CLAT Gurukul — By Ready For Exam

Daily Practice Sheet — Answers, Skills & Examiner Notes — 16 October 2026

26 Qs · 0 Min
Answer key + skill tags + examiner notes

ANSWER KEY — 16 OCTOBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	A	C	D	B	C	A	D	B	C
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
A	D	B	A	C	D	B	A	C	D
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**				
B	C	A	D	B	C				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B — BNS 100(3) intent-injury test — HARD

The governing provision is BNS Section 100(3), which covers cases where the accused acts with intention to cause a bodily injury that is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Supreme Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1958 SC 465) — the settled touchstone for this clause — requires four elements: (a) a bodily injury is present; (b) the injury was intentionally inflicted; (c) the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; and (d) the accused intended to inflict that particular injury. All four elements are satisfied here: the metal-rod blow produced a documented injury (a), the blow was deliberate (b), medical evidence certifies the injury's lethal sufficiency in the ordinary course of nature (c), and the accused chose to strike the head with force (d). The accused's claim of only intending grievous hurt is irrelevant to this clause — Section 100(3) does not require intent to kill, only intent to inflict the specific injury that medical evidence shows to be ordinarily fatal.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the most attractive distractor: many candidates equate murder with an intention to kill. Virsa Singh corrects this — under 100(3) the inquiry is whether the particular injury inflicted was intended and was ordinarily sufficient to cause death, making the absence of a kill-intent irrelevant.

Q2 A — BNS 100(2) victim-specific knowledge — HARD

BNS Section 100(2) addresses situations where the accused acts with the intention of causing such bodily injury as he knows to be likely to cause the death of the particular person to whom harm is caused. The critical element is subjective, victim-specific knowledge: the accused need not know that the dose is lethal for people in general, only that it is likely to be fatal for this person. Here, the accused knew of the victim's heart condition and administered a dose that would be lethal precisely because of that condition. This satisfies Section 100(2) squarely. Section 100(1) (intent to cause death) requires direct intent to kill, which is not established merely from knowledge of a vulnerability. Section 100(4) (imminently dangerous act) requires knowledge that the act will in all probability cause death or grievous hurt in general, not victim-specifically — it is a residual clause. BNS 99 would apply only if the accused lacked the requisite knowledge, which the facts negate.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B (Section 100(1)) is the most attractive distractor because administering a lethal dose looks like an intent to kill. The critical distinction is that Section 100(1) requires direct intent to cause death, while Section 100(2) requires only knowledge of likely death to the particular person — the facts support 100(2), not 100(1).

Q3 C — Exception 2 to BNS 101 — excessive private defence — ELITE

Exception 2 to BNS Section 101 provides that culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence, exceeds the power given to such right and causes the death of the person against whom such right is exercised without premeditation and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defence. Here, the accused genuinely believed the necessity of private defence (good faith established), but the force used was objectively excessive. This brings the case squarely within Exception 2, reducing the offence from murder (Section 100) to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under Section 104. Full acquittal is unavailable because the force was excessive. Conviction under murder with maximum penalty ignores the operative exception. Reducing the offence to only grievous hurt misreads the provision — the death occurred and the charge is homicide-related; the exception only affects its classification, not whether a homicide offence is made out.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B (complete acquittal) is the most seductive wrong answer for students who recall that genuine private defence is a complete defence — they overlook that excessive exercise of that right is specifically addressed by Exception 2, which reduces rather than eliminates criminal liability.

Q4 D — Exception 4 BNS 101 — sudden fight — MED

Exception 4 to BNS Section 101 applies where the accused commits the killing in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without premeditation and without the accused having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Option D satisfies every element: the quarrel arose spontaneously from a business dispute (sudden quarrel), no weapons were drawn initially (no

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premeditation, no undue advantage), the fatal blow was struck in the heat of passion after the brawl escalated (heat of passion), and the object used was grabbed opportunistically rather than brought to the scene (no prior plan). Option A (boxing bout) involves a consensual, organised fight — not a sudden quarrel. Option B (homeowner and intruder) falls under private defence, not sudden fight — the law recognises these as distinct exceptions. Option C (soldier on orders) operates under a standing instruction, which is the antithesis of spontaneity.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B (homeowner and intruder) is the most attractive wrong choice because it involves unexpected violence. The critical distinction is that homeowner-versus-intruder facts engage Exception 2 (right of private defence), not Exception 4 (sudden fight between parties with equal standing in the quarrel).

