ANSWER KEY — 21 NOVEMBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
C	A	B	C	C	D	B	A	A	D
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
C	B	C	B	D	D	C	D	B	A
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**				
A	D	B	A	D	B				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 **C** ***Objective territoriality*** MED

The passage gives the territorial principle two limbs. Under objective territoriality, a State may try an offence that was completed, or whose constituent effect occurred, within its territory even though it was begun abroad. Amir fired the rifle in State Y, but the death, which completes the killing, occurred inside State X. State X can therefore try him on the objective territorial basis, which is option C. Option A treats the place where the act began as the only relevant place; the passage allows the State where the offence is completed to try it, and it adds that more than one State may have a valid basis over the same conduct, so State Y's subjective-territorial claim does not exclude State X's. Option B fails on the facts: the victim was a national of State W, not of State X, so the passive personality principle gives State X nothing. Option D turns the protective principle, which concerns threats to security or governmental functions, into a general limit on trying foreigners; no such limit appears in the passage.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A tempts because the trigger was pulled in State Y, but objective territoriality looks to where the offence was completed, and the death occurred in State X.

Q2 **A** ***Passive personality distinguished from nationality*** HARD

State N's only link with the offence is that the victim, Lena, is one of its nationals. The passage describes exactly this link as the passive personality principle: it lets a State try a foreigner for an offence committed abroad against one of its nationals, and the passage expressly calls it more contested than the other bases. Option A is therefore correct. Option B misstates the nationality (active personality) principle, which lets a State try its own nationals for offences they commit; it would support State M, whose national Ravi is, not State N. Option C stretches the protective principle, which the passage confines to acts threatening a State's security or vital governmental functions, such as counterfeiting its currency or forging its passports; cheating a single tourist does neither. Option D wrongly assumes that territory is the only basis. State P certainly has territorial jurisdiction, but the passage states that more than one State may have a valid basis over the same conduct, so State P's claim does not wipe out State N's.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B attracts students who remember that 'nationality' is a basis, but the nationality principle follows the offender's nationality, not the victim's.

Q3 **B** ***Collision on the high seas: Article 97 UNCLOS*** HARD

The passage states that the Lotus rule on collisions was later reversed by treaty. Under Article 97 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, penal proceedings arising out of a collision on the high seas may be instituted against the master or any other person serving on a ship only before the authorities of that ship's flag State or of the State of which the accused is a national. The officer served on the Aurora, which flies State R's flag, and he is a national of State T. Only R or T may therefore prosecute him, so option B is correct. Option A applies the Lotus holding as if it still governed collisions, which the passage expressly says it no longer does. Option C invents a fallback right for the victim's flag State that arises if the flag State declines; Article 97 contains no such rule. Option D overstates the position: the high seas are not a lawless zone, since the flag State and the State of nationality both have jurisdiction.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the classic trap: Lotus did allow Turkey to prosecute, but the passage says the treaty later reversed that rule for collisions.

Q4 **C** ***Jurisdiction to prescribe versus jurisdiction to enforce*** HARD

Two separate questions arise. First, may State K make a law covering Zed's acts in State L? Yes: the passage lists counterfeiting a State's currency as an example of the protective principle, which lets a State try foreigners for acts abroad that threaten its vital governmental functions. Second, may K enforce that law by arresting Zed inside L? The passage records the separate limit stressed in Lotus: whatever its power to make law, a State may not exercise its power in any form, such as arresting a person, in the territory of another State without that State's consent. L did not consent, so the arrest was unlawful even though the law was valid. That is option C. Option A wrongly denies the protective principle altogether. Option B merges the two questions and assumes that a valid basis for making the law also authorises arrest anywhere, which Lotus rejects. Option D wrongly treats counterfeiting as universal; the passage gives piracy as the classic universal offence and places counterfeiting under the protective principle.

NAME: _____ ROLL NO: _____ BATCH: _____

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B tempts because K's law is valid, but the passage separates making a law from enforcing it inside another State's territory.

