CLAT Gurukul — By Ready For Exam

Daily Practice Sheet — Answers, Skills & Examiner Notes — 11 November 2026

26 Qs · 0 Min
Answer key + skill tags + examiner notes

ANSWER KEY — 11 NOVEMBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
B	D	A	C	D	A	C	B	D	C
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
A	B	D	A	C	B	D	A	B	C
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**				
D	A	C	B	A	C				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 B VCDR Art 31: commercial-activity exception MED

The passage states that a diplomatic agent's immunity from criminal jurisdiction is complete, but his immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction yields in three cases, one of which is an action relating to any professional or commercial activity he carries on in the receiving state outside his official functions (Article 31). Running a private export consultancy from a rented office is plainly a commercial activity, and advising private clients for fees forms no part of an ambassador's official functions. A suit for refund of those fees therefore falls within the exception, and the civil court may hear it. Option A overstates the rule: immunity is complete only in criminal matters. Option C confuses a remedy with a bar: the persona non grata power exists, but nothing makes it the only route when an exception to civil immunity applies. Option D reaches the right result for a wrong reason: the passage says a waiver belongs to the sending state and must always be express, so a waiver can never be implied from conduct. Option B is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D is the trap: it gives the right outcome, but the passage makes waiver an express act of the sending state, so 'implied waiver' by the envoy is not a legal ground at all.

Q2 D VCDR Arts 31-32: criminal immunity and waiver HARD

Under the passage, a diplomatic agent's immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state is complete; the three exceptions it lists apply only to civil and administrative jurisdiction. A prosecution for causing death by driving is criminal, so the fact that the accident happened on a private outing makes no difference, and option A, which imports the 'outside official functions' test from the civil exceptions, fails. Option C fails for the same reason: there is no functional test for criminal immunity of a diplomatic agent. The decisive question is waiver. The passage says immunity belongs to the sending state, which alone may waive it, and that a waiver must always be express (Article 32). The ambassador's own statement at a press conference is neither a waiver by Ostravia nor, in any case, a formal waiver; it cannot strip him of a protection that is not his to give up. As Ostravia has said nothing, the immunity stands, and India's remedies are to request a waiver or declare him persona non grata. Option D is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B tempts because the envoy's words sound like an express waiver, but the passage vests the power of waiver in the sending state alone, not in the agent.

Q3 A Art 51 armed attack: Nicaragua threshold HARD

Article 51, as stated in the passage, permits self-defence only 'if an armed attack occurs'. The passage then records the holding in Nicaragua v. United States (1986) that supplying weapons or logistical support to rebels does not amount to an armed attack, although it may be unlawful intervention. Karvia's secret shipment of rifles and field radios to rebels is exactly that kind of support. It may be a wrong for which Lumera has other remedies, but it does not open the door to the use of force in self-defence, so the bombing of the Karvian base cannot be justified under Article 51. Option B describes what Article 2(4) protects, not what triggers self-defence; a threat to integrity is not the same as an armed attack. Option C treats reporting as sufficient, but reporting is a duty that accompanies a valid exercise of self-defence and cannot create one. Option D overstates the rule: the passage itself recognises self-defence as an exception that does not wait for Council authorisation. Option A is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C traps candidates who remember the reporting duty: a prompt report is required, but it cannot turn support for rebels into an armed attack.

Q4 C Self-defence: necessity, proportionality, reporting HARD

Sustained artillery shelling of a town that kills dozens is a use of force by one state's army against another state's territory of a scale that is plainly an armed attack, unlike the mere supply of arms discussed in Nicaragua. Article 51 then permits self-defence, and the passage adds that the right exists until the Security Council has taken the necessary measures, so Lumera did not have to wait for the Council to meet; option B inverts the rule. Lumera struck only the batteries that were firing, just across the border, and stopped as soon as the shelling stopped. That is force that is necessary to repel the attack and proportionate to it, and Lumera reported to the Council at once, as the passage requires. Option A ignores the Article 51 exception, which is the very reason a defending state may lawfully use force on

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the attacker's soil. Option D describes conduct that goes beyond repelling the attack and would fail the proportionality requirement. Option C is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the attractive error: the passage says self-defence lasts until the Council acts, so the Council's prior consideration is not a condition of lawful self-defence.

