ANSWER KEY — 20 NOVEMBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
A	D	C	A	B	C	C	A	D	A
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
D	B	B	C	A	C	C	D	B	D
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**				
B	C	B	D	A	A				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 **A** ***Acting under dictation (Gordhandas Bhanji)*** MED

The Excise Act gives the power of renewal to the District Collector alone, so the law expects the Collector's own judgment on Ratan's application. The passage states that an authority must not act under dictation and cites Commissioner of Police, Bombay v Gordhandas Bhanji (AIR 1952 SC 16), where a licence cancelled on the State Government's direction was struck down because the order was in substance the Government's and not the Commissioner's. Here the Minister writes 'I have decided this', and the Collector's own order records that renewal is refused 'as directed'. The Collector has surrendered his discretion, so the refusal is invalid, which is option A. Option B wrongly treats seniority as a source of statutory power: the Act names the Collector, not the Minister. Option C makes the merits decisive, but the defect is that the wrong person decided, whatever the reasons. Option D names a different ground (hearing) that the passage does not rely on and wrongly says it is the only defect.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B tempts because officers ordinarily obey superiors, but a statutory discretion vested in a named authority cannot be exercised by anyone else, however senior.

Q2 **D** ***Fettering discretion by rigid policy (British Oxygen)*** HARD

The passage says an authority may adopt a policy to guide like cases, but must not apply it so rigidly that it refuses to consider an applicant who has something new to say (British Oxygen Co v Board of Trade). The board was free to frame a five-year residence policy. Its error lies in what followed: Farida asked the board to consider her particular circumstances, a flood that destroyed her home and her disability, yet the clerk returned the application unread. The board never weighed whether her case justified a departure from the policy, so it fettered its discretion and acted unlawfully, which is option D. Option A treats uniformity as a complete answer, but the passage condemns exactly the rigid application that uniformity produces. Option B overstates the rule: policies are expressly allowed. Option C confuses relevance with rigidity; residence may well be a relevant consideration, but making it wholly decisive and refusing to hear the applicant is the fettering the passage forbids.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the overcorrection trap: the fault is not having a policy but refusing to look beyond it, and the passage expressly permits policies that guide like cases.

Q3 **C** ***Irrelevant considerations; malice in law*** HARD

The Act tells the Authority to have regard to 'the interests of the travelling public and road safety'. Mehul meets every safety norm, and the only reason for refusal is the circular's instruction not to favour members of a political party. Party membership is a consideration the Act does not make relevant, and the passage says an authority must exclude irrelevant considerations; such an exercise is bad as 'malice in law' even where the officer bears the applicant no personal ill-will (S R Venkataraman v Union of India, 1979). The refusal is therefore invalid, which is option C. Option A assumes that only personal spite counts as malice, which is precisely what malice in law rejects. Option B wrongly makes a departmental circular superior to the statute; indeed, deciding on a circular's command also looks like acting under dictation. Option D demands proof of the officer's personal bias, which the passage says is unnecessary once the decision rests on an irrelevant ground.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: the fact that the officer never met Mehul is planted to suggest good faith, but malice in law needs no personal ill-will.

Q4 **A** ***Order judged by its own reasons (Gordhandas Bhanji)*** HARD

The passage records a second rule from Gordhandas Bhanji: a public order made under statutory authority must be judged by the reasons stated in it, and it cannot be supported by fresh reasons supplied later in an affidavit filed in court. The Commissioner's order states only 'Cancelled in public interest'. The fire-safety ground appears for the first time in the affidavit, so the court cannot use it to sustain the order. That is option A. Option B is the attractive answer because the fire-safety breaches are true and would have justified cancellation, but the rule looks at the reasons on which the order was actually made, not at reasons that might have supported it. Option C mistakes the evidentiary status of an affidavit for a power to rewrite the order. Option D goes too far in the other direction: the passage says nothing to suggest a Commissioner can never cancel on public-interest grounds; the defect is the absence of stated reasons, not a lack of power.

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Examiner's note — the trap: Option B tempts because the late reason is true and adequate, but validity is tested on the reasons in the order, so a good reason supplied later cannot save it.

