CLAT Gurukul — By Ready For Exam

Daily Practice Sheet — Answers, Skills & Examiner Notes — 6 November 2026

26 Qs · 0 Min
Answer key + skill tags + examiner notes

ANSWER KEY — 6 NOVEMBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	D	A	C	B	D	A	C	B	A
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
D	B	C	C	A	D	B	D	B	A
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**				
D	A	C	D	B	A				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B — Section 11 bar: living Hindu son — HARD

Section 11 does not bar every person who has a living son; it bars a person adopting a son who has a Hindu son, son's son or son's son's son living at the time of the adoption. The qualifier 'Hindu' is part of the rule. Kabir converted to Christianity ten years before the adoption, so at the moment Ramesh adopted Vivek he had no living Hindu son. Every other requirement is met: Ramesh is an adult of sound mind under section 7, his living wife has consented in writing, Vivek is a Hindu boy below fifteen who is unmarried and not already adopted, and he was actually given and taken. No age gap is required because a male is adopting a male. The adoption is therefore valid. Kabir's consent is nowhere required by the passage, and Kabir's age or residence is irrelevant to validity; the reason the bar falls away is his religion, not his independence.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option says any living son bars the adoption; it drops the word 'Hindu' from section 11, which is exactly the word the facts turn on.

Q2 D — Section 11 age gap (female adopting male) — MED

Section 8, as amended in 2010, allows any female Hindu of sound mind who is not a minor to adopt a son or a daughter, so the option saying a woman may adopt only a daughter misstates the rule. Meena is divorced, so she has no husband living whose consent is needed. Arjun is a Hindu boy aged 9, unmarried and not previously adopted, and he was actually given and taken. The adoption fails on one condition only. Section 11 says that where a female adopts a male, the adopter must be at least twenty-one years older than the child. Meena is 29 and Arjun is 9, a gap of 20 years, which is one year short. The gap rule is not confined to a man adopting a girl; the passage applies it expressly in both cross-gender directions. The adoption is therefore invalid, even though every other condition is satisfied.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option says the adoption is valid because no consent is needed; consent is indeed dispensed with, but the twenty-one-year gap condition is independently fatal.

Q3 A — Section 12 proviso: no divesting of vested estate — HARD

Section 12 makes an adopted child the child of the adoptive parents for all purposes from the date of the adoption, not from his birth and not retrospectively to some earlier event. The same section adds a proviso that the adoption does not divest any person of any estate that vested in him or her before the adoption. Savitri inherited the house absolutely in 2015, five years before she adopted Dev in 2020. The house therefore vested in her before the adoption, and Dev's adoption cannot take any part of it away from her, however he frames his status in relation to the deceased husband. His claim fails. The option saying widows cannot adopt is wrong, because section 8 gives every adult female Hindu of sound mind the capacity to adopt and a widow has no husband whose consent is needed. The options upholding the claim ignore the date-of-adoption rule and the proviso.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option relies on 'for all purposes'; it forgets that the deeming runs only from the date of adoption and that the proviso protects estates vested earlier.

Q4 C — Consent exceptions and the daughter bar — ELITE

Two conditions need checking, and each looks fatal at first sight. First, consent: section 8 requires a married woman with a husband living to obtain his consent, but the same three exceptions as in section 7 apply, and one of them is that the husband has ceased to be a Hindu. Mohan converted to Islam two years earlier, so his consent was not needed. Second, the bar in section 11: a person adopting a daughter must not have a Hindu daughter or son's daughter living. Lata has a living son, which is relevant only to the adoption of a son, not of a daughter. No age gap is required where a female adopts a female. Riya is a Hindu girl under fifteen, unmarried and not already adopted, and was actually given and taken. The adoption is valid. The passage makes no provision for later ratification, which is why that option fails.

NAME: _____ ROLL NO: _____ BATCH: _____

Examiner's note — the trap: The attractive wrong option says a married woman can never adopt without her husband's consent; it ignores the exception for a husband who has ceased to be a Hindu.

