CLAT Gurukul — By Ready For Exam

Daily Practice Sheet — Answers, Skills & Examiner Notes — 25 October 2026

23 Qs · 0 Min
Answer key + skill tags + examiner notes

ANSWER KEY — 25 OCTOBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	D	A	C	B	C	A	D	A	C
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
B	A	D	B	C	C	B	D	A	B
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**							
A	D	C							

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B — Section identification — unfair trade practice (CPA 2019 s.2(47)) [MED]

Section 2(47) of the CPA 2019 lists distinct sub-categories of unfair trade practices. The conduct described — claiming '48-hour battery life' based on an unverified lab simulation — squarely fits Section 2(47)(ii) read with the clause relating to warranties or guarantees of performance 'not based on an adequate or proper test.' Option A (false representation about standard or quality) is concerned with misdescribing the inherent attribute of the goods (e.g., claiming 22 karat gold is 24 karat), not with an unverified performance claim. Option B is precisely on point: the claim about battery life is a guarantee of performance that has not been validated by any adequate or proper test. Option C relates to bargain-price advertisements for goods not intended to be sold at that price — inapplicable. Option D concerns gifts and prizes — wholly irrelevant. The precision of Option B makes it the most accurate answer for this conduct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the attractive distractor because falsely claiming '48-hour battery life' can loosely be characterised as a misrepresentation about 'quality.' However, quality refers to intrinsic attributes; the guarantee of performance from an inadequate test is captured by the specific performance-warranty clause of Section 2(47), making B the precise and correct choice.

Q2 D — Platform liability — e-commerce rules under CPA 2019 [HARD]

The CPA 2019, read with the Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020, imposes specific obligations on marketplace e-commerce entities. Rule 4(9) of the E-Commerce Rules explicitly prohibits marketplace entities from manipulating search results or search indices in a manner that is unfair or discriminatory. Where an algorithmic ranking is commercially driven (premium listing fees) and not disclosed to the consumer, it creates a misleading impression about the organic merit of the listed goods — constituting an unfair trade practice. Option A incorrectly treats the platform as having no liability at all; the Rules impose platform-level obligations independent of the seller. Option C's 'due diligence' defence is available for third-party user-generated content under IT Act provisions, not for the platform's own algorithmic manipulation. Option D correctly states that financial loss to an individual consumer is not a prerequisite for CCPA action — the deceptive practice itself is the wrong, and the CCPA can act under Section 18(1). The platform therefore faces CCPA action under this framework.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C is the most dangerous distractor: students familiar with IT Act's intermediary immunity may conflate it with consumer law defences. That immunity does not apply to conduct that is the platform's own commercial decision (manipulating rankings), as the platform steps out of its neutral intermediary role.

Q3 A — Statutory interpretation — 'free' representation under CPA 2019 [ELITE]

Section 2(47) of the CPA 2019 specifically identifies as an unfair trade practice the act of 'giving to the public any representation that creates an impression that something is being given or offered free of charge when it is fully or partly covered by the amount charged.' The key statutory word is 'partly.' The law does not require that the consumer pay the full price of the 'free' item — even partial recovery through the transaction price suffices. Here, ₹1 is charged, which means part of the cost is recovered through the transaction; the statutory test is clearly met. Option A incorrectly states that the law requires complete non-payment. However, because the question asks us to evaluate the trader's argument (not identify the correct legal position directly), Option A's evaluation — 'the argument succeeds because the law requires complete non-payment' — is the wrong answer precisely because this claim about the law is false; the statute uses 'partly.' Option C correctly captures why the argument fails and represents the accurate legal position. Therefore A (the claim that the argument succeeds on this erroneous statutory reading) is the wrong answer that the question steers away from, and C is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is extremely attractive because students may instinctively feel that charging ₹1 is 'technically not free' and that full non-payment is required. The statute's use of 'fully or partly' demolishes this intuition. Elite questions require exact statutory reading; approximations fail here.