Q5 B Exception 1 BNS 101 — cooling-off and self-induced provocation HARD

Exception 1 to BNS Section 101 requires that the act be done under grave and sudden provocation not given by the accused himself, not sought by the accused as an excuse for the offence, and that there was no sufficient time for the passion to cool. The three-hour gap between the discovery of infidelity and the killing is critical: courts consistently hold that a lapse of time indicating cooling-off defeats the Exception 1 plea because 'sudden' requires the act to be done while still under the heat of the initial provocation. Additionally, if the accused deliberately sought out the spouse to confront and then kill, the provocation may be deemed self-induced or used as a pretext, which Section 101's proviso explicitly excludes. Option A is wrong: courts do not automatically recognise spousal infidelity as grave and sudden provocation, and the suddenness requirement is strictly enforced. Option C misstates the law — both gravity and suddenness are required. Option D mis-characterises the provision: the proviso excludes provocation caused by the accused's own voluntary intoxication or provocation sought as a pretext; it does not exclude provocation arising from lawful acts simply because the underlying act is not itself criminal.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the most attractive distractor because candidates familiar with older case law on 'crime of passion' assume that spousal infidelity automatically triggers Exception 1. The correct position requires the killing to be practically contemporaneous with the provocation and not premeditated over a cooling-off period.

Q6 C BSA Section 27 — admissibility not contingent on death HARD

The admissibility of a dying declaration under BSA Section 27 is determined at the time the statement is made, not retrospectively on whether the declarant survives. What matters is that the statement was made when the declarant was in expectation of death and that it related to the circumstances of the transaction that caused the injury. If both conditions are satisfied at the time of recording, the statement is admissible as a dying declaration regardless of the subsequent medical outcome. This rule prevents a perverse situation where a declarant who unexpectedly recovers is deprived of the evidentiary benefit of her earlier statement. Option A incorrectly treats death as a precondition for admissibility. Option B is factually wrong: BSA does not restrict the recording of dying declarations to magistrates; a police officer, doctor, or any person present may record one. Option D mischaracterises the legal position: the statement's classification does not change post-survival, and its weight is governed by the totality of circumstances, not an automatic reduction.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the overwhelming first choice of candidates because the very phrase 'dying declaration' implies that death must follow. The Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified that the test is the declarant's mental state at the time of making the statement, not the subsequent occurrence of death.

Q7 A BSA — multiple inconsistent dying declarations HARD

Where two or more dying declarations are inconsistent, Indian law — as carried forward into the BSA framework — does not require a court to discard all of them or to automatically prefer the later one. The settled approach, affirmed in multiple Supreme Court decisions, is that the court must examine each declaration independently, assessing the circumstances of its recording, the mental and physical state of the declarant at that moment, the coherence of the statement, whether any external pressure was present, and the general reliability of the declaration. After this independent assessment, the court is entitled to rely on whichever declaration (or part thereof) it finds to be truthful, even if only one of the two is believed. Option B is wrong — temporal proximity to death does not automatically confer greater reliability; internal consistency, voluntariness, and corroborating circumstances matter more. Option C incorrectly treats inconsistency as rendering all dying declarations unusable. Option D imposes a mandatory corroboration requirement that does not exist in law.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C is the most attractive wrong answer: the logical inference that two contradictory declarations cancel each other out is intuitive but legally incorrect. Courts routinely accept one of two inconsistent dying declarations after a contextual comparative assessment.