Q5 **B** ***Consultation distinguished from dictation*** **ELITE**

The passage draws a careful line: 'Consulting others or receiving advice is not in itself wrong; the vice lies in surrendering one's own judgment, so that the decision is in truth another's.' The Mining Officer, who alone holds the power, asked the geologist and the Collector for their views. He then studied the site report himself and recorded his own reasons for agreeing. Those facts show that he weighed the advice and that the final judgment was his own, so there was no dictation and the owner's argument fails, which is option B. Option A treats any coincidence between advice and outcome as dictation, but agreement reached after independent study is not surrender. Option C contradicts the passage, which expressly permits consultation. Option D reaches the right result for the wrong reason: if the Collector were 'entitled to direct the outcome', that would be dictation, which Gordhandas Bhanji condemns, and seniority confers no power over a discretion the statute gives to another officer.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the stretch trap: it says the owner is wrong, matching the correct result, but rests on the very ground of seniority that would make the order invalid.

Q6 **C** ***S 68: necessaries to a minor, reimbursement from property*** **MED**

Section 68, as set out in the passage, applies where a person incapable of contracting, such as a minor, is supplied with necessaries suited to his condition in life. School uniforms and winter clothing for a fifteen-year-old are classic necessaries. The supplier is then 'entitled to be reimbursed from the property of the incapable person', and the passage adds that the incapable person incurs no personal liability; the claim lies only against his property. Aman owns a fixed deposit of Rs 2 lakh, so Bhola can be reimbursed Rs 9,000 out of that property, but he cannot obtain a decree against Aman personally. That is option C. Option A is wrong because the claim arises from the law, not from a valid contract, and it is limited to property. Option B ignores section 68 altogether: the minor's agreement may be void, but the statutory obligation still exists. Option D invents a personal liability of the father that section 68 does not impose.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the trap: students recall that a minor 'must pay for necessaries' and assume personal liability, but section 68 reaches only the minor's property.

Q7 **C** ***S 70: lawful, non-gratuitous act, benefit enjoyed (B K Mondal)*** **HARD**

Section 70 imposes liability where a person lawfully does something for, or delivers something to, another, not intending to do so gratuitously, and the other enjoys the benefit. In State of West Bengal v B K Mondal and Sons (1962) the Supreme Court added that the other person must have been free to accept or reject the benefit and must have chosen to enjoy it. All three conditions are met. Gopal's delivery was lawful; as a dealer who believed an order existed, he plainly did not intend a gift; and Hari, knowing he had ordered nothing, could have rejected the bags but chose to use all fifty in his building. Hari must compensate Gopal, so option C is correct. Option A misses the point of Chapter V, which creates obligations without any offer and acceptance. Option B wrongly makes a mistake fatal, when the passage's whole aim is to prevent unjust enrichment. Option D invents a limit that section 70 does not contain.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because there was no contract, but quasi-contractual liability exists precisely where there is no agreement, and Hari chose to enjoy the benefit.

Q8 **A** ***S 72: mistake of law (Kanhaiya Lal)*** **HARD**

Section 72 requires a person to whom money has been paid by mistake or under coercion to repay it. The State's reply relies on the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse, but the passage records that in Sales Tax Officer v Kanhaiya Lal Mukundlal Saraf (1959) the Supreme Court held that 'mistake' in section 72 includes a mistake of law, so tax paid under a statute later declared invalid is recoverable. Rekha's firm paid entry tax under an Act later struck down as unconstitutional, and the question tells us the claim is within time. She may recover, which is option A. Option B is the trap: it repeats the State's argument and wrongly confines section 72 to mistakes of fact. Option C names section 70 as the only route, which is wrong because section 72 covers the case directly. Option D treats the absence of coercion as fatal, but section 72 is disjunctive: money paid by mistake is recoverable even if no coercion was used.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B tempts because 'ignorance of law is no excuse' sounds like a settled rule, but Kanhaiya Lal held that section 72 extends to mistakes of law.

