

ANSWER KEY — 13 OCTOBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	C	D	A	C	A	D	B	C	D
Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20
A	C	B	C	B	A	D	A	D	B
Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26				
C	D	B	A	C	A				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B Lis pendens binds a bona fide purchaser without notice **HARD**

Every ingredient of Section 52 is present. Meera's suit for specific performance was pending in a court in India, it was not collusive, and a right to immovable property, the house, was directly and specifically in question. Harish, a party to the suit, transferred the house while it was pending, and he did so without the authority of the court. The consequence, as explained in *Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami* (1972), is that the transfer cannot affect Meera's rights under the decree: Kabir takes the house subject to the result of the suit and is bound by the decree exactly as Harish is. Option B is therefore correct. Option A fails because the passage states that the rule rests on necessity, not notice, so full value and good faith do not help Kabir. Option C overstates the doctrine: the transfer is not void, it is merely subservient to the decree. Option D is wrong because the decree for specific performance can be enforced against the transferee, so Meera is not confined to damages.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: good faith and full price protect purchasers in many other doctrines, but the passage says expressly that lis pendens does not depend on notice.

Q2 C Lis pendens needs a right to immovable property directly in question **MED**

Section 52 applies only to a suit or proceeding 'in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question'. The bank's suit was a suit to recover Rs 40 lakh. No right to the Nashik farmland, or to any other immovable property, was in issue in it; the land could at most have been reached later in execution of a money decree. The passage makes the point in terms: a creditor's suit for a sum of money does not freeze the debtor's land. The sale to Sunita is therefore untouched by Section 52, and option C is correct. Option A confuses the possibility of executing a future decree against the land with the land being in question in the suit. Option B is wrong twice over: the section never makes a transfer void, and in any event it does not apply here. Option D imports a test of notice that the doctrine does not use, and it assumes the doctrine applies when it does not. Whether the sale could be attacked on some other ground is outside the question.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: that the land could later be attached in execution does not mean any right to it was directly and specifically in question in the money suit.

Q3 D Transfer under the authority of the court **HARD**

The bar in Section 52 is qualified by the words 'except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose'. The partition suit put the family shop directly in question, and Dev, a party, transferred it while the suit was pending, so the section would ordinarily subject Lata's purchase to the final decree. But Dev did not act on his own: he applied for leave, the court permitted the sale, and it imposed a term, that the price be deposited in court. A sale made under the authority of the court is outside the bar, so Lata's title is protected; Arjun's interest is secured by the deposited price. Option D is correct. Option A states the general rule but ignores the exception written into the same sentence. Option B invents an exception for sales made for medical expenses; the motive matters only because it led the court to grant leave. Option C invents a requirement of the other co-owner's written consent, which the section does not contain.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: it applies the general rule mechanically and overlooks the words 'except under the authority of the court', which govern this sale.

Q4 A A transfer pendente lite is valid between the parties **HARD**

The passage says that the doctrine 'does not make a transfer pendente lite void'. Following *Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami* (1972), the transfer is good between transferor and transferee and is merely subject to the result of the suit. The only thing Section 52 protects is the right of the other party under the decree that may be passed. Here no decree in Farida's favour was passed: her suit was dismissed on the merits and the dismissal became final when no appeal was filed. There is therefore nothing to which Imran's purchase must yield, and his title derived from Gopal stands. Option A is correct. Option B treats lis pendens as a rule of voidness, which the passage expressly rejects. Option C makes the result turn on notice, but the doctrine does not depend on notice in either direction. Option D

overstates the leave requirement: a sale without leave is not invalid, it is only incapable of defeating the opposing party's rights under a decree.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: many candidates read 'cannot be transferred' as a prohibition, but the section only subordinates the transfer to the decree; it does not avoid it.