Q5 D Stretch: innocent passage plus EEZ enforcement ELITE

Two zones are in play. While crossing Lumera's territorial sea, the trawler kept its nets stowed and simply sailed through, which is innocent passage, so Lumera could not have acted against it for that leg. But the arrest took place 150 nautical miles from the coast, which lies within the exclusive economic zone that, according to the passage, extends up to 200 nautical miles. In that zone the coastal state has sovereign rights over fish and other natural resources and may board, inspect and arrest vessels to enforce its fisheries laws. Fishing there without a Lumeran licence breaches those rights, so the arrest is lawful. Option A wrongly assumes that innocent passage earlier on the voyage gives a ship immunity everywhere afterwards. Option B ignores the EEZ altogether: freedom of navigation survives in the zone, but the right to fish does not. Option C reaches the right outcome on a false premise, since the passage gives sovereignty only over the 12-mile territorial sea and only sovereign rights over resources in the EEZ. Option D is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C is the trap: it upholds the arrest but treats the EEZ as sovereign territory, whereas the passage confines sovereignty to 12 nautical miles and grants only resource rights beyond.

Q6 A Ss 4-5: revocation of proposal too late HARD

Section 5 allows a proposal to be revoked only before the communication of its acceptance is complete as against the proposer. Under section 4, an acceptance is complete as against the proposer when it is put in a course of transmission so as to be out of the acceptor's power, which here is when Bilal posted it on 5 March. A revocation, in turn, is complete as against the person to whom it is made only when it comes to his knowledge, so Arjun's revocation took effect against Bilal on 6 March. By then Arjun was already bound, since the acceptance had been complete against him a day earlier, and the revocation came too late. Option B uses the wrong limb: completion of a revocation against its maker does not bind the other party, who must learn of it. Option C applies the test for completion against the acceptor, which is irrelevant to whether the proposer may still revoke. Option D invents a rule that receipt alone makes a proposal irrevocable. Option A is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B tempts because 4 March is earlier than 5 March, but a revocation operates against the offeree only when it comes to his knowledge, which was 6 March.

Q7 C Stretch: revoking a posted acceptance in time ELITE

The passage treats the two parties differently. As against the proposer, Dev, the acceptance was complete when Chitra posted it at 10 a.m.; as against the acceptor, Chitra, it becomes complete only when it comes to Dev's knowledge, which would have been on Wednesday. Section 5 lets an acceptance be revoked at any time before the communication of acceptance is complete as against the acceptor. Chitra's e-mail revoking it reached Dev and was read at 1 p.m. on Monday, well before the letter arrived, so the revocation was in time and no contract arose. The passage itself spells out this result: the acceptor may withdraw a posted acceptance by a faster message that reaches the proposer before the letter does. Option A takes the rule that binds the proposer on posting and wrongly extends it to the acceptor. Option B confuses being out of the acceptor's physical control with being beyond revocation. Option D adds a confirmation requirement that the Act does not contain. Option C is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the strongest distractor: the proposer is indeed bound on posting, but section 5 keeps the acceptor free to revoke until the acceptance reaches the proposer's knowledge.

Q8 B Minor's agreement void: Mohori Bibee HARD

Section 11 makes a person who has not attained majority incompetent to contract, and the passage records the holding in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose that a minor's agreement is void from the beginning. Raghav was 17 when he signed, so the loan agreement never had any legal effect and he cannot be sued on it. The passage adds two further points that decide the lender's specific pleas. First, the minor cannot be made to refund under the Act money received under such an agreement, which defeats both full recovery and the partial-refund theory in option C. Second, the minor is not estopped from pleading minority even if he lied about his age, which directly rejects option A. Option D reaches the right result for a wrong reason: the passage says nothing to make parents liable, and section 68 concerns necessaries, not loans, so its absence explains nothing about the parents. The lender therefore fails, because the agreement is void and no refund can be ordered under the Act. Option B is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap that many candidates find just: the passage expressly says a minor is not estopped from pleading minority even after lying about his age.

