CLAT Gurukul — By Ready For Exam

Daily Practice Sheet — Answers, Skills & Examiner Notes — 10 November 2026

26 Qs · 0 Min
Answer key + skill tags + examiner notes

ANSWER KEY — 10 NOVEMBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	D	A	C	B	A	C	D	B	C
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
A	D	B	D	B	A	C	A	C	B
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**				
D	A	D	B	C	A				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B — Audi alteram partem: no notice, no hearing [MED]

The passage states that an authority deciding a matter affecting a person's rights must give him notice of the case against him and a fair opportunity to answer it before an adverse decision, unless a statute excludes this expressly or by necessary implication. Cancelling a restaurant licence plainly affects Sunil's right to carry on his business, and he was not even told of the complaint. The statute is merely silent; silence is neither express exclusion nor necessary implication, so option C fails. Option A fails because the passage says in terms that the availability of an appeal later does not cure the absence of a hearing at the first stage. Option D invents a ground: nothing in the facts suggests that the Commissioner had any interest in the outcome or any personal hostility; receiving a complaint is the ordinary starting point of an inquiry, not evidence of bias. The defect is the absence of notice and hearing, so option B is correct and the order may be quashed.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: an appeal looks like a full hearing, but the passage expressly states that a later appeal does not cure the denial of a hearing at the first stage.

Q2 D — Nemo judex: automatic disqualification for pecuniary interest [HARD]

The passage separates two situations. For bias in general, the test is real likelihood or reasonable apprehension, and actual bias need not be proved. For pecuniary interest, it lays down a stricter rule: any pecuniary interest in the outcome, however small, disqualifies automatically. Ravindra owned shares in Jet Coaches Ltd, a party that benefited from his decision, so he had a direct financial interest in the result. The size of the holding is irrelevant, which defeats option A. Option B demands proof of actual favouritism, which the passage says is never required, least of all in a case of pecuniary interest. Option C adds an invented condition that the company's profits must rise measurably; the rule attaches to the interest itself, not to how much the decision ends up being worth. Because the disqualification is automatic, the decision is vitiated and may be set aside by certiorari, which makes option D correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is attractive because Rs 6,000 seems trifling, but the passage says any pecuniary interest, however small, disqualifies automatically.

Q3 A — Acting under dictation [HARD]

The statute gives the power to the District Magistrate and makes his own satisfaction about the applicant's need the test. The passage states that an authority to which a statute gives a discretion must exercise it itself and may not act under the dictation of another body, however senior. The Magistrate's only recorded reason is a telephone direction from the Home Secretary; he did not consider whether Kiran needed a licence for self-protection at all. That is the classic case of acting under dictation, so the rejection is invalid and option A is correct. Option B relies on seniority, which the passage expressly says makes no difference. Option C dresses the direction up as equal treatment, but a blanket refusal also fetters discretion, which the passage forbids. Option D reaches the right result for a wrong reason: nothing in the passage requires the Home Secretary to hear anyone; the flaw is that the Magistrate abdicated his own statutory judgment.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D is the trap: it says 'invalid', but locates the defect in a hearing by the Home Secretary rather than in the Magistrate's surrender of his own discretion.

Q4 C — Stretch: Kraipak bias test plus the correct writ [ELITE]

This question combines two rules from the passage. First, bias: the test is a real likelihood or a reasonable apprehension in a fair-minded observer's mind, not proof of actual bias. In Kraipak a selection fell even though the interested member withdrew while his own name was considered, because he took part in assessing his rivals. Mehta did the same: he graded his brother's competitors and joined the final ranking, so a fair-minded observer would reasonably apprehend bias. Option A repeats the argument Kraipak rejected, and option D demands proof of actual bias, which the test does not require. Second, the remedy: the passage says certiorari quashes a decision taken in breach of these rules, while mandamus compels an authority to perform a public duty it has refused to perform. The

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court will quash the tainted selection; it does not, by mandamus, appoint the rival in place of the panel's fresh judgment. Option B therefore picks the wrong writ and the wrong relief, leaving option C.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the trap: it rightly says the selection may be quashed, but mandamus does not let the court make the appointment itself.