Q5 C Stretch: duration of pendency under the Explanation ELITE

The Explanation to Section 52 does not end pendency when the decree is pronounced. Pendency continues 'until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and that decree or order has been completely satisfied or discharged, or has become unobtainable' by the expiry of limitation. Neha's decree for possession had not been executed in March 2025, so it was not satisfied or discharged, and since the sale took place well within the limitation period for execution, the decree had not become unobtainable either. The suit was therefore still pending for the purposes of Section 52 when Vikram sold to Omkar, and Omkar takes the flat subject to Neha's decree. Option C is correct. Option A identifies the end of pendency with the pronouncement of the decree, which is only the first of the two conditions. Option B invents a rule that the decree-holder must execute at once. Option D overstates the doctrine: a sale is not void, and once a decree is fully satisfied the property is no longer pending in any sense.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: it reads the first half of the Explanation, 'disposed of by a final decree', and ignores the second, 'completely satisfied or discharged'.

Q6 A Article 311(1): dismissal by a subordinate authority MED

Article 311(1) is independent of the inquiry requirement in clause (2). It says that a civil servant cannot be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one by which he was appointed. Pradeep was appointed by the Commissioner of Excise, and the order of dismissal was passed by the Deputy Commissioner, who the facts say is subordinate to the Commissioner. The order therefore violates clause (1), however fair the procedure that preceded it. Option A is correct. Option B is the most tempting wrong answer, because it is true that an inquiry complying with clause (2) was held; but satisfying clause (2) does not cure a breach of clause (1), since the two safeguards are cumulative. Option C misstates the rule: the Article does not reserve dismissal to the Governor; it only forbids dismissal by an authority lower than the appointing authority. Option D substitutes the head of the office for the appointing authority, which is not the test the Article lays down.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: a proper inquiry satisfies clause (2) only, and the order still fails clause (1) because it was passed by an authority below the appointing authority.

Q7 D Exception (a): penalty founded on conduct leading to conviction HARD

Clause (2) ordinarily requires an inquiry in which the civil servant is told of the charges and heard. But the second proviso lists three situations in which the inquiry may be dispensed with, and the first, clause (a), covers a penalty 'imposed on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge'. Seema was convicted by a criminal court of accepting a bribe, and the authority dismissed her relying on that conviction. The case falls squarely within clause (a), so no departmental inquiry was required, and option D is correct. Option C borrows the requirement of recorded reasons from clause (b), which applies only where the authority dispenses with the inquiry because it is not reasonably practicable; it has no role where the penalty rests on a conviction. Option B ignores the proviso entirely. Option A borrows the satisfaction of the President or Governor from clause (c), the security-of-State exception, which is a separate and independent ground.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: recorded reasons are the condition of clause (b), not of clause (a), and Seema's dismissal rests on her conviction.

Q8 B Exception (b): reason must be recorded in writing HARD

The Director could dispense with the inquiry only under clause (b), and that clause has a built-in condition: the authority must be satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry 'for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing'. Tulsiram Patel (1985) confirms that the reason must be recorded, that the satisfaction must rest on objective facts, and that courts may test whether the reason is relevant. Here the order merely recites the clause, and no reason appears in the order or anywhere in the file. Reciting the provision is not recording a reason, so the condition for dispensing with the inquiry is not met and the dismissal is invalid. Option B is correct. Option C accepts the bare assertion of satisfaction, which is exactly what the requirement of a written reason is meant to prevent. Option A makes the authority the final judge, which Tulsiram Patel rejects by allowing judicial review. Option D confuses clause (b) with clause (c), the only exception that needs the President or Governor.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: clause (b) needs more than satisfaction; the reason must be recorded in writing, and a bare recital of the clause records none.

Q9 C Stretch: termination simpliciter versus stigmatic termination ELITE

Parshotam Lal Dhingra (1958) draws the decisive line. Ending a probationer's service according to the terms of his appointment is not dismissal or removal, so Article 311 is not attracted. But where the order is in substance a punishment, as where it founds the termination on misconduct and so casts a stigma, Article 311 applies in full. Ankit's letter would have allowed a simple termination, but the order actually passed does not rest on the terms of appointment: it states that he was found to have tampered with case records, which is a finding of misconduct on the face of the order. The order is therefore a punishment, and since it ended his service without informing him of any charge or hearing him, it violates Article 311(2). Option C is correct. Option B describes a termination simpliciter,

which this order is not. Option A overstates the position of probationers, who are protected against punitive orders. Option D invents a bar on ending probation early, which the passage does not contain.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: the letter permitted termination, but the order chose to rest on misconduct, and a stigmatic order is a punishment under Dhingra.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q10 **D** Inference from a stated policy and a stated rule **MED**

