor consideration **MED**

The passage states that it does not matter that a promise was not supported by consideration or was not executed as a contract in the form required by Article 299 of the Constitution, because promissory estoppel rests on equity, not on contract. Both of the Department's arguments attack the promise as though it had to be a valid contract, and both therefore fail. Harit received a clear promise of a capital subsidy if it set up a cold-storage chain in three hill districts, and it acted on that promise by building the chain, so it altered its position in reliance. Nothing in the facts suggests that a statute forbids the subsidy, and no public interest has been pleaded. Option B is correct.

NAME: _____ **ROLL NO:** _____ **BATCH:** _____

Option A treats the promise as a contract, which is exactly the approach the doctrine rejects. Options C and D each split the two requirements and keep one of them, but the passage dismisses both in the same sentence, so neither half survives. The question tests whether the student sees that the doctrine is equitable rather than contractual.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: Article 299 sounds like a constitutional requirement that cannot be waived, but the passage says its absence does not matter for estoppel.

Q5 C Stretch: public interest must be proved to the court ELITE

Both States made a clear promise and both sets of factories relied on it, so both States are *prima facie* bound. The only question is whether either has shown an overriding public interest. The passage says the government must place before the court the material showing that interest, and it is for the court, not the government, to decide whether the public interest outweighs the equity in favour of the promisee; a mere change of policy is not enough. State X filed reservoir data showing that drinking water for three districts depended on charging industry, and the court was satisfied, which is the Kasinka Trading situation. State Y offered only its own conclusion that the policy no longer served the public interest, which is a bare change of policy with no material behind it. Hence the withdrawal can be upheld only in State X, option C. Option A wrongly makes the government the judge of its own case. Option B ignores the public interest exception altogether. Option D inverts the rule by preferring an unsupported assertion to evidence.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: it sounds deferential and familiar, but the passage places the final judgment on public interest with the court, not the government.

Q6 A Civil immunity and its three closed exceptions HARD

Under Article 31(1), a diplomatic agent is immune from the civil jurisdiction of the receiving State except in three listed cases: a real action concerning private immovable property, a succession action in which he is involved as a private person, and an action relating to a professional or commercial activity he carries on outside his official functions. A suit for damages arising from a road accident is none of these. Driving to a friend's wedding is private conduct, but it is not a professional or commercial activity, so exception (c) does not apply. The court therefore cannot hear the suit while Valdora has not waived immunity, and option A is correct. Options B and C both assume that civil immunity is limited to official acts. That is the rule for a former diplomat under Article 39(2), not for a serving one: while in post, a diplomat is immune for private acts too, subject only to the three exceptions. Option D invents a procedure; under Article 32 only the sending State can waive immunity, and Ramesh's remedy lies in such a waiver or in Valdora's own courts under Article 31(4).

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: the outing was private, but exception (c) covers only professional or commercial activity, not every act outside official duties.

Q7 D Real-action exception for private immovable property HARD

Exception (a) to civil immunity in Article 31(1) covers a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the receiving State, unless the diplomat holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission. Ms Brandt bought the Goa villa in her own name, for family holidays, so it is private immovable property in India, and the seller's suit to recover it is a real action. That suit may proceed. The ambassador, by contrast, holds the official residence on behalf of Valdora for the purposes of the mission, which is precisely the case the proviso excludes, so his immunity bars the eviction suit. Option D is therefore correct. Option A applies the exception without its proviso. Option B ignores the exceptions altogether and treats civil immunity as absolute. Option C introduces a test the passage does not use: what matters is not whether the property is rented or owned, but whether it is held for the mission or privately. The question requires the student to apply both the exception and its carve-out in one step.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: both suits do concern immovable property in India, but the proviso shields property held on behalf of the sending State for the mission.

Q8 B Waiver belongs to the sending State and must be express MED

Article 37(1) extends a diplomat's immunities to members of his family forming part of his household if they are not nationals of the receiving State. The daughter is a Valdoran national living in his household in Mumbai, so she is immune from India's criminal jurisdiction in the first place. But Article 32 provides that immunity belongs to the sending State, which alone may waive it, and that the waiver must be express. Valdora's Foreign Ministry has sent a formal note expressly waiving her immunity for this case, so the waiver is valid and the prosecution may go ahead. Her personal objection is irrelevant because the immunity was never hers to keep or surrender. Option B is correct. Option A reverses the rule by giving the power of waiver to the individual. Option C misstates Article 37(1): family members receive the same immunities as the diplomat, not a narrower immunity confined to the mission's work. Option D invents a requirement of prior approval by the receiving State; India is the State that benefits from the waiver and need approve nothing.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: it feels natural that a person may decide about her own immunity, but the passage vests the power of waiver in the sending State alone.

