

ANSWER KEY — 14 OCTOBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	C	C	C	A	C	D	B	D	A
Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20
D	B	A	D	A	B	A	C	D	C
Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26				
B	C	B	D	A	A				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B Section 23(1)(a) — advantage of own wrong **HARD**

Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act allows either spouse to petition for restitution of conjugal rights when the other withdraws from society without reasonable excuse. However, Section 23(1)(a) bars a petitioner who takes advantage of his or her own wrong. Here, Amar's persistent abusive conduct was the proximate cause of Sudha's departure. Allowing Amar to frame Sudha's consequent departure as a 'withdrawal' and sue for restitution would be to let him profit directly from his own wrongdoing. Courts applying Section 23(1)(a) have consistently refused relief in such circumstances. Option A is wrong because mere physical departure is not automatically 'withdrawal without reasonable excuse' — the cause of the departure matters. Option C wrongly characterises repeated verbal abuse as insufficient; courts have treated sustained humiliation as cruelty that justifies departure. Option D is wrong because no statutory notice requirement precedes a Section 9 petition.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap — students may focus on the fact of departure rather than its cause and overlook the Section 23(1)(a) bar that applies when the petitioner's own wrong drove the respondent away.

Q2 C Section 9 — reasonable excuse for withdrawal; bigamy as just cause **HARD**

Under Section 9, the burden of proving a reasonable excuse for withdrawal lies on the respondent. Rajan's second 'marriage', though void under the Hindu Marriage Act, constitutes bigamy — a serious matrimonial wrong that gives Priya an entirely valid reason for leaving the matrimonial home. The void nature of the second union does not eliminate the social and emotional harm it inflicts on the first wife. Courts have held that a husband's taking of another woman in a ceremony of marriage constitutes just and sufficient cause for the wife's withdrawal, discharging her burden under Section 9. Option A is wrong because the Act does not restrict 'reasonable excuse' to grounds for divorce; it is a fact-based inquiry. Option B is wrong both because the remedy is available to either spouse and because there is no procedural requirement to litigate bigamy separately first. Option D confuses monetary consequences with legal rights.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap — students may assume that since bigamy does not appear in the divorce grounds list, it cannot constitute 'reasonable excuse,' but the concept of reasonable excuse is broader and fact-specific.

Q3 C Condonation under Section 23(1)(b) — revival of condoned wrong **ELITE**

Section 23(1)(b) provides that a court shall not grant relief where the petitioner has condoned the respondent's matrimonial offence. Condonation requires both forgiveness and resumption of cohabitation. Here, Meena forgave Ganesh and they lived together for two weeks, which satisfies the conditions for condonation. However, the law on condonation is that a condoned wrong revives if the offending spouse repeats the same type of conduct or commits any further matrimonial wrong after condonation. Ganesh resumed his adulterous relationship after the reconciliation period ended. This revives the originally condoned wrong, meaning Meena can once again rely on Ganesh's adultery as a defence. Option B is wrong because condonation only holds if the offending party does not repeat the wrong; post-condonation repetition destroys the condonation. Options A and D state rules that misrepresent the law on condonation and its revival doctrine.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap — many students stop at 'condonation' and ignore the critical revival mechanism when the wrong is repeated after reconciliation.

Q4 C Section 9 — basic eligibility **EASY**

Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is worded in neutral terms: when 'either the husband or the wife' has withdrawn from society without reasonable excuse, 'the aggrieved party' may apply for restitution. The expression 'aggrieved party' encompasses both spouses. The remedy is available on equal terms to the husband and to the wife, reflecting the Act's policy of treating spouses equally before the law in marital remedies. Option A is wrong because the section makes no distinction favouring the husband; the fiction that the matrimonial home 'belongs' to the husband has no statutory basis in this provision. Option B is wrong for the same reason — there is no

textual basis for restricting the remedy to wives. Option D introduces a one-year condition that does not exist in Section 9; a minimum marriage duration bar applies only to divorce petitions under Section 14.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap — students confuse the one-year bar on divorce petitions (Section 14) with the requirements for Section 9, which has no such waiting period.