Q9 D S 68: necessaries supplied to a minor MED

Meera, at 16, is a minor, so under the Mohori Bibee rule her agreement with Sohan is void and she cannot be sued on it as a contract. Section 68, as the passage explains, makes an exception for necessaries: where a person supplies a minor with necessaries suited to her condition in life, the supplier is entitled to be reimbursed from the minor's property, though the minor incurs no personal liability. School textbooks and a winter coat for a girl from a well-off family are necessaries suited to her station. Sohan may therefore be reimbursed out of the fixed deposit she owns, but he cannot obtain a personal decree against her. Option A ignores section 68 entirely. Option B overstates the exception: supplying necessaries does not make the contract binding or create personal liability. Option C

invents liability for the parents and wrongly treats the minor's own property as immune, when section 68 makes that property the very source of reimbursement. Option D is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A tempts because the agreement is indeed void, but section 68 creates a claim for reimbursement from the minor's property that exists independently of any contract.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q10 C Both limbs met: under half, transformed MED

The policy makes a video with third-party material original only if two conditions are both met: the third-party material makes up less than half the running time, and the creator adds commentary, criticism or educational explanation that transforms it. Anika's video runs 10 minutes and the unlicensed debate clips take 4 of them, which is less than half. After each clip she gives her own analysis of the speakers' arguments, which is commentary or criticism of exactly the kind the rule says transforms material. Both conditions are satisfied, so the video is original. Option A treats the lack of a licence as decisive, but the rule permits unlicensed third-party material if both conditions are met; a licence merely removes material from the third-party category. Option B contradicts the rule, which names criticism and commentary as transforming. Option D states a test the policy does not contain: adding one's own footage does not by itself satisfy the second condition, which requires commentary, criticism or explanation of the third-party material. Option C is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A attracts candidates who equate 'unlicensed' with 'not allowed', but the policy permits unlicensed material when both conditions are met.

Q11 A Licensed material treated as own HARD

The policy says that material the creator holds a written licence to use is treated as the creator's own and is not third-party material. Kabir holds a licence for the 9 minutes of highlights, so those minutes count as his own, and the other 3 minutes are his own training footage. The video therefore contains no third-party material at all, and the first sentence of the definition applies: a video that contains no third-party material is original. The two conditions on running time and transformation apply only to videos that contain third-party material, so they never come into play here. Option B wrongly treats licensed highlights as third-party material when calculating the share of running time. Option C applies the transformation requirement to a video to which it does not apply; the rule against compilations matters only for third-party material. Option D reaches the right result for a wrong reason, since unedited training footage is not commentary, criticism or explanation and would not transform anything. Option A is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C is the trap: compilations do not transform material, but the transformation test applies only to third-party material, and licensed clips are not third-party material.

Q12 B Reversed findings excluded from the count HARD

The suspension rule requires findings of unoriginality on three occasions within any period of 90 consecutive days, and it adds that a finding reversed on appeal does not count towards the three. The 20 July finding was reversed on 30 July, so it drops out. That leaves findings on 3 June and 25 August, which are only two, and the channel therefore does not lose monetisation, even though the three original findings fell within 83 days of one another. Option A ignores the express rule on appeals. Option C invents a timing rule: the policy simply says a reversed finding does not count, and the reversal on 30 July had in any case already happened before the 25 August finding was made. Option D gives the right answer for a wrong reason by confusing the 30-day length of the penalty with the 90-day window used to count findings; nothing in the policy turns on whether the findings span more than 30 days. Option B is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D reaches 'No' by mixing up the 30-day suspension with the 90-day counting window, which is a classic misreading of a two-number rule.

Q13 D Stretch: transformation test plus the 90-day window ELITE

Two questions arise. First, is the video original? The licensed 2.5 minutes count as the channel's own, so the only third-party material is the 3 minutes of unlicensed clips, which is under half the running time. But the second condition also has to be met, and adding music does not transform material, while the 4.5 minutes of talk are on another topic and so do not comment on or explain the clips. The finding of unoriginality is therefore right, which rules out options A and C. Second, does suspension follow? The findings fall on 2 January, 20 February and 7 April. From 2 January to 7 April is 95 days, so no period of 90 consecutive days contains all three, and the 'third finding' is not within the window. Option B relies on a loose 'about three months' instead of the policy's exact 90-day test. No suspension follows, so option D is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: it applies only the first condition, but the clips are set to music and never discussed, so the second, transformation, condition fails.