Q9 **D** ***Ss 69, 70, 72 applied together*** **HARD**

Take each person in turn. Leela is a tenant who pays the landlord's overdue property tax, money the landlord is bound by law to pay, to stop an auction of the building where she runs her shop. She is interested in the payment, so section 69 entitles her to reimbursement. Mohan has no stake in the building and pays the tax as a gift, expecting nothing back. He is not an interested person under section 69, and section 70 does not help him because it requires that the act be done 'not intending to do so gratuitously'. He recovers nothing. Nisha paid the jeweller twice for one order by mistake; section 72 obliges the jeweller to repay the extra Rs 40,000. So Leela and Nisha can recover, which is option D. Option A misses Nisha's section 72 claim. Option B wrongly includes Mohan, whose payment was a gift. Option C also includes Mohan, treating the landlord's duty to pay as enough without the interest section 69 demands.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C tempts because both Leela and Mohan paid a sum the landlord owed, but section 69 needs an interest in the payment and Mohan paid as a gift.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q10 **A** ***Parallel reasoning: valid denial of a necessary condition*** **MED**

Argument I runs: playing in the concert requires attending the final rehearsal (attendance is a necessary condition); Ishaan did not attend; so he will not play. In symbols, if P then R; not R; therefore not P. This is a valid pattern, often called denying the consequent. Option A has exactly this shape: winning the scholarship requires filing an income certificate; Meera has not filed one; so she will not win. Option B affirms the necessary condition and concludes the outcome, which is invalid and mirrors Argument II rather than Argument I. Option C changes the conditional: it makes filing a sufficient condition for winning and then denies that condition, which is the fallacy of denying the antecedent. Option D begins with the same premise but draws a conclusion about an interview that no premise mentions, so its structure is entirely different. Only option A preserves both the form of the premises and the valid direction of the inference.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C tempts because its wording is almost identical, but it turns a necessary condition into a sufficient one and so commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent.

Q11 **D** ***Parallel flaw: necessary treated as sufficient*** HARD

Argument II says only players with at least 400 runs are considered, so 400 runs is a necessary condition for selection, not a sufficient one. It then concludes from Rohit's 520 runs that he will be selected, treating the necessary condition as if it guaranteed the outcome. Option D repeats this flaw: only stamped petitions are listed, so a stamp is necessary for listing, yet the argument concludes that a stamped petition will be listed. Option A commits a different error: it treats a sufficient condition (crossing the danger mark) as necessary and concludes from its absence that the school stays open, which is denying the antecedent. Option B commits a quantifier error of the 'most... most' kind, which matches Argument III, not Argument II. Option C is valid: if no unstamped petition is listed and this petition is unstamped, it will not be listed. Only option D uses the same structure and the same mistake as Argument II.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A tempts because it is also a conditional fallacy, but it mistakes a sufficient condition for a necessary one, the mirror image of Argument II's error.

Q12 **B** ***Parallel flaw: quantifier error with 'most'*** ELITE

Argument III chains two 'most' statements: most club members are in the photography society, and most society members are college students, so most club members are college students. The conclusion does not follow, because the club members who are in the society may all fall within the minority of society members who are not students. Option B has exactly this form and flaw: most bakers are guild members, most guild members own scooters, so most bakers own scooters. Option A uses 'all' twice and is valid. Option C is the subtle trap: it pairs 'most' with 'every', and that inference is valid, since if most bakers are guild members and every guild member owns a scooter, those bakers all own scooters and they are a majority. Option D is also valid: the bakers who belong to the guild cannot own scooters, so some bakers do not. Only option B reproduces Argument III's invalid chaining of two 'most' premises.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C is the stretch trap: it looks like Argument III, but replacing the second 'most' with 'every' makes the inference valid, so it does not share the error.

Q13 **B** ***Supplying the missing sufficient condition*** HARD

Argument II knows only that 400 runs is necessary for consideration, and that Rohit scored 520. To make 'Rohit will be selected' follow, we need a premise that makes 400 runs sufficient for selection. Option B supplies exactly that: every player who scores at least 400 runs is selected. With it, the argument becomes: Rohit scored at least 400; everyone who did is selected; so Rohit is selected, a valid inference. Option A is the converse of what is needed: it says selection requires 400 runs, which merely restates the necessary condition and still leaves open whether Rohit is chosen. Option D says the same thing in negative form, since 'no one below 400 is selected' is logically equivalent to 'everyone selected has at least 400', so it too fails. Option C makes Rohit the top scorer, but nothing in the argument says the top scorer must be picked, so selection still does not follow.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D tempts because it sounds strong and absolute, but it is only the contrapositive of the necessary condition and gives no guarantee that Rohit is chosen.