Q9 C Stretch: residual immunity for official acts after the posting ends ELITE

Article 39(2) governs a diplomat whose functions have ended. His immunities normally cease when he leaves the country, but immunity continues for acts he performed in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission. Rennick left India in 2024, so his general immunity has ended and he returns in 2026 as an ordinary tourist. The question is which of his past acts still carry the residual immunity. Signing a visa refusal on his embassy's instructions is plainly an act in the exercise of his functions, so the businessman's

defamation suit remains barred. Assaulting a neighbour over parking is a private act, not a function of the mission, so it lost its protection when he left, and the assault case may now be brought. Option C is correct. Option A ignores the continuing immunity for official acts. Option B treats every act during the posting as permanently immune, which would make the official-acts proviso meaningless. Option D applies a civil-versus-criminal distinction that Article 39(2) does not draw; the test is whether the act was official.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: 'immunities cease when he leaves' is the general rule, but the passage keeps alive the immunity for acts done in exercising his functions.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q10 **D** Necessary assumption: removing the obstacle leads to use **MED**

The argument moves from 'distance is the main obstacle' to 'bicycles will bring most of these non-users onto the metro'. That step works only if the non-users who cite distance can and will actually cycle the kilometre or more between home and station. If most of them are elderly, unable to ride, or simply unwilling to cycle in the city's heat, the obstacle remains in practice even though bicycles exist, and the prediction collapses. Applying the negation test confirms it: if hardly any of these non-users are able or willing to cycle, the conclusion cannot follow. Option D is therefore the assumption the argument depends on. Option A concerns residents beyond three kilometres, whom the argument never relies upon; its conclusion is about the surveyed non-users near stations. Option B concerns the scheme's finances, which may matter to the corporation but not to whether ridership rises. Option C is irrelevant, and if anything its negation, that most respondents have never tried the metro, fits the argument equally well. The required gap lies between the bicycles and their use.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: it sounds like an extension of the plan, but the conclusion is limited to non-users who live near stations, so nothing beyond three kilometres is needed.

Q11 **A** Hidden assumption about the first leg of the trip **HARD**

The passage says the bicycles will be docked at the 30 stations. A non-user's problem is the kilometre or more between his home and the station, and his first trip of the day starts at home. A bicycle docked at the station is useful for the return leg, but it cannot carry him from his house to the station in the morning unless bicycles are somehow available near homes when needed, for example because riders leave them in residential areas or the company redistributes them. If no bicycle can be had near home, the non-user still has to cover the distance on foot, and the scheme cannot remove the obstacle. The prediction therefore assumes option A. Option B is irrelevant: existing passengers switching from walking to cycling changes nothing about the number of passengers. Option C is not required, because the survey says no convenient auto service exists over that distance, so comparison with auto fares is beside the point. Option D concerns a fare cut that the argument never mentions and does not need in order to reach its conclusion.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: price comparison seems relevant to any rental scheme, but the respondents said no convenient auto service exists, so the bicycles compete with walking, not autos.

Q12 **B** Assumption EXCEPT: distinguishing required from merely consistent **HARD**

Three options are gaps the argument needs to close. Option A is required: if the same non-users are also kept away by fares they think too high, removing the distance problem will not bring them onto the metro. Option C is required: the conclusion is about 'most of these non-users', and the survey of 6,000 can support that only if they are broadly representative of non-users near stations. Option D is required: if the roads are too dangerous to cycle, residents will not use the bicycles, and the obstacle survives. Option B, however, is not needed. The argument predicts that new riders will be drawn in; it does not need those new riders to be the main users of the bicycles. Existing passengers could use most of the bicycles for convenience while enough non-users also use them to lift ridership; the conclusion would still hold. Negating B therefore does not destroy the argument, which is the mark of a non-assumption. Option B is the exception asked for, and it is the correct answer.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: survey representativeness seems like a technical point, but the conclusion about 'most of these non-users' rests entirely on it.