Q5 B Section 15 irrevocability and severance of birth ties HARD

Section 15 states that a valid adoption cannot be cancelled by the adoptive parent or by anyone else, and that the adopted child cannot renounce it and return to the family of birth. Harish's registered deed is therefore of no effect; registration cannot give a document a power that the statute denies. Neel's announcement is equally ineffective, whatever his age, because the passage gives the child no right of renunciation at seventeen or at any age. The adoption of 2019 therefore stands. Under section 12, from that date Neel was deemed the child of his adoptive parents for all purposes, and his ties with the family of birth were severed and replaced. When his birth father died intestate in 2025, Neel was not his son in law, so he cannot claim in that estate as a son. The option saying blood ties are never severed contradicts section 12 directly.

Examiner's note — the trap: The attractive wrong option keeps the adoption alive but lets Neel inherit from his birth father; it overlooks section 12's express severance of ties with the birth family.

Q6 D Theft: dishonest intention at time of moving MED

Section 303 requires three things to coincide: movable property in another's possession, a moving of it out of that possession without consent, and a dishonest intention existing at the time of the moving. When Rohit took the bicycle in the afternoon he had Aman's permission and no dishonest purpose, so that moving was not theft. By the evening the bicycle was already in Rohit's own possession under the loan, so riding it to the dealer did not move it out of anyone else's possession; the later dishonest decision cannot be joined to an earlier innocent moving. Extortion needs a delivery induced by fear, and nobody was put in fear here. On the passage alone, therefore, no theft is made out. Rohit's conduct may well amount to another offence, such as criminal misappropriation or breach of trust, but those offences are not stated in the passage and the question asks only what the passage establishes.

Examiner's note — the trap: The attractive wrong option says the ride to the dealer was a fresh dishonest moving; it fails because the bicycle was then in Rohit's own possession, not taken out of Aman's.

Q7 A Robbery: hurt in carrying away stolen property HARD

Salim's lifting of the wallet was theft under section 303. The question is whether the later violence converts it into robbery. Section 309 covers hurt caused not only in order to commit the theft but also 'in carrying away or attempting to carry away the stolen property', provided the hurt is caused for that end. When the conductor grabbed him, Salim was still carrying the wallet away, and he punched the conductor precisely to get away with it. Section 309 speaks of hurt to 'any person', so it does not matter that the victim of the hurt was the conductor rather than Vinod. The offence is therefore robbery. It is not snatching, because the wallet was lifted quietly, not suddenly or forcibly seized from Vinod. Treating the theft as closed once the wallet moved ignores the express words of section 309 about carrying away the stolen property.

Examiner's note — the trap: The attractive wrong option says the theft was complete before force was used; section 309 deliberately extends robbery to force used while carrying the stolen property away.

Q8 C Extortion versus robbery: fear of instant injury ELITE

Kiran intentionally put Prakash in fear of injury to his property, the burning of his godown, and thereby dishonestly induced him to deliver Rs 50,000. That satisfies every element of extortion under section 308; injury is not limited to bodily harm. The harder question is whether the extortion becomes robbery. Section 309 converts extortion into robbery only if three things combine: the offender is present, the delivery is made then and there, and the fear induced is of instant death, instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint. The first two are met, since Kiran stood at the counter and was paid on the spot. The third is not: the threat was to burn a godown next week, which is a future injury to property, not an instant injury to the person. The offence is extortion, not robbery. It is not theft, because Prakash delivered the money himself rather than Kiran moving it.

Examiner's note — the trap: The attractive wrong option is robbery, because presence and delivery then and there are both present; it overlooks that the fear must be of instant death, hurt or restraint.

