CLAT Gurukul — By Ready For Exam

Daily Practice Sheet — Answers, Skills & Examiner Notes — 3 November 2026

26 Qs · 0 Min
Answer key + skill tags + examiner notes

ANSWER KEY — 3 NOVEMBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
C	A	D	B	C	B	D	A	C	B
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
D	A	C	B	A	D	B	C	D	A
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**				
B	C	A	D	C	B				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 C — Rule against bias: pecuniary interest — EASY

The passage divides interests into two kinds. Where the decision-maker has a pecuniary interest in the outcome, he is disqualified automatically, and no one need prove that bias actually operated. Any other interest invalidates the decision only if a real likelihood of bias is shown. Mr Rao holds thirty per cent of the shares of Bharat Foods, and Bharat Foods is the rival applicant for the only available stall. If Sunrise is rejected, the stall goes to Bharat Foods, so the value of his shares stands to rise with the very decision he takes. That is a pecuniary interest in the outcome, not a remote or sentimental connection. The test of likelihood of bias therefore never arises, and Sunrise need not show any actual gain or prejudice. Nothing in the passage confines the rule to judicial bodies; it governs every decision-maker. His silence about the shareholding only aggravates the defect. Hence the decision is liable to be set aside and option C is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is A: it treats a shareholding as a mere indirect interest needing proof of likely bias, whereas a stake in a company that wins the stall is a direct pecuniary interest and disqualifies automatically.

Q2 A — Post-decisional hearing in an emergency — MED

The passage states that natural justice varies with the circumstances and that, where an order is made without a hearing in a genuine emergency, a prompt post-decisional hearing may cure the defect. Both conditions are met here. The emergency was real and not invented: the inspection found fireworks stored far above the permitted quantity in a crowded residential lane, so waiting for notice and reply could have cost lives. The remedy was also prompt, because the owner was offered a full hearing within 48 hours and the Magistrate confirmed the suspension only afterwards, having heard him. The absence of a prior hearing is therefore cured. The rule of fair hearing is ordinary, not absolute, so option B misreads it. Option D is wrong because writ courts do review the process, including whether the claimed emergency was genuine. The suspension is valid, and option A is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is B: it treats audi alteram partem as an absolute pre-decision rule, ignoring the passage's allowance for genuine emergencies cured by a prompt later hearing.

Q3 D — Legitimate expectation and overriding public interest — HARD

A consistent past practice, here twelve years of supplementary examinations, gives rise to a legitimate expectation, and the passage protects it procedurally: the authority must give a hearing before departing from it. The Board gave no hearing at all, merely a notice on its website, so the procedural duty was breached. The passage adds that the expectation does not bar a change of policy justified by an overriding public interest. The only reason offered is reduction of administrative workload, which is the Board's own convenience and not a public interest strong enough to override the settled expectation of students who had already registered. So the Board must hear the affected students and must also justify the change on stronger grounds. Option B overstates the doctrine by making the expectation absolute, option A ignores the review of process, and option C ignores the requirement of a justifying public interest. Option D is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is C: it satisfies the hearing requirement but forgets the second half of the passage, that the departure itself must be justified by an overriding public interest and not by mere convenience.

Q4 B — Irrationality (Wednesbury) and scope of review — HARD

The passage says that courts review the process and not the merits, and they do not substitute their view for the authority's unless one of the three grounds is shown. Irrationality is one such ground: a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have reached it. Dismissal of a clerk with nineteen years of clean service for a single ten-minute delay is a penalty so out of proportion to the lapse that a court could hold that no reasonable employer would impose it. The hearing was given in full, so procedural impropriety is not the ground available. The High Court is also not free to prefer its own lighter punishment merely because it disagrees; it can only find irrationality and send the matter back for fresh decision. Option A is wrong because merits-review is barred only until a ground is shown, and option D wrongly treats hearing as the only ground. Option B is correct.

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Examiner's note — the trap: The attractive wrong option is A: it correctly recalls that courts avoid merits but forgets the passage's exception, that an irrational decision is itself a ground of review and need not be left alone.