Q14 **C** ***Bold-face roles: opposed prediction and relied-on feature*** MED

The first bold portion reports the critics' prediction that the mandate will fail, with their supporting figure from the 2012 rule. The author's conclusion is the opposite, that the council should adopt the mandate, so the first portion is a position the argument opposes. The second bold portion describes the new proposal's link between the property-tax rebate and a working system checked by an annual meter reading. That is the very feature the author uses to explain why the 2012 experience will not repeat, so the argument relies on it against the critics. Option C states both roles correctly. Option A is wrong because the main conclusion is the final sentence, not the critics' prediction. Option B is wrong because the author accepts the critics' figure as accurate but not as decisive, and does not reject the rebate mechanism; the author relies on it. Option D reverses the roles, treating the critics' prediction as support for the author and the author's key premise as a concession.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B tempts because the author says the figure is 'accurate', but accepting a figure is not accepting it as decisive, and the second portion is relied on, not rejected.

Q15 **A** ***Method of reasoning: concede evidence, distinguish the case*** HARD

The author's reply to the critics has two steps. First, the author concedes their figure: 'That figure is accurate, but it measures the wrong thing.' Second, the author explains why the figure does not carry over: the 2012 rule required only installation and nobody inspected systems afterwards, whereas the new proposal ties a rebate to a working system verified each year. The difference between the schemes is said to remove the cause of the earlier failure, namely the lack of any reason to maintain the systems. Option A describes this method. Option B is wrong because the author expressly accepts the accuracy of the figure and offers no new count of 2012 systems. Option C is

wrong because the author never discusses the critics' motives. Option D is wrong because the author's case depends on systems continuing to work; the final sentence rejects the idea that installation alone is enough, so the author would not support the mandate if most systems failed.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B tempts because the author says the figure 'measures the wrong thing', but that challenges its relevance, not its accuracy, which the author concedes.

Q16 **C** *Bold-face role: analogical evidence for the mechanism* HARD

The third bold portion reports that in two neighbouring cities that linked rebates to verified performance, more than four-fifths of systems were still working after five years. Its job is to show that the mechanism described in the second bold portion, a rebate tied to a verified working system, actually keeps systems running when tried elsewhere. That is evidence from comparable cases supporting the author's reliance on the rebate, so option C is correct. Option A is wrong because the main conclusion is the final sentence recommending that the council adopt the mandate. Option B is wrong because the critics' evidence is the 2012 figure in the first bold portion, not the neighbouring cities' result, which helps the author. Option D is wrong because the neighbouring cities' experience supports the author's proposal; it is not raised as an objection to be answered. The comparison of 'fewer than a third' under the old rule with 'more than four-fifths' under verified rebates is the author's best evidence.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B tempts because the first bold portion was the critics' evidence, but the third portion favours the author, so it cannot be evidence the critics rely on.

Q17 **C** *Function of a qualifying clause in the conclusion* ELITE

The final sentence gives the conclusion and the reason for it, and the clause 'not because installation by itself recharges groundwater' tells the reader what the author's reason is not. The author has already argued that installation without upkeep failed under the 2012 rule, so resting the case on installation alone would invite the critics' objection again. By setting that ground aside, the author makes the conclusion depend solely on the incentive created by the verified rebate: 'this time owners would have a reason to keep the systems running'. Option C captures this. Option A misreads the clause as a concession that the mandate will fail; the author concedes only that installation alone is not enough. Option B reverses the clause's role, since it names a reason the author disclaims, not the principal reason. Option D is wrong because the clause introduces no evidence, and the claim that unmaintained systems keep recharging groundwater is the opposite of the author's view.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the stretch trap: the clause sits inside the conclusion and mentions a reason, but it names the reason the author rejects, not the one relied on.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q18 **D** *Percentage change: comparison across groups* EASY

Percentage change from 2022-23 to 2024-25 = (2024-25 figure - 2022-23 figure) / 2022-23 figure x 100. Coal: (181.5 - 150) / 150 x 100 = 31.5 / 150 x 100 = 21.00%. Iron ore: (41.4 - 40) / 40 x 100 = 3.50%. Cement: (33 - 25) / 25 x 100 = 8 / 25 x 100 = 32.00%. Foodgrains: (22.5 - 20) / 20 x 100 = 12.50%. Fertilisers: (19.5 - 15) / 15 x 100 = 4.5 / 15 x 100 = 30.00%. The highest increase is cement at 32%, so option D is correct. Notice that coal had by far the largest absolute increase, 31.5 MT, but percentage change is measured relative to the base, and cement's base of 25 MT is small. Fertilisers come close at 30%, which is why the calculation must be done for each group rather than estimated by eye. Foodgrains fell in 2023-24 before recovering, but over the two-year span they rose only 12.5%.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A tempts because coal shows the largest absolute rise of 31.5 MT, but in percentage terms cement (32%) edges out fertilisers (30%) and coal (21%).