An inference must follow from the passage without new assumptions. The passage says that under the old system a member with an unpaid fine had his borrowing privileges suspended until he paid, and that in April 2023 the library abolished fines and wrote off every fine still owed. Once the fine was written off, the only ground of suspension disappeared, and the library made no other change to its rules. It follows that at least some members whose borrowing had been suspended became able to borrow again, so option D is properly inferred. Option A generalises from one library to every library, which the passage cannot support. Option B is attractive because the passage links unpaid fines to schoolchildren and daily-wage workers, but it says nothing about who the new borrowers were. Option C runs against the data: if fines had been the main reason for timely return, abolishing them should have caused a far larger jump in late returns than the one-tenth recorded.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: the passage profiles the members who had unpaid fines, not the members who began borrowing after the change.

Q11 **A** Most strongly supported: reading a stated proportion **HARD**

The passage says fines brought in less than two per cent of the library's annual budget. A source that covers under two per cent of running costs was not an important source of money, so option A is directly supported. Option D is the attractive wrong answer. The passage says that members with unpaid fines were disproportionately schoolchildren and daily-wage workers, but an unpaid fine is not the same thing as a late return. These groups may return books late no more often than others and simply be less able to pay the fine when they do. The passage gives no comparison of late-return rates across groups, so D is not supported. Option B claims a cause ('entirely') for which the passage provides no evidence, since it never separates new from old members. Option C predicts the opposite of what the data show: books never returned fell slightly after fines were abolished, so the passage gives no support for a future rise in permanent losses.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: it converts 'disproportionately had unpaid fines' into 'return books late more often', a different claim the passage never makes.

Q12 **C** EXCEPT inference: counts versus proportions **HARD**

Three options follow from the passage. Option A follows because suspended members mostly stopped visiting, so some lost access through unpaid fines. Option B follows because the library made no other change to its rules, hours or collection, which rules out new opening hours or new books as the explanation. Option D follows because staff spent several hours a week recording and collecting fines, a cost beyond the small revenue the fines raised. Option C cannot be inferred. The passage gives a count: books returned late rose by about one-tenth. It does not say how many books were lent in either year. The number of borrowing members rose by about one-third, so total lending may well have risen faster than late returns, in which case the share of books returned late actually fell. Without the total number of loans, a rise in the count of late returns tells us nothing about the share returned late. Option C is therefore the exception.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: a rise in the number of late returns looks like a rise in the rate of late returns, but the passage never supplies the number of loans.

Q13 **B** Stretch: combining an added premise with two growth rates **ELITE**

With the added premise, total lending moves in step with the number of borrowing members. If borrowing members rose by about one-third, books lent rose by about one-third: on a base of 100 loans before the change there were about 133 after it. Late returns rose by about one-tenth, so if 10 of the 100 were late before, about 11 of the 133 were late after. The proportion returned late therefore fell, from 10 per cent to about 8.3 per cent; in general it is multiplied by 1.1 divided by 1.33, roughly 0.83. Option B must be true. Option A is wrong: late returns per borrowing member are also multiplied by about 0.83, so they fell rather than staying the same. Option C cannot be established because the passage never separates new members from old ones. Option D confuses the growth in late returns, about one-tenth, with the growth in lending, which under the premise is about one-third.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: it attaches the one-tenth growth figure for late returns to total lending, which under the added premise grew by about one-third.