Q5 C Exclusion of natural justice versus illegality ELITE

Two separate grounds are in play, and the passage treats them differently. First, natural justice may be excluded by statute expressly or by necessary implication. Section 9 empowers the Chairman to detain 'forthwith', and a power to be exercised forthwith is inconsistent with prior notice and reply, so the hearing requirement is excluded by necessary implication. The complaint of procedural impropriety therefore fails. Second, illegality includes taking an irrelevant consideration into account. The prohibited cargo is a relevant ground under Section 9, but the Chairman's wish to teach the owner a lesson for opposing his appointment is a personal motive that the Act does not authorise. His own file note records it as part of the reason. That ground survives, because exclusion of a hearing does nothing to cure an illegality. Option D is wrong because motive is reviewable as an irrelevant consideration, and option B wrongly counts the excluded hearing. Option C is correct.

Examiner's note — the trap: The attractive wrong option is B: it counts want of a hearing as a second defect, missing that the word 'forthwith' excludes the hearing by necessary implication, leaving only the irrelevant consideration.

Q6 B Article 20(2): prior prosecution before a court MED

Article 20(2), as the passage states it, has two limbs: a person must have been prosecuted and punished, and the earlier prosecution must have taken place before a court or judicial tribunal. Mahesh was dismissed after a departmental inquiry. A departmental inquiry is an administrative disciplinary process conducted by his employer; it is not a prosecution before a court or tribunal, and dismissal is a disciplinary penalty, not a punishment for an offence in the constitutional sense. The passage itself says that a departmental inquiry followed by a criminal trial is not barred. The Special Court may therefore proceed against him for the bribe. Option A and option D read the guarantee too widely, treating any penalty or any proceeding as enough. Option C misstates the article, which bars the combination of prosecution and punishment together. The prosecution is not barred, and option B is correct.

Examiner's note — the trap: The attractive wrong option is A: dismissal feels like a punishment already suffered, but the guarantee requires an earlier prosecution before a court or judicial tribunal, which a departmental inquiry is not.

Q7 D Article 20(1): penalty greater than at the time of offence MED

Article 20(1) has two protections, and the second applies here. A person cannot be given a penalty greater than the law in force at the time of the offence prescribed. In March 2021, the date of the act, the maximum was two years. The amendment of 2023 raised the ceiling to five years, but it cannot reach back to increase the punishment for an act already done. The conviction itself is unaffected, because the act was already an offence when it was done, so the first protection is not engaged and option B is wrong. The four-year sentence, however, exceeds the two-year maximum then in force and must be reduced to two years or less. Option A looks only to the date of trial, and option C treats the quantum of penalty as procedural, which the passage excludes by speaking of penalty and not of procedure. The correct statement is option D.

Examiner's note — the trap: The attractive wrong option is A: it tests the sentence against the law at the date of trial, whereas Article 20(1) fixes the ceiling by the law in force on the date of the offence.

Q8 A Article 14: rational nexus test HARD

The passage sets a two-part test for a valid classification: an intelligible differentia and a rational nexus between that differentia and the object of the law. Land holding is certainly intelligible, since it is measurable and separates large holders from small ones, so the first part is satisfied. The second part fails. The stated object is to help small and marginal farmers, yet the scheme gives the benefit only to those holding two hectares or more and excludes exactly the farmers it claims to serve. The differentia works against the object instead of advancing it, so there is no rational nexus, and the scheme is also arguably arbitrary. Option B stops after the first limb of the test. Option C is wrong because the guarantee of equality does extend to State benefits, and option D is wrong because the passage expressly permits reasonable classification. The scheme is invalid, and option A is correct.

Examiner's note — the trap: The attractive wrong option is B: it is satisfied by the clear, measurable differentia and forgets that the passage also requires a rational nexus with the stated object.

Q9 C Citizens versus persons; Article 14 and arbitrariness ELITE

The passage separates the rights by who may claim them. The rights in Article 19, including the freedom to carry on a trade or business under clause (1)(g), are available only to citizens. Karki is a Nepali national, so he cannot rely on Article 19(1)(g), however long he has lived in the city. But Articles 14, 20 and 21 are available to every person, including a foreigner. The municipal order picks him out and cancels his licence while identical violators nearby are left alone, and it gives no reason. That is selective, unreasoned treatment, which a court may strike down as arbitrary and as a breach of equal treatment under Article 14. He thus has a remedy, though not under the article he first thought of. Option A overlooks that Article 14 is available to every person, option B wrongly extends Article 19, and option D reverses the position. Option C is correct.