Q19 **B** *Percentage change of a total over two years* MED

First find the totals. 2022-23: 150 + 40 + 25 + 20 + 15 = 250 MT. 2023-24: 165 + 46 + 30 + 18 + 16.5 = 275.5 MT. 2024-25: 181.5 + 41.4 + 33 + 22.5 + 19.5 = 297.9 MT. Percentage change from 2022-23 to 2024-25 = (297.9 - 250) / 250 x 100 = 47.9 / 250 x 100 = 19.16%. So total loading rose by 19.16%, option B. Check with successive changes: 2023-24 over 2022-23 = 25.5 / 250 = 10.20%; 2024-25 over 2023-24 = 22.4 / 275.5 = 8.13%. Combined: 1.102 x 1.0813 = 1.1916, a rise of 19.16%, which confirms the answer. Option A (18.33%) simply adds the two yearly rates, 10.20 + 8.13, and ignores compounding. Option C (21%) is coal's growth alone, not the total's. Option D (8.13%) is only the 2024-25 year-on-year change.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A tempts because adding the two yearly rates feels natural, but successive percentage changes multiply, so 10.20% and 8.13% combine to 19.16%, not 18.33%.

Q20 **D** *Percentage change of a derived sub-total* MED

Non-coal loading = total loading - coal. 2022-23: 250 - 150 = 100 MT (or 40 + 25 + 20 + 15 = 100). 2024-25: 297.9 - 181.5 = 116.4 MT (or 41.4 + 33 + 22.5 + 19.5 = 116.4). Percentage growth = (116.4 - 100) / 100 x 100 = 16.40%, which is option D. A useful cross-check: total loading grew 19.16% and coal grew 21%, and coal is 60% of the 2022-23 total. The total's growth is a weighted average: 0.6 x 21 + 0.4 x g = 19.16, so 0.4g = 19.16 - 12.6 = 6.56, giving g = 16.4%, confirming the answer. Option A (19.16%) is the growth of the total, including coal. Option B (21%) is coal's own growth. Option C (5.34%) is the non-coal growth over a single year only, from 110.5 MT in 2023-24 to 116.4 MT in 2024-25, not over the two-year span the question asks about.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C tempts students who read the wrong base year: 5.34% is the 2023-24 to 2024-25 growth, while the question spans 2022-23 to 2024-25.

Q21 B *Percentage needed to reverse a fall* HARD

Iron ore fell from 46 MT in 2023-24 to 41.4 MT in 2024-25, a fall of 4.6 MT, which is 4.6 / 46 x 100 = 10% of the 2023-24 figure. To return to 46 MT in 2025-26, loading must rise by 4.6 MT over the 2024-25 figure of 41.4 MT. Required increase = 4.6 / 41.4 x 100 = 11.11%, option B. The general rule is that a fall of r% needs a rise of r / (100 - r) x 100% to recover: 10 / 90 x 100 = 11.11%. The rise must be larger than the fall because it is measured on the smaller, post-fall base. Check: 41.4 x 1.1111 = 46.0 MT. Option A (10%) assumes a fall and an equal rise cancel out; in fact 41.4 x 1.10 = 45.54 MT, short of 46. Option C (9.09%) is 10 / 110 x 100, the formula for reversing a rise, not a fall. Option D (15%) is the 2023-24 growth rate of iron ore, which is irrelevant here.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because a 10% fall seems to need a 10% rise, but the recovery is measured on the smaller base of 41.4 MT, so 11.11% is required.