Q14 A Grouping: deducing the Tax pair MED

Neither F nor G is on the Civil bench, and they are on different benches, so one of them is on Criminal and the other on Tax. H is on Tax, so Tax (two seats) is filled by H and one of F or G. K cannot share a bench with F or G. Both Criminal and Tax contain one of F or G, so K must be on Civil. L and M must sit together; Criminal has only one seat left after F or G, and Tax is full, so L and M are both on Civil, which completes Civil as K, L and M. The only intern left, J, therefore takes the last Criminal seat. Since G and J must be on different benches, G cannot be on Criminal, so G is on Tax with H and F is on Criminal with J. The full placement is Civil: K, L, M; Criminal: F, J; Tax: G, H. H's partner on Tax is G, so option A is correct; F and J sit on Criminal and K on Civil.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B (F) is tempting at first because F and G are interchangeable until the final note, but the G-J condition forces G onto Tax.

Q15 C Grouping: identifying a shared bench HARD

Working from the notes gives a unique placement. F and G avoid Civil and are split between Criminal and Tax; H fills the second Tax seat. K must avoid both F and G, who between them sit on Criminal and Tax, so K is on Civil. L and M must sit together, and since Tax is full and Criminal has a single seat left, they must be on Civil, completing it as K, L and M. J then takes the remaining Criminal seat, and because G and J must differ, G goes to Tax and F to Criminal. Final placement: Civil K, L, M; Criminal F, J; Tax G, H. Checking the options: G is on Tax and K on Civil, so A is wrong; H is on Tax and J on Criminal, so B is wrong; J is on Criminal and L on Civil, so D, which needs J on Civil, is wrong. F and J are both on the Criminal bench, so option C is correct. Every note is satisfied by this placement, which confirms the deduction.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D (J and L) attracts candidates who place J on Civil as the 'leftover' intern before seeing that L and M fill Civil with K.

Q16 B Grouping: what survives when a condition is dropped HARD

Without the note that G and J differ, the earlier chain of deductions still works up to a point. F and G avoid Civil and are split between Criminal and Tax; H completes Tax with one of them. K must avoid both F and G, so K is on Civil. L and M must sit together, and only Civil has room for two, so Civil becomes K, L and M, and J takes the last Criminal seat. What changes is that nothing now decides which of F and G is on Criminal with J and which is on Tax with H. Two placements are possible: Criminal F, J with Tax G, H; or Criminal G, J with Tax F, H. In both, K, L and M sit on Civil, so option B must be true. Option A and option C hold only in the first placement, and option D, J and G on different benches, fails in the second, where they share Criminal. Option B is correct.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C is the trap: G on Tax was forced only by the G-J note, so once that note is disregarded G could equally sit on Criminal.

Q17 D Stretch: counting placements after relaxing a rule ELITE

Drop the L-M note and count. F and G are still split between Criminal and Tax with H on Tax, and K must avoid both F and G, so K is on Civil. Case 1: G on Tax with H, F on Criminal. Criminal has one more seat, which may go to J, L or M, the other two joining K on Civil. J cannot be the one only if G and J share a bench, but G is on Tax, so J, L or M may all take it: three placements. Case 2: F on Tax with H, G on Criminal. The second Criminal seat cannot go to J (G and J must differ) or K (already on Civil), so it goes to L or M, with J and the other joining K on Civil: two placements. In total, 3 + 2 = 5 complete placements satisfy the remaining notes, which a brute-force check of all assignments confirms. Option D is correct.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A (Two) is what candidates get when they count only Case 2, or Option B (Three) when they count only Case 1; both cases are open once the L-M note goes.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q18 A Percentage increase comparison MED

Percentage increase = (beds 2025 - beds 2020) / beds 2020 x 100. For P: (50 - 40)/40 = 10/40 = 25%. For Q: (30 - 25)/25 = 5/25 = 20%. For R: (40 - 32)/32 = 8/32 = 25%. For S: (55 - 50)/50 = 5/50 = 10%. For T: (27 - 18)/18 = 9/18 = 50%. T's increase of 50% is twice that of the next districts, P and R, which tie at 25%, so T alone recorded the highest percentage increase. Option B names the joint second place. Option C confuses size with growth: S has the largest number of beds in both years, but its increase of 5 thousand on a base of 50 thousand is the smallest percentage of all, at 10%. Option D gives Q's figure correctly, but 20% is lower than three other districts. The key point in a bar-graph question of this kind is to compare the change relative to the starting bar, not the absolute height of the bars. Option A is correct.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C traps candidates who compare absolute bar heights; S has the tallest bars but the smallest percentage growth.