Q5 B Fettering discretion by a rigid rule HARD

The statute tells the Board to consider each student's financial need. The passage states that an authority may not fetter its discretion by a rigid rule that refuses every application of a class without considering the individual case. The Board's resolution excludes every child of a government employee, and it rejected Lata without examining her family's income at all; a peon's salary may well leave a family in real need. That is precisely the forbidden fettering, so option B is correct. Option A is wrong because the passage objects not to guidance as such but to a rule applied so rigidly that the individual case is never considered. Option C assumes the conclusion the Board was required to reach by inquiry; the existence of a salary says nothing about whether the family is needy. Option D overstates the statute, which says the Board 'may award', not 'must award'; the remedy is fresh consideration of her case, not an automatic scholarship.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: consistency sounds like good administration, but the passage forbids a rule that shuts out a class without looking at the individual case.

Q6 A Rylands v Fletcher: act of a stranger exception MED

The passage states the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher: a person who brings on his land, for a non-natural use, something likely to do mischief if it escapes is liable for the damage its escape causes even if he took reasonable care. A large reservoir built to serve an ice factory is a non-natural accumulation of water that can do mischief if it escapes, so the rule is engaged. But the passage also lists the exceptions, one of which is escape caused by the deliberate act of a stranger over whom the defendant had no control. The trespasser who broke in and smashed the valve is exactly such a stranger, so Arun is not liable and option A is correct. Option B states the rule correctly but ignores the exception. Option C misapplies M.C. Mehta: an ice factory's reservoir is not a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry. Option D invents a limit: the rule covers anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, and Rylands itself concerned water escaping from a reservoir.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the trap: strictness only removes the defence of reasonable care; it does not remove the listed exceptions, including the act of a stranger.

Q7 C Absolute liability (M.C. Mehta): no exceptions HARD

Vayu Agro handles toxic intermediates to make pesticides, so it is an enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry. The passage states that such an enterprise owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to ensure that no harm results from its activity, and that if harm results to anyone on account of an accident in its operation, it must compensate all those affected; crucially, none of the exceptions recognised in Rylands v. Fletcher is available to it. The deliberate act of a stranger is one of those exceptions, so it cannot help Vayu Agro, and its guards and alarms are equally irrelevant because the duty is absolute rather than a duty of reasonable care. Option C is therefore correct. Option A would be right under Rylands but is excluded by M.C. Mehta. Option B converts absolute liability into negligence. Option D invents a geographical limit; the passage says the enterprise must compensate all those affected, including villagers outside its walls.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: the stranger's act would excuse a defendant under Rylands, but M.C. Mehta withdraws every Rylands exception from hazardous enterprises.

Q8 D Vicarious liability: wrongful mode of an authorised act HARD

The passage says an employer is vicariously liable for a tort committed in the course of employment, and that this includes a wrongful or unauthorised mode of doing an act the employee was authorised to do. Tariq was employed as a guard and was specifically told to remove the abusive shopper, so removing him was an authorised act; shoving him down the steps was a wrongful mode of doing it. The passage also says an express prohibition does not take an act outside the course of employment if it merely restricts the manner in which the employee performs the work he was engaged to do. The order 'never use force' restricted the manner of removing visitors, so option A fails and option D is correct. Option B fails because Tariq was not pursuing a private purpose; he was doing his employer's work badly. Option C turns vicarious liability into the employer's own negligence, which the passage does not require.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: the express written order looks decisive, but the passage says a prohibition that merely limits the manner of doing the job does not end the course of employment.