Q8 D BSA — corroboration of dying declaration not mandatory ELITE

The settled legal position, most authoritatively stated in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2002 SC 2973), is that a dying declaration does not require corroboration as a matter of law. If a court, after careful scrutiny, finds the dying declaration to be voluntary (made without threat, inducement, or coaching), consistent (internally coherent and free of material contradictions), and truthful (the declarant was in a fit state of mind and had no apparent reason to fabricate), it may convict an accused solely on the basis of that declaration without any supporting evidence. The rationale rests on the maxim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire — the sanctity of dying words. The mandatory corroboration rule urged in Options A, B, and C does not exist in Indian statutory or case law. The only practical qualification is that courts should satisfy themselves about the declarant's physical and mental fitness to make the statement — which is a threshold for reliability, not a corroboration requirement.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the most attractive wrong answer because candidates conflate the general hearsay rule (which requires corroboration) with the specific dying declaration exception, which is an admissible and potentially conclusive piece of evidence precisely because it is made under the solemnity of impending death.

Q9 B BSA Section 27 — expectation of death requirement MED

A dying declaration under BSA Section 27 requires, as an absolute precondition, that the statement was made when the declarant believed he or she was about to die. This is not a technical formality: the expectation of death at the moment of making the statement is the core element that supplies the dying declaration with its heightened trustworthiness (nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire). Where the declarant has no reason to believe death is imminent — as confirmed here by the doctor's certification that the motorcyclist is stable and expected to recover fully — the statement cannot qualify as a dying declaration, regardless of whether it relates to the circumstances of the incident. The statement may nonetheless be admissible through other provisions (as a statement of a witness, or as corroborative evidence), but it is not a dying declaration. Options A and C conflate admissibility via other provisions with dying declaration status. Option D introduces a retroactive test that does not exist in BSA: admissibility cannot be determined retrospectively by subsequent events.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the most attractive distractor because the statement does relate to 'the cause of... the transaction resulting in the death,' and candidates familiar with that formula forget that the expectation-of-death element at the time of making the statement is equally indispensable.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q10 C Strengthen — causal mechanism confirmation HARD

The argument's conclusion is that mandatory labelling is necessary to reduce harm from AI-generated content. The premise chain runs: users cannot distinguish AI from real content → unlabelled AI content influences harmful behaviour → labelling will disrupt this pathway → therefore mandatory labelling is proportionate and necessary. The critical gap in this chain is the causal mechanism: will labelling actually change user behaviour? Option C directly plugs this gap by providing experimental evidence — a 40% reduction in harmful action among users shown a disclosure watermark — confirming that labelling does break the causal chain. This is the most direct and powerful strengthener because it validates the policy mechanism. Option A (voluntary schemes with high compliance) shows the market may self-correct, which actually weakens the case for mandatory regulation. Option B (one company labelling voluntarily) is irrelevant to whether all platforms should be mandated. Option D (growth of AI content) establishes scale of the problem but does not address whether labelling would solve it.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the most tempting wrong answer because it mentions labelling and high compliance — students read this as supporting the case for labelling. In fact, if voluntary compliance is already high, the argument for mandatory intervention is weakened, not strengthened.

Q11 A Strengthen — analogy validation MED

The argument uses the nutritional-labelling analogy to argue that informational asymmetry alone justifies mandatory disclosure obligations. For this analogy to be persuasive, the principle it invokes — that law compels disclosure when consumers cannot independently verify information — must already be established. Option A does exactly this: it provides legal precedent showing that courts have upheld food-labelling mandates on the precise ground of informational asymmetry, validating the underlying legal theory that the AI-labelling argument borrows from. This makes the analogy robust by anchoring it in settled law rather than mere intuition. Option B is irrelevant — the fact that the same platforms carry food ads does not validate the normative principle underlying the analogy. Option C strengthens the urgency of the problem but does not validate the analogy's legal basis. Option D establishes the research body's credibility generally but does not speak to the analogy's legal foundation.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D (Oxford report credibility) is the most attractive wrong answer because candidates reason that more research authority supports the argument more broadly. The question specifically asks about the analogy — only Option A supplies the legal precedent that makes the analogy work as a normative argument.