Examiner's note — the trap: The attractive wrong option is A: spotting that Article 19 is for citizens only, it wrongly concludes that no right survives, forgetting that Article 14 protects every person.

Q10 B Article 19(6): proportionality of restriction HARD

Article 19(1)(g) protects the shopkeeper's right to trade, and Article 19(6) lets the State impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. Child health is a legitimate public interest, so the aim of the law is not in doubt. The passage, however, adds that a restriction which is excessive or disproportionate to the need it serves is not reasonable. A blanket ban on every food item, even sealed packaged goods that carry a food-safety certification, goes far beyond what is needed to keep unsafe food away from children; a narrower rule aimed at uncertified or hazardous items would serve the object. The limited area of 500 metres does not rescue it, because the test looks at the fit between the means and the object and not at the size of the area. Option A ignores the means, option C denies any power to restrict, and option D rests on the area alone. Option B is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is A: a worthy aim of child health tempts a student to accept the law, but the passage tests the fit of the means too, and a total ban on certified items is disproportionate.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q11 D Strengthen: eliminating a rival cause MED

The commissioner's conclusion is causal: the portal made approvals faster. A rival explanation is that the 40 new junior engineers, and not the portal, cleared the queue. The best way to strengthen the causal claim is to remove that rival cause, and option D does so. If the new engineers were posted to the sanitation wing and none to the building-plan section, they could not have speeded up plan approval, and the portal is left as the main change in that section. The other options leave the rival explanation untouched. Praise for the portal's design is about user satisfaction, not speed. The lower cost per application concerns economy and says nothing about the time taken. The commissioner's long experience is an appeal to authority, which proves nothing about the cause of this fall. Only option D bears on the causal link, so it is the correct answer and it strengthens the argument most.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is B: lower cost sounds like proof of the portal's success, but cost per application says nothing about whether the time fell because of the portal.

Q12 A Strengthen: generalising a result to other cases HARD

The commissioner moves from one city's experience to a recommendation for other cities. That step assumes the portal would produce similar gains elsewhere. The strongest support is evidence that it already has: option A reports that three similar cities adopted the same portal without altering staffing or fees and each saw a sharp fall in approval time. This shows the effect is repeatable and not peculiar to this city, and by excluding changes in staff or fees it also isolates the portal as the cause. Option B shows that other cities have room to improve, but it does not show that the portal would be what improves them; slow approvals could be fixed by other means. Option C concerns the vendor's business and is irrelevant. Option D describes how the portal was introduced, not what it achieved elsewhere. Option A therefore most strengthens the recommendation.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is B: other cities being slower shows they need improvement, but not that this portal would deliver it, which is the link the recommendation requires.

Q13 C Strengthen: defeating an alternative explanation ELITE

The critic offers a specific alternative: fewer plans meant a shorter queue and therefore quicker approvals. To strengthen the commissioner, we need evidence that the speed-up happened without the drop in volume. Option C supplies exactly that. The fee was raised in July, so in the months before it, volumes were unchanged; yet approval time under the portal was already below 35 days, far under the earlier 74. If volume had been the cause, no such fall could have appeared before volume fell. The alternative is therefore badly damaged. Option A talks of revenue, which is not speed. Option B shows only that fee rises reduce submissions in other cities, which the critic may readily accept; it says nothing about what produced faster approvals here. Option D is a prediction made before launch, and a forecast does not prove a cause. Option C most strengthens the reply.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is B: it confirms that fee rises cut submissions, which actually supports the critic's premise, but does nothing to show the speed-up occurred independently of volume.

Q14 B Strengthen: validating the basis of comparison HARD

The commissioner compares an average of 74 days in one year with 31 days in the next and attributes the difference to the portal. An average can change simply because the kinds of plans changed: if the portal year had mostly small, simple plans, quicker approval would be expected whatever the system. Option B removes this doubt by showing that the mix of large, multi-storey plans was about the same in both years, so the two averages measure like with like. The difference is then more plausibly due to the portal. Option A concerns how long approvals last after being granted, which has no bearing on how quickly they are given. Option C is about construction quality after approval, a different matter. Option D merely repeats the corporation's own praise and is not independent evidence. Therefore option B alone strengthens the comparison, and it is the correct answer.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is D: the annual report seems to endorse the claim, but it is the corporation praising itself and adds no independent evidence about the comparability of the two years.