Q13 **C** Quantitative assumption behind a ridership target **HARD**

The conclusion is not just that ridership will rise but that it will come close to the original forecast of 4 lakh passengers a day, up from about 2.4 lakh. That is an increase of roughly 1.6 lakh a day. The survey tells us what proportion of non-users cite distance, sixty-two per cent, but it says nothing about how many non-users there are in absolute terms or how many trips they would make. If the non-users near stations who would switch add only twenty thousand trips a day, ridership rises but stays far below the forecast. The prediction therefore assumes that the potential switchers are numerous enough to supply roughly 1.6 lakh additional trips daily, which is option C. Option A is irrelevant: past monthly fluctuations do not affect whether the scheme can add the missing trips. Option B concerns the survey's size compared with other surveys, which does not bear on the gap. Option D describes people who already reach the metro by bus; their switching to bicycles adds no new passengers and is not needed.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: it mentions the bicycles and the metro, but bus users who switch are already metro passengers, so they add nothing to the count.

Q14 **B** Flaw: ignoring the base rate **HARD**

The officer treats the fact that 70 per cent of the failed students had attended tuition as evidence that tuition causes failure. That inference is valid only if tuition students are over-represented among those who failed, and she cannot know that without the base rate: the share of all Class 10 students who attended tuition. If, say, 85 per cent of all candidates took tuition, then tuition students were

actually under-represented among the failures, and the figure points the other way. Without the comparison, 70 per cent tells us nothing about whether tuition raises or lowers the chance of failing. Option B names this flaw precisely. Option A is not a flaw in this argument; it is a background assumption shared by almost any reasoning about examination results and is not where the argument goes wrong. Option C overstates: one year's data cannot show a trend, but the officer is not claiming a trend, she is claiming a cause. Option D misdescribes the circular, which rests on figures, not on her authority. The decisive gap is the missing comparison group.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: 'only one year' sounds like a sound statistical objection, but the argument claims a cause, not a trend, so the single year is not its main defect.

Q15 D Supplying the base rate that reverses the inference **HARD**

To show that the 70 per cent figure does not support the officer's conclusion, we need the comparison she left out: the proportion of all candidates who attended tuition. Option D supplies it. If 85 per cent of all Class 10 candidates took tuition, but only 70 per cent of those who failed did, then tuition students were less likely to fail than students without tuition. The figure she relies on would then suggest that tuition is associated with a lower failure rate, the opposite of her conclusion. Option A only says some failing students had little tuition; that might slightly blunt her point but does not show that the figure fails to support it. Option B compares this year's failures with last year's, which says nothing about tuition. Option C explains why some families cannot afford tuition, which might bear on who takes it, but does not by itself tell us whether tuition students fail more or less often. Only the base rate turns the officer's own number against her conclusion.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: it seems to dilute the 70 per cent, but even if some failures had little tuition, the figure still lacks a comparison group to give it meaning.

Q16 A Flaw: reverse causation **HARD**

The officer reads the link between tuition and failure as tuition causing failure: students who rely on tutors stop paying attention in school. A rival explanation runs the other way. Parents often send a child to a tutor because the child is already struggling; if so, weak students are concentrated among tuition-takers because of their weakness, not because of the tuition, and those students would have been at higher risk of failing in any case. This is the classic reverse-causation objection, and option A states it. Option B is not an objection to the causal claim; the officer says tuition does more harm than good on balance, which is consistent with some tuition students scoring well. Option C introduces guidebooks, a separate factor that would, if anything, be expected to help students, and the option does not show how it explains the failures. Option D notes that some school teachers run tuition classes, which may raise other concerns, but it does not offer an alternative explanation of why so many failures took tuition.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: high-scoring tuition students look like counter-examples, but a claim about the overall balance of harm survives individual exceptions.