Q9 B Dacoity: persons present and aiding HARD

Section 310 counts two groups together: those who conjointly commit or attempt the robbery, and those who are present and aiding it. If the two groups add up to five or more, every one of them commits dacoity. The four men who took the jewellery at knifepoint committed robbery. The fifth man was waiting at the gate with the engine running, ready to drive them away; he was at the scene and was aiding the robbery by securing the escape, so he is a person present and aiding. Four plus one makes five, and so all five commit dacoity. Usha cannot be counted. She merely watched from her own window and did nothing to aid the robbery; presence without aid does not make a person part of the group. The options saying only robbery is made out read section 310 as if it counted only those who physically took the property.

Examiner's note — the trap: The attractive wrong option says the driver outside is not 'present'; a confederate stationed at the gate to secure the getaway is present and aiding.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q10 A Applying combined eligibility conditions MED

The rule has two routes on marks. A score of 85 per cent or more qualifies on its own; a score of at least 80 but less than 85 per cent qualifies only for a first-generation college student. Asha scored 82 and is the first in her family to attend college, so she is on the second route. That route is 'on the same income condition', and the income condition is varied by a separate sentence: for a student with a certified disability of 40 per cent or more, the limit is Rs 8 lakh instead of Rs 6 lakh. That sentence is not confined to students who scored 85 per cent or more; it applies to the income condition wherever the condition operates. Asha's disability is 45 per cent and her family income is Rs 7.5 lakh, which is within Rs 8 lakh. She therefore qualifies. Nothing in the rule requires a first-generation student to reapply each year.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option confines the disability limit to the 85-per-cent route; the rule states it generally, so it governs the first-generation route as well.

Q11 D Applying a renewal-and-regain rule over time HARD

Track the years one by one. Bina held the scholarship in Year 1. She failed a course in Year 1, so under the rule she loses it for the following year only, which is Year 2. In Year 2, the year without it, she passed every course, so she regains it automatically for the year after that, Year 3. In Year 3 she failed a course, so she loses it for the following year, Year 4. Passing every course in Year 4 would only matter for a Year 5, which the four-year course does not have. She therefore held it in Years 1 and 3 only. The option giving Years 1, 3 and 4 wrongly treats passing in Year 4 as restoring the award within the same year, whereas the rule restores it only for the year after. Nothing in the rule makes a second failure permanent, and the loss takes effect immediately in the next year, not two years later.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is Years 1, 3 and 4; the rule restores the award only for the year after the clean year, never within it.

Q12 B Applying the funding-source test HARD

The rule bars holding the Vidyadhara scholarship together with 'any other scholarship funded by the state government', and expressly says that a scholarship funded by a private body does not bar it. The test is therefore the source of the money, not the identity of the body that advertises, administers or disburses it. Chetan's second scholarship is funded entirely by a private company. The fact that the state Education Department handles the paperwork and pays it out does not make it a scholarship funded by the state government. Chetan may hold both. The rule says nothing about the relative size of the two awards, so the option making the outcome depend on amount adds a condition that does not exist. Nor is there any link between accepting a second award and the permanent disqualification, which the rule reserves for a student who submits a false income certificate.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option treats state administration as state funding; the rule's bar is triggered only by who funds the scholarship.

Q13 C Applying two independent disqualifying conditions MED

Divya fails the rule on two independent grounds. First, her marks: she scored 84 per cent, which is below the 85 per cent needed on the general route, and the 80-to-85 band is open only to a first-generation college student, which she is not. So she was never eligible, whatever her income. Second, the certificate: she submitted a false income certificate, and the rule says a student found to have done so is permanently disqualified 'whether or not the false figure affected her eligibility'. The fact that her true income of Rs 5.5 lakh was also within the Rs 6 lakh limit does not save her. The correct statement captures both points. The option saying the false certificate does not count contradicts the express words of the rule. The option equating a false certificate with a failed course confuses the one-year loss for failure with the permanent bar for falsehood.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option says the false certificate is irrelevant because it changed nothing; the rule makes the bar apply even when the false figure affected nothing.