Q14 **C** Resolving a paradox through a change in case mix **HARD**

The puzzle is that small-claim filings rose by about 60 per cent with no new judges and no new technology, yet the average time to dispose of a small claim fell from 31 to 22 months. A good resolution explains how more cases could coexist with a lower average. Option C does this. If most of the extra claims were uncontested suits over unpaid bills that courts decide at a single hearing, they would be disposed of in a few months, and adding many such quick cases to the pool pulls the average disposal time down even if older, contested claims take as long as ever. Option D is attractive because it explains why filings rose, but the rise in filings is not the puzzling fact; the faster disposal is, and D says nothing about it. Option A concerns lawyers' opinions and is irrelevant. Option B concerns larger suits and leaves the speed of small claims unexplained.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: it explains the uncontroversial half of the passage, the rise in filings, and leaves the faster disposal unexplained.

Q15 B Paradox EXCEPT: eliminating the irrelevant fact **HARD**

Three options each give a mechanism by which small claims could be disposed of faster despite the rise in filings. Option A sends them to mediation, where most settle within four months, which removes them from the courts quickly. Option C says more defendants paid the sum claimed soon after being served, which ends cases early. Option D says much of the increase was in very small claims decided summarily on documents, which are quick to dispose of and pull the average down. Option B, by contrast, says only that the fee cut was widely publicised. Publicity might explain why filings rose, but it offers no mechanism by which a claim, once filed, would be decided sooner. It therefore does nothing to explain the faster disposal, and it is the exception. Note that the question asks about faster disposal, not about the rise in filings, which is what makes B fail.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A may look like an outside change ruled out by the passage, but the passage excludes only new judges and new technology, not a mediation rule.

Q16 A Deepening rather than resolving a paradox **MED**

A fact deepens a paradox when it removes the most natural explanation and makes the surprising result harder to understand. The most natural explanation of a lower average disposal time despite more filings is that the extra cases were simpler or quicker than the old ones. Option A says the opposite: the extra small claims were, on average, as complex and as hotly contested as those filed before 2022. If so, a 60 per cent increase in comparable cases handled by the same number of judges with no new technology should have lengthened delays, which makes the fall from 31 to 22 months even more puzzling. Option B resolves the paradox, because uncontested suits are disposed of quickly. Option C offers a procedural reason why small claims might move faster. Option D also resolves it, because cases dismissed at the first hearing are disposed of almost at once and pull the average down.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C may look neutral, but a new listing practice that gives small claims priority is a reason for them to move faster, so it helps resolve rather than deepen the puzzle.

Q17 D Stretch: choosing the evidence that tests the resolution **ELITE**

The question asks whether courts became quicker at the kind of claims filed before 2022, or whether the average fell only because new, quicker cases were added. The way to separate these two possibilities is to compare like with like: the disposal time after 2022 of claims similar in type and value to the older ones. If those comparable claims also became faster, the courts really did speed up; if they took as long as before, the fall in the average was a change in the mix of cases. Option D supplies exactly this comparison. Option A gives filing figures from before the fee cut, which say nothing about disposal times afterwards. Option B concerns judges in other States and cannot show what happened to Sahyadri's cases. Option C concerns court-fee revenue, which reflects the number of filings and the fee rate, not the speed of disposal, so it is irrelevant to the question asked.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: historical filing data look rigorous, but the question is about disposal speed for comparable cases, which only option D measures.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q18 A Share of a category in total revenue **HARD**

First compute revenue for 2025, category by category, using crossings in lakh multiplied by the toll per crossing. Cars and jeeps: 54 times 90 is 4,860. LCVs: 15 times 145 is 2,175. Buses and trucks: 18 times 305 is 5,490. Multi-axle vehicles: 13 times 470 is 6,110. Total 2025 revenue is 4,860 plus 2,175 plus 5,490 plus 6,110, which is Rs 18,635 lakh. The multi-axle share is 6,110 divided by 18,635, which is 0.3279, or about 32.8 per cent. Option A is correct. As a check, 18,635 times 0.328 is about 6,112, which matches. Option B, 13.0 per cent, is the multi-axle share of crossings (13 of 100 lakh), not of revenue. Option C, 27.9 per cent, is the correct share for 2024 (4,700 divided by 16,860), so it answers the question for the wrong year. Option D, 30.0 per cent, is the growth in multi-axle crossings from 10 to 13 lakh, a different quantity altogether.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: 13 per cent is the multi-axle share of vehicles; because these vehicles pay the highest toll, their share of revenue is far larger.