Q5 **C** ***Stretch: testing competing jurisdictional claims*** **ELITE**

Each claim must be matched to a basis the passage recognises. State E's claim rests on the nationality principle, since the pirates are its nationals and that principle covers offences committed anywhere; option A is supported. State G's claim rests on the passive personality principle, since the crew, the victims, are its nationals; the passage calls this basis contested but recognises it, so option B is supported. State H's claim rests on universality, which the passage illustrates with piracy on the high seas, triable by any State whoever committed it and wherever; option D is supported. State J's only link is that the pirates' boat passed through its waters on a fishing trip a month before any plan existed. Territorial jurisdiction requires that the offence be begun or completed within the State's territory, and nothing that formed part of the offence took place in J's waters. Option C is therefore the claim with no support, and it is the answer.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B tempts students who remember that the passage calls passive personality contested, but a contested basis is still a recognised basis; State J has no basis at all.

Q6 **D** ***Mistake of fact in good faith (s 14 BNS)*** **MED**

Section 14 BNS excuses a person who, by reason of a mistake of fact and not of law, in good faith believes himself bound by law to do an act. Hari was bound by the warrant to arrest Mohan Lal of House 12. His mistake was about a fact, the identity of the man in front of him, not about what the law required. The belief was also held in good faith in the sense the passage gives, with due care and attention: Hari found the man at the stated address, matched the description, heard him give the name and checked his identity card. Hari is therefore excused and is not guilty of wrongful confinement, which is option D. Option A ignores section 14 entirely, since the exception exists precisely for cases where the act turns out to be directed at the wrong person. Option B adds a condition about harm that the section does not contain. Option C overstates the protection: an officer is excused only when the conditions of the exception are met, not in every case.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because the wrong man was held, but section 14 exists for exactly that situation where the mistake is one of fact made carefully and in good faith.

Q7 **B** ***Mistake of law is no excuse (s 17 BNS)*** **HARD**

Section 17 BNS protects a person who, by reason of a mistake of fact and not of law, in good faith believes himself justified by law. The passage adds that a person who knows the facts but misreads what the law allows is not excused, because ignorance of the law is no excuse. Sunil knew every relevant fact: the tenant had not paid rent for three months. His error lay only in believing that the law lets a landlord lock out a defaulter and keep his goods. That is a mistake of law, so section 17 gives him no protection, which is option B. Option A drops the requirement that the mistake be one of fact and treats any honest belief as enough, which the passage rejects in terms. Option C points to a true fact, the default, but the default was not mistaken; the mistaken belief was about the legal consequence of that fact. Option D gives a reason the passage does not state and wrongly presents it as the only ground for refusing the excuse.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C tempts because Sunil's belief started from a true fact, but section 17 needs the mistake itself to be about a fact, and his mistake was about the law.

Q8 **A** ***Accident requires proper care and caution (s 18 BNS)*** **HARD**

Section 18 BNS excuses an act done by accident or misfortune, without criminal intention or knowledge, in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner, by lawful means and with proper care and caution. The passage stresses that every one of these conditions must be met and that an accident caused by want of proper care is not excused. Cleaning one's own licensed gun is a lawful act, and Ajay had no intention to kill. But he cleaned the gun while it was still loaded, without unloading it, with children playing around him. That is a plain want of proper care and caution, so the last condition fails and section 18 is not available, which is option A. Options B and C each rely on one condition being met, the lawful act in B and the absence of intention in C, and ignore the condition that actually fails. Option D overstates: a death caused by a firearm can be an accident under section 18 if every condition, including proper care, is satisfied.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B tempts because the act itself was lawful, but section 18 requires all its conditions together, and proper care and caution was missing.