Q19 B Aggregate percentage change HARD

First total the bars for each year. Beds in 2020 = 40 + 25 + 32 + 50 + 18 = 165 thousand. Beds in 2025 = 50 + 30 + 40 + 55 + 27 = 202 thousand. The increase is 202 - 165 = 37 thousand. Percentage increase = 37 / 165 x 100 = 22.42%, which rounds to 22.4%. Note that the aggregate rise cannot be found by averaging the five district percentages (25, 20, 25, 10 and 50, whose simple average is 26%), because the districts start from very different bases and a simple average gives T's small base the same weight as S's large one; that is the trap in option C. Option D, 37.0%, takes the absolute increase in thousands and wrongly reads it as a percentage. Option A, 18.32%, divides the increase by the 2025 total instead of the 2020 base (37/202 = 18.32%), which measures the increase as a share of the final figure rather than the initial one. Option B is correct.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C, the simple average of the five district growth rates, is the classic trap: an aggregate change must be weighted by each district's base.

Q20 C Weighted ratio: beds per lakh HARD

Beds per lakh for the five districts together = total beds / total population in lakh. Total beds in 2025 = 50 + 30 + 40 + 55 + 27 = 202 thousand = 2,02,000. Total population = 10 + 5 + 8 + 11 + 6 = 40 crore = 4,000 lakh. Beds per lakh = 2,02,000 / 4,000 = 50.5. The district figures are P 50,000/1,000 = 50, Q 30,000/500 = 60, R 40,000/800 = 50, S 55,000/1,100 = 50 and T 27,000/600 = 45. Their simple average is

(50 + 60 + 50 + 50 + 45)/5 = 51.0, which is option A, but this ignores the different populations: Q's high ratio applies to only 5 crore people, while the large districts sit at 50. Option B, 50.0, is the most common district value, not the combined ratio. Option D, 50.25, has no basis in the data. Only the ratio of the totals gives the correct combined figure, so option C, 50.5, is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: averaging the five district ratios gives 51.0, but a combined ratio must be computed from total beds over total population.

Q21 D Target ratio with population growth HARD

S's population in 2025 is 11 crore = 1,100 lakh. A 10% rise gives 1,100 x 1.1 = 1,210 lakh in 2030. To have 60 beds per lakh, S needs 1,210 x 60 = 72,600 beds. It has 55,000 beds in 2025, so the required increase is 72,600 - 55,000 = 17,600 beds. As a percentage of the 2025 figure, this is 17,600 / 55,000 x 100 = 32.0%. A quicker route: the ratio must rise from 50 to 60 (a factor of 1.2) while population rises by a factor of 1.1, so beds must rise by a factor of 1.2 x 1.1 = 1.32, i.e. by 32%. Option B, 20.0%, raises the ratio from 50 to 60 but forgets the population growth. Option A, 9.1%, is 1.2/1.1 - 1, which wrongly divides by the population factor instead of multiplying. Option C, 26.4%, has no basis. Option D is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B (20%) is the trap: it raises the ratio from 50 to 60 but treats population as fixed, ignoring the 10% growth.

Q22 A Stretch: growth projection with a ratio ELITE

T's beds rose from 18 thousand in 2020 to 27 thousand in 2025, an increase of 9/18 = 50%. Applying the same 50% increase from 2025 to 2030 gives 27,000 x 1.5 = 40,500 beds. T's population in 2025 is 6 crore = 600 lakh; a 20% rise gives 600 x 1.2 = 720 lakh. Beds per lakh in 2030 = 40,500 / 720 = 56.25. Equivalently, the 2025 ratio of 27,000/600 = 45 is multiplied by 1.5/1.2 = 1.25, which gives 45 x 1.25 = 56.25. Option B, 67.50, applies the 50% growth to beds but forgets the population rise (45 x 1.5). Option C, 45.00, simply repeats the 2025 ratio. Option D, 58.50, adds the 50% rise in beds and subtracts the 20% rise in population to get a net 30% increase in the ratio (45 x 1.3), which treats a ratio of two growth factors as a difference. The only defensible figure divides the grown beds by the grown population, so option A, 56.25, is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B (67.50) is the trap: it grows the beds by 50% but leaves the population at its 2025 level, forgetting the 20% rise.