Q17 C Stretch: parallel flaw, sufficiency inferred while ignoring other factors **ELITE**

The officer observes that all ten top scorers studied at a government school and concludes that a government school education alone is enough to reach the top. The flaw is that sharing one feature does not show that the feature was sufficient: the top scorers may also have taken private tuition, had educated parents or studied long hours, and the officer has not ruled any of this out. Ironically, they may have been tuition students themselves. Option C has the same structure: all prize-winning growers used the new seed, so the seed alone is all a grower needs, ignoring irrigation, soil and care that the winners may also have had. Option A infers a cause from a time-of-day correlation, which is a different flaw. Option B infers a comparison of popularity from total visitor numbers, ignoring other reasons for the fall. Option D draws a conclusion of irrelevance from a fifty per cent figure without a base rate; it resembles the officer's first argument, about the failures, not her argument about the top scorers. Only option C mirrors the 'alone is enough' leap.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: it echoes the officer's earlier base-rate error, but the question asks about the top-scorer argument, whose flaw is an unwarranted 'alone is enough'.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q18 A Percentage change on the original base **MED**

Percentage change is always measured on the earlier value. Property tax rose from Rs 420 crore in 2024-25 to Rs 483 crore in 2025-26, an increase of 483 minus 420, which is Rs 63 crore. Percentage increase equals the increase divided by the original value, multiplied by 100: 63 divided by 420, times 100. Since 420 times 0.15 is exactly 63, the result is 15 per cent. Checking the other way, 420 multiplied by 1.15 gives 420 plus 63, which is 483, matching the table. Option A is therefore correct. Option B, about 13 per cent, comes from dividing 63 by the new value 483 instead of the old value 420, the most common slip in percentage-change questions. Option C, 5.25 per cent, divides the increase of 63 by the 2025-26 total of 1,200, mixing a single source with the whole budget. Option D, about 5.73 per cent, divides 63 by the 2024-25 total of 1,100, the same mix-up on the earlier year. Only the original-base calculation gives 15 per cent.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: 63 divided by 483 gives about 13 per cent, a result that uses the later year as the base instead of the earlier one.

Q19 D Share of a composite category **HARD**

Own-source revenue is defined in the passage as property tax, water charges, advertisement and licence fees, and other receipts, that is, everything except grants from the state government. For 2025-26 it equals 483 plus 162 plus 72 plus 105. Adding step by step: 483 plus 162 is 645, plus 72 is 717, plus 105 is 822. As a check, the total of 1,200 minus the state grant of 378 also gives 822. The share is 822 divided by 1,200, times 100. Since 1,200 times 0.685 equals 822, the share is 68.5 per cent, option D. Option A, 31.5 per cent, is the share of state grants (378 divided by 1,200), the complement of the answer. Option B, about 68.2 per cent, is the own-source share for the

wrong year: in 2024-25 own-source revenue was 1,100 minus 350, which is 750, and 750 divided by 1,100 is about 68.18 per cent. Option C, 70 per cent, is a rough estimate. The question requires the correct year and the correct grouping.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: 68.2 per cent is the own-source share for 2024-25, so a student who reads the wrong column lands on a plausible near-miss.

Q20 B Contribution to a net increase HARD

The total rose from Rs 1,100 crore to Rs 1,200 crore, a net increase of Rs 100 crore. Property tax contributed 483 minus 420, which is Rs 63 crore of that increase. Its share of the increase is therefore 63 divided by 100, times 100, which is 63 per cent, option B. It is worth checking that the pieces add up to the net change. Water charges rose by 12, state grants by 28 and other receipts by 5, while advertisement and licence fees fell by 8. The rises add up to 63 plus 12 plus 28 plus 5, which is 108, and subtracting the fall of 8 leaves exactly 100, confirming the table. Option A, about 58.3 per cent, divides 63 by the gross rise of 108 and ignores the fall in advertisement fees, but the question asks about the actual increase in total receipts, which is 100. Option C, 15 per cent, is property tax's own growth rate, a different quantity. Option D, 40.25 per cent, is property tax's share of total receipts in 2025-26, not of the increase.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: 63 out of the gross increase of 108 looks thorough, but the question names the actual Rs 100 crore increase, which already nets off the fall.