Q5 A Section 23(1)(a) — post-separation wrong by petitioner ELITE

Section 23(1)(a) bars relief to a petitioner who takes advantage of his own wrong or disability for the purpose of obtaining relief. The question is whether 'wrong' under Section 23(1)(a) must predate the respondent's withdrawal. Courts have held that the section is concerned with any wrong by the petitioner that is relevant to the marriage and the petition, not merely wrongs committed before the separation. Nilesch's adultery after Kavita's departure is a serious matrimonial wrong — adultery is a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(i). Allowing him to seek restitution while having committed adultery after separation would permit him to take advantage of that wrong in the context of a proceeding aimed at restoring the marriage. Option B applies an artificially narrow temporal reading that most courts have rejected. Options C and D state procedural preconditions that do not exist in the statute.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the most attractive trap — its logic is superficially coherent (adultery happened after departure so could not have caused the departure) but ignores the court's broad discretion under Section 23(1)(a) to deny relief on account of any relevant post-marriage wrong.

Q6 C Apportionment of damages — contributory negligence MED

Under the apportionment principle applied by Indian courts following *Bhim Singh v. Kan Singh* (1980), the court does not treat contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery. Instead, it reduces the plaintiff's damages by the proportion representing the plaintiff's own share of fault. Total damages are Rs 10 lakh. Ravi was found 30% at fault, so his damages are reduced by 30%, giving Rs 7 lakh ($\text{Rs } 10 \text{ lakh} \times 0.70 = \text{Rs } 7 \text{ lakh}$). Option A states the old common law rule of absolute bar, which is no longer applied by Indian courts. Option B misapplies the last opportunity rule — apportionment has superseded that fiction. Option D confusingly awards the plaintiff only his own fault share, which is the inverse of the correct calculation.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap — students may confuse the defendant's share and the plaintiff's share, mistakenly giving the plaintiff his own fault percentage (30%) rather than deducting it from 100%.

Q7 D Last opportunity rule — historical scope; apportionment for defendants HARD

The last opportunity rule (*Davies v. Mann*, 1842) was developed to help plaintiffs recover when they too were negligent, by holding defendants fully liable if they had the last chance to avoid the accident. The rule was never designed as a tool for defendants to escape liability. Bhola created a sustained and foreseeable danger by parking an unlit lorry on a dark highway. Jeewan encountered this danger while driving. Under the apportionment approach, Bhola's original fault in creating the dangerous situation bears a substantial share of responsibility. Option A misapplies the last opportunity rule in the defendant's favour — the doctrine historically benefits plaintiffs, not defendants; applying it to give Jeewan sole liability would distort the rule beyond recognition. Option B is wrong because a fifty-fifty split is not mandated by law. Option C is wrong because road lighting is not a complete answer to the parties' respective negligence.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the primary trap — students who recall the last opportunity rule may mechanically apply it in the defendant's favour, forgetting that the rule was framed to assist negligent plaintiffs, not to exonerate negligent defendants.

Q8 B Standard of care for children — contributory negligence HARD

The standard of care in contributory negligence is the objective standard of the reasonable person, but courts may calibrate 'reasonable person' to reflect characteristics of the plaintiff where relevant. For a child, the standard is not that of the reasonable adult but that of a reasonable child of the same age and experience. An eight-year-old crossing a busy road without looking may fall short of reasonable conduct even for a child, and thus may be found partially contributorily negligent. However, Madan's concurrent fault — distraction by a mobile phone while driving — is a separate and significant breach of duty. Both contribute; the court assesses each fault independently and apportions. Option A invokes a non-existent legal rule that children below ten cannot be negligent; no such absolute rule exists in Indian tort law. Option C is wrong because the objective standard is applied with reasonable adjustments for age. Option D wrongly treats mobile phone use as a *novus actus* eliminating contributory negligence.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the most attractive distractor — students may assume the law provides a bright-line age immunity for children, when in reality it applies a child-appropriate standard of care.

Q9 D Multi-party apportionment — contributory negligence; joint defendants ELITE

Under apportionment, the plaintiff's damages are reduced by his own contributory share (20%), leaving 80% of Rs 20 lakh = Rs 16 lakh as the recoverable amount. This Rs 16 lakh is the combined liability of Truck A and Car B. As between those two defendants, the court found Truck A 50% at fault (of total) and Car B 30% at fault (of total). Their shares relative to each other within the recoverable Rs 16 lakh are: Truck A bears $50/80 \times \text{Rs } 16 \text{ lakh} = \text{Rs } 10 \text{ lakh}$; Car B bears $30/80 \times \text{Rs } 16 \text{ lakh} = \text{Rs } 6 \text{ lakh}$. Option A misstates the logic by using each defendant's raw fault percentage applied directly to Rs 20 lakh, ignoring the interaction when the plaintiff is also at fault. Option B wrongly applies the last opportunity rule to make the dominant defendant fully liable. Option C applies the old common law absolute bar, which Indian courts have moved away from.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the most dangerous trap — it reaches the right numbers (Rs 10 lakh + Rs 6 lakh) through plausible-sounding arithmetic but uses the wrong denominator, ignoring the plaintiff's 20% share.