Q14 C Rule-check of a complete order MED

Test each order against every condition. K, N, L, J, M, O puts L in slot 3 immediately after N in slot 2, which breaks the rule that L must not argue next to N. O, K, N, M, J, L puts M in slot 4 and J in slot 5, so J does not argue earlier than M. J, K, N, O, M, L puts J in slot 1, which is forbidden, and also puts O in slot 4 when O must be in slot 1 or slot 6. That leaves O, J, L, M, K, N. Check it fully: K is in slot 5 and N in slot 6, so K is immediately before N; J in slot 2 is earlier than M in slot 4 and is not in slot 1; O is in slot 1; L in slot 3 is next to J and M only, not to K or N; and M is not in slot 6. Every condition holds, so this order is possible.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is K, N, L, J, M, O, which satisfies the K-N, J-M and O rules; the L-next-to-N breach is easy to miss.

Q15 A Conditional must-be-true HARD

With O in slot 1, J cannot be in slot 1 anyway, and J must precede M while M avoids slot 6. Listing the orders that satisfy every condition with O first gives exactly four: O, J, K, N, M, L; O, J, L, M, K, N; O, K, N, J, M, L; and O, L, J, M, K, N. In these M sits in slot 5, slot 4, slot 5 and slot 4 respectively, so M always argues in slot 4 or slot 5, and that must be true. The other statements each fail in at least one valid order. J is in slot 4 in O, K, N, J, M, L, so J need not be in slot 2. L is in slot 3 in O, J, L, M, K, N, so L need not be last. K is in slot 5 after M in slot 4 in O, J, L, M, K, N, so K need not precede M. Only the statement about M holds in all four cases.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is J in slot 2, true in three of the four orders; O, K, N, J, M, L shows it is not forced.

Q16 D Deduction of an impossible position HARD

M must argue in a later slot than J, and J cannot argue in slot 1. So the earliest slot J can take is slot 2, which means the earliest slot M can take is slot 3. M therefore can never argue in slot 2, whatever the rest of the schedule looks like. Each of the other teams can take slot 2 in some valid order. J is in slot 2 in O, J, L, M, K, N. K is in slot 2 in O, K, N, J, M, L, with N directly after it in slot 3. L is in slot 2 in O, L, J, M, K, N, where its neighbours are O and J, not K or N. So J, K and L can each take slot 2, and only M is excluded. The reason is a short chain of two conditions, the ban on J in slot 1 and the requirement that J precede M, rather than any condition about M directly.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is L, because the L-adjacency rule looks restrictive; O, L, J, M, K, N shows L can sit in slot 2.

Q17 B Counting orders under an added condition ELITE

Start from the complete list of orders that satisfy every condition. There are eight: K, N, J, L, M, O; K, N, J, M, L, O; L, J, K, N, M, O; L, J, M, K, N, O; O, J, K, N, M, L; O, J, L, M, K, N; O, K, N, J, M, L; and O, L, J, M, K, N. Now add the new condition that L comes in the slot immediately after M. Check each order for the pair M, L in that sequence. It appears in K, N, J, M, L, O, with M in slot 4 and L in slot 5; in O, J, K, N, M, L, with M in slot 5 and L in slot 6; and in O, K, N, J, M, L, with M in slot 5 and L in slot 6. In O, J, L, M, K, N, L comes before M, not after it, so it does not count. Exactly three complete orders are possible.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is four, which wrongly counts O, J, L, M, K, N, where L and M are adjacent but in the reverse order.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q18 D Coverage ratio comparison MED

Coverage in 2025 is the number fully immunised in 2025 divided by the number eligible in 2025. Compute it for each district. P: 42 divided by 48 is 0.875, or 87.5 per cent. Q: 51 divided by 60 is 85.0 per cent. R: 28 divided by 35 is 80.0 per cent. S: 63 divided by 72 is 0.875, or 87.5 per cent. T: 22 divided by 25 is 0.88, or 88.0 per cent. The highest is T at 88.0 per cent, half a percentage point above P and S, which tie at 87.5 per cent. The trap is that S has by far the tallest bar for immunised children, 63 thousand, and P and S share an identical, clean-looking 87.5 per cent, which tempts a student to stop before checking the smallest district. Coverage is a ratio, so the smallest district can lead even though its bars are the shortest on the graph.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is S, with the tallest immunised bar and an 87.5 per cent figure; T's 22 out of 25 gives a slightly higher 88 per cent.