Q12 D Strengthen — self-regulation inadequacy HARD

The question asks what strengthens the case specifically for mandatory third-party verification over voluntary self-disclosure. The logical need for mandatory external verification arises only if self-disclosure mechanisms are unreliable. Option D supplies precisely this: an empirical audit showing that voluntary self-labelling resulted in 60% under-reporting. This directly demonstrates that self-regulation is insufficient, making the case for compulsory third-party verification compelling and evidence-based. The argument structure is: if platforms systematically misreport when given discretion, then discretion must be removed through mandatory external oversight. Options A and B (voluntary commitment by companies and platforms) actually suggest self-regulation might work, which weakens the case for mandatory verification. Option C (Digital Personal Data Protection Act) is legally tangential — even if that Act covers synthetic content, it does not speak to the reliability of self-disclosure mechanisms.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the most seductive wrong answer because it involves AI companies labelling voluntarily — students read this as supporting labelling. The question asks about mandatory third-party verification, not voluntary labelling; voluntary labelling actually undermines the case for the more stringent third-party mandate.

Q13 B Strengthen — identifying load-bearing assumption ELITE

This is an assumption-identification question phrased as a strengthen question through logical inversion. The argument concludes that mandatory labelling is 'necessary and proportionate' to reduce harm. But this conclusion is entirely dependent on the assumption that labelling actually changes user behaviour — specifically, that users who see an AI-disclosure watermark will reduce their reliance on the

synthetic content. If users continue to trust AI content at the same rate even when informed it is AI-generated, then mandatory labelling accomplishes nothing and the entire regulatory case collapses. Therefore, the finding that 'informed users significantly reduce reliance on AI content' (the opposite of Option B's stated finding) would be the single most important strengthener. This question tests the ability to identify the load-bearing assumption that the argument takes for granted but never states. Option A (Oxford report limitations) is a peripheral attack on one piece of evidence. Options C and D challenge analogies and examples, not the core mechanism.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Options A and C are attractive because they seem to address specific premises in the argument. The key insight is that the question asks for the finding whose opposite would most strengthen the conclusion — meaning we must identify the argument's central unstated assumption and then negate it, which points exclusively to Option B.

Q14 A Weaken — cost-benefit reversal HARD

The committee's central economic case rests on three claims: import reduction, job creation, and current-account deficit reduction of ₹60,000 crore annually. Option A attacks all three indirectly by showing that the net economic outcome is negative over a fifteen-year horizon when full costs — infrastructure, rehabilitation, environmental restoration — are counted against the savings. A policy that costs more than it saves is not 'economically imperative'; it is economically harmful. This fundamentally reverses the committee's cost-benefit conclusion. Option B (Paris Agreement) is a normative or political constraint, not an economic rebuttal. Option C (tribal petitions) raises a legal obstacle but does not address the economic merits. Option D (other countries' coal phase-outs) is irrelevant to India's domestic economic calculus.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C (tribal petitions) is the most attractive distractor for students aware of Forest Rights Act jurisprudence. However, petitions represent a legal risk, not an economic argument — they could delay or block the project but do not refute the economic premise that expansion would be beneficial if implemented.

Q15 C Weaken — COP28 provision scope HARD

The committee invokes COP28's language permitting developing nations to expand 'existing coal capacity' as global legitimation for the proposal. Option C destroys this argument by demonstrating a categorical mismatch: the COP28 provision, on its plain terms, applies only to already-operating mines being expanded, not to brand-new greenfield blocks. Hasdeo Arand is described as a proven but entirely unextracted reserve — a greenfield deposit. The committee is therefore relying on a provision that, correctly read, does not cover its proposal at all. This entirely eliminates the global-legitimacy pillar of the argument. Option A (non-ratification) might reduce domestic legal force but does not defeat the normative appeal to global legitimacy that the committee invokes. Option B (per capita emissions) is a counter-argument in climate negotiations but does not technically undermine the COP28 provision's scope. Option D (objections by developed nations) merely records a negotiating history; the provision was ultimately adopted.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A (non-ratification) is the most attractive wrong answer because it makes the COP28 provision sound domestically unenforceable. However, the committee relies on COP28 not as binding law but as normative international legitimation — a non-ratification argument does not defeat that normative claim, whereas Option C shows that even the normative permission does not extend to the proposed action.