Q21 D Stretch: comparing changes in shares to two decimal places ELITE

Shares are each source divided by that year's total. In 2024-25 the total is 1,100; in 2025-26 it is 1,200. Property tax: 420 out of 1,100 is about 38.18 per cent, and 483 out of 1,200 is 40.25 per cent, so its share rose; option A is out. Water charges: 150 out of 1,100 is about 13.64 per cent, and 162 out of 1,200 is 13.5 per cent, a fall of about 0.14 points. State grants: 350 out of 1,100 is about 31.82 per cent, and 378 out of 1,200 is 31.5 per cent, a fall of about 0.32 points. Other receipts: 100 out of 1,100 is about 9.09 per cent, and 105 out of 1,200 is 8.75 per cent, a fall of about 0.34 points. Advertisement fees fell in absolute terms, so they are excluded by the question. The largest fall among rising sources is other receipts, at about 0.34 points against 0.32 for grants, option D. The reason is that other receipts grew by only 5 per cent, more slowly than grants (8 per cent), while the total grew by about 9.1 per cent.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: grants have the bigger absolute share and their fall (0.32 points) is close, but other receipts, growing at only 5 per cent, lose slightly more ground.

Q22 B Central angle from a percentage share MED

The passage gives the rule for converting a share into an angle: the central angle equals the percentage share multiplied by 3.6 degrees. This works because a full circle of 360 degrees represents 100 per cent, so each one per cent corresponds to 360 divided by 100, which is 3.6 degrees. Non-communicable diseases account for 20 per cent of visits. The angle is therefore 20 multiplied by 3.6, which equals 72 degrees, option B. As a check, 72 out of 360 is one-fifth, and one-fifth is 20 per cent, so the angle is consistent with the share. Option A, 20 degrees, simply copies the percentage as though it were already an angle, forgetting the conversion. Option C, 54 degrees, is 15 times 3.6, an angle for a share that does not appear in the table. Option D, 90 degrees, is the angle for the maternal and child health sector (25 times 3.6), the next row in the table, and catches students who read the wrong line. Only the correct share multiplied by 3.6 gives 72 degrees.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: 90 degrees is the angle for maternal & child health, the row just above, and a misread line produces it instantly.

Q23 C Difference of shares converted to a count MED

Fevers and infections are 30 per cent of visits. Injuries are 10 per cent and dental and eye care 8 per cent, so together they are 18 per cent. The difference is 30 minus 18, which is 12 percentage points of the total. Total visits in 2025-26 were 3,60,000, so the difference in visits is 12 per cent of 3,60,000. One per cent of 3,60,000 is 3,600, and 12 times 3,600 is 43,200. Option C is correct. Working the long way gives the same result: fevers are 30 per cent of 3,60,000, which is 1,08,000; injuries are 36,000 and dental and eye care 28,800, together 64,800; and 1,08,000 minus 64,800 is 43,200. Option A, 72,000, is 20 per cent of the total, the result of subtracting injuries alone and forgetting dental and eye care. Option B, 79,200, is 22 per cent, from subtracting dental and eye care alone. Option D, 64,800, is the combined total of the two smaller categories, not the difference asked for.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: subtracting only injuries (30 minus 10 per cent) gives 72,000, which looks reasonable if the 'combined' is overlooked.

Q24 A Share after unequal growth of part and whole HARD

In 2025-26, non-communicable disease visits were 20 per cent of 3,60,000, which is 72,000. A 50 per cent rise makes them 72,000 multiplied by 1.5, which is 1,08,000 in 2026-27. The total is expected to rise by 20 per cent, from 3,60,000 to 3,60,000 multiplied by 1.2, which is 4,32,000. The new share is 1,08,000 divided by 4,32,000. Since 4,32,000 divided by 4 is 1,08,000, the share is one-quarter, or 25 per cent, option A. A quicker route uses ratios: the share changes by the factor 1.5 divided by 1.2, which is 1.25, so 20 per cent becomes 20 times 1.25, which is 25 per cent. Option B, 30 per cent, applies the 50 per cent rise to the share and forgets that the total has also grown. Option C, 24 per cent, applies the total's 20 per cent growth to the share instead of the category's own growth. Option D, about 16.7 per cent, divides the old count of 72,000 by the new total, forgetting the category's own rise.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: raising 20 per cent by half gives 30 per cent, but that ignores the 20 per cent growth in the total, which pulls the share back to 25 per cent.