Q19 B Percentage change against an aggregate HARD

First find the combined change. The 2024 total of fully immunised children is 36 + 45 + 30 + 50 + 19 = 180 thousand, and the 2025 total is 42 + 51 + 28 + 63 + 22 = 206 thousand. The combined rise is 26 on 180, about 14.44 per cent. Now each district. P rose from 36 to 42, which is 6 on 36, about 16.67 per cent. Q rose from 45 to 51, which is 6 on 45, about 13.33 per cent. R fell from 30 to 28, a drop of about 6.67 per cent. S rose from 50 to 63, which is 13 on 50, or 26.0 per cent. T rose from 19 to 22, which is 3 on 19, about 15.79 per cent. The districts above 14.44 per cent are P, S and T, so the answer is three. Q is the near miss: it gained 6 thousand, the same absolute gain as P, but on a larger 2024 base.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is four, which counts Q; its 13.33 per cent rise is below the combined 14.44 per cent despite the same 6-thousand gain as P.

Q20 A Target-setting from a graph value HARD

In 2025 district S had 72 thousand eligible children and 63 thousand fully immunised, so 72 minus 63 = 9 thousand were not fully immunised. The target is to cut this to two-thirds of its 2025 level, which is 9 multiplied by 2/3 = 6 thousand. In 2026 the eligible number will be 5 per cent higher than 72 thousand, that is 72 multiplied by 1.05 = 75.6 thousand. The number that must be fully immunised is the eligible number minus the permitted shortfall: 75.6 minus 6 = 69.6 thousand, or 69,600 children. The distractors come from predictable slips. Ignoring the 5 per cent growth gives 72 minus 6 = 66,000. Cutting the shortfall by only one-third of itself from the new base, 75.6 minus 3, gives 72,600. Leaving the shortfall at 9 thousand gives 75.6 minus 9 = 66,600.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is 66,000, which reduces the shortfall correctly but forgets that the eligible population grows by 5 per cent in 2026.

Q21 D Coverage change under a stated assumption ELITE

Under the assumption, the 2024 eligible figure in each district is the 2025 figure minus 4 thousand. P: 36 out of 44 is 81.82 per cent in 2024 against 87.50 in 2025, a rise of about 5.68 points. Q: 45 out of 56 is 80.36 per cent against 85.00, a rise of about 4.64 points. R: 30 out of 31 is 96.77 per cent against 80.00, a fall of about 16.77 points. S: 50 out of 68 is 73.53 per cent against 87.50, a rise of about 13.97 points. T: 19 out of 21 is 90.48 per cent against 88.00, a fall of about 2.48 points. The largest rise is in S, at about 14.0 percentage points. The trap is to carry over the answer to the 2025 ranking, where T led; under this assumption T's coverage actually fell, because its 2024 eligible base of 21 thousand was so small that its 2024 coverage was already high.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is T, the 2025 coverage leader; with a 2024 base of only 21 thousand, its coverage actually falls by about 2.5 points.

Q22 A Profit from a multi-stage caselet MED

Production is 300 hectares multiplied by 42 quintals, which is 12,600 quintals. Members kept one-sixth, so they sold five-sixths: 12,600 multiplied by 5/6 = 10,500 quintals procured. Grading removed 4 per cent, leaving 10,500 multiplied by 0.96 = 10,080 quintals. Grade A

is 60 per cent, which is 6,048 quintals, worth 6,048 multiplied by 2,900 = Rs 1,75,39,200. Grade B is 40 per cent, which is 4,032 quintals, worth 4,032 multiplied by 2,600 = Rs 1,04,83,200. Revenue is Rs 2,80,22,400. Total cost is procurement of 10,500 multiplied by 2,400 = Rs 2,52,00,000 plus handling of 10,500 multiplied by 150 = Rs 15,75,000, giving Rs 2,67,75,000. Profit is 2,80,22,400 minus 2,67,75,000 = Rs 12,47,400. Forgetting the handling cost gives Rs 28,22,400; ignoring the grading loss gives Rs 24,15,000; charging handling on all 12,600 quintals gives Rs 9,32,400.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is Rs 28,22,400, which subtracts only the procurement payment and forgets the Rs 150 per quintal handling cost.