Q4 C — Scope of unfair trade practice — medium of representation [HARD]

NAME: _____ ROLL NO: _____ BATCH: _____

Section 2(47) of the CPA 2019 is deliberately broad in its scope regarding the medium of representation. It expressly covers statements made 'orally or in writing or by visible representation' — a brochure distributed to customers falls squarely within 'writing or visible representation.' The brand's argument that Section 2(47) is limited to formal advertisements is legally indefensible because the statutory text does not make this distinction. Furthermore, the Act's regulatory architecture under CCPA (Section 18) empowers the authority to act against any unfair trade practice, not merely advertising. Options A and D propose restrictions on the scope of coverage that are not present in the statute. Option B introduces a dishonest intent requirement — the CPA 2019 does not require mens rea or dishonest intent for unfair trade practice liability; the practice's effect on consumers is the relevant test. Option C accurately captures that the definitional clause covers all forms of representation and that 'hallmarked' carries a specific quality connotation in the gold trade, making a false use of the term an unfair trade practice.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D is the attractive distractor: it attempts to re-characterise the quality misrepresentation as a 'product liability' issue. Product liability under Chapter VI of CPA 2019 involves physical harm from defective products — it is a distinct cause of action. A quality misrepresentation in trade promotion is an unfair trade practice under Section 2(47), not a product liability claim.

Q5 B Proportionality review — Om Kumar doctrine (service matters) HARD

In Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001), the Supreme Court laid down a dual-standard framework: where fundamental rights are affected by administrative action, proportionality review is required; where they are not, the Wednesbury standard applies. The right to livelihood is recognised as a component of the right to life under Article 21. Dismissal from government service, being the most severe penalty affecting the individual's livelihood, engages proportionality review. Under that standard, courts assess: (i) whether the objective is legitimate; (ii) whether the measure is suitable; (iii) whether the measure is necessary (least restrictive); and (iv) whether there is fair balance between the individual's burden and the public benefit. Here, the single inadvertent delay causing no harm is unlikely to satisfy the 'necessary' prong — a minor penalty would have sufficed. Option A incorrectly applies the Wednesbury standard; once a fundamental right is engaged, Om Kumar mandates proportionality. Option C incorrectly limits proportionality to procedural aspects — Om Kumar extends it to the quantum of punishment when fundamental rights are at stake. Option D misstates the ratio of Om Kumar entirely.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C is the most dangerous distractor: it concedes proportionality in principle but artificially limits it to procedure. This reflects a common misreading that courts cannot 'substitute their view' on punishment quantum. Om Kumar itself recognised that courts, while not selecting the punishment themselves, can set aside disproportionate penalties.

Q6 C Legitimate expectation — procedural vs substantive HARD

The doctrine of legitimate expectation in Indian administrative law recognises two forms: procedural and substantive. A consistent course of conduct by a public authority — here, ten years of uninterrupted renewal — creates, at minimum, a procedural legitimate expectation: the expectation of being heard before the established practice is departed from. This is supported by the principles of natural justice and the requirement of procedural fairness. The sudden circular denying all applications without any hearing violates this expectation. Option A overstates the position that statutory discretion can never be fettered by legitimate expectation — courts have consistently held that legitimate expectation can qualify how discretion is exercised. Option C correctly identifies the procedural dimension without overclaiming a substantive entitlement. Option D is wrong because the law does not limit legitimate expectation to specific individual promises; consistent past practice is sufficient. Option D would also render the doctrine largely hollow in practice.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C (substantive entitlement amounting to a vested right) is the attractive distractor — students may feel ten years of consistent conduct generates an absolute right. Courts, however, sharply distinguish procedural from substantive legitimate expectation, and even substantive expectations are not absolute; they are weighed against public interest. The corporations has power to refuse — it must simply do so after hearing the hawkers.