Q19 D Percentage change in a computed total **MED**

Revenue in 2024: cars 48 times 90 is 4,320; LCVs 12 times 145 is 1,740; buses and trucks 20 times 305 is 6,100; multi-axle vehicles 10 times 470 is 4,700. The 2024 total is 16,860 lakh rupees. Revenue in 2025, computed the same way, is 4,860 plus 2,175 plus 5,490 plus 6,110, which is 18,635. The increase is 18,635 minus 16,860, which is 1,775. As a percentage of the original 2024 figure, it is 1,775 divided by 16,860, which is 0.1053, or about 10.5 per cent. Option D is correct. Option A, 11.1 per cent, is the growth in total crossings from 90 to 100 lakh; revenue grew more slowly because the mix shifted away from buses and trucks. Option B, 9.5 per cent, divides the same increase by the 2025 total instead of the 2024 base. Option C, 12.5 per cent, is the growth in car crossings from 48 to 54 lakh.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: traffic grew by 11.1 per cent, but revenue grew by only 10.5 per cent because fewer high-toll buses and trucks crossed.

Q20 B Change in shares, measured in percentage points **HARD**

Revenue shares in 2024 (total 16,860): cars 4,320, about 25.62 per cent; LCVs 1,740, about 10.32 per cent; buses and trucks 6,100, about 36.18 per cent; multi-axle 4,700, about 27.88 per cent. Revenue shares in 2025 (total 18,635): cars 4,860, about 26.08 per cent; LCVs

2,175, about 11.67 per cent; buses and trucks 5,490, about 29.46 per cent; multi-axle 6,110, about 32.79 per cent. The changes are: cars up 0.46 points, LCVs up 1.35 points, buses and trucks down 6.72 points, multi-axle up 4.91 points. The largest change in absolute terms is the fall for buses and trucks, so option B is correct. Option D is attractive because multi-axle crossings grew fastest, by 30 per cent, and its share did rise by almost 5 points, but that is still smaller than the 6.72-point fall for buses and trucks. The question asks about the size of the change, not its direction, so a fall counts as fully as a rise.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: the fastest-growing category is not the one whose share moved most; the bus-and-truck share fell by more than the multi-axle share rose.

Q21 C Stretch: weighted average when the mix changes ELITE

Average toll per crossing is total revenue divided by total crossings. In 2024 it is 16,860 lakh rupees divided by 90 lakh crossings, which is about Rs 187.33. In 2025 it is 18,635 divided by 100, which is Rs 186.35. The change is 186.35 minus 187.33, a fall of about Rs 0.98. Option C is correct. The result looks surprising because no toll rate changed and total revenue rose, but the average is a weighted average of fixed tolls, and its weights shifted. Bus and truck crossings, at Rs 305 each, fell from 20 to 18 lakh, while cheaper cars at Rs 90 rose from 48 to 54 lakh; that shift towards low-toll vehicles slightly outweighed the gain from more multi-axle vehicles. Option A divides the revenue increase of 1,775 by the 2025 crossings, and option B divides it by the 2024 crossings; neither is a change in the average. Option D assumes that unchanged rates mean an unchanged average.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: with every toll rate unchanged, the average still moves because the mix of vehicles changed, and here it fell slightly.

Q22 D Weighted average of survival rates MED

Overall survival is total survivors divided by total saplings, not a simple average of the three percentages. North bank: 70 per cent of 12,000 is 8,400. Creek mouth: 85 per cent of 8,000 is 6,800. South bank: 60 per cent of 5,000 is 3,000. Total survivors are 8,400 plus 6,800 plus 3,000, which is 18,200, out of 12,000 plus 8,000 plus 5,000, which is 25,000 saplings. The overall rate is 18,200 divided by 25,000, which is 0.728, or 72.8 per cent. Option D is correct. Option A, about 71.7 per cent, is the simple average of 70, 85 and 60; it gives the small South bank plot the same weight as the large North bank plot, which is wrong because the plots had different numbers of saplings. Option B, 27.2 per cent, is the share that died rather than survived. Option C, 75.0 per cent, has no basis in the data. A quick check: 25,000 times 0.728 is 18,200, matching the total.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: averaging the three percentages ignores that the plots had 12,000, 8,000 and 5,000 saplings, so the larger plots must count for more.