Q9 B Stretch: absolute liability, volenti and knowledge of risk ELITE

Two rules must be combined. First, Kaveri Chlor-Alkali is a hazardous enterprise, so under M.C. Mehta it owes an absolute duty and is liable to everyone harmed by an accident in its operation, with none of the Rylands exceptions available. Consent is one of those exceptions, so even a genuine consent would not help the plant; and proper maintenance is irrelevant because the duty is absolute, which defeats option C. Second, even on its own terms the plea of consent fails: the passage says volenti requires a free and voluntary agreement to run the risk, and mere knowledge of a risk does not amount to consent. A form saying Rohit 'knows the risks' records knowledge, not agreement, so option A fails twice over. Option D adds a condition about breach of a statutory safety rule that the passage nowhere imposes. The plant is therefore liable to both Rohit and the cyclist, with compensation correlated to its magnitude and capacity, and option B is correct.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: a signed risk form looks like consent, but it records only knowledge, and absolute liability excludes the consent exception anyway.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q10 C Must be true: chaining two universal statements MED

Two statements in the passage combine. The Department reported that every boat that sold its catch at an auction hall in October had paid the landing fee, and that no canoe had paid the landing fee. If any canoe had sold at an auction hall, it would have had to pay the fee, which contradicts the second statement. So no canoe sold its catch at an auction hall in October, and option C must be true. Option A goes beyond the data: only boats that sold at the auction halls are known to have paid the fee, and some trawlers may have sold elsewhere or not fished at all. Option B confuses a legal requirement with compliance; the law requires transponders, but the passage only guarantees that boats selling at auction halls had one. Option D is a causal claim the passage never makes; the fall in auction sales could have many causes, such as weather, fish stocks or a shift to private buyers.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: the law requires transponders on long boats, but a legal requirement is not proof that every trawler actually complies.

Q11 A Must be true: conditional chain on a single case HARD

Start from the supposition that a Matsya boat sold at an auction hall in October. Every boat that sold at an auction hall paid the landing fee, so it paid the fee. No canoe paid the fee, so it was not a canoe; since every Matsya boat that is not a trawler is a canoe, it must have been a trawler. Finally, since January no boat without a working transponder has been allowed to sell at an auction hall, so it carried a working transponder. All three properties follow, which is exactly option A. Option B wrongly drops the fee, which is the most direct consequence of selling. Option C wrongly drops the transponder, which every seller since January must have. Option D reopens the possibility of a canoe, which the fee statements rule out regardless of transponders. The question rewards students who chain every available premise rather than stopping at the first conclusion.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: it gets the trawler and transponder right but forgets that every auction-hall seller paid the landing fee.

Q12 D Stretch: what a total and a count jointly support ELITE

The passage gives two quantities. The total quantity sold at the auction halls fell by 18 per cent from last October, while the number of registered boats rose. When a total falls and the number it is divided among rises, the quantity per registered boat must fall, so option D follows arithmetically and is strongly supported. Option A shifts from fish sold at the auction halls to fish caught; boats may have caught as much or more and sold it to private buyers, especially now that boats without transponders cannot use the halls. Option B is speculation about the rule's effect on fishing activity; the passage gives no figure for boats that actually went out. Option C counts boats, but the passage reports only quantities: the same number of boats, or even more, could have sold smaller catches. The skill is to stay with what the numbers jointly entail and not to read in causes or counts the passage never provides.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: 'sold at the auction halls' silently becomes 'caught', ignoring sales to buyers outside the halls.

Q13 B Could be true EXCEPT: spotting the contradiction HARD

An EXCEPT question asks for the one statement that contradicts the passage. Option B says a Matsya canoe paid the landing fee, but the passage states flatly that no canoe paid the landing fee in October, so option B cannot be true and is the answer. It also fails a second way: a canoe that sold at an auction hall would have to pay the fee. The other options are all consistent with the passage. Option A is possible, because the passage nowhere says that every trawler sold at an auction hall. Option C is possible, because carrying a transponder only makes a boat eligible to sell; a boat with a transponder that did not sell at a hall need not have paid the fee. Option D is possible, because the rules govern only sales at the government auction halls and say nothing that forbids private sales outside them.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: students assume transponder and fee always go together, but only selling at a hall forces payment of the fee.