Q7 A Proportionality review — Om Kumar standard and constitutional basis ELITE

Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001) is the foundational authority establishing that where administrative action curtails a fundamental right, proportionality — not merely Wednesbury reasonableness — is the appropriate standard of review. Article 19(1)(g) protects the right to carry on any trade or profession, which is a fundamental right. A licensing restriction that affects this right requires the authority to demonstrate not only a legitimate aim, but also that the measure is necessary, suitable, and proportionate to that aim. The High Court's dismissal of proportionality as a 'foreign import' is constitutionally incorrect: Om Kumar explicitly endorsed proportionality as part of Indian administrative law for fundamental rights cases. Option B misstates the legal position on separation of powers — proportionality review does not involve courts substituting their judgment; it involves courts holding authorities to a standard of rational and minimal intrusion. Option D's suggestion that only the Article 21 procedural test applies is wrong: Article 19(1)(g) directly attracts proportionality. The correct answer is C.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D is the most seductive wrong answer: it invokes Article 21 and 'procedure established by law' — familiar territory for students — and seems to offer a principled constitutional basis. The error is that it is the wrong Article and the wrong standard; Article 19(1)(g) is engaged, and that provision explicitly requires that restrictions be 'reasonable,' which courts have read through the proportionality lens under Om Kumar.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q8 D Principle Application — absence of evidence standard MED

The stated principle requires 'clear and documented evidence that the candidate actively engaged in the prohibited act.' It further specifies that 'mere proximity' or 'possession of permissible materials that could theoretically be misused' does not constitute misconduct. Priya's situation presents: (i) the chit is in her handwriting — a factual link — but (ii) there is no evidence that she passed it to Rohan, and (iii) her explanation (she wrote it as notes) is uncontroverted by any direct evidence. The principle's first limb requires

clear and documented evidence of active engagement; circumstantial handwriting evidence, without proof of the act of passing, does not reach that standard. Option A incorrectly suggests Priya must rebut beyond doubt once handwriting is established — the principle places the burden on the authority to establish misconduct, not on the candidate to disprove it. Option B incorrectly aggregates proximity and a written connection to meet the 'knowingly facilitated' threshold — facilitation requires established knowledge of intent to assist, not mere physical links. Option D accurately applies the principle.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the attractive distractor: the handwriting link feels intuitively incriminating, and students may instinctively feel Priya should explain herself adequately. The principle is clear, however — the burden of establishing misconduct lies with the authority, and circumstantial links do not substitute for clear documented evidence of the active act.

Q9 A Principle Application — knowing facilitation (positive act requirement) HARD

The principle draws a specific distinction: knowing facilitation — even without personal benefit — is treated on par with the primary act. However, facilitation requires an affirmative act of enabling or assisting. Aakash's conduct is purely passive: he knew of the violation but neither assisted Dev in using the phone nor did he enable the use in any way. 'Knowingly facilitated' in the principle's language implies some positive act that enables the primary wrong — silence alone, without any enabling action, does not satisfy this requirement. Option B correctly captures this distinction: without a positive act, the principle's facilitation clause is not triggered. Option A is the attractive wrong answer — it claims silence constitutes 'passive facilitation.' The principle does not use the word 'passive'; facilitation in its legal and contextual sense requires active contribution. Option C invents a 'duty to report' — the principle does not impose any such duty. Option D invokes the proximity clause, but the principle explicitly says proximity alone does not constitute misconduct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the precise distractor: 'passive facilitation' sounds principled and legally nuanced. Students reasoning by analogy to concepts like 'abetment by silence' in criminal law may select it. However, the stated principle is the controlling text, and it does not recognise passive inaction as facilitation.

Q10 C Principle Application — third-party facilitator HARD

The principle states: 'if the examination authority establishes that the candidate knowingly facilitated another's prohibited act — even without personal benefit — that candidate shall be treated on par with the candidate who committed the primary act.' Neha is not a candidate and is therefore outside the scope of 'candidate shall be treated on par.' However, the question asks what the principle says about Neha's liability within its own terms. The principle does not govern non-candidates; it governs candidates who facilitate other candidates. Neha's liability for what she did is therefore not addressed within this principle — any action against her would need to be grounded in separate provisions. Option B applies the facilitator clause to Neha — but that clause governs candidates who facilitate; Neha is not a candidate. Option C correctly identifies this limitation. Option D suggests Neha is the 'primary wrongdoer' — but the question asks about the principle's application, and the principle does not address non-candidates at all.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the dangerous distractor: it correctly identifies that Neha 'knowingly facilitated without personal benefit' and jumps to the 'on par' conclusion. The trap is that the principle's 'candidate' language is a limiting term — Option B reads over it. Precision in reading the principle's scope defeats this otherwise compelling option.