Q16 D Weaken — employment claim contradiction MED

The committee asserts 80,000 direct employment opportunities as a key benefit of the expansion. Option D directly and quantitatively contradicts this claim: mechanised extraction — the only economically viable method for the Hasdeo Arand geology — generates only 12,000 direct jobs, not 80,000, because automation substitutes for the traditional labour-intensive workforce. This is not a peripheral quibble; it reduces the claimed employment benefit by approximately 85%, fundamentally changing the social cost-benefit calculus. Option A (renewable energy programme) addresses a different source of employment and does not refute the coal-mining employment claim. Option B (unionisation) might affect workforce stability post-hiring but does not reduce the number of jobs created. Option C (fossil fuel subsidy commitments) is a fiscal or diplomatic constraint, not a direct contradiction of the employment figure.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the most tempting wrong answer because renewable energy and coal employment seem directly comparable. The question asks what weakens the committee's specific claim about Hasdeo Arand coal creating 80,000 jobs — a separate programme creating jobs elsewhere does not rebut that claim.

Q17 B Weaken — solution-problem mismatch HARD

The committee's argument is a means-end argument: the means (Hasdeo Arand coal production) is justified because it solves the problem (high coal import expenditure). Option B exposes a fundamental type-mismatch between means and end: the 220 million tonnes of coal India imports is almost entirely coking coal, needed for iron and steel production and for which there is no substitute in current industrial processes. Hasdeo Arand produces thermal coal, suitable only for electricity generation. These two types cannot substitute for each other in their respective industrial processes. Therefore, producing more thermal coal domestically does not reduce coking coal imports by even a single tonne, leaving the stated problem entirely unsolved. This is a structural refutation of the premise that Hasdeo Arand production addresses India's import bill. Options A, C, and D raise real concerns but none show that the proposed solution categorically cannot address the stated problem.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D (conflicts of interest) is attractive to candidates who treat motivational attacks as substantive rebuttals. Even if true, it addresses the credibility of the recommenders rather than the logical relationship between the proposed solution and the stated problem, which is the weaken question's target.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q18 A Ratio & proportion — average deal size ratio ELITE

Step 1 — Average funding per deal in FinTech: Total funding ÷ number of deals = ₹1800 crore ÷ 12 deals = ₹150 crore per deal. Step 2 — Average funding per deal in EdTech: Total funding ÷ number of deals = ₹800 crore ÷ 20 deals = ₹40 crore per deal. Step 3 — Ratio of FinTech average to EdTech average: 150 : 40. Simplify by dividing both terms by their HCF of 10: 15 : 4. The answer is therefore 15:4. Verification: 15/4 = 3.75, and 150/40 = 3.75. Confirmed. Option B (9:4) would arise if FinTech total funding were ₹900 crore — a confusion with AgriTech. Option C (12:5) has no computational basis from the given data. Option D (3:1) would require the ratio to be 3.0, but 150/40 = 3.75 ≠ 3.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D (3:1) is the most attractive wrong answer because 150 is roughly 'three times' 40 in a casual mental estimate. The error is in rounding 3.75 to 3 — CLAT quant questions frequently test whether candidates perform the exact division or approximate it.