Q10 A Burden of proof in contributory negligence MED

Contributory negligence is a partial defence available to a defendant who contends that the plaintiff's own lack of care contributed to the harm. As a defence, it must be pleaded and proved by the party asserting it, i.e., the defendant. The standard is the civil standard — the balance of probabilities. The defendant does not need to prove contributory negligence beyond reasonable doubt, which is the criminal standard. Option B incorrectly reverses the burden and imposes a criminal standard. Option C wrongly creates an automatic burden shift based on road location, which has no support in the law of torts. Option D is incorrect because contributory negligence must be pleaded; courts do not find it of their own motion, since to do so would deprive the plaintiff of an opportunity to contest the allegation.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap — students may think the plaintiff must affirmatively prove their own care to establish the defendant's liability, mixing up the elements of a prima facie negligence case with the concept of a contributory negligence defence.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q11 D Principle I — vicarious liability; frolic of own HARD

Principle I makes an employer vicariously liable for employee torts committed in the course of employment, but specifically carves out a 'frolic of the employee's own' — an act done for purely personal purposes entirely unconnected with employment. Deepak had completed his final delivery. The detour to his girlfriend's home was a purely personal errand with no connection to his delivery duties. Crucially, the accident occurred while he was still on the off-route detour — not during a return journey that could be characterised as heading back to work. At the moment of the collision, Deepak was on a complete frolic disconnected from his employment. Option A is wrong because ownership of the vehicle is not determinative. Option B is wrong because Deepak was still off-route and had not yet commenced any return toward his employment duties. Option C invents a rule about delivery drivers being independent contractors after their last delivery.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the most attractive trap — students may reason that since Deepak was 'on his way back' he was partially re-entering the course of employment, missing the fact that he was still mid-frolic at the time of the collision.

Q12 B Principle II — promissory estoppel; detrimental reliance HARD

Principle II sets out three requirements for promissory estoppel: a clear and unequivocal promise; reliance by the promisee; and detriment caused by that reliance. All three are present here. The Corporation made a clear promise not to increase fees for three years. The shopkeepers relied on it by spending significant sums on renovations. They suffered financial detriment. The Corporation is therefore estopped from resiling from the promise to the extent necessary to prevent injustice. Option A is wrong because Indian courts have consistently applied promissory estoppel against government bodies where all three conditions are met; a subsequent policy directive does not automatically override the doctrine. Option C invokes part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, which applies to immovable property contracts, not fee-exemption promises. Option D is wrong because the Principle itself states the doctrine operates without consideration — requiring consideration would eliminate promissory estoppel entirely.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap — students may assume government immunity from estoppel based on the phrase 'new government policy', when the doctrine has been applied to public bodies in both Indian and English courts.

Q13 A Principle III — privilege against self-incrimination; scope MED

Principle III protects only testimonial evidence that is incriminatory in nature. It explicitly does not extend to documents held in a bailee or agent capacity. Sunita holds the corporate board resolutions in her capacity as company secretary — she is the company's agent, not the personal owner of those documents. The documents are corporate records, not Sunita's personal testimony. Compelling her to produce them does not compel her to make any statement of fact against herself; it compels her to produce records belonging to another entity (the company). Option B misstates the scope of the privilege by treating any documentary production that could lead to incrimination as protected; the Principle expressly excludes documents held in a bailee or agent capacity. Option C invents a distinction between voluntary and compelled production that the Principle does not draw for bailee/agent documents. Option D introduces a pleaded-charge requirement the Principle does not impose for third-party documents.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap — students may conflate indirect incriminatory potential with the scope of the privilege, forgetting that the Principle draws a sharp line at testimonial compulsion and expressly excludes documents held as agent.