Q11 B Principle Application — collective vs individual evidence ELITE

The principle is unambiguous: misconduct is established ONLY IF clear and documented evidence exists that the candidate 'actively engaged' in the prohibited act. The principle does not provide an exception for administrative impossibility of individual identification. Collective cancellation — applying a group penalty because individual attribution is difficult — directly contradicts the principle's requirement of evidence against each individual. Option C correctly reflects this: cancelling candidatures of 30 candidates when the authority lacks individual evidence against most of them is impermissible under the principle, regardless of practical necessity. Option A incorrectly posits broad administrative discretion as an override for the principle. Option B attempts to save collective action by invoking 'practical necessity' — but the principle admits of no such exception. Option D misapplies the facilitator clause: it requires the authority to identify at least one candidate who facilitated the impersonation, but that still only permits action against that specific candidate and the impersonator — not the entire row. The principle is an individual-evidence standard with no group-liability exception.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Options A and B are co-equally attractive because they invoke real-world justifications (administrative convenience; impracticability of identification) that feel compelling. Elite-level reasoning requires resisting these consequentialist pulls and applying the principle's text strictly. The principle's 'ONLY IF' formulation is categorical.

Q12 A Valid inference from analytical passage HARD

The passage states that the fiscal multiplier for stimulus spending is 'substantially lower in open economies with high import propensity, because a significant portion of increased domestic demand leaks out through imports rather than stimulating local production.' This directly supports Option C: in a high-import-propensity economy, a stimulus may produce a smaller domestic multiplier than in a relatively closed economy. This is a valid inference directly drawn from the passage's stated causal logic. Option A is contradicted by the passage — it says no single prescription fits all conditions; the IMF's recommendation of stimulus is not universal. Option B is invalid: the passage describes the 'contractionary spiral' phenomenon — premature consolidation can worsen the deficit — meaning consolidation does not always improve the fiscal position. Option D overstates the case — the passage says aggressive stimulus 'may' lead to wider deficit and higher debt-to-GDP; it does not assert this as an invariable outcome.

Examiner's note — the trap: The question asks what can be VALIDLY INFERRED. Option D is attractive because it sounds like a direct paraphrase of the passage. The qualifying word 'invariably' in Option D, however, makes it an overstatement — the passage uses 'may,' not 'always.' Valid inference must not go beyond what the passage asserts.

Q13 D Identifying core assumption of an argument MED

The argument for 'fiscal multiplier reversal' is: premature consolidation (cutting government spending before private investment recovers) can cause economic activity to fall, which reduces tax revenues to such an extent that the fiscal deficit worsens despite the direct saving from reduced expenditure. The core assumption is that the negative effect on activity and revenues is large enough to outweigh the direct saving. This is Option B. Option A introduces a comparison between government and private investment productivity — this is not what the argument assumes; the argument concerns the revenue consequences of a demand shock, not investment quality. Option C inverts the logic about risk premiums — the argument does not claim that consolidation lowers borrowing costs; it claims the revenue collapse outweighs the expenditure saving. Option D claims the multiplier is negative, which would mean stimulus reduces output — the opposite of what the passage claims.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the attractive distractor: it invokes the familiar 'crowding out' debate (government vs private investment). But the argument for multiplier reversal is about the revenue consequences of reducing government demand, not about comparative investment efficiency.

Q14 B Identifying analytical flaw in a policy argument HARD

The official's argument that stimulus is 'self-financing' because higher demand raises revenues contains multiple logical gaps, all captured in Option B. First, the multiplier effect is not guaranteed to be large enough to generate revenues covering the full stimulus cost — in open economies, import leakage reduces the multiplier. Second, the stimulus itself must be financed by borrowing, which generates debt servicing costs (interest payments) that grow over time. Higher demand may raise tax revenue, but the net fiscal position depends on whether that revenue gain exceeds both the debt-servicing cost of the borrowing and any multiplier leakage. The argument treats revenue gain as sufficient without accounting for these offsets. Option A is narrow — it focuses only on tax structure. Option C introduces a separate condition (full capacity) which may limit the argument's scope but is not the 'most significant' flaw in the logic of self-financing. Option D reframes the argument as correct — this is directly contradicted by the passage's analysis.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is attractive because it correctly identifies that stimulus at full employment causes inflation rather than output growth — a real economic insight. However, the question asks for the 'most significant analytical flaw' in the self-financing claim specifically. The failure to account for debt servicing cost and multiplier leakage is the direct and most fatal objection to the self-financing argument.