Q14 D Resolve the discrepancy: one fact that explains every figure HARD

The puzzle has several parts: fares for students fell, yet journeys on student passes fell; general ridership rose; and two-wheeler sales to young buyers fell, which suggests students were in fact being drawn to the metro. Option D reconciles all of them. If the discount was available only on a re-issued pass needing fresh verification, many students would have kept travelling on ordinary cards. Their journeys would then be counted as general ridership, which explains its 9 per cent rise, while student-pass journeys fell, and students could still be leaving two-wheelers for the metro. Option A points the wrong way: cheaper petrol would favour two-wheelers, yet their sales fell. Option B explains rising general ridership but not falling student-pass use. Option C gives a reason students might avoid the metro, but that clashes with falling two-wheeler sales and does not explain why the fare cut failed to show up in the student-pass figures.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: crowding explains why students might avoid the metro, but it cannot explain rising general ridership or falling two-wheeler sales.

Q15 B Paradox EXCEPT: the option that deepens the puzzle HARD

In an EXCEPT question, three options supply a reason for fewer student-pass journeys and one does not. Option A cuts the number of days on which students travel to college, so fewer journeys follow naturally. Option C puts a long vacation into the later period only, which would reduce journeys compared with the earlier period. Option D makes the pass so inconvenient to keep that students would drop it and travel on other tickets. Option B, by contrast, says the fare cut was widely publicised in every college. Wider awareness should have increased the use of student passes, so this fact makes the fall harder, not easier, to understand. It therefore does not help explain the fall, and option B is the answer. Students should test each option by asking whether it gives a reason for the observed fall, not merely whether it is relevant to the topic of student travel.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D is the trap: it reads like a complaint about the scheme, but a burdensome renewal rule is exactly a reason for student-pass journeys to fall.

Q16 A Stretch: supporting a claim against the headline figure ELITE

The chairperson claims the fare cut worked, meaning it drew students to the metro, and says the student-pass figures mislead. The best support is evidence that students did ride more, whatever ticket they used. Option A gives exactly that: if the share of all metro journeys made by students, on any ticket, rose sharply while total ridership also rose, student travel must have grown, and the fall in student-pass journeys reflects a change in ticket type, not in behaviour. Option B speaks of journey length, but the aim was to win riders from two-wheelers, and longer trips by fewer pass holders do not show that. Option C undercuts her: if ridership has risen 9 per cent every year, this year's rise is just the trend. Option D also undercuts her, since an equal fall across all ages suggests a general market slowdown rather than students switching to the metro because of the fare cut.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the trap: longer journeys sound like more metro use, but they say nothing about whether more students chose the metro.

Q17 C Deepening the paradox: closing off the best explanation HARD

The most natural way out of the puzzle is that students moved from student passes to other tickets, so their journeys were counted as general ridership. Option C closes that route. If the discount was applied automatically to every existing pass from day one, with no new registration, students had every reason to keep using their passes, and the cheaper fare should have increased student-pass journeys; the 12 per cent fall then becomes harder to explain, so C is the answer. Option A does the opposite: it confirms the ticket-switching explanation. Option B explains falling two-wheeler sales without the metro, which loosens the tension rather than tightening it. Option D gives students another way to travel, which helps explain fewer metro-pass journeys. Only option C removes an explanation without supplying a new one, which is what makes a discrepancy hardest to resolve.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the trap: it seems to cut against the fare cut's success, but it actually offers an alternative explanation, which eases the puzzle.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q18 A Percentage change vs absolute change MED