Q23 C Proportional bonus per unit HARD

The bonus pool is 40 per cent of the profit. From the season's figures, the profit is revenue of Rs 2,80,22,400 minus total cost of Rs 2,67,75,000, which is Rs 12,47,400. Forty per cent of this is 12,47,400 multiplied by 0.4 = Rs 4,98,960. The bonus is shared in proportion to the quantity each member sold, so it is a flat amount per quintal sold. The quantity sold to the company is 10,500 quintals, which is the procured quantity, not the 10,080 quintals left after grading and not the 12,600 quintals produced. So the bonus is 4,98,960 divided by 10,500 = Rs 47.52 per quintal. Dividing by the graded quantity of 10,080 gives Rs 49.50, and dividing by production of 12,600 gives Rs 39.60. Using 60 per cent of profit instead of 40 per cent and dividing by 12,600 gives Rs 59.40.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is Rs 49.50, which divides the bonus pool by the graded quantity; members are paid on what they sold, 10,500 quintals.

Q24 D Required price for a target margin HARD

Total cost is Rs 2,67,75,000, so a profit of 8 per cent of cost needs revenue of 2,67,75,000 multiplied by 1.08 = Rs 2,89,17,000. Grade A revenue is unchanged at 6,048 quintals multiplied by Rs 2,900 = Rs 1,75,39,200. Grade B must therefore bring in 2,89,17,000 minus 1,75,39,200 = Rs 1,13,77,800. Grade B quantity is 4,032 quintals, so the price must be 1,13,77,800 divided by 4,032 = Rs 2,821.875 per quintal, which rounds to Rs 2,822. Any lower price would leave profit below 8 per cent, so Rs 2,822 is the lowest such price to the nearest rupee. A check: at Rs 2,822, Grade B revenue is 4,032 multiplied by 2,822 = Rs 1,13,78,304, total revenue is Rs 2,89,17,504 and profit is Rs 21,42,504, just over 8 per cent of cost. Spreading the extra Rs 8,94,600 over all 10,080 graded quintals gives Rs 2,689; taking 8 per cent of revenue gives Rs 2,868.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is Rs 2,689, obtained by spreading the extra revenue over all 10,080 graded quintals instead of only the 4,032 quintals of Grade B.

Q25 B Sensitivity of profit to a loss rate MED

Costs depend on the 10,500 quintals procured, so they do not change when the grading loss changes; only revenue changes. With a 6 per cent loss, graded wheat is 10,500 multiplied by 0.94 = 9,870 quintals. Grade A is 60 per cent, 5,922 quintals, worth 5,922 multiplied by 2,900 = Rs 1,71,73,800. Grade B is 40 per cent, 3,948 quintals, worth 3,948 multiplied by 2,600 = Rs 1,02,64,800. New revenue is Rs 2,74,38,600, against actual revenue of Rs 2,80,22,400, a fall of Rs 5,83,800. Since cost is unchanged, profit falls by the same Rs 5,83,800, from Rs 12,47,400 to Rs 6,63,600. A quick check: the extra 2 per cent loss is 210 quintals, and the average graded price is 0.6 multiplied by 2,900 plus 0.4 multiplied by 2,600 = Rs 2,780, and 210 multiplied by 2,780 is again Rs 5,83,800. The figure Rs 6,63,600 is the new profit, not the fall.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is Rs 6,63,600, which is the new profit after the higher loss, not the amount by which profit falls.