Q15 C Evidence that challenges a conclusion — analytical reasoning ELITE

The passage concludes that 'no single prescription fits all conditions.' To challenge this conclusion most seriously, we need evidence showing that a single condition does in fact determine the appropriate policy in all cases — i.e., a universal determinant exists. Option B provides exactly this: if a cross-country study of 80 economies over 30 years consistently found that the debt-to-GDP ratio (relative to a threshold) fully predicted which policy produced recovery, this would suggest a single structural feature universally determines the correct policy — directly undermining the passage's 'no single prescription' claim. Option A actually supports the passage's conclusion (different economies used different policies with mixed outcomes, confirming context-dependency). Option C also supports the conclusion — the IMF's frequent revisions confirm context-dependency. Option D confirms that structural features matter (supporting the passage's view) but does not establish that one feature alone is sufficient — it merely validates the analytical framework the passage already endorses.

Examiner's note — the trap: Options A, C, and D all either support the passage or are neutral — a careful reader will identify these as non-challengers. The trap in Option D is subtle: it sounds like it 'confirms something' about the passage's analytical approach, which students may confuse with challenging the conclusion. Option B alone presents an empirical finding that, if true, would replace context-dependent analysis with a single universal threshold.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q16 C Percentage change — combined renewable capacity MED

Step 1 — Compute Rajasthan's 2021 total: Solar 10.8 + Wind 4.2 + Hydro 0.1 = 15.1 GW. Step 2 — Compute 2024 total: Solar 22.5 + Wind 5.6 + Hydro 0.1 = 28.2 GW. Step 3 — Percentage increase = [(28.2 − 15.1) / 15.1] × 100 = [13.1 / 15.1] × 100 = 86.75%, which rounds to approximately 87%. Among the four options — 74%, 95%, 87%, 108% — Option C (approximately 87%) matches this result exactly. Option A (74%) results from computing the percentage increase in Solar only using a wrong denominator. Option B (95%) over-estimates the growth. Option D (108%) corresponds to computing only the Solar growth percentage (22.5/10.8 − 1 ≈ 108%) and ignoring Wind and Hydro — a common error when students read the Solar columns selectively and treat Solar growth as total renewable growth. The correct technique is to aggregate all three source types for each year before computing the percentage change.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D (approximately 108%) is the strongest distractor: Rajasthan's solar capacity more than doubled, and students who compute Solar growth alone arrive at 108% and select D. The question specifies 'Solar + Wind + Hydro combined,' which demands summing all three columns.

Q17 B Percentage share — wind capacity in 2024 MED

The question asks for Wind energy as a share of total (Solar + Wind + Hydro) in 2024 for each state. Compute for all four options: Gujarat: Wind=10.2 GW, Total=14.8+10.2+0.9=25.9 GW → Wind share = 10.2/25.9 = 39.4%. Tamil Nadu: Wind=13.5 GW, Total=11.4+13.5+2.3=27.2 GW → Wind share = 13.5/27.2 = 49.6%. Karnataka: Wind=7.1 GW, Total=18.2+7.1+3.8=29.1 GW → Wind share

= 7.1/29.1 = 24.4%. Rajasthan: Wind=5.6 GW, Total=22.5+5.6+0.1=28.2 GW → Wind share = 5.6/28.2 = 19.9%. Ranking: Tamil Nadu (49.6%) > Gujarat (39.4%) > Karnataka (24.4%) > Rajasthan (19.9%). Tamil Nadu has the highest wind share among the options. The correct answer is B. Note that absolute wind capacity is not the same as wind share — Tamil Nadu's large hydropower and solar base is still smaller in total terms than Rajasthan's solar-dominant portfolio, making the share calculation essential.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A (Gujarat) is the dangerous distractor — Gujarat is culturally associated with India's wind energy leadership, and students relying on general knowledge rather than computing the ratio will select A. Tamil Nadu, however, has a proportionally larger wind share because its solar capacity in 2024, while high, is smaller than its wind capacity.

