CLAT Gurukul — By Ready For Exam

Daily Practice Sheet — Answers, Skills & Examiner Notes — 9 November 2026

26 Qs · 0 Min
Answer key + skill tags + examiner notes

ANSWER KEY — 9 NOVEMBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
C	A	D	B	A	B	D	A	C	D
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
B	C	A	A	C	B	D	B	D	A
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**				
C	B	D	A	C	B				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 C — Separate legal personality (Salomon) MED

The passage states the Salomon rule: a validly incorporated company is a legal person distinct from its members and is not their agent or trustee, even where one person holds almost all the shares. Its debts are its own, and a member is liable only to the extent of any amount unpaid on his shares. Ravi's shares are fully paid, so nothing is unpaid and his liability for the company's debts is nil. The veil can be lifted only where the company is a sham or facade used for fraud or to evade an existing obligation, and the facts say the company always traded honestly, so there is no ground for lifting it. Option A states exactly the argument the House of Lords rejected in Salomon. Option B invents a liability measured by the face value of shares, which the passage does not recognise for fully paid shares. Option D is overbroad: the passage itself shows that, where the veil is lifted, persons behind the company can be reached.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: near-total shareholding feels like ownership of the debts, but Salomon holds that even a one-man company is not its shareholder's agent.

Q2 A — Lifting the veil: company used to evade an obligation HARD

The general rule is separate personality, but the passage names an exception: the court will lift the veil where the company is a mere sham or facade used to evade an existing legal obligation. Meena was bound by a covenant both sides accept as valid. Within a week of leaving she formed a company, installed her husband as its sole director and had the company immediately do the very thing she had promised not to do. These are the facts of Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne, where the court restrained both the former employee and his company. The company here is a device for evading her covenant, so the injunction can run against both. Option B relies on separate personality but ignores the evasion exception. Option C wrongly limits veil-lifting to statutory instances; the passage expressly allows it for sham or evasion. Option D ignores the covenant entirely, which the facts say is valid and binding.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the trap: it is true that the company signed nothing, but the veil is lifted precisely because the company was interposed to do what Meena could not.

Q3 D — Indoor management (Turquand) vs constructive notice HARD

Constructive notice means the bank is deemed to know what the articles say, so it is deemed to know that a shareholders' resolution was needed for a loan above Rs 5 crore. But whether that resolution was actually passed is an internal matter. Under the rule in Royal British Bank v. Turquand, an outsider dealing in good faith may assume that such internal procedures have been duly complied with. The bank knew nothing of the omission and saw nothing suspicious, and no forgery is involved, so none of the three exceptions applies and the bank can recover. Option A misreads constructive notice: it fixes the bank with knowledge of the requirement, not of its breach. Option B confuses two kinds of excess: the loan is within the company's objects, since the memorandum lists borrowing, so it is not ultra vires the company; only the directors' authority was irregular. Option C imposes a duty to inspect internal minutes, which the indoor management rule exists to remove.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the trap: 'beyond the limit' sounds like ultra vires, but ultra vires concerns the objects in the memorandum, and borrowing is among Kaveri's objects.

Q4 B — Stretch: ultra vires objects vs indoor management ELITE

Under Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche, a contract outside the objects in the memorandum is void and cannot be ratified even by the unanimous consent of the shareholders. Vardhan's memorandum confines its objects to making and selling medicines; building and running a hotel falls outside them. The contract is therefore void from the start, and the later unanimous approval cannot cure it, so Option C fails. Option A tries to use the indoor management rule, but that rule only lets an outsider assume that internal procedures, such as resolutions or quorums, have been followed. It does not protect an outsider from the memorandum itself, which is a public document whose contents every outsider is deemed to know through constructive notice. Good faith therefore does not help Prakash. Option D reaches the right result for a false reason: the facts say the meeting was duly convened with a full quorum, so there was no procedural defect at all; the defect lies in the objects.