Q14 D Principle I — vicarious liability; prohibition versus restriction on mode ELITE

A key subtlety in vicarious liability is that an employer's prohibition does not necessarily take an employee's act outside the course of employment. If the prohibition defines what the employee must do (restricts the sphere of employment), acts outside it fall outside the course of employment. But if the prohibition merely restricts how the employee does an authorised act — the mode of doing it — the act remains within the course of employment even if done in the prohibited manner. Serving customers at a petrol pump is Suresh's authorised task. Green Petrol's instruction is about how Suresh deals with disputes — a mode restriction. Suresh's assault arose directly from a customer interaction within his authorised duties. Accordingly, the employer is liable. Option A states the common but legally incorrect view that any violation of a prohibition takes an act outside the course of employment. Option B is partially correct in conclusion but gives an imprecise reason (physical presence) rather than the correct legal analysis. Option C is wrong because employers can be vicariously liable for employees' criminal acts.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the most powerful trap — the rule that violations of employer instructions defeat vicarious liability is widely believed but is not the law; courts distinguish between prohibitions restricting the sphere of employment and those restricting the mode of doing an authorised task.

Q15 A Analytical — falsifiability; identifying what undermines an unfalsifiable argument **HARD**

The critics' core complaint is that the proponents' claim is unfalsifiable — no evidence can disprove it because 'prices would have risen faster' is a counterfactual that cannot be directly tested. The critics' challenge would be most directly supported by showing that cities that did not expand supply also saw prices rise at the same rate. This would suggest that supply expansion is doing no work at all — prices rose at the same rate with and without the policy, undercutting any causal claim. Option B, while relevant to pointing out that supply additions are absorbed by wealthy investors, does not directly address the critics' specific logical complaint about unfalsifiability. Option C supports cost-push arguments for price floors but does not address the comparative counterfactual claim. Option D about rental stock decline is tangential to the critics' specific logical objection.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the most tempting distractor — it engages with the broader affordability argument but addresses a different critique (segment mismatch) rather than the critics' specific logical objection about unfalsifiability.

Q16 B Analytical — logical inference from proportional versus absolute data **ELITE**

The passage states that affordable housing stock 'has actually declined as a share of total housing inventory.' A declining share does not automatically imply a declining absolute number. Consider: if total inventory grows from 1,000 to 2,000 units and affordable units grow from 400 to 450, the share falls from 40% to 22.5% while the absolute number rose. Alternatively, if affordable units fell from 400 to 350, both share and absolute number fell. The passage's statement about share is silent on absolute numbers. Therefore the only precise inference is that the absolute number could have either declined or grown more slowly than total inventory growth — the passage alone does not resolve this. Option A contains a mathematical error: a declining share of a growing total is perfectly consistent with an increasing absolute number. Option C is wrong because the passage makes no claim about absolute figures remaining constant. Option D is ruled out because the passage explicitly says affordable housing declined as a share, inconsistent with proportionate growth across segments.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap — the claim that 'a declining share of a growing total must mean an absolute fall' sounds mathematical but is factually incorrect, and students without rigorous quantitative reasoning may accept it.

Q17 A Analytical — identifying the logical flaw in an argument as presented in the passage **MED**

The passage states the critics' specific objection: that the claim 'prices would have risen faster without the measures' is 'unfalsifiable' and 'conveniently immune to empirical challenge.' This is a direct accusation that the proponents' claim is a counterfactual that cannot be disproved by any observable evidence — the hallmark of an unfalsifiable assertion. The passage quotes this objection in these precise words. Option B is an argument that could be made but is not the logical flaw the critics specifically identify as per the passage's text. Option C describes the second complicating factor (segment mismatch) but is not what the passage attributes to the critics' specific logical challenge. Option D is also a valid concern but is presented as an analytical complication, not as the critics' specific logical objection.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the tempting trap — it describes a real and powerful argument against supply-side policy, but the passage attributes this to the 'more granular analysis' section, not to the critics' logical challenge to the proponents' specific claim.

Q18 C Analytical — synthesising the passage's qualified conclusion **HARD**

The passage's final sentence is critical: 'Neither complicating factor proves that supply expansion is useless; it suggests rather that supply policy alone, untethered from interventions on land speculation, income support, and tenure security for renters, is insufficient.' This supports a nuanced conclusion: supply expansion has some role but must be combined with other interventions. Option A overstates — the passage explicitly says the evidence does not prove supply expansion is useless; it does not recommend reversing it. Option B makes a causal claim (speculation as the primary determinant) that goes beyond what the passage establishes. Option D introduces mandatory affordable-unit mandates as the solution; while plausible as policy, the passage does not endorse this specific mechanism — it mentions land speculation, income support, and tenure security, not mandatory quotas.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap — students who focus on the passage's critical tone toward supply expansion may leap to the conclusion that the policy should be reversed, ignoring the passage's explicit qualifier that the evidence does not prove supply expansion is useless.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q19 D Percentage change — single source **MED**