Q19 C Simple addition — total deals EASY

The total number of deals is obtained by summing the deals across all five sectors: FinTech (12) + AgriTech (18) + HealthTech (15) + EdTech (20) + CleanTech (10). Computing step by step: 12 + 18 = 30; 30 + 15 = 45; 45 + 20 = 65; 65 + 10 = 75. The total is 75 deals, which matches the figure stated in the passage as a built-in cross-check — always use such passage-stated totals to verify your own arithmetic. Option A (65) arises if CleanTech's 10 deals are omitted. Option B (70) arises if one sector is under-counted by 5. Option D (80) arises if one sector is overcounted by 5 — for instance, misreading EdTech as 25 deals.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** This is a direct-recall question and the passage states '75 deals' explicitly, making it a double check. The most common error is misreading one sector's number (e.g., reading HealthTech as 10 instead of 15), which produces 70 — Option B.

Q20 D Ratio & proportion — combined funding ratio MED

Step 1 — Combined funding of HealthTech and CleanTech: ₹1200 crore + ₹500 crore = ₹1700 crore. Step 2 — Funding of AgriTech: ₹900 crore. Step 3 — Ratio: 1700 : 900. Divide both terms by their HCF of 100: 17 : 9. The answer is 17:9. Verification: 1700/900 = 17/9 ≈ 1.89. The correct approach is to carefully combine only the two sectors the question specifies and avoid substituting a third sector by accident. Option A (17:12) would arise if FinTech's funding (₹1200 crore) were used instead of HealthTech's — a common sector-substitution error. Option B (4:2 = 2:1) has no computational basis from the data. Option C (19:9) would require the combined total to be ₹1710 crore — an arithmetic error of ₹10.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A (17:12) is the most attractive wrong answer because candidates sometimes confuse HealthTech (₹1200 crore) with FinTech (₹1800 crore) when reading the table quickly, then compute 1800+500=2300, and further misread this as 1700:1200 → 17:12.

Q21 B Ratio & proportion — percentage difference HARD

Step 1 — Average funding per deal in FinTech: ₹1800 ÷ 12 = ₹150 crore. Step 2 — Average funding per deal in AgriTech: ₹900 ÷ 18 = ₹50 crore. Step 3 — Absolute difference: ₹150 − ₹50 = ₹100 crore. Step 4 — Percentage by which FinTech exceeds AgriTech: (Difference ÷ AgriTech average) × 100 = (100 ÷ 50) × 100 = 200%. FinTech's average is 200% higher than AgriTech's. Verification: ₹150 = ₹50 × 3, so FinTech's average is three times AgriTech's average, which means it is 200% higher (not 300% — a common error when candidates confuse 'is N times' with 'is N% higher'). Option A (100%) arises from computing (150−50)/100 × 100 using FinTech's average as the base instead of AgriTech's. Option C (150%) has no valid computational basis. Option D (300%) arises from the 'three times = 300% higher' error.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D (300%) is the most common wrong answer because candidates compute that FinTech's average is three times AgriTech's and translate that as '300% higher.' The critical distinction: if X is three times Y, X is 200% higher than Y (not 300%), since percentage increase is measured relative to the base.

Q22 C Averages — mean computation HARD

Step 1 — Sum of India's annual exports to ASEAN over the five years: FY2021 ($30 bn) + FY2022 ($36 bn) + FY2023 ($42 bn) + FY2024 ($48 bn) + FY2025 ($54 bn) = $210 bn. Step 2 — Average over 5 years: $210 bn ÷ 5 = $42 bn. The answer is $42.0 billion. Verification using the arithmetic-progression property: the exports form an AP with first term 30, last term 54, and 5 terms. Average of an AP = (first + last) ÷ 2 = (30 + 54) ÷ 2 = 84 ÷ 2 = $42 bn. Confirmed. Option A (38.4) has no valid derivation from this data. Option B (40.2) would arise from miscounting one year or an arithmetic error. Option D (44.0) would arise from adding an extra $10 bn to the sum.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B (40.2) is the most attractive wrong answer as it is close to the correct value and could result from a careless mis-addition. Candidates who use the AP shortcut (average = midpoint = $42 bn for a symmetric sequence) can verify instantly and avoid arithmetic errors.