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Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: good faith and indoor management protect against breaches of internal procedure, never against a contract beyond the objects that the outsider is deemed to have read.

Q5 A Director's duty: no undue gain to relatives (s.166) HARD

Section 166, as stated in the passage, requires a director to act in good faith in the interests of the company and forbids him to achieve or attempt to achieve any undue gain or advantage for himself or his relatives. Arjun learnt of the company's plan at a board meeting, and before it became public his brother bought the plot and later sold it to the company for Rs 60 lakh more. The gain is undue because it flowed from information Arjun held only as a director, and the section reaches gains made for relatives, so the brother's separate personality does not help (Option C fails). Option B assumes that the duty is breached only if the company suffers a loss, but the prohibition targets the director's undue gain, not the company's loss; paying market price does not make the gain due. Option D overstates the rule: the passage does not forbid every sale of property to a company by a director; it forbids undue gain.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: 'the company paid only market price' sounds like no harm, but section 166 forbids the director's undue gain whether or not the company loses.

Q6 B Article 12: private body is not 'the State' MED

Fundamental rights in Part III, including Article 14, are guaranteed chiefly against 'the State' as defined in Article 12. A society is an 'other authority' only if it is an instrumentality or agency of the government under the Ajay Hasia tests: government share capital, government funding, deep and pervasive government control, and functions closely related to governmental functions. The association has none of these: it runs on residents' fees, under its own bye-laws, with no government funding or control. The passage adds that a private body does not become 'the State' merely because it is registered or regulated under a statute or performs a useful service. That disposes of Options A and C, which rely on exactly those two features. Option D is wrong because Article 12 includes local and other authorities, not just the Union and State governments. The tenant may have remedies under the bye-laws or ordinary law, but not a fundamental-rights petition against this body.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: registration under a statute sounds official, but the passage says statutory registration or regulation alone never makes a private body 'the State'.

Q7 D Article 12: instrumentality test (Ajay Hasia) HARD

Apply the Ajay Hasia tests from the passage. The Union government holds the entire share capital; it appoints and removes all directors, which is deep and pervasive control; it meets 90% of the budget, which is almost all the expenditure; and distributing certified seed under a national food-security scheme is a function of public importance closely related to governmental functions. Every test points the same way, so the company is an instrumentality of the government and an 'other authority' under Article 12. Its action is State action, and under Royappa an arbitrary act, such as a dismissal with no reason at all, can violate Article 14 even without any classification. Option A uses the separate-personality rule of company law, but the form of incorporation does not decide Article 12; Ajay Hasia expressly covers corporations. Option B is overbroad. Option C gives a reason the passage rejects: regulation by law alone never makes a body the State.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: it imports the Salomon principle from company law, but Article 12 looks behind the corporate form to ownership, funding, control and function.

Q8 A Article 14: rational nexus with the object HARD

Article 14 permits classification only if two conditions are both met: an intelligible differentia, and a rational nexus between that differentia and the object of the law. The stated object is to widen access to engineering education for students from poor families. The differentia chosen is whether a parent is a state government employee, regardless of income. It is intelligible, because it is easy to tell who falls within it, so the first condition is met. But it has no rational nexus with the object: it covers a well-paid state officer's child and excludes the child of a poor farm labourer, the very person the law claims to help. The classification therefore fails the second condition and is invalid. Option B treats the first condition as enough, ignoring the nexus requirement. Option C is overbroad, since the passage says Article 14 permits reasonable classification. Option D invents a limit: Article 14 governs State action conferring benefits as well as burdens.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: the group is clearly identifiable, but intelligibility is only half the test; the differentia must also relate to the law's object.