Q9 **A** ***Stretch: involuntary intoxication still needs incapacity (ss 23-24 BNS)*** **ELITE**

Section 23 BNS excuses a person only if two conditions are both met. First, at the time of the act he must, by reason of intoxication, be incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it is wrong or contrary to law. Second, the intoxicant must have been administered without his knowledge or against his will. Neel satisfies the second condition, since his drink was spiked secretly. He fails the first: the facts say he was aware he was quarrelling with Raj and knew a bottle blow would hurt him, so he knew the nature of his act. He is therefore not excused, which is option A. Option B treats the second condition as sufficient and omits the incapacity requirement. Option C misreads section 24 in two ways: it applies only to voluntary intoxication, and the passage says it imputes knowledge only and does not presume intention. Option D wrongly says involuntary intoxication falls outside both sections; section 23 is precisely the provision that deals with it.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B is the trap: the spiked drink satisfies one condition of section 23, but the section also needs incapacity, and Neel knew exactly what he was doing.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q10 **D** ***Strengthen: ruling out a pre-existing difference*** HARD

The report infers causation from a comparison: adopters harvested 92 tonnes per hectare against 71 for flood-irrigating growers. The obvious gap in this reasoning is that adopters may have been better farmers, or farming better land, before they ever installed kits. Option D closes that gap: if, before 2021, the future adopters harvested about the same yield as everyone else, the later difference is far more likely to come from what changed, the drip kits. Option C does the opposite. If the adopters were mostly growers with the largest holdings and the best-drained soils, the yield gap could reflect land quality rather than irrigation, which weakens the conclusion. Option B describes mill prices that rose for all growers alike; a common price change cannot explain a difference in yield per hectare between two groups. Option A concerns the cost of kits, which bears on the affordability of extending the subsidy but says nothing about whether drip irrigation caused the yield gain observed by 2024.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C looks relevant because it describes the adopters, but it supplies an alternative explanation for their higher yields and so weakens the report.

Q11 **C** ***Assumption behind extending the policy*** MED

The evidence comes from the 1,200 growers who chose to install kits. The recommendation goes further: it proposes extending the subsidy to every sugarcane grower in the district, on the footing that they too will gain. That step works only if the gain seen among early adopters would broadly hold for those who have not adopted, which is option C. If the remaining growers farm land where drip lines add little, the recommendation fails even if drip irrigation did help the first group. Option A is too strong: a subsidy can sensibly be offered to every grower without assuming that every grower already wants a kit. Option B is also too strong; the report need not claim that drip is the only way to raise yields, only that it is one that works. Option D concerns inspection staff, which the argument never mentions; the conclusion is about yields, not about administration of the scheme. A negation test confirms C: if the gain would not hold for new adopters, the case for extending the subsidy collapses.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B tempts because it sounds like strong support for drip, but the argument does not need drip to be the only route to higher yields.

Q12 **B** ***Strengthen EXCEPT: spotting the alternative cause*** HARD

Three options support the causal claim and one undermines it. Option A is a within-farm comparison: where only half a field had drip lines, the drip half out-yielded the flooded half every year, which holds the farmer, soil and variety constant and isolates the effect of drip. Option C confirms the mechanism the report relies on, that drip keeps fields from swinging between waterlogged and dry. Option D shows a dose-response pattern: yields rose as drip lines covered more of each field, which is what one would expect if drip were the cause. Option B introduces a rival explanation: many adopters also switched in 2021 to a new high-yield cane variety that flood-irrigating growers did not plant. If so, part or all of the yield gap may be due to the variety rather than the irrigation, which weakens the report's causal claim. Since the question asks for the option that does NOT strengthen, B is the answer.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D can look like a mere description of growth over time, but yields rising with coverage is dose-response evidence that strengthens the causal claim.