Solar capacity rose from 75.0 GW in 2024 to 96.0 GW in 2025. Applying the percentage change formula: Percentage change = $((\text{New Value} - \text{Old Value}) \div \text{Old Value}) \times 100 = ((96.0 - 75.0) \div 75.0) \times 100 = (21.0 \div 75.0) \times 100 = 0.2800 \times 100 = 28\%$. The answer is Option D (28%). Option A (24%) results from an incorrect denominator or arithmetic slip. Option B (18%) has no valid derivation from the given data — there is no computation that yields 18% for Solar. Option C (21 GW) correctly gives the absolute addition in gigawatts but does not answer the question, which asks for the percentage increase; this is a deliberate unit-confusion trap. The key step students must not skip is dividing the 21 GW addition by the 2024 base of 75 GW before multiplying by 100.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C (21 GW) is the trap — it is the correct absolute addition and students who misread 'percentage increase' as 'increase in gigawatts' will select it.

Q20 C Percentage change — comparative across multiple sources **HARD**

Percentage changes: Solar = $((96 - 75) \div 75) \times 100 = (21 \div 75) \times 100 = 28.0\%$. Wind = $((51.75 - 46) \div 46) \times 100 = (5.75 \div 46) \times 100 = 12.5\%$. Hydro = $((49.88 - 47) \div 47) \times 100 = (2.88 \div 47) \times 100 \approx 6.13\%$. Solar at 28.0% is the highest. Option C is therefore correct. Option A is wrong because it looks at absolute addition — Wind added 5.75 GW — rather than percentage change off the base; Solar's absolute addition of 21 GW already dwarfs Wind's in any case. Option B is wrong because capital intensity is an investment characteristic, not a measure of percentage growth. Option D is factually false: the three sources grew at very different rates (Solar 28.0%, Wind 12.5%, Hydro 6.13%), so the claim that all three grew at similar rates is directly contradicted by the data. Students must compute percentage change for each source separately rather than comparing only absolute GW additions.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap — students may confuse 'highest percentage growth' with 'largest absolute addition' and select Wind because 5.75 GW sounds noteworthy, forgetting to compute percentage change off the base.

Q21 B Percentage change — combined base calculation **HARD**

Combined Wind and Hydro capacity in 2024: $46.0 + 47.0 = 93.0$ GW. Combined in 2025: $51.75 + 49.88 = 101.63$ GW. Combined percentage change = $((101.63 - 93.0) \div 93.0) \times 100 = (8.63 \div 93.0) \times 100 \approx 9.28\%$. Option B states 'approximately 9.28%, calculated on the combined 2024 base of 93 GW' which is the correct calculation. Option A divides only by Wind's 46 GW base, ignoring Hydro — giving 18.5%, which is a common error when students forget to form the combined denominator. Option C averages the two individual percentage rates (12.5% and 6.13%), which is mathematically invalid when the bases differ. Option D divides by the 2025 total renewable capacity, which is the wrong denominator entirely.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap — dividing total addition (8.63 GW) by only Wind's base of 46 GW (= 18.5%) is a common error when students forget to add the Hydro base to form the combined denominator.

Q22 C Compound percentage growth — projecting one period forward **ELITE**

Solar capacity grew from 75.0 GW to 96.0 GW — a growth rate of 28% from 2024 to 2025. If the same rate applies from 2025 to 2026, the new base is 96.0 GW, not 75.0 GW: New capacity = $96.0 \times 1.28 = 122.88$ GW. Option C (122.88 GW) is correct. Option A (117.0 GW) corresponds to adding 21 GW absolutely, confusing a fixed absolute addition with percentage growth; $96 + 21 = 117$ but this is wrong because 21 GW was 28% of 75 GW, not 28% of 96 GW. Option B (114.48 GW) implies 96×1.1925 , i.e. roughly 19.25% growth, which is incorrect. Option D (119.0 GW) implies approximately 24% growth. Only $96 \times 1.28 = 122.88$ correctly applies the established 28% rate to the new 2025 base, making this a two-step compound growth problem.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A (117.0 GW) is the trap — students may add 21 GW (the absolute 2024-2025 addition) to 96 GW, confusing percentage growth with a fixed absolute addition and failing to recognise that percentage growth compounds on the new base.