Q9 C Stretch: Article 21 after Maneka plus forum under Article 32 ELITE

Two things must be decided: the forum and the merits. On forum, Rafiq's personal liberty, a fundamental right under Article 21, is affected, so he may move the Supreme Court under Article 32; he may also go to the High Court under Article 226. Nothing in the passage confines challenges to State laws to the High Court, so Option A fails. On the merits, the confinement does follow the Act, but after Maneka Gandhi a 'procedure established by law' must be just, fair and reasonable, not arbitrary or oppressive, and natural justice, including a fair hearing, is ordinarily part of it. A scheme with no notice, no hearing and no review at any stage is a clear case of an unfair procedure, so Rafiq may succeed. Option B states the pre-Maneka reading that any enacted procedure will do, which the passage rejects. Option D wrongly limits the court's power: if the procedure is not fair, the deprivation of liberty itself is not 'according to procedure established by law'.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: every step of the Act was followed, but after Maneka the question is whether the procedure itself is fair, not merely whether it was enacted and obeyed.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q10 D Necessary assumption: no other bottleneck MED

The registrar's argument runs: most of the 41-day delay is spent on clerical checking; e-filing makes that checking instant; therefore the delay will fall below 15 days. For the conclusion to follow, removing the clerical stage must actually shorten the path to the first hearing, which requires that no other stage, such as the listing of cases before judges, becomes the new bottleneck. Apply the negation test to Option D: if listing before judges still holds cases back, the time saved at the registry is simply spent waiting elsewhere and the prediction fails. So D is necessary. Option A is not needed, because the help-desk covers those who cannot file themselves. Option B is a supporting example at most; the prediction does not depend on what happened in every other state. Option C concerns the future use of clerks, which has no bearing on whether first hearings come sooner.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: it feels essential for e-filing, but the help-desk already provides for litigants without devices, so the argument does not depend on it.

Q11 B Necessary assumption behind a 'no disadvantage' claim HARD

The registrar's second conclusion is that litigants will not be disadvantaged, and her only support is that each court complex will have a help-desk where staff upload documents for those who cannot. That reason works only if the help-desk can actually serve everyone who needs it without long queues or added delay. Negate Option B: if the help-desk is overwhelmed and litigants wait days to file, those without devices are disadvantaged compared with those who file from home, and the claim collapses. Option A goes beyond what the argument needs: the help-desk is meant to serve litigants indefinitely, so they need not learn to file themselves. Option C, if true, would make the help-desk less important but is not something the argument requires. Option D raises a language point the passage never touches; the claim could hold even if the software were offered only in one language, provided the help-desk staff can file for those who need it.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: if most litigants use advocates the worry shrinks, but the argument does not rely on that; it relies on the help-desk working.

Q12 C Stretch: hidden assumption in a causal mechanism ELITE

The registrar's mechanism is precise: the delay is caused by clerks manually checking, stamping and registering paper files, and e-filing performs these checks automatically at submission. The saving is real only if a filing accepted by the software is finished with at that stage. If accepted filings still had to be scrutinised by clerks in the old way, the manual step, and with it the delay, would simply move to after submission. Negate Option C and the explanation fails, so C is the assumption on which it rests most directly. Option A, more judges, might speed things up but is not required by the explanation, which concerns the registry, not the bench. Option B concerns the advocates' attitude to the direction, which does not affect how fast a filing is processed once it is made. Option D, judges reading on screens, concerns how judges handle files at hearings, not the gap between filing and first hearing that the registrar explains.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: more judges would help hearings, but the registrar's explanation is about clerical scrutiny, so it neither needs nor assumes extra judges.

Q13 A Assumption that answers a critic HARD

The critic identifies a second source of delay that the registrar did not mention: court fees are paid in stamp paper bought from licensed vendors, which takes time. If the new system still required litigants to buy stamp paper before filing, that delay would remain and could keep first hearings beyond 15 days. The registrar's prediction therefore survives the criticism only if the new system removes this step, for example by letting fees be paid online at the moment of filing, which is Option A. Negate A and the critic's point stands unanswered. Option B is about what vendors may sell for other documents and does not touch the delay in filing suits. Option C concerns the amount of fees, not the time taken to pay them; cheaper fees could still be slow to pay. Option D, fewer outlets, actually makes the critic's point stronger, since stamp paper would be harder to obtain and the delay would grow.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: it changes the fee, but the critic's objection is about delay in paying, which only an online payment step removes.