Q23 A Averages — ratio identification across years HARD

Check the import-to-export ratio for each year: FY2021: 48/30 = 1.60 (not 1.5). FY2022: 54/36 = 1.50 ✓. FY2023: 63/42 = 1.50 ✓. FY2024: 72/48 = 1.50 ✓. FY2025: 81/54 = 1.50 ✓. Only FY2021 has a different ratio (1.6). Therefore, the 1.5 relationship holds in FY2022, FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025 — four of the five years. Option B (all five years) is wrong because FY2021's ratio is 1.6, not 1.5. Option C (FY2023 and FY2024 only) is incomplete. Option D (FY2022 and FY2023 only) is also incomplete. The key calculation is checking FY2021 carefully: imports were $48 bn and exports $30 bn, giving a ratio of 1.6, not 1.5.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B (all five years) is overwhelmingly the most attractive wrong answer. Candidates who only check one or two years — finding the 1.5 ratio confirmed — conclude it holds throughout. FY2021 is the trap year, and only a student who checks all five years individually avoids Option B.

Q24 D Averages — mean of trade deficits MED

Step 1 — Sum of annual trade deficits: FY2021 ($18 bn) + FY2022 ($18 bn) + FY2023 ($21 bn) + FY2024 ($24 bn) + FY2025 ($27 bn) = $108 bn. Step 2 — Average deficit: $108 bn ÷ 5 = $21.6 bn. The answer is $21.6 billion. Verification: the deficits are 18, 18, 21, 24, 27. This is not a perfect AP (first two terms are equal), so the midpoint shortcut cannot be applied directly. Direct summation gives 18+18=36, 36+21=57, 57+24=81, 81+27=108; 108/5=21.6. Option A (22.0) would require the sum to be $110 bn. Option B (20.4) would require the sum to be $102 bn — a mis-addition dropping $6. Option C (23.0) would require the sum to be $115 bn.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A (22.0) is the most attractive wrong answer because 22 is close to the correct answer and candidates who make a minor arithmetic error in summing the five deficit values may arrive at a sum of 110 instead of 108.

Q25 B Averages — percentage increase HARD

Step 1 — Starting value (FY2021 exports): $30 bn. Step 2 — Ending value (FY2025 exports): $54 bn. Step 3 — Absolute increase: $54 − $30 = $24 bn. Step 4 — Percentage increase: (24 ÷ 30) × 100 = 80%. India's exports to ASEAN grew by 80% from FY2021 to FY2025. Verification: 30 × 1.80 = $54 bn, confirmed. Always use the base value (FY2021) as the denominator for a percentage-increase calculation. Option A (75%) would require an increase of $22.5 bn (from $30 bn to $52.5 bn). Option C (60%) would imply FY2025 exports of $48 bn, which is actually the FY2024 figure — a common year-confusion error. Option D (90%) would require FY2025 exports of $57 bn.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C (60%) is the most attractive wrong answer because $48 bn appears in the table as FY2024 exports, and candidates who misread or select the wrong row compute 48−30=18, then 18/30×100=60%. Careful row identification is essential.

Q26 C Averages — projection using constant increment ELITE

Step 1 — Total export growth over the observation period: FY2021 to FY2025 spans 4 year-on-year increments (FY2021→FY2022, FY2022→FY2023, FY2023→FY2024, FY2024→FY2025). Each increment = +$6 bn (confirmed: 30→36→42→48→54). Step 2 — Average absolute annual increment: $24 bn ÷ 4 = $6 bn per year. Step 3 — Project forward two steps from FY2025: FY2026 = $54 + $6 = $60 bn; FY2027 = $60 + $6 = $66 bn. The answer is $66 billion. Option A (60) gives only FY2026 and not FY2027 — a one-year error in projecting forward. Option B (64) has no valid derivation from the given data. Option D (68) would result from incorrectly adding $7 per year instead of $6.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A (60) is the most common wrong answer: candidates correctly compute FY2026 = $60 bn but stop there, forgetting the question asks for FY2027 (requiring one more increment). Reading the question year carefully — FY2027 requires two forward steps from FY2025 — is the key.