Q23 B Counting deaths and costing replacements MED

Every sapling that died was replaced. Total saplings planted were 25,000 and total survivors after the first year were 18,200 (8,400 plus 6,800 plus 3,000), so the number that died is 25,000 minus 18,200, which is 6,800. Checking plot by plot: North bank lost 30 per cent of 12,000, which is 3,600; the creek mouth lost 15 per cent of 8,000, which is 1,200; the South bank lost 40 per cent of 5,000, which is 2,000; and 3,600 plus 1,200 plus 2,000 is 6,800. At Rs 40 per replacement sapling, the cost is 6,800 times 40, which is Rs 2,72,000. Option B is correct. Option C, Rs 7,28,000, prices the 18,200 survivors instead of the 6,800 dead saplings. Option D, Rs 2,17,600, applies the 80 per cent expected survival to the replacements before costing them, but the panchayat pays for every replacement sapling it plants, not only for those expected to survive. Option A has no basis in the data.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: the 80 per cent survival figure affects how many replacements will live, not how many must be bought and paid for.

Q24 A Combining survivors from two plantings, per unit area HARD

On the South bank, 5,000 saplings were planted and 60 per cent survived, which is 3,000. The 2,000 that died were all replaced, and 80 per cent of the replacements are expected to survive, which is 1,600. Survivors on the plot after replacement are therefore 3,000 plus 1,600, which is 4,600. The plot covers 5 hectares, so the density is 4,600 divided by 5, which is 920 per hectare. Option A is correct. Option B, 600, is the density before replacement (3,000 divided by 5). Option C, 1,000, is the density if every one of the original 5,000 saplings were alive, which ignores the 20 per cent of replacements expected to die. Option D, 960, wrongly applies the 80 per cent survival to the whole plot of 5,000 saplings rather than only to the 2,000 replacements (4,800 divided by 5). The calculation must keep the two plantings separate, each with its own survival rate, before combining them.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: it applies the replacements' 80 per cent survival to all 5,000 saplings, when the first planting's survivors were already fixed at 3,000.

Q25 C Multi-step unit conversion: count to kilograms to tonnes to rupees HARD

First count the surviving trees after replacement. Original survivors were 18,200. Replacements numbered 6,800, and 80 per cent of them are expected to survive, which is 5,440. Total surviving mangroves are 18,200 plus 5,440, which is 23,640. Each removes 12 kg of carbon dioxide a year, so together they remove 23,640 times 12, which is 2,83,680 kg, or 283.68 tonnes. At Rs 1,500 a tonne, the annual payment is 283.68 times 1,500, which is Rs 4,25,520. Option C is correct. Option A, Rs 3,27,600, counts only the 18,200 original survivors and forgets the replacements. Option B, Rs 4,50,000, assumes all 25,000 saplings survive, as if every planting place held a living tree. Option D, Rs 42,55,200, is ten times the correct figure; it results from dividing by 100 rather than 1,000 when converting kilograms into tonnes.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: it uses the survivor count from the first year and leaves out the 5,440 replacements that are expected to live.