Q14 A Flaw: overlooked alternative explanation (displacement) MED

The commissioner infers from a 30 per cent fall in accidents at the 40 junctions that the cameras made the roads safer. One alternative explanation he never rules out is displacement: drivers wishing to avoid the cameras may simply have taken other routes. Fewer vehicles through the camera junctions would mean fewer accidents there even if no one drove more safely, and the accidents would merely have moved to other roads. Option A names this overlooked possibility, which is a genuine gap in the reasoning. Option B is irrelevant, because the type of vehicle does not affect whether the cameras reduced accidents. Option C attacks the source of the figures without any reason to think they are wrong; questioning the compiler is not a flaw in the commissioner's reasoning. Option D describes something that is simply true: 30 per cent is a larger fall than 5 per cent, and the argument is entitled to treat it so.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: doubting police figures sounds critical, but the argument's flaw lies in its inference, not in who compiled the data.

Q15 C Flaw: unrepresentative sample and self-report HARD

The commissioner says that because 9 out of 10 motorists questioned at petrol pumps beside the camera junctions say they now drive more carefully, the cameras have changed how the whole city drives. Two weaknesses combine. First, the sample is drawn only from places next to camera junctions, where drivers are most aware of the cameras, so it cannot stand for drivers across the city. Second, the evidence is what motorists say about their own driving, which is not a measure of how they actually drive. Option C captures both: it generalises from motorists questioned beside camera junctions, about their own driving, to drivers city-wide. Option A is a reasonable background assumption, not a flaw; careful drivers probably do have fewer accidents. Option B, fuel prices, has no bearing on what the survey shows. Option D, the time of day, is a minor detail whose absence does not undermine the inference in the way the sampling does.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: it names an assumption the argument makes, but that assumption is reasonable, so pointing it out does not expose a flaw.

Q16 B Stretch: projecting a selected-sample effect to the whole ELITE

The forecast takes the 30 per cent fall measured at the 40 junctions with the highest accident counts and claims that cameras at 400 more junctions will cut the city's accidents by 30 per cent. There are two leaps here. The new junctions were not selected for having the most accidents, so a camera there has fewer accidents to prevent and the same percentage fall cannot be assumed. And a percentage fall at camera junctions does not translate into the same percentage fall in the city's total, since many accidents happen away from junctions altogether. Option B captures both leaps. Option A raises a budget concern, which is a policy objection rather than a flaw in the forecast's reasoning. Option C invents a new side-effect not suggested by the passage. Option D, the price per camera, concerns cost, not whether accidents will fall by 30 per cent, so it does not touch the forecast at all.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: Rs 60 crore is a striking figure, but affordability is a separate question; the flaw is in extrapolating the 30 per cent.

Q17 D Parallel flaw: regression to the mean HARD

The 40 junctions were chosen because they had the most accidents in the year before installation. An unusually bad year tends to be followed by a less extreme one even with no intervention, a pattern known as regression to the mean, so part of the 30 per cent fall may have happened anyway. The commissioner treats the whole fall as proof that the cameras worked. Option D has the same structure: pupils are chosen for extra classes because they scored lowest in one test, and their later improvement is taken as proof that the classes worked, though the lowest scorers would tend to score higher next time anyway. Option A confuses correlation with causation through self-selection, a different flaw. Option B generalises from an unrepresentative sample, which matches the petrol-pump survey, not the 30 per cent claim. Option C draws a general conclusion from one shop's experience, a hasty generalisation rather than selection on an extreme value.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the trap: it parallels the survey flaw in the same passage, but the question asks about the 30 per cent fall at junctions chosen for their bad year.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q18 B Dividing an amount in a given ratio MED