Q23 B Profit% and loss% on cost price — two commodities simultaneously **HARD**

Alphonso Mango: CP = Rs 180/kg, SP = Rs 153/kg. Loss = $180 - 153 = \text{Rs } 27$. Loss % = $(27 \div 180) \times 100 = 15\%$. Pomegranate: CP = Rs 80/kg, SP = Rs 96/kg. Profit = $96 - 80 = \text{Rs } 16$. Profit % = $(16 \div 80) \times 100 = 20\%$. So Alphonso loss = 15% and Pomegranate profit = 20%, which matches Option B. Option A gives 17% loss and 16% profit — neither figure is correct. Option C gives 15% and 15% — the loss calculation is right but profit is wrong (carrying over the same percentage). Option D gives 20% for both — this would require Alphonso's SP to be Rs 144 (20% loss on Rs 180), but the SP is Rs 153. Students must compute both figures carefully.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap — it gets the Alphonso loss correct (15%) but carries over the same percentage to the Pomegranate, failing to perform the separate profit calculation.

Q24 D Profit% — target selling price given desired profit on cost **HARD**

Papaya: CP = Rs 30/kg. Current SP = Rs 24/kg (a loss of 20% on cost). To earn exactly 20% profit on cost: Required SP = $CP \times (1 + 20/100) = 30 \times 1.20 = \text{Rs } 36$ per kg. Option D (Rs 36) is correct. Option A (Rs 33) gives profit = $(33 - 30)/30 \times 100 = 10\%$, not 20%. Option B (Rs 24) is the current selling price, which yields a 20% loss — selecting it reveals a failure to read the question. Option C (Rs 38) gives $(38 - 30)/30 \times 100 = 26.67\%$, not 20%. The key difficulty is recognising that the current SP of Rs 24 represents a loss, and the student must compute the new SP for a profit.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B (Rs 24) is placed as a trap for students who misread the question and look at the table without computing; it is the current SP, which yields a loss, not the required SP for 20% profit.

Q25 A Multi-commodity total cost and revenue computation **ELITE**

Total Procurement Cost: Alphonso: $200 \times 180 = \text{Rs } 36,000$. Pomegranate: $500 \times 80 = \text{Rs } 40,000$. Banana: $1000 \times 22 = \text{Rs } 22,000$. Papaya: $800 \times 30 = \text{Rs } 24,000$. Watermelon: $1200 \times 12 = \text{Rs } 14,400$. Total Cost = Rs 1,36,400. Total Revenue: Alphonso: $200 \times 153 = \text{Rs } 30,600$. Pomegranate: $500 \times 96 = \text{Rs } 48,000$. Banana: $1000 \times 26.40 = \text{Rs } 26,400$. Papaya: $800 \times 24 = \text{Rs } 19,200$. Watermelon: $1200 \times 14.40 = \text{Rs } 17,280$. Total Revenue = Rs 1,41,480. Net Profit = Rs 5,080. Option A correctly states Rs 1,36,400 cost and Rs 1,41,480 revenue. Option B inflates both cost and revenue. Option C understates cost and revenue. Option D states the right cost but wrong revenue, producing an incorrect net figure. The Banana and Watermelon multiplications (non-round decimal prices) are where errors typically occur.

Examiner's note — the trap: Options B and C are traps with plausible but incorrect totals; the Banana multiplication ($1000 \times 26.40 = 26,400$) and Watermelon ($1200 \times 14.40 = 17,280$) are the most error-prone steps.

Q26 A Overall profit/loss percentage on total cost — multi-commodity **ELITE**

From Question 25: Total Cost = Rs 1,36,400; Total Revenue = Rs 1,41,480; Net Profit = Rs 5,080. Overall profit % = $(5,080 \div 1,36,400) \times 100 = 3.72\%$. The two loss-making commodities (Alphonso: $200 \times (180-153) = \text{Rs } 5,400$ loss; Papaya: $800 \times (30-24) = \text{Rs } 4,800$ loss; combined loss = Rs 10,200) are offset by gains from Pomegranate (Rs 8,000), Banana (Rs 4,400), and Watermelon (Rs 2,880), giving total gains of Rs 15,280 and a net profit of Rs 5,080. Option A (3.72% net profit) is correct. Option B (net loss) is wrong — total revenue exceeds total cost. Option C overstates the profit percentage. Option D (2.63% net loss) is wrong in both sign and magnitude.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D (2.63% net loss) is the trap — students who correctly compute the net figure but make an arithmetic error in determining whether it is profit or loss, or who err in computing the net percentage, will select it. Option B is also a trap for those who forget that multiple profit-making commodities outweigh the losses.