Q23 C Setting up linear equations MED

Votes cast = 75% of 2,40,000 = 1,80,000. Valid votes = 1,80,000 - 1,200 = 1,78,800. Votes for the four candidates = 1,78,800 - 2,400 (NOTA) = 1,76,400. Let S receive s votes. Then Q = 2s, R = s + 6,000 and P = Q + 18,000 = 2s + 18,000. Adding: (2s + 18,000) + 2s + (s + 6,000) + s = 6s + 24,000 = 1,76,400, so 6s = 1,52,400 and s = 25,400. Hence Q = 2 x 25,400 = 50,800, P = 68,800 and R = 31,400. Check: 68,800 + 50,800 + 31,400 + 25,400 = 1,76,400, as required, and P beats Q by 18,000. Option A, 50,000, comes from forgetting to remove the rejected postal ballots and NOTA before solving. Option B, 58,800, results from adding the 18,000 margin to Q instead of P. Option D, 1,52,400, is the value of 6s, an intermediate step, not anyone's tally. Option C, 50,800, is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A tempts candidates who solve on all votes cast; the four candidates share only the valid votes left after NOTA.

Q24 B Threshold on the correct base HARD

The rule fixes the forfeiture level at one-sixth of the total valid votes, NOTA included. Total valid votes = 1,80,000 cast - 1,200 rejected = 1,78,800. One-sixth of 1,78,800 = 29,800. From the equations, S = 25,400 and R = S + 6,000 = 31,400. R therefore exceeds the forfeiture level by 31,400 - 29,800 = 1,600 votes (and S, at 25,400, forfeits). The distractors each use a wrong base. Option A, 1,400, takes one-sixth of all votes cast (1,80,000/6 = 30,000), wrongly including the rejected ballots. Option C, 2,000, takes one-sixth of the candidates' votes only (1,76,400/6 = 29,400), wrongly excluding NOTA, which the rule expressly includes. Option D, 31,400, is R's whole tally, not the margin above the forfeiture level. Only the base of valid votes with NOTA included matches the stated rule, so option B is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C (2,000) traps candidates who drop NOTA from the base; the caselet states that NOTA votes are included in the valid votes.

Q25 A Choosing the right denominator HARD

The question asks for the winner's votes as a share of all electors on the roll, not of the votes cast. P received Q + 18,000 = 50,800 + 18,000 = 68,800 votes (from 6s + 24,000 = 1,76,400, s = 25,400, Q = 50,800). Electors on the roll = 2,40,000. Share = 68,800 / 2,40,000 x 100 = 28.67%, which is approximately 28.7%. The distractors each use a different base. Option B, 38.22%, divides by the 1,80,000 votes cast. Option C, 38.5%, divides by the 1,78,800 valid votes. Option D, 39.0%, divides by the 1,76,400 votes polled by the four candidates. Each of these is a legitimate figure for some other question, which is why a careful reading of the denominator matters in election caselets: a candidate can win with a large share of the votes cast while being backed by well under a third of the electorate. Option A is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C (38.5%) is the trap: it is P's share of valid votes, the figure usually quoted, but the question asks about all electors on the roll.

Q26 C Stretch: minimum switch to overturn a margin ELITE

From the equations, P = 68,800 and Q = 50,800, a gap of 18,000. When a voter switches from P to Q, P loses one vote and Q gains one, so the gap narrows by two. If k voters switch, Q has 50,800 + k and P has 68,800 - k. For Q to win outright, 50,800 + k > 68,800 - k, so 2k >

18,000 and k > 9,000. The smallest whole number is k = 9,001, giving Q 59,801 and P 59,799. R (31,400) and S (25,400) remain far behind, so Q is the outright winner. At k = 9,000 the two would tie at 59,800 each, which is not an outright win, so option B fails. Option A, 18,001, forgets that each switch moves the margin by two votes, not one. Option D, 6,001, has no basis in the data. Option C is correct.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A (18,001) is the trap: it treats each switch as moving the margin by one vote, when a switch both removes a vote from P and adds one to Q.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Which 1961 treaty governs diplomatic relations? — **The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations**

2. Which Indian Act of 1972 gives effect to that Convention? — **The Diplomatic Relations (Vienna Convention) Act**

3. Under Article 22, who must consent before officials enter a mission? — **The head of the mission**

4. Does Article 22 allow entry into a mission in an emergency without consent? — **No; the Convention makes no exception**