Q15 A Weaken: introducing a rival cause MED

The secretary's argument is causal: breakfast was introduced, attendance rose, so breakfast raised attendance. The surest way to weaken such an argument is to offer another cause that operated in the same period and place. Option A does that. If parents in the same districts began receiving a monthly cash incentive in 2023 for keeping children in school at least 85 per cent of days, the rise to 86 per cent is just what that incentive would produce, and breakfast need not have mattered at all. The other options do not touch the causal link. Option B, that many children went without breakfast earlier, actually supports the secretary by showing a need that the scheme

met. Option C compares fees in private schools and is irrelevant to why government attendance rose. Option D describes the menu and says nothing about attendance. Option A weakens the conclusion most seriously.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is B: it looks like a comment on the scheme's context, but it supports the secretary by showing a real hunger problem that breakfast could have solved.

Q16 D Weaken: undermining the extension to a new group HARD

The recommendation assumes that what worked for primary pupils will work for upper-primary pupils, which holds only if the same cause of absence applies to both. Option D attacks this assumption directly. If most absences among older children arise because they take up seasonal wage work, then a free breakfast addresses a problem they do not have, and the scheme is unlikely to raise their attendance. Option A is about the size of schools and does not say why pupils are absent. Option B raises the higher cost of breakfast for older pupils, which could argue against affordability but does not challenge the claim that attendance would rise; the argument is about effect, not cost. Option C is about record-keeping and is irrelevant. Only option D weakens the link between the scheme and an improvement among upper-primary pupils, so it is the correct answer.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is B: higher cost is a practical objection, but it leaves the claimed effect on attendance untouched, whereas the recommendation depends on that effect.

Q17 B Weaken: questioning the reliability of the data HARD

The secretary's evidence is a rise in recorded attendance in the government schools set against a flat record in private schools. Her argument depends on the two sets of figures being measured the same way. Option B destroys that assumption: if government schools switched in 2023 to an app on which a teacher could mark pupils present for a whole week in one entry, the recorded rise from 78 to 86 per cent may reflect looser recording, not more children in class. The private schools' flat figure then cannot serve as a fair comparison. Option A says private schools used the same method both years, which, if anything, supports the comparison with the government schools' change being genuine. Option C, a 4 per cent rise in enrolment, does not alter a percentage rate of attendance. Option D is about another country and in fact supports breakfast. Option B weakens the argument most seriously.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is D: it concerns school meals and attendance, but it supports the secretary's view; students sometimes pick an option simply because it is on topic.

Q18 C Weaken: regression to a normal level ELITE

The secretary treats the jump from 78 to 86 per cent as the effect of breakfast. Option C offers a different, natural explanation: the districts were selected because floods in early 2022 had pushed attendance down abnormally, and attendance in such areas usually recovers within a year after the floods. The 2022 base figure of 78 per cent was therefore artificially low, and a bounce back would have come with or without breakfast. This also explains why private schools elsewhere, never depressed, stayed flat at 91 per cent, so her comparison does not support her. Option A concerns private fees and is irrelevant to government attendance. Option B states a spending pattern that does not bear on attendance. Option D, that private schools in the same districts were flat as well, would in fact support her by acting as a control. Only option C undermines the causal claim, so it is the correct answer.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is D: private schools in the same districts staying flat looks like a damaging fact, but it works as a control group and so supports the secretary's argument.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q19 D Area of a rectangle and ratio MED

Area of a rectangle = length x breadth. Computing each hall: P1 = 24 x 15 = 360 square metres; P2 = 30 x 18 = 540; P3 = 20 x 20 = 400; P4 = 36 x 14 = 504; P5 = 28 x 16 = 448. The greatest floor area is that of hall P2 at 540 square metres. Its registered voters are 1620, so voters per square metre = 1620 / 540 = 3. Note that this is a ratio of the voters to the area of the same hall; it should not be confused with the highest density in the table. Hall P1 has 1440 / 360 = 4 voters per square metre, which is the densest hall, but it is not the largest. Check of other values: 2.5 would need 1350 voters in 540 square metres, and 3.6 would need 1944 voters, neither of which the table supports. The answer is therefore 3 voters per square metre, which is option D.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is the value 4: it is the density of hall P1, which is crowded but not the largest hall, so it answers a different question.