The prize pool is shared among the top three teams in the ratio of their points. From the table, the Panthers have 22 points, the Tuskers 20 and the Falcons 18, so the ratio is 22 : 20 : 18, which simplifies to 11 : 10 : 9. The total of the parts is 11 + 10 + 9 = 30. The Tuskers' share is therefore 10/30 of Rs 9,00,000, which is Rs 9,00,000 x 1/3 = Rs 3,00,000. As a check, the Panthers get 11/30 x 9,00,000 = Rs 3,30,000 and the Falcons get 9/30 x 9,00,000 = Rs 2,70,000, and 3,30,000 + 3,00,000 + 2,70,000 = 9,00,000. Rs 3,30,000 is the champion's share and Rs 2,70,000 the third team's. Rs 2,14,286 comes from dividing the pool in proportion to the points of all six teams (20/84 of 9,00,000), but the passage says only the top three share it.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Rs 2,14,286 is the trap: it uses the league's total of 84 points as the base instead of the top three teams' 60 points.

Q19 D Comparing ratios with a threshold MED

The ratio 5 : 2 equals 2.5, so a team qualifies if its wins divided by its losses is at least 2.5. Panthers: 7 wins, 2 losses, 7/2 = 3.5, which qualifies. Tuskers: 6/2 = 3, which qualifies. Falcons: 5/2 = 2.5, exactly equal to 5 : 2, which qualifies because the question says 'at least'. Rhinos: 4/4 = 1, which does not. Eagles: 2/6 = 0.33, which does not. Cobras have 0 wins against 8 losses, a ratio of 0, which does not. So three teams, the Panthers, Tuskers and Falcons, have a win-to-loss ratio of at least 5 : 2. The answer 'two teams' results from reading the condition as 'greater than 5 : 2' and dropping the Falcons, whose ratio is exactly 5 : 2. 'Four teams' would need the Rhinos to qualify, but their ratio is only 4 : 4 = 1, and 'only one team' counts just the Panthers, whose ratio alone exceeds 3 : 1.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** 'Two teams' is the trap: the Falcons sit exactly on 5 : 2, and 'at least' includes the boundary.

Q20 A Recomputing points and forming a ratio HARD

Under the changed rule a win is worth 2 points and a tie 1, with a loss still 0. Panthers: 7 wins and 1 tie, so 7 x 2 + 1 x 1 = 14 + 1 = 15 points. Rhinos: 4 wins and 2 ties, so 4 x 2 + 2 x 1 = 8 + 2 = 10 points. The ratio of the Panthers' points to the Rhinos' points is 15 : 10, which simplifies, dividing both terms by 5, to 3 : 2. The option 11 : 7 is the ratio under the actual 3-point rule, 22 : 14, and ignores the change the question asks for. The option 7 : 4 is simply the ratio of wins, 7 : 4, which ignores ties altogether. The option 5 : 3 (15 : 9) results from counting only one of the Rhinos' two ties. The correct ratio is therefore 3 : 2.

Examiner's note — the trap: 11 : 7 is the trap: it is read straight off the table, but the question changes the value of a win to 2 points.

Q21 C Splitting a total in a ratio, then scoring HARD

Each team plays 10 matches. If the Rhinos tie exactly 2, the remaining 10 - 2 = 8 matches are wins or losses. Wins and losses must be in the ratio 3 : 1, so the 8 matches split into 3 + 1 = 4 parts of 2 matches each: wins = 3 x 2 = 6 and losses = 1 x 2 = 2. Check: 6 + 2 + 2 = 10 matches, and 6 : 2 = 3 : 1. Points = 6 wins x 3 + 2 ties x 1 + 2 losses x 0 = 18 + 2 = 20 points. The option 18 points counts only the wins and forgets the 2 points from ties. The option 22 points would need, for example, 7 wins and 1 tie, which breaks both the two-tie condition and the 3 : 1 ratio. The option 14 points is the Rhinos' current total and ignores the new target.