Percentage growth = (FY25 revenue minus FY24 revenue) divided by FY24 revenue, times 100. KrishiLink: (162 - 120)/120 = 42/120 = 35%. MedRoute: (100 - 80)/80 = 20/80 = 25%. PaySetu: (300 - 250)/250 = 50/250 = 20%. EduNova: (81 - 60)/60 = 21/60 = 35%. ShipKart: (165 - 150)/150 = 15/150 = 10%. The highest rate, 35%, is shared exactly by KrishiLink and EduNova, so option A is correct. PaySetu has the largest absolute increase, Rs 50 crore, but on a large base of Rs 250 crore that is only 20%, which is why option B is wrong. Options C and D each name one of the two leaders but claim it stands alone, which ignores the tie. The lesson for data interpretation is to read the question's measure carefully: 'percentage growth' compares the change with the starting value, so a smaller firm can grow faster than a bigger one even when it adds fewer crores of revenue.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the trap: PaySetu adds the most crores (Rs 50 crore), but the question asks about percentage growth, where it is only 20%.

Q19 C Runway = cash / monthly burn HARD

Runway in months = cash at the start of FY26 divided by monthly burn. KrishiLink: 270/9 = 30 months. MedRoute: 90/6 = 15 months. PaySetu: 450/15 = 30 months. EduNova: 81/4.5 = 18 months. ShipKart: 200/10 = 20 months. The condition is 'at least 20 months', which includes exactly 20. KrishiLink (30), PaySetu (30) and ShipKart (20) qualify, while MedRoute (15) and EduNova (18) fall short. That is three startups, so option C is correct. Option A, two startups, results from treating 'at least 20' as 'more than 20' and so wrongly excluding ShipKart. Option B, four, usually comes from misreading EduNova's burn of 4.5 as 4, which would give it a runway of just over 20 months. Option D ignores the calculation altogether. Careful handling of boundary words such as 'at least' and of decimal entries in a table separates accurate solvers from quick ones.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: ShipKart's runway is exactly 20 months, and 'at least 20' includes it.

Q20 B Unit conversion: crore and lakh to rupees per user MED

Revenue per user = FY25 revenue divided by FY25 users. Since revenue is in crore and users are in lakh, and 1 crore = 100 lakh, revenue per user in rupees = (revenue in crore / users in lakh) x 100. KrishiLink: 162/45 x 100 = Rs 360. MedRoute: 100/20 x 100 = Rs 500. PaySetu: 300/120 x 100 = Rs 250. EduNova: 81/27 x 100 = Rs 300. ShipKart: 165/50 x 100 = Rs 330. The highest is MedRoute at Rs 500 and the lowest is PaySetu at Rs 250, so the difference is 500 - 250 = Rs 250, which is option B. Option A (Rs 200) compares MedRoute with EduNova, the second-lowest, rather than with the lowest. Option C (Rs 140) compares MedRoute with KrishiLink. Option D (Rs

170) compares MedRoute with ShipKart. PaySetu's large user base, 120 lakh, is what drives its revenue per user down even though its total revenue is the highest of the five.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: EduNova looks like the weakest earner, but PaySetu's 120 lakh users give it the lowest revenue per user.

Q21 D Combined growth is a weighted, not a simple, average HARD

Combined FY24 revenue = 120 + 80 + 250 + 60 + 150 = Rs 660 crore. Combined FY25 revenue = 162 + 100 + 300 + 81 + 165 = Rs 808 crore. The increase is 808 - 660 = Rs 148 crore, so combined growth = 148/660 x 100 = 22.42%, about 22.4%, which is option D. Option A, exactly 25.0%, is the simple average of the five individual growth rates (35 + 25 + 20 + 35 + 10 = 125, divided by 5). That average treats every startup as equally large, but PaySetu, with the biggest revenue base, grew at only 20% and ShipKart at only 10%, so they pull the combined rate below the simple average. Option B, about 18.3%, divides the increase by the FY25 total (148/808) instead of the FY24 base. Option C, 20.0%, is merely PaySetu's own rate, taken as typical because PaySetu is the largest. Combined growth compares the change in the totals with the starting total.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: averaging the five percentage rates ignores the different sizes of the startups; combined growth must be computed from the totals.