Q20 A Percentage increase and unit conversion (area) HARD

Registered voters of P1 = 1440. The press order = voters plus 10 per cent spare = 1440 x 1.10 = 1584 papers. Area of one ballot paper = 20 x 12 = 240 square centimetres. Total area = 1584 x 240 = 380,160 square centimetres. To convert to square metres, remember that 1 square metre = 100 x 100 = 10,000 square centimetres, so 380,160 / 10,000 = 38.016 square metres. This is option A. Checking the traps: leaving out the spare papers gives 1440 x 240 = 345,600 square centimetres, that is 34.56 square metres; dividing by 100 instead of 10,000, as if converting a length, gives 3,801.6; and rounding the order up to 1600 papers gives 384,000 square centimetres, that is 38.4 square metres. Each of these deviates from the stated 10 per cent allowance or the square conversion. The required area is 38.016 square metres.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is the 3,801.6 figure: a student who divides by 100 as for a length forgets that areas convert by the square, 10,000.

Q21 B Area of circle minus rectangle; capacity HARD

Area of the circular ground = pi x r squared = (22/7) x 35 x 35 = 22 x 5 x 35 = 3850 square metres. The stage occupies a rectangle of 10 m x 7 m = 70 square metres and lies wholly inside the ground, so the free ground = 3850 - 70 = 3780 square metres. Each person needs 0.6 square metre, hence the maximum crowd = 3780 / 0.6 = 6300 persons. This is option B. The common slips are these: if the stage is forgotten, 3850 / 0.6 = 6416.67, which rounds to about 6,417 persons and is the tempting value in option A; if 1.2 square metres per person is used, the crowd is halved to 3,150; and 5,600 results from a miscalculated free area. The stage area must be subtracted before dividing, because nobody can stand on the stage. The correct capacity is therefore 6,300 persons.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is the 6,417 figure: it is what one gets by forgetting to deduct the stage, which is the very step the question tests.

Q22 C Mensuration: inner rectangle and division into equal parts ELITE

Hall P4 measures 36 m x 14 m and has 1536 voters. With a 2 m passage on all four sides, the central rectangle is (36 - 2 x 2) x (14 - 2 x 2) = 32 x 10 = 320 square metres. Number of booths = 320 / 10 = 32. Voters per booth = 1536 / 32 = 48. With a 3 m passage the central rectangle is (36 - 6) x (14 - 6) = 30 x 8 = 240 square metres, giving 240 / 10 = 24 booths, and voters per booth = 1536 / 24 = 64. The increase = 64 - 48 = 16 voters per booth, which is option C. The key step is deducting the passage width twice from each dimension, once for each wall. The 64 figure in the other options is the new load per booth, not the increase, and 8 and 24 come from deducting only one width or from mistaken booth counts. The correct increase is 16 voters per booth.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is the one that gives 64: it is the new voters per booth, not the increase over the original 48, so it answers a different question.

Q23 A Average speed over two legs MED

Average speed = total distance / total time, and it is not the simple mean of the two speeds. On R1 the one-way distance is 240 km, the loaded speed is 40 km/h and the empty speed is 60 km/h. Time outward = 240 / 40 = 6 hours. Time on return = 240 / 60 = 4 hours. Total time = 6 + 4 = 10 hours. Total distance = 240 + 240 = 480 km. Average speed = 480 / 10 = 48 km/h. Cross-check with the formula for equal distances, 2xy / (x + y) = 2 x 40 x 60 / 100 = 4800 / 100 = 48 km/h. The simple arithmetic mean (40 + 60) / 2 = 50 km/h is wrong because the truck spends more time at the lower speed than at the higher speed, which pulls the true average below 50. Option A, 48 km/h, is therefore correct, and it is always below the arithmetic mean when the two speeds differ.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is 50 km/h: it is the simple mean of 40 and 60, which ignores that the truck spends six hours at the slower speed and only four at the faster.