Q18 D Arithmetic — aggregate solar capacity change HARD

This question requires summing Solar capacity across all five states in each year, then computing the difference. Step 1 — Total Solar 2021: Rajasthan 10.8 + Gujarat 7.6 + Tamil Nadu 5.2 + Himachal Pradesh 0.4 + Karnataka 8.6 = 32.6 GW. Step 2 — Total Solar 2024: Rajasthan 22.5 + Gujarat 14.8 + Tamil Nadu 11.4 + Himachal Pradesh 1.2 + Karnataka 18.2 = 68.1 GW. Step 3 — Increase = 68.1 − 32.6 = 35.5 GW. The correct answer is D (35.5 GW). A critical discipline here is column isolation: the question asks about Solar only, so Wind and Hydro figures must be excluded from both summations. The five-state solar increment of 35.5 GW over three years represents a compound annual growth rate of approximately 28%, consistent with India's accelerated solar installation pace from 2021 to 2024. Option A (35.5 GW) appears as both a distractor and the answer — only Option D in the given list is 35.5 GW, confirming the selection.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C (37.3 GW) is the attractive distractor — students who accidentally add Himachal Pradesh's Hydro growth (1.3 GW) into the Solar tally instead of its Solar growth (0.8 GW) will overshoot the answer. Carefully reading column headers is essential in multi-column DI questions.

Q19 A Projection — linear extrapolation MED

Step 1 — Compute the annual increment: Himachal Pradesh's solar capacity grew from 0.4 GW in 2021 to 1.2 GW in 2024, an increase of 0.8 GW over 3 years. Annual absolute increment = 0.8 ÷ 3 ≈ 0.267 GW per year. Step 2 — Project forward from 2024 (base = 1.2 GW): 2025 ≈ 1.467 GW; 2026 ≈ 1.734 GW; 2027 ≈ 2.001 GW; 2028 ≈ 2.268 GW; 2029 ≈ 2.535 GW. The capacity first exceeds 2.5 GW in 2029. Option A (2029) is correct. Option B (2027) corresponds to the error of asking when capacity exceeds 2.0 GW — a student who misreads the threshold will arrive at 2027. Option C (2026) is too early — the capacity is only 1.73 GW in 2026 on this trajectory. Option D (2028) corresponds to incorrectly computing the increment as 0.4/3 = 0.133 GW/year rather than 0.8/3, reaching 2.5 only after many more years — or to misreading the starting point. The key discipline is to compute the increment over the stated span and apply it sequentially from the most recent data year.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B (2027) is the attractive distractor — students who target 2.0 GW instead of 2.5 GW as the threshold, or who round the annual increment too aggressively, will arrive at 2027. Careful reading of 'first exceed 2.5 GW' and precise annual projection from the 2024 base prevents this error.

Q20 B Operating cost per km — Phase III HARD

Phase III has a network length of 160 km and an annual operating cost of ₹1,440 crore (as stated in the caselet). Formula: Operating cost per km = Total annual cost ÷ Network length = ₹1,440 crore ÷ 160 km = ₹9.00 crore per km. The correct answer is B (₹9.00 crore per km). Option A (₹8.00 crore per km) results from incorrectly dividing by 180 km or from using a lower cost figure. Option C (₹10.00 crore per km) arises from rounding the cost figure upward or dividing by 144 km. Option D (₹7.50 crore per km) results from using an incorrect Phase III cost of ₹1,200 crore. This question tests the straightforward application of the cost-per-unit formula to data from the caselet — the primary error source is misreading the stated cost figure or the network length. Phase III's elevated per-km cost (₹9 crore vs the legacy network's ₹12 crore per km) reflects the newer infrastructure's smaller ridership base relative to its construction and maintenance outlay.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A (₹8.00 crore per km) is the attractive distractor — students who recall that newer phases tend to be more expensive may second-guess their arithmetic and round down to the 'plausible' ₹8 figure. The caselet's explicit figures must take precedence over intuition.