Q26 A Break-even price working backwards ELITE

To break even, revenue must exactly cover total cost, which is the procurement payment plus the handling cost. Revenue stays at Rs 2,80,22,400 and handling stays at 10,500 quintals multiplied by Rs 150 = Rs 15,75,000. The most the company can pay its members in total is therefore 2,80,22,400 minus 15,75,000 = Rs 2,64,47,400. Spread over the 10,500 quintals procured, the highest procurement price is 2,64,47,400 divided by 10,500 = Rs 2,518.80 per quintal. As a check, the present profit of Rs 12,47,400 divided by 10,500 quintals is Rs 118.80 per quintal, and 2,400 plus 118.80 is again Rs 2,518.80. The distractors come from slips: adding back the Rs 150 handling cost instead of deducting it gives Rs 2,668.80; spreading the profit over all 12,600 quintals produced gives Rs 2,499.00; adding only the members' bonus of Rs 47.52 gives Rs 2,447.52.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The attractive wrong option is Rs 2,668.80, which forgets that the Rs 150 handling cost must also be met out of revenue before members are paid.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Under HAMA s.7, whose consent does a married male Hindu need to adopt? — **His living wife's, unless she has renounced the world, ceased to be a Hindu or been declared of unsound mind**

2. After the 2010 amendment, may a married Hindu woman adopt? — **Yes, under s.8, but with her living husband's consent, subject to the same three exceptions**

3. What age limit does HAMA s.10 set for the child adopted? — **The child must be below fifteen, unless a custom applicable to the parties permits otherwise**

4. Can a married child be adopted under HAMA s.10? — **No, unless a custom applicable to the parties permits it**

5. Which living relatives bar the adoption of a son under s.11? — **A Hindu son, son's son or son's son's son living at the time**

6. Which living relatives bar the adoption of a daughter under s.11? — **A Hindu daughter or son's daughter living at the time**

7. What age gap does s.11 require in a cross-gender adoption? — **The adopter must be at least twenty-one years older than the child**

8. Does the twenty-one-year gap apply when a man adopts a boy? — **No; it applies only where a male adopts a female or a female adopts a male**

9. What physical act must accompany every valid adoption? — **The child must actually be given and taken in adoption**

10. From when is an adopted child deemed the child of the adoptive family? — **From the date of the adoption (s.12), not retrospectively**

11. What happens to the adopted child's ties with the birth family? — **They are severed and replaced by ties in the adoptive family (s.12)**

12. Can an adoption divest someone of an estate vested before it? — **No; the s.12 proviso protects estates that vested before the adoption**

13. Can an adoptive parent cancel a valid adoption by registered deed? — **No; s.15 says a valid adoption cannot be cancelled by anyone**

14. Can an adopted child renounce the adoption on reaching majority? — **No; s.15 bars renunciation and return to the birth family**

15. Does a son who converted to Christianity bar his father from adopting a son? — **No; s.11 bars only a living Hindu son**

16. When is theft complete under BNS s.303? — **When the property is moved in order to take it, with dishonest intention at that time**

17. Must the dishonest intention in theft exist at the moment of moving? — **Yes; a later dishonest decision cannot convert an innocent moving into theft**

18. What does BNS s.304 call a sudden or forcible grabbing of property from a person? — **Snatching**

19. What is the core element that distinguishes extortion (s.308) from theft? — **A delivery of property induced by putting a person in fear of injury**

20. Does 'injury' in extortion include harm to property? — **Yes; fear of injury to property, such as burning a godown, suffices**

21. Name the three moments in which force turns theft into robbery under s.309. — **In order to commit it, in committing it, or in carrying away the stolen property**

22. Must the hurt in robbery be caused to the owner of the property? — **No; s.309 covers hurt to any person, such as a conductor**

23. Which three fears convert extortion into robbery? — **Fear of instant death, instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint**

24. Besides fear, what two conditions turn extortion into robbery? — **The offender's presence and delivery then and there**

25. Is a threat to burn a shop next week, paid on the spot, robbery? — **No; it is extortion, as the fear is of a future injury, not instant**