5. Which Article makes the diplomat's person inviolable? — **Article 29**

6. Is a diplomatic agent's immunity from criminal jurisdiction complete? — **Yes**

7. Name one exception to a diplomat's civil immunity. — **Commercial activity outside official functions**

8. Which civil immunity exception concerns land? — **A real action on private immovable property**

9. Who alone may waive a diplomat's immunity? — **The sending state**

10. In what form must a waiver of immunity be made? — **Always express**

11. What may the receiving state declare an unwanted envoy? — **Persona non grata**

12. Must reasons be given for a persona non grata declaration? — **No**

13. Which Charter Article bans the threat or use of force? — **Article 2(4)**

14. Which Charter Article preserves the right of self-defence? — **Article 51**

15. What event triggers self-defence under Article 51? — **An armed attack**

16. To whom must self-defence measures be reported? — **The Security Council**

17. Until when does the right of self-defence last? — **Until the Security Council takes necessary measures**

18. In which 1986 case did the ICJ rule on arms supply to rebels? — **Nicaragua v. United States**

19. Is arming rebels an armed attack, per Nicaragua? — **No, though it may be unlawful intervention**

20. Name the two limits on force used in self-defence. — **Necessity and proportionality**

21. How wide is the territorial sea under UNCLOS? — **12 nautical miles**

22. Which right do foreign ships enjoy in the territorial sea? — **Innocent passage**

23. How far may the EEZ extend? — **200 nautical miles**

24. What does a coastal state hold over EEZ fish? — **Sovereign rights**

25. Which freedom do other states keep in the EEZ? — **Freedom of navigation**

26. When is communication of a proposal complete under s 4? — **When it comes to the offeree's knowledge**

27. When is a posted acceptance complete against the proposer? — **When it is posted, out of the acceptor's power**

28. When is acceptance complete against the acceptor? — **When it comes to the proposer's knowledge**

29. When is a revocation complete against its recipient? — **When it comes to his knowledge**

30. Until when may a proposal be revoked under s 5? — **Until acceptance is complete against the proposer**

31. Until when may an acceptance be revoked? — **Until it is complete against the acceptor**

32. How may an acceptor withdraw a posted acceptance? — **By a faster message reaching the proposer first**

33. Which section makes minors incompetent to contract? — **Section 11**

34. Which 1903 case held a minor's agreement void ab initio? — **Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose**

35. Is a minor who lied about his age estopped from pleading minority? — **No**

36. Can a minor be made to refund a loan under the Act? — **No**

37. Which section deals with necessaries supplied to a minor? — **Section 68**

38. From what is the supplier of necessaries reimbursed? — **The minor's property**

39. Is a minor personally liable for necessaries? — **No**

40. Is a video with no third-party material original under the policy? — **Yes**

41. What share of running time may third-party material reach? — **Less than half**

42. Does adding background music transform material? — **No**

43. How is licensed material treated under the policy? — **As the creator's own**

44. How many findings in 90 days trigger suspension? — **Three**

45. How long does a monetisation suspension last? — **30 days**

46. Does a finding reversed on appeal count? — **No**

47. How many interns does the Civil bench take? — **Three**

48. Who sits on the Criminal bench in the final placement? — **F and J**

49. Total beds in the five districts in 2025? — **2,02,000**

50. Forfeiture level in the constituency? — **29,800 votes (one-sixth of valid votes)**

51. Which section of the Contract Act defines a proposal? — **Section 2(a)**

52. Which section defines 'consideration'? — **Section 2(d)**

53. What is a promise without consideration, as a rule? — **Void (s 25)**

54. At what age does a person attain majority under the Indian Majority Act? — **18 years**

55. Is a minor's agreement voidable or void in India? — **Void**

56. Can a minor be a promisee or beneficiary? — **Yes**

57. What is a counter-offer in law? — **A rejection of the original offer**

58. Does silence ordinarily amount to acceptance? — **No**

59. Who may revoke a proposal, and when? — **The proposer, before acceptance is complete against him**

60. What Latin maxim means 'agreements must be kept'? — **Pacta sunt servanda**

61. Which ICJ case is the leading authority on 'effective control'? — **Nicaragua v. United States**

62. What is the contiguous zone's maximum breadth? — **24 nautical miles from the baseline**