Q13 **C** ***Stretch: isolating the stated mechanism*** ELITE

The report makes a specific claim: the steadier supply of water, rather than any other feature of the kits, produces the extra cane. The obvious rival feature is fertigation, since drip lines also carry dissolved fertiliser to the root zone. Option C separates the two: adopters who fed fertiliser through the lines and adopters who spread it by hand obtained the same yield gain. Since the gain did not depend on how fertiliser was delivered, the shared feature, steadier water, is the better explanation, which strengthens the claim. Option A does the reverse: if fertigating adopters gained far more, delivery of fertiliser looks like an important cause, which weakens the claim about water. Option B shows only that fertiliser matters among non-adopters; it says nothing about which feature of the kits made the difference and, if anything, makes the fertiliser explanation more plausible. Option D is about the quantity of water used, which bears on water savings, not on whether the steadiness of supply raised yields.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D tempts because it is about water, but using less water says nothing about whether a steadier supply produced the extra cane.

Q14 **B** ***Weaken: an alternative cause in the same place and time*** MED

The committee infers that the brighter lights caused the 25 per cent fall in reported night-time crime. Option B offers a competing cause that operated at exactly the same time and place: two extra night patrol teams were posted in Ward 9, and in no other ward. Police patrols are an obvious deterrent, so the fall may be due to them rather than to the lamps, which weakens the conclusion directly. Option D, far from weakening, makes the fall look more striking, since crime had been rising for three years before the change. Option C describes customers staying later in the market; if anything this means more people on the streets at night, which makes the fall in crime harder to explain away and does not suggest another cause. Option A concerns electricity consumption, which bears on the cost of the lamps but not on whether they reduced crime. Only B gives a rival explanation for the specific change the committee attributes to lighting.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D tempts because it is about the trend in crime, but a fall after three years of increases supports the committee rather than weakening it.

Q15 **D** ***Weaken: displacement rather than deterrence*** HARD

The committee's proposal assumes that the lights stopped crimes, not merely that they pushed them across the ward boundary. Option D strikes directly at that assumption: night-time crime in the two neighbouring wards rose by about as many cases as Ward 9 lost. That pattern suggests the offenders moved rather than stopped, so lighting all forty wards would not cut the total, it would only remove the places to move to, or might not help at all. Option A strengthens the deterrence story by tying the fall most closely to the brightest lamps. Option B, steady day-time crime, also tends to support the committee, since it suggests no general change in offending apart from the night hours the lights affect. Option C concerns how safe residents felt, which tells us about perception, not about whether crime was prevented or displaced. Only D gives evidence that the crimes still happened, just somewhere else.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B can look like a weakener because crime did not fall by day, but that is what deterrence by night-time lighting would predict.

Q16 **D** ***Weaken EXCEPT: identifying the supporter*** HARD

Three options undermine the committee's reasoning. Option A supplies a rival cause, private CCTV cameras fitted in 2024 across Ward 9's shops, which could deter offenders without any help from the lamps. Option B attacks the data itself: if minor-theft complaints taken online were left out of the station's count, the fall from 480 to 360 may partly reflect a change in recording, not in crime. Option C shows that night-time crime fell by about the same 25 per cent across the whole city, including wards with the old lamps, which suggests a citywide cause and leaves nothing for the new lights to explain. Option D, by contrast, is direct evidence for the committee's mechanism: offenders themselves said they now avoided streets where they could be seen, which is exactly the deterrent effect the committee claims. Because D strengthens rather than weakens, it is the exception and the answer.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is easy to pass over as a dull administrative detail, but a change in how crimes are counted undermines the 25 per cent figure itself.

Q17 **C** ***Stretch: weakening a generalisation from one ward*** ELITE

The question concedes that the lights cut night-time crime in Ward 9 and asks what undermines extending them to all forty wards. The mechanism the committee relies on is that offenders are less willing to act when they can be seen and identified on lit streets. Option C shows that this mechanism has little to work on elsewhere: most night-time crime in the other wards takes place inside homes and closed premises, not on streets, where brighter streetlights will not make offenders visible. So even if lighting works on the streets of Ward 9, spending Rs 60 crore citywide would do little about the crime that actually occurs in the other wards. Option A merely spreads the cost over three years, which affects budgeting, not effectiveness. Option B raises a nuisance complaint about glare, a minor cost that does not show the policy would fail. Option D, longer lamp life, actually strengthens the case on cost. Only C attacks the step from one ward to forty.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B tempts because it is a genuine complaint about the lamps, but a nuisance does not show the citywide plan would fail to cut crime.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q18 **D** ***Time = distance / speed*** EASY