Q26 A Stretch: working backwards from a target weighted average ELITE

Overall survival of 80 per cent of 25,000 saplings means 20,000 survivors. The North bank and creek mouth plots, unchanged, contribute 8,400 and 6,800, which is 15,200. The South bank must therefore supply 20,000 minus 15,200, which is 4,800 survivors out of its 5,000 saplings. That is 4,800 divided by 5,000, which is 0.96, or 96 per cent. Option A is correct. Check: 8,400 plus 6,800 plus 4,800 is 20,000, which is exactly 80 per cent of 25,000. Option C, 85 per cent, comes from treating the target as a simple average of three rates, solving $70 + 85 + x = 240$; that ignores the different plot sizes. Option B, 80 per cent, wrongly assumes that the South bank alone needs to match the target rate, which would give only 4,000 survivors and an overall rate of 76.8 per cent. Option D is wrong because 96 per cent is below 100 per cent, so the target was attainable.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: equal-weight averaging gives 85 per cent, but the South bank holds only a fifth of the saplings, so it must reach 96 per cent.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Which section of the Transfer of Property Act codifies lis pendens? — **Section 52**
2. Which Article bars dismissal by an authority below the appointing authority? — **Article 311(1)**
3. Sonapur: total toll revenue in 2024? — **Rs 16,860 lakh**
4. Kharadi: saplings that died in the first year? — **6,800 (25,000 - 18,200)**
5. Is a transfer pendente lite void under Section 52? — **No; it is subject to the result of the suit**
6. Which 1972 case explained that a transfer pendente lite binds the transferee to the decree? — **Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami**
7. Does lis pendens depend on the transferee's notice of the suit? — **No; it rests on necessity**
8. Does Section 52 apply to a collusive suit? — **No**
9. When does pendency begin under Section 52? — **When the plaint is presented**
10. When does pendency end under Section 52? — **When the decree is fully satisfied, discharged or unobtainable**
11. Does a money suit freeze the debtor's land under Section 52? — **No**
12. Exception that lets a party transfer property during a suit? — **Authority (leave) of the court**
13. Is a transfer pendente lite valid between transferor and transferee? — **Yes**
14. What kind of property does Section 52 cover? — **Immovable property**
15. What must be 'directly and specifically' in question for lis pendens? — **A right to immovable property**
16. Year of the Transfer of Property Act? — **1882**
17. Which clause of Article 311 requires an inquiry before dismissal? — **Clause (2)**
18. Three penalties covered by Article 311(2)? — **Dismissal, removal, reduction in rank**
19. Exception (a) to the inquiry in Article 311(2)? — **Conduct leading to a criminal conviction**
20. Exception (b) to the inquiry in Article 311(2)? — **Inquiry not reasonably practicable, reason recorded**
21. Exception (c) to the inquiry in Article 311(2)? — **Security of the State, President/Governor satisfied**
22. Which 1985 case held reasons under 311(2)(b) are reviewable? — **Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel**
23. Must the reason under Article 311(2)(b) be in writing? — **Yes**
24. Who must be satisfied under Article 311(2)(c)? — **The President or the Governor**
25. Which 1958 case drew the line for probationers' termination? — **Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India**
26. Is ending probation under the appointment terms a 'dismissal'? — **No, unless it is punitive**
27. When does Article 311 apply to a probationer's termination? — **When it is founded on misconduct (stigma)**
28. Two rights in the Article 311(2) inquiry? — **Told of the charges; reasonable hearing**
29. Rampur library: when were fines abolished? — **April 2023**
30. Rampur: what happened to fines still owed? — **All written off**
31. Rampur: rise in books returned late? — **About one-tenth**
32. Rampur: rise in members who borrowed at least once? — **About one-third**
33. Rampur: change in books never returned? — **Fell slightly**
34. Rampur: share of the budget raised by fines? — **Less than two per cent**
35. Rampur: which members most often had unpaid fines? — **Schoolchildren and daily-wage workers**
36. Sahyadri: by how much was the small-claim fee cut? — **Halved**
37. Sahyadri: rise in small-claim filings over two years? — **About 60 per cent**
38. Sahyadri: change in average small-claim disposal time? — **31 months to 22 months**
39. Sahyadri: what happened to the number of civil judges? — **Unchanged**
40. What usually resolves 'more cases, faster average' paradoxes? — **A change in the mix of cases**
41. Sonapur: toll per crossing for a multi-axle vehicle? — **Rs 470**
42. Sonapur: total toll revenue in 2025? — **Rs 18,635 lakh**
43. Sonapur: growth in total crossings, 2024 to 2025? — **11.1% (90 to 100 lakh)**
44. Sonapur: growth in total revenue, 2024 to 2025? — **About 10.5%**
45. Sonapur: bus/truck revenue in 2025? — **Rs 5,490 lakh (18 x 305)**
46. Sonapur: average toll per crossing in 2024? — **About Rs 187.33**