Q25 D Central angle when the whole grows but a part does not HARD

Maternal and child health visits in 2025-26 were 25 per cent of 3,60,000, which is 90,000. If this number stays the same in 2026-27 while the total rises by 20 per cent to 4,32,000, the new share is 90,000 divided by 4,32,000. Simplifying, 90,000 over 4,32,000 equals 90 over 432, which reduces to 5 over 24, about 20.83 per cent. The central angle is the share multiplied by 3.6 degrees, or equivalently the fraction multiplied by 360 degrees: 5 over 24 times 360 is 1,800 over 24, which is exactly 75 degrees. Option D is correct. A shortcut: the old angle was 25 times 3.6, which is 90 degrees, and an unchanged count in a total 1.2 times larger gives 90 divided by 1.2, which is 75 degrees. Option A, 90 degrees, is this year's angle and ignores the growth of the total. Option B, 108 degrees, multiplies 90 by 1.2 instead of dividing. Option C, 72 degrees, is the angle for non-communicable diseases in 2025-26.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: an unchanged number of visits feels like an unchanged sector, but the pie's total has grown, so the same count occupies a smaller angle.

Q26 B Stretch: change in count when both share and total change ELITE

In 2025-26, fevers and infections were 30 per cent of 3,60,000, which is 1,08,000 visits. In 2026-27 the total is 3,60,000 multiplied by 1.2, which is 4,32,000, and fevers are to be 24 per cent of it: 0.24 times 4,32,000 equals 1,03,680. The change is 1,03,680 minus 1,08,000, a fall of 4,320. As a percentage of the original 1,08,000, the fall is 4,320 divided by 1,08,000, which is 0.04, or 4 per cent. Option B is correct. The ratio method confirms it: the number changes by the factor (24 divided by 30) times 1.2, which is 0.8 times 1.2, or 0.96, a fall of 4 per cent. Option A, a fall of 6 per cent, confuses the drop in share, 6 percentage points, with a percentage change in the number of visits. Option C, a fall of 20 per cent, is the relative fall in the share (6 out of 30) and ignores the larger total. Option D reverses the sign: the total's 20 per cent growth does not fully offset the 20 per cent fall in share.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: the share falls by a fifth, but the total grows by a fifth, and the net effect on the count is a fall of only 4 per cent.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Which 1979 case laid down promissory estoppel against the government? — **Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of UP**
2. Which Article of the Vienna Convention lets a State declare a diplomat persona non grata? — **Article 9**
3. Devgarh: state grants as a share of 2025-26 receipts? — **31.5% (378 / 1,200)**
4. Kiratpur: central angle for injuries in 2025-26? — **36 degrees (10 x 3.6)**
5. On what does promissory estoppel rest: contract or equity? — **Equity**
6. Must the promisee prove a loss for promissory estoppel? — **No; altering his position is enough**
7. Is consideration needed for promissory estoppel? — **No**
8. Which Article prescribes the form of government contracts? — **Article 299**
9. Can estoppel compel the State to do what a statute forbids? — **No; there is no estoppel against a statute**
10. Who decides whether public interest justifies withdrawing a promise? — **The court, not the government**
11. Is a wish to raise more revenue enough to withdraw a promise? — **No, not by itself**
12. Which 1995 case upheld early withdrawal of a duty exemption? — **Kasinka Trading v. Union of India**
13. What must the government place before the court to resile? — **Material showing overriding public interest**
14. Can a person who never acted on a promise invoke estoppel? — **No; the doctrine protects reliance alone**
15. Is a mere change of policy enough to withdraw a promise? — **No**
16. Two elements of the government's promise for estoppel? — **Clear and unequivocal, intended to be acted upon**
17. Indian Act giving force to the Vienna Convention? — **Diplomatic Relations (Vienna Convention) Act, 1972**
18. Year of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations? — **1961**
19. Which Article makes a diplomat's person inviolable? — **Article 29**
20. Can a diplomatic agent be arrested in the receiving State? — **No**
21. Which Article grants immunity from criminal jurisdiction? — **Article 31(1)**
22. How many exceptions to a diplomat's civil immunity? — **Three**
23. Is private immovable property an exception to civil immunity? — **Yes, unless held for the mission**
24. Is a succession action as private heir an exception? — **Yes**
25. Is private commercial activity an exception to civil immunity? — **Yes, if outside official functions**
26. Does immunity abroad exempt a diplomat from his own State's courts? — **No, Article 31(4)**
27. Which Article extends immunity to household family members? — **Article 37(1)**
28. Which family members lose that immunity? — **Nationals of the receiving State**
29. To whom does diplomatic immunity belong? — **The sending State**
30. Must a waiver of immunity be express? — **Yes, always (Article 32)**
31. Receiving State's remedy against a diplomat? — **Declare him persona non grata**