Q22 C *Weighted percentage change across groups* ELITE

In 2024-25 coal loading is 181.5 MT and the other four groups total 297.9 - 181.5 = 116.4 MT. In 2025-26, coal falls 10%: 181.5 x 0.9 = 163.35 MT. The others rise 10%: 116.4 x 1.1 = 128.04 MT. New total = 163.35 + 128.04 = 291.39 MT. Change = (291.39 - 297.9) / 297.9 x 100 = -6.51 / 297.9 x 100 = -2.19%. Total loading falls by about 2.19%, option C. The shortcut: the net change equals 10% of the difference between the shrinking and the growing parts, 0.10 x (116.4 - 181.5) = -6.51 MT. Because coal is the larger part (about 61% of the total), a 10% fall in coal outweighs a 10% rise in the rest. Option A assumes equal and opposite percentages cancel, which is true only if the two parts are equal. Option D gets the size right but the direction wrong. Option B (1.22%) does not correspond to the correct weighting of the two parts.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A is the stretch trap: a 10% fall and a 10% rise cancel only for equal bases, and coal at 181.5 MT outweighs the other groups' 116.4 MT.

Q23 B *Mark-up, discount and profit percentage* MED

Cost price (CP) = Rs 1,20,000. Marked price (MP) = CP x 1.40 = Rs 1,68,000. Festive discount = 12.5% of MP = Rs 21,000, so selling price (SP) = 1,68,000 x 0.875 = Rs 1,47,000. Profit = SP - CP = 1,47,000 - 1,20,000 = Rs 27,000. Profit % = 27,000 / 1,20,000 x 100 = 22.5%, option B. A quicker route: SP/CP = 1.40 x 0.875 = 1.225, a profit of 22.5%. The subsidy of Rs 78,000 is irrelevant here, because the passage says it does not change the installer's selling price. Option A (27.5%) subtracts the discount from the mark-up, 40 - 12.5, but the two percentages are on different bases: the mark-up is on cost and the discount on marked price. Option C (40%) is the mark-up, ignoring the discount altogether. Option D (14.29%) is the discount of Rs 21,000 expressed as a percentage of the selling price of Rs 1,47,000, which answers a different question.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because 40% minus 12.5% looks like the net margin, but the mark-up and the discount are measured on different bases and combine by multiplication.

Q24 D *Compound interest on the amount borrowed* HARD

The festive price is Rs 1,47,000 (Rs 1,68,000 less 12.5%). The subsidy meets Rs 78,000, so Ms Kapoor borrows the balance: 1,47,000 - 78,000 = Rs 69,000. At 8% per annum compounded annually for 2 years, amount A = P (1 + r) ^ 2 = 69,000 x 1.08 ^ 2 = 69,000 x 1.1664 = Rs 80,481.60. She repays Rs 80,481.60, option D. Year-by-year check: interest in year 1 = 8% of 69,000 = Rs 5,520, so the balance is Rs 74,520; interest in year 2 = 8% of 74,520 = Rs 5,961.60; total = 74,520 + 5,961.60 = Rs 80,481.60. Option A (Rs 80,040) is the simple-interest amount, 69,000 + 2 x 5,520. Option B (Rs 1,71,461.76) applies compound interest to the full Rs 1,47,000 and forgets the subsidy, contrary to the passage's rule that interest is charged on the amount actually borrowed. Option C (Rs 11,481.60) is the compound interest alone, not the total repayment the question asks for.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B tempts students who compound the whole festive price, but the subsidy cuts the loan to Rs 69,000, and interest runs only on the amount borrowed.

Q25 A *CI minus SI over two years* HARD

The loan is Rs 69,000 (the festive price of Rs 1,47,000 less the Rs 78,000 subsidy). Simple interest for 2 years at 8% = 69,000 x 0.08 x 2 = Rs 11,040, so the simple-interest repayment would be Rs 80,040. Compound interest = 80,481.60 - 69,000 = Rs 11,481.60. The difference = 11,481.60 - 11,040 = Rs 441.60, option A. For two years there is a direct formula: CI - SI = P x r ^ 2 = 69,000 x 0.08 x 0.08 = 69,000 x 0.0064 = Rs 441.60, which confirms the result. The difference arises because, under compounding, the first year's interest of Rs 5,520 itself earns 8% in the second year, and 8% of 5,520 is Rs 441.60. Option B (Rs 940.80) applies the formula to the full Rs 1,47,000, ignoring the subsidy. Option C (Rs 220.80) halves the correct figure. Option D (Rs 5,520) is one year's simple interest, not the difference between the two methods.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B tempts students who use the full festive price as principal, but only Rs 69,000 was borrowed, so the difference is P x r ^ 2 on Rs 69,000.