Q22 A Stretch: runway target with a burn cut and fresh funds ELITE

ShipKart's FY25 monthly burn is Rs 10 crore. A 10% cut makes the new burn 10 x 0.9 = Rs 9 crore a month. For a runway of 30 months it needs cash of 30 x 9 = Rs 270 crore at the start of FY26. It already holds Rs 200 crore, so the least fresh funding required is 270 - 200 = Rs 70 crore, option A. Check: (200 + 70)/9 = 270/9 = 30 months exactly. Option B, Rs 100 crore, ignores the burn cut and uses 30 x 10 = 300, minus 200. Option C, Rs 50 crore, is the shortfall for a 25-month runway at the old burn (25 x 10 = 250, minus 200), which answers a different question. Option D, Rs 90 crore, reasons that the present runway is 20 months, so 10 more months at Rs 9 crore are needed, forgetting that the existing Rs 200 crore itself lasts longer at the lower burn. Working forward from the new burn, then to the required cash, then subtracting existing cash, avoids each of these traps.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the trap: it is the right method at the old burn of Rs 10 crore, forgetting that the 10% cut lowers the cash needed.

Q23 D Share of a total from a pie chart MED

Interest payments take 15% of total expenditure. Amount = 15% of Rs 3,60,000 crore = 0.15 x 3,60,000 = Rs 54,000 crore, which is option D. The same answer follows from the central angle: the interest sector is 54 degrees out of 360, and 54/360 = 0.15; a useful shortcut here is that each degree of this pie stands for 3,60,000/360 = Rs 1,000 crore, so 54 degrees is Rs 54,000 crore. Option A, Rs 45,000 crore, is the amount for subsidies or for other revenue expenditure (45 degrees), so it comes from reading the wrong row. Option B, Rs 36,000 crore, is the amount for grants to local bodies (36 degrees). Option C, Rs 64,800 crore, is the interest bill after a 20% rise, a figure that belongs to the next question rather than to this year's budget. Matching the head to the right row before calculating avoids all three slips.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: 45 sits next to 54 in the table, and the subsidies row is easily read for the interest row.

Q24 B Recomputing a sector angle after both parts change HARD

This year interest is Rs 54,000 crore. A 20% rise makes it 54,000 x 1.2 = Rs 64,800 crore. Total expenditure rises by 10% to 3,60,000 x 1.1 = Rs 3,96,000 crore. The new share of interest = 64,800/3,96,000 = 16.36%, and the central angle = 0.16364 x 360 = 58.91 degrees, about 58.9 degrees, which is option B. A neat cross-check: the angle scales by 1.2/1.1, so 54 x 1.2/1.1 = 58.9 degrees. Option C, 59.4 degrees, multiplies the angle by 1.1, applying the wrong growth factor and ignoring the change in the total. Option A, 64.8 degrees, treats the new amount in thousands of crore as if it were the angle, which would be correct only if the total had stayed at Rs 3,60,000 crore. Option D, 54.0 degrees, assumes the angle is unchanged, which would hold only if interest grew at the same rate as the total.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: 64.8 is the new interest bill in thousand crore, which equals the angle only if the total does not grow.

Q25 C Reallocating sectors with a fixed total HARD

With the total unchanged, shares and angles can be moved directly. Capital expenditure is 72 degrees and salaries and pensions are 108 degrees, so capital expenditure must rise by 108 - 72 = 36 degrees (10 percentage points, or Rs 36,000 crore). The rise is taken equally from subsidies and other revenue expenditure, so each gives up 36/2 = 18 degrees. Subsidies fall from 45 degrees to 45 - 18 = 27 degrees, option C; in money, from Rs 45,000 crore to Rs 27,000 crore. Check: 108 + 54 + 108 + 27 + 36 + 27 = 360 degrees. Option B, 18 degrees, is the amount subsidies lose, not their new angle. Option D, 9 degrees, takes the whole 36-degree rise from subsidies alone and subtracts it from 45. Option A, 36 degrees, is the size of the total transfer, which students sometimes report instead of finishing the calculation.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the trap: 18 degrees is what subsidies give up; the question asks for the sector that remains, 45 - 18 = 27 degrees.