Examiner's note — the trap: 18 points is the trap: the ratio work is right, but the 2 tied matches still earn 1 point each.

Q22 B Stretch: building a three-way ratio from conditions ELITE

Let the champion's share be 3x and the third team's share 2x. The runner-up gets the average of these, (3x + 2x)/2 = 2.5x. Total = 3x + 2.5x + 2x = 7.5x = Rs 9,00,000, so x = Rs 1,20,000. Next season's champion gets 3x = Rs 3,60,000, the runner-up Rs 3,00,000 and the third team Rs 2,40,000, which add up to Rs 9,00,000. This season's champion, the Panthers, received 22/60 of the pool, that is 11/30 x 9,00,000 = Rs 3,30,000. The difference is 3,60,000 - 3,30,000 = Rs 30,000. The option Rs 60,000 compares next season's champion with this season's runner-up, Rs 3,00,000, instead of with this season's champion. The option Rs 1,20,000 is the value of one part, x, reported as if it were the answer, and Rs 20,000 does not follow from any consistent reading of the new rule.

Examiner's note — the trap: Rs 60,000 is the trap: it compares the new champion's share with this season's runner-up instead of this season's champion.

Q23 D Comparing a monthly average with an overall average MED

July readings: 1,140 + 240 + 290 + 580 + 330 = 2,580 mm, so the five-station average for July is 2,580 / 5 = 516 mm. For the overall average, first find the season totals: Ratnagiri 3,100, Pune 720, Nashik 840, Kolhapur 1,520 and Satara 960, which add to 7,140 mm. There are 5 x 4 = 20 monthly readings, so the average reading is 7,140 / 20 = 357 mm. The July average exceeds it by 516 - 357 = 159 mm. The option 146 mm compares July with the August average only (1,850 / 5 = 370 mm). The option 192 mm compares July with the June average (1,620 / 5 = 324 mm). The option 298 mm compares July with the September average (1,090 / 5 = 218 mm). Each of these uses one month in place of all twenty readings, which is what the question asks for.

Examiner's note — the trap: 146 mm is the trap: it compares July with a single neighbouring month instead of with the average of all twenty readings.

Q24 A Correcting one value in an average HARD

When one of five readings changes, the average changes by the change in that reading divided by 5. The August average rises by 18 mm, so the total of the five August readings must rise by 18 x 5 = 90 mm. Kolhapur's recorded August value was 420 mm, so its correct value is 420 + 90 = 510 mm. Check: the original August total is 760 + 180 + 230 + 420 + 260 = 1,850 mm, an average of 370 mm. After correction the total is 1,850 + 90 = 1,940 mm, and 1,940 / 5 = 388 mm, which is 18 mm higher. The option 438 mm adds the 18 mm rise in the average directly to the single reading, forgetting that the rise is spread over five stations. The option 492 mm subtracts 18 from the correct answer, and 600 mm adds 180 rather than 90, both arithmetic slips.

Examiner's note — the trap: 438 mm is the trap: it adds the change in the average to one reading, but one reading must change by five times as much.

Q25 C Stretch: weighted average of totals ELITE

First find each station's season total: Ratnagiri 820 + 1,140 + 760 + 380 = 3,100; Pune 160 + 240 + 180 + 140 = 720; Nashik 150 + 290 + 230 + 170 = 840; Kolhapur 300 + 580 + 420 + 220 = 1,520; Satara 190 + 330 + 260 + 180 = 960. Multiply each by its weight: 3,100 x 3 = 9,300; 720 x 1 = 720; 840 x 2 = 1,680; 1,520 x 2 = 3,040; 960 x 2 = 1,920. The sum is 16,660. The weights add to 3 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 2 = 10, so the weighted average is 16,660 / 10 = 1,666 mm. The option 1,428 mm is the simple average, 7,140 / 5, which ignores the weights. The option 3,332 mm divides the weighted sum by the number of stations (5) instead of by the sum of the weights (10). The option 16,660 mm is the weighted sum itself, left undivided.