Time on a leg is distance divided by speed. The last leg, from Village R back to the chilling centre, is 30 km at an average speed of 45 km/h. Time = 30 / 45 hours = 2/3 hour. Converting to minutes, 2/3 x 60 = 40 minutes. So the van takes 40 minutes on the last leg, which is option D. A quick check: at 45 km/h the van covers 45 km in 60 minutes, that is 0.75 km every minute, and 30 / 0.75 = 40 minutes. Option A, 30 minutes, would be the time at 60 km/h, or the result of reading the distance as the time. Option B, 45 minutes, simply copies the speed figure as a number of minutes. Option C, 1 hour 30 minutes, inverts the formula by dividing the speed by the distance, 45 / 30 = 1.5 hours. The halt of 10 minutes does not belong to this leg at all, because the van does not halt at the chilling centre; it stops only at the three villages P, Q and R.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B tempts careless readers who treat the speed figure 45 as a number of minutes instead of dividing 30 km by 45 km/h.

Q19 **B** ***Schedule with driving time and halts*** MED

Compute each leg's time as distance divided by speed. Centre to P: 18 / 36 = 0.5 h = 30 min. P to Q: 12 / 24 = 0.5 h = 30 min. Q to R: 20 / 40 = 0.5 h = 30 min. R to centre: 30 / 45 = 2/3 h = 40 min. Total driving time = 30 + 30 + 30 + 40 = 130 minutes. The van halts for 10 minutes at each of the three villages, adding 30 minutes, and does not halt at the chilling centre. Total time = 130 + 30 = 160 minutes = 2 hours 40 minutes. Starting at 5:00 am, the van returns at 7:40 am, which is option B. The timetable confirms it: arrive P 5:30, leave 5:40; arrive Q 6:10, leave 6:20; arrive R 6:50, leave 7:00; arrive centre 7:40. Option A, 7:10 am, ignores the halts. Option C, 7:50 am, counts four halts, wrongly adding one at the chilling centre. Option D, 7:30 am, treats the last leg as 30 minutes.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C tempts those who count a halt for every leg, but the van halts only at the three villages, not on return to the chilling centre.

Q20 **A** ***Average speed including halts*** HARD

The passage defines average speed for a journey as total distance divided by total time, including any halts within the journey. Total distance = 18 + 12 + 20 + 30 = 80 km. Total time, from the previous working, = 130 minutes of driving + 30 minutes of halts = 160 minutes = 8/3 hours. Average speed = 80 / (8/3) = 80 x 3 / 8 = 30 km/h, which is option A. Option C, 36.92 km/h, divides 80 km by the driving time alone, 13/6 hours, and so ignores the three halts that the definition expressly includes. Option B, 36.25 km/h, is the simple arithmetic mean of the four speeds, (36 + 24 + 40 + 45) / 4; that is wrong because the van does not spend equal time on each

leg, and in any case it ignores the halts. Option D, 32 km/h, is the average speed over only the P to R stretch, 32 km in one hour, and does not describe the whole round trip.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the classic trap of averaging the speeds; average speed must be total distance over total time, halts included.

Q21 **A** *Meeting point on a two-way road* HARD

From the schedule, the van leaves Village R at 7:00 am and drives the 30 km road towards the chilling centre at 45 km/h. At the same moment the fodder tractor leaves the chilling centre for R on the same road at 27 km/h. They approach each other, so their relative speed is 45 + 27 = 72 km/h. Time to meet = 30 / 72 hours = 5/12 hour = 25 minutes, so they meet at 7:25 am. In 25 minutes the tractor covers 27 x 5/12 = 11.25 km from the chilling centre, which is option A. Check: the van covers 45 x 5/12 = 18.75 km from R, and 11.25 + 18.75 = 30 km, the full length of the road. Option B, 18.75 km, is the van's distance from Village R, not the distance from the chilling centre that the question asks for. Option C, 15 km, assumes they meet halfway, which would be true only if their speeds were equal. Option D, 12.5 km, uses a wrong meeting time.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B is the right number measured from the wrong end: 18.75 km is the meeting point's distance from Village R, not from the chilling centre.