Q26 A Stretch: share of a composite head after uneven growth ELITE

Committed expenditure = salaries and pensions + interest. This year salaries and pensions = 30% of 3,60,000 = Rs 1,08,000 crore, and interest = Rs 54,000 crore. Next year salaries and pensions = 1,08,000 x 1.15 = Rs 1,24,200 crore, and interest = 54,000 + 9,000 = Rs 63,000 crore, so committed expenditure = 1,24,200 + 63,000 = Rs 1,87,200 crore. The new total = 3,60,000 x 1.125 = Rs 4,05,000 crore. Share = 1,87,200/4,05,000 = 46.22%, about 46.2%, option A. Option B, 45.0%, is this year's committed share (30 + 15), which would hold

only if both heads grew at 12.5%. Option D, 52.0%, divides the new committed amount by the old total of Rs 3,60,000 crore. Option C, about 42.2%, forgets the 15% rise in salaries and pensions and uses 1,71,000/4,05,000. Each distractor is one missed step.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D is the trap: dividing next year's committed spending by this year's total inflates the share; the denominator must also grow.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. What does audi alteram partem require before an adverse decision? — **Notice of the case and a fair chance to answer it**

2. Which 1978 case held that impounding a passport without a hearing was unfair? — **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India**

3. When may a post-decisional hearing satisfy the hearing rule? — **Where urgent action is genuinely necessary**

4. Does a later appeal cure the absence of a first-stage hearing? — **No**

5. What does nemo judex in causa sua forbid? — **Deciding a matter in which one has an interest**

6. Must actual bias be proved to set aside a decision? — **No; real likelihood or reasonable apprehension suffices**

7. What is the effect of even a small pecuniary interest in the outcome? — **Automatic disqualification**

8. In which 1969 case was a selection quashed because a board member was a candidate? — **A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India**

9. Did Kraipak's interested member escape by withdrawing for his own name? — **No; he still assessed his rivals**

10. Name the vice when an authority obeys another body instead of deciding itself. — **Acting under dictation**

11. What is it called when a rigid rule shuts out a class without examining each case? — **Fettering discretion**

12. May an authority rely on considerations irrelevant to the statute's purpose? — **No**

13. Which writ quashes a decision taken in breach of natural justice? — **Certiorari**

14. Which writ compels an authority to perform a public duty it has refused to perform? — **Mandamus**

15. Under which Article does a High Court issue writs? — **Article 226**

16. Under which Article does the Supreme Court issue writs for fundamental rights? — **Article 32**

17. Can a statute exclude natural justice? — **Yes, expressly or by necessary implication**

18. Does silence in a statute exclude the right to a hearing? — **No**

19. In which year was Rylands v. Fletcher decided? — **1868**

20. Under Rylands, what kind of use of land attracts strict liability? — **A non-natural use**

21. Is reasonable care a defence under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher? — **No**

22. Name the Rylands exception for a natural catastrophe. — **Act of God**

23. Is a defendant liable under Rylands for a stranger's deliberate act? — **No, if he had no control over the stranger**

24. Name two other Rylands exceptions besides act of God and stranger. — **Plaintiff's own default; plaintiff's consent**

25. Does statutory authority excuse liability under Rylands? — **Yes**

26. Which 1987 case laid down absolute liability in India? — **M.C. Mehta v. Union of India**

27. Which gas leaked in the M.C. Mehta case, and where? — **Oleum gas, from a factory in Delhi**

28. What kind of duty does a hazardous enterprise owe under M.C. Mehta? — **An absolute and non-delegable duty**

29. Which Rylands exceptions are open to a hazardous enterprise? — **None**

30. To what is compensation correlated under M.C. Mehta? — **The magnitude and capacity of the enterprise**

31. Why is compensation linked to the enterprise's capacity? — **To give it a deterrent effect**

32. Is an employer liable for a wrongful mode of doing an authorised act? — **Yes, it is within the course of employment**