Examiner's note — the trap: 1,428 mm is the trap: it is the simple average; a weighted average must be divided by the total of the weights, here 10.

Q26 B Finding a missing value from a new average HARD

The five season totals are 3,100, 720, 840, 1,520 and 960 mm, which add to 7,140 mm. If the average of six stations is 1,300 mm, the six totals together must be 6 x 1,300 = 7,800 mm. Sangli's season total is therefore 7,800 - 7,140 = 660 mm. Check: (7,140 + 660) / 6 = 7,800 / 6 = 1,300 mm. Another way: the five-station average is 1,428 mm, which is 128 mm above the new average of 1,300; the five stations together are 5 x 128 = 640 mm above it, so Sangli must be 640 mm below it, at 1,300 - 640 = 660 mm. The option 1,172 mm comes from treating the new average as the mean of only two numbers, 1,428 and Sangli (2 x 1,300 - 1,428). The option 600 mm rounds the five-station total to 7,200 before subtracting, and 728 mm comes from subtracting 572 from 1,300 by a slip in the deviation method.

Examiner's note — the trap: 1,172 mm is the trap: it averages Sangli with the old average as if the two carried equal weight, ignoring that the old average stands for five stations.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Which 1897 House of Lords case established a company's separate legal personality? — **Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd**

2. Is a validly incorporated company the agent of its majority shareholder? — **No, it is a distinct legal person**

3. How far is a member liable for the company's debts? — **Only to the extent of any amount unpaid on his shares**

4. When will courts lift the corporate veil? — **When the company is a sham or facade used for fraud or to evade an existing obligation**

5. Which 1933 case restrained an ex-employee's company formed to breach a covenant? — **Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne**

6. Which document states a company's objects? — **The memorandum of association**

7. Which 1875 case settled the doctrine of ultra vires? — **Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche**

8. Can shareholders unanimously ratify an ultra vires contract? — **No, it is void and cannot be ratified**

9. What is constructive notice? — **Outsiders are deemed to know the contents of the memorandum and articles**

10. Which 1856 case laid down the rule of indoor management? — **Royal British Bank v. Turquand**

11. What may an outsider assume under the indoor management rule? — **That internal procedures like resolutions and quorums were duly followed**

12. Name the three exceptions to indoor management protection. — **Knowledge of irregularity, suspicious circumstances, forgery**

13. Which section of the Companies Act, 2013 sets out directors' duties? — **Section 166**

14. For whose benefit must a director promote the company's objects under s.166? — **Its members as a whole**

15. What gain does s.166 forbid a director to make? — **Any undue gain or advantage for himself or his relatives**

16. Does indoor management protect an outsider from a contract beyond the objects? — **No, only from breaches of internal procedure**

17. Which Article defines 'the State' for Part III? — **Article 12**

18. Which 1981 case set the instrumentality test under Article 12? — **Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib**

19. Name two Ajay Hasia tests for 'other authority'. — **Entire government share capital; deep and pervasive government control**

20. Does statutory registration alone make a private body 'the State'? — **No**

21. What two conditions must a classification meet under Article 14? — **Intelligible differentia and rational nexus with the law's object**

22. Which 1974 case held arbitrariness is the antithesis of equality? — **E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu**

23. Can arbitrary State action violate Article 14 without any classification? — **Yes, after Royappa**

24. What does Article 21 protect? — **Life and personal liberty, save by procedure established by law**

25. Which 1978 case required procedure to be just, fair and reasonable? — **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India**

26. Is a fair hearing ordinarily part of Article 21 procedure after Maneka? — **Yes, natural justice is ordinarily part of it**

27. Under which Article does one move the Supreme Court for a fundamental right? — **Article 32**

28. Under which Article does one move a High Court for writs? — **Article 226**

29. Can a High Court's writ power enforce rights other than fundamental rights? — **Yes, other legal rights too**