Q24 D Relative speed: opposite directions MED

When two vehicles approach each other along the same road, their speeds add: relative speed = 50 + 75 = 125 km/h. The gap to be closed is the route length, 300 km. Time to meet = 300 / 125 = 2.4 hours, which is 2 hours 24 minutes. Distance of the meeting point from the loading hub = speed of the loaded truck x time = 50 x 2.4 = 120 km. As a check, the empty truck covers 75 x 2.4 = 180 km from the market hub, and 120 + 180 = 300 km, the full route. The meeting point is thus 120 km from the loading hub, which is option D. The value 180 km is the distance travelled by the empty truck, that is, the distance from the market hub, so it answers a different question. The value 150 km would hold only if the two trucks had equal speeds, and the faster empty truck covers more ground than the loaded one.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is 180 km: it is the empty truck's distance from the market hub, a correct figure for the wrong end of the road.

Q25 C Time-speed-distance: revised speed and percentage HARD

On R3 the distance is 420 km at a loaded speed of 60 km/h, so the planned time is 420 / 60 = 7 hours, from 5:00 to 12:00. In the first 2 hours the truck covers 60 x 2 = 120 km, leaving 420 - 120 = 300 km. After the halt of 1 hour, the time left for the journey is 7 - 2 - 1 = 4 hours. The required speed for the remaining distance = 300 / 4 = 75 km/h. Percentage increase over the original speed = (75 - 60) / 60 x 100 = 15 / 60 x 100 = 25 per cent, which is option C. A student who forgets that the halt consumes part of the time budget would divide 300 by 5 hours and obtain 60 km/h, thereby concluding that no increase is needed; and a student who computes 15 / 75 uses the new speed as the base and gets 20 per cent. The increase is measured on the original speed, so it is 25 per cent.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is 20 per cent: it comes from dividing the 15 km/h rise by the new speed of 75 instead of by the original speed of 60.

Q26 B Relative speed: same direction (catch-up) HARD

The loaded truck on R3 travels at 60 km/h. By 7:30 it has been on the road for 1.5 hours, so its head start = 60 x 1.5 = 90 km. The van moves at 80 km/h in the same direction, so it closes the gap at the relative speed 80 - 60 = 20 km/h. Time taken by the van to overtake = 90 / 20 = 4.5 hours after 7:30, which is 12:00. Distance of the overtaking point from the hub = 80 x 4.5 = 360 km. Check with the truck: it has travelled from 6:00 to 12:00, that is 6 hours, and 60 x 6 = 360 km, which agrees. Since the route is 420 km long and 360 is less than 420, the overtaking occurs before the market hub is reached, so the answer is valid. This is option B. The figure 420 km is only the route length, and it would be right only if both vehicles reached the market hub together.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is 420 km: it is the full length of R3, which the van never needs to reach because it catches the truck 60 km before the market hub.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Name the maxim for the rule against bias. — **Nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a judge in his own cause)**

2. Which test checks whether a decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could reach it? — **The Wednesbury test (irrationality)**

3. Which maxim gives the right of fair hearing? — **Audi alteram partem (hear the other side)**

4. Which interest disqualifies a decision-maker automatically? — **A pecuniary interest in the outcome**

5. Articles under which High Courts and the Supreme Court issue writs? — **Article 226 (High Courts) and Article 32 (Supreme Court)**

6. Two parts of the Article 14 classification test? — **Intelligible differentia and rational nexus with the object of the law**

7. Which Article 19 clause allows reasonable restrictions on trade and business? — **Article 19(6)**

8. Which Article bars conviction under an ex post facto law? — **Article 20(1)**

9. Which rights are available to foreigners too: Article 19 or Article 21? — **Article 21 (Article 19 is for citizens only)**

10. Area of a circle of radius 14 m (pi = 22/7)? — **616 square metres**

11. Average speed over equal distances at x and y km/h? — **2xy / (x + y), not (x + y) / 2**

12. A strengthen question on a causal argument is best answered by which kind of option? — **One that rules out a rival cause or shows the same effect elsewhere**