Q26 A *Discount allowed for a target profit after commission* ELITE

SunRoof wants a profit of 15% on cost after paying the commission. Required net receipt = 1.15 x 1,20,000 = Rs 1,38,000. The agent takes 2% of the selling price, so SunRoof keeps 98% of SP: 0.98 x SP = 1,38,000, giving SP = 1,38,000 / 0.98 = Rs 1,40,816.33. The marked price is Rs 1,68,000, so the largest discount = 1,68,000 - 1,40,816.33 = Rs 27,183.67, which as a percentage of MP is

27,183.67 / 1,68,000 x 100 = 16.18%. That is option A. Option B (17.86%) ignores the commission: it sets SP = 1,38,000 and finds 30,000 / 1,68,000. Option C (15.86%) subtracts 2 percentage points from 17.86%, but the commission is 2% of the selling price, not of the marked price, so it cannot be removed by simple subtraction. Option D (25%) subtracts the target profit from the mark-up, 40 - 15, mixing percentages on different bases.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C is the stretch trap: it adjusts for the commission, but by subtracting 2 points instead of grossing up the selling price by dividing by 0.98.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Which 1952 case struck down a licence cancelled on the State Government's direction? — **Commissioner of Police, Bombay v Gordhandas Bhanji**

2. Name the ground of review where an authority decides on another's orders. — **Acting under dictation**

3. Is consulting others before deciding, by itself, acting under dictation? — **No; the vice is surrendering one's own judgment**

4. What is it called when an authority applies a policy so rigidly it hears no one? — **Fettering its discretion**

5. Which case allows a policy but requires hearing anyone with something new to say? — **British Oxygen Co v Board of Trade (1971)**

6. May an authority adopt a policy to guide like cases? — **Yes, if it does not apply it rigidly**

7. What is 'malice in law'? — **Using a power on irrelevant grounds or for an improper purpose**

8. Does malice in law require personal ill-will? — **No**

9. Which 1979 case is cited for malice in law? — **S R Venkataraman v Union of India**

10. What is an order made mechanically, without considering the facts, said to lack? — **Application of mind**

11. Can a statutory order be saved by fresh reasons given later in an affidavit? — **No**

12. By what must a public order made under statutory authority be judged? — **The reasons stated in it**

13. Can a Minister exercise a discretion that a statute gives to a Collector? — **No; only the named authority may**

14. Which Chapter of the Contract Act covers relations resembling contract? — **Chapter V**

15. Which sections of the Contract Act deal with quasi-contracts? — **Sections 68 to 72**

16. What do quasi-contracts aim to prevent? — **Unjust enrichment**

17. Which section covers necessaries supplied to a person incapable of contracting? — **Section 68**

18. From what is a supplier of necessaries to a minor reimbursed? — **The minor's property**

19. Is a minor personally liable for necessaries under s 68? — **No**

20. What must necessaries be suited to under s 68? — **The person's condition in life**

21. Which section lets an interested person who pays another's dues be reimbursed? — **Section 69**

22. Can a tenant who pays the landlord's tax to avert an auction recover it? — **Yes, under section 69**

23. Which section covers a lawful, non-gratuitous act whose benefit is enjoyed? — **Section 70**

24. Which 1962 case set out the conditions for s 70? — **State of West Bengal v B K Mondal and Sons**

25. Can a person who paid as a gift claim under s 70? — **No; the act must not be intended gratuitously**

26. Under s 70, what freedom must the other person have had? — **Freedom to accept or reject the benefit**

27. What responsibility does s 71 place on a finder of goods? — **The same as a bailee's**

28. Which section covers money paid by mistake or under coercion? — **Section 72**

29. Does 'mistake' in s 72 include a mistake of law? — **Yes**

30. Which 1959 case held tax paid under an invalid law recoverable? — **Sales Tax Officer v Kanhaiya Lal Mukundlal Saraf**

31. What fallacy treats a necessary condition as sufficient? — **Affirming the consequent**

32. What fallacy treats a sufficient condition as necessary? — **Denying the antecedent**

33. Is 'if P then R; not R; so not P' valid? — **Yes (denying the consequent)**

34. Does 'most A are B; most B are C' prove most A are C? — **No**