Q21 A Fare box revenue — legacy network annual total MED

The legacy network (Phase I + II) carries 28,00,000 passengers daily at an average fare of ₹35 per trip. Step 1 — Annual passengers: 28,00,000 × 365 = 10,22,00,000 passenger-trips per year. Step 2 — Annual revenue: 10,22,00,000 × ₹35 = ₹3,57,70,00,000 = ₹3,577 crore. The exact arithmetic: 2,800,000 × 365 = 1,022,000,000; multiply by 35 = 35,770,000,000 = ₹3,577 crore (or ₹3,577.00 crore to two decimal places; the option lists ₹3,577.75 as a slight rounding version). Option A is correct. Option B (₹3,430.25 crore) is the result of using 350 days instead of 365 days — a common error from students who assume metro networks do not operate on certain days. The caselet is explicit: treat 1 year = 365 days. Option C (₹3,650.00 crore) involves using 28,00,000 trips at ₹37.01 — a misread fare. Option D (₹3,211.50 crore) corresponds to using only 28 lakh passengers at ₹31.5 fare, both incorrect. Always extract fare and daily ridership figures precisely from the caselet text.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B (₹3,430.25 crore) is the strong distractor — it results from using 350 operating days, a 'reasonable' assumption that metro networks shut for maintenance. The caselet's instruction to use exactly 365 days overrides this intuition.

Q22 D Net surplus/deficit — multi-source financial calculation HARD

Step 1 — Total annual operating costs: Legacy network = ₹2,280 crore; Phase III = ₹1,440 crore. Total costs = ₹2,280 + ₹1,440 = ₹3,720 crore. Step 2 — Total income: Fare box revenue = ₹2,850 crore; VGF grant = ₹600 crore. Total income = ₹2,850 + ₹600 = ₹3,450 crore. Step 3 — Net position = ₹3,450 − ₹3,720 = −₹270 crore. This is a deficit of ₹270 crore. The correct answer is D. Option A (Surplus of ₹270 crore) is the sign-error version — students who subtract income from costs and forget to apply the sign correctly. Option B (Deficit of ₹90 crore) results from using the wrong Phase III cost figure (₹1,080 crore instead of ₹1,440 crore, then computing 3450−3360=90). Option C (Surplus of ₹90 crore) results from the same incorrect Phase III cost with the sign reversed. Carefully reading the updated Phase III operating cost from the caselet (₹1,440 crore) is essential to arriving at the correct deficit figure.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C (Surplus of ₹90 crore) is the trap for students who use the Phase III cost figure casually or recall an older version of the data. Precision in reading the caselet — particularly updated numerical values — is the skill tested by this question.

Q23 C Cost per passenger-trip — multi-step projection ELITE

This is a four-step calculation. Step 1 — Legacy network operating cost per km: Legacy = Phase I (65 km) + Phase II (125 km) = 190 km. Annual cost = ₹2,280 crore. Cost per km = 2,280 ÷ 190 = ₹12 crore per km per year. Step 2 — Phase IV annual operating cost: 40 km × ₹12 crore/km = ₹480 crore. Step 3 — Phase IV annual passenger-trips: 5,00,000 daily × 365 days = 18,25,00,000 trips per year. Step 4 — Cost per trip: ₹480 crore ÷ 18,25,00,000 = ₹4,80,00,00,000 ÷ 18,25,00,000 = ₹26.30 per trip. Option C (₹26.30) is correct. Option A (₹32.88) results from computing cost per km using only Phase I (65 km) as the base: 2280/65 = 35.07 × 40 = 1402.7 crore / 182,500,000 = ₹7.69 — not matching; or using Phase III's per-km cost (₹9 crore/km): 40 × 9 = 360 crore / 182,500,000 = ₹1.97 — also not matching. Option B (₹24.00) arises from rounding the legacy cost per km to ₹11 crore instead of ₹12. Option D (₹21.62) comes from using only Phase I (65 km) costs proportionally. The correct approach builds sequentially: derive legacy per-km rate → scale to Phase IV → divide by annual trips.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A (₹32.88) is the distractor for students who use Phase II alone (125 km) as the denominator for legacy cost: 2280/125 = ₹18.24/km × 40 = ₹729.6 crore / 182,500,000 = ₹4.00/trip (this yields a different figure). The key error path is using a partial legacy length. The correct base is both Phase I and Phase II combined (190 km).