Q22 **D** *Stretch: effect of a percentage fall in speed* ELITE

If speed falls by 20 per cent, the new speed is 0.8 times the old on every leg, and since time = distance / speed, each leg takes 1 / 0.8 = 1.25 times as long. Normal driving time = 130 minutes, so the new driving time = 130 x 1.25 = 162.5 minutes, an increase of 32.5 minutes. The halts lengthen from 10 to 15 minutes at each of three villages, adding 3 x 5 = 15 minutes. Total delay = 32.5 + 15 = 47.5 minutes, which is option D; the van returns at about 8:27:30 am instead of 7:40 am. Option A, 41 minutes, wrongly assumes a 20 per cent fall in speed means a 20 per cent rise in time, 130 x 0.2 = 26 minutes, and then adds 15. Option B, 26 minutes, makes the same error and also forgets the longer halts. Option C, 32.5 minutes, gets the driving delay right but forgets that each of the three halts is also five minutes longer.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A is the trap: a 20 per cent fall in speed raises time by 25 per cent, not by 20 per cent.

Q23 **B** *Volume of a hollow cylinder* MED

Each package is a hollow cylinder of yarn: the yarn fills the space between an outer cylinder of diameter 21 cm and an inner core of diameter 7 cm, both of height 14 cm. Outer radius R = 10.5 cm and inner radius r = 3.5 cm. Volume of yarn = pi x (R squared minus r squared) x h = 22/7 x (110.25 minus 12.25) x 14 = 22/7 x 98 x 14 = 22 x 14 x 14 = 4312 cubic cm, which is option B. Check: full cylinder = 22/7 x 110.25 x 14 = 4851, core = 22/7 x 12.25 x 14 = 539, and 4851 minus 539 = 4312. Option A, 4851 cubic cm, is the volume of the full cylinder and forgets that the core holds no yarn. Option C, 17248 cubic cm, uses the diameters 21 and 7 in place of the radii, which multiplies the answer by four. Option D, 3773 cubic cm, subtracts the core twice.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A tempts because it is a correct cylinder volume, but the core holds no yarn and must be subtracted.

Q24 **A** *Packing count and unoccupied volume* HARD

Packages stand upright, each occupying a 21 cm by 21 cm square of floor and 14 cm of height. Along 84 cm, 84 / 21 = 4 packages fit; along 63 cm, 63 / 21 = 3; and in the 42 cm height, 42 / 14 = 3 layers. So a carton holds 4 x 3 x 3 = 36 packages. Yarn per carton = 36 x 4312 = 155232 cubic cm. Carton volume = 84 x 63 x 42 = 222264 cubic cm. Yarn occupies 155232 / 222264 = 0.6984, that is 69.84 per cent, so the volume not occupied by yarn is 100 minus 69.84 = 30.16 per cent, which is option A. This empty space includes both the hollow cores and the gaps between the round packages. Option B, 21.43 per cent, uses the full cylinder volume of 4851 and so counts the empty cores as filled with yarn. Option C, 69.84 per cent, is the share occupied by yarn, the complement of what is asked. Option D, 25 per cent, is a guess with no basis in the dimensions.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option C is the right calculation answering the opposite question: 69.84 per cent is occupied by yarn, so 30.16 per cent is not.

Q25 **D** *Stretch: larger packages, fewer per carton* ELITE

New packages have outer diameter 28 cm, height 14 cm and core 7 cm. Yarn per new package = 22/7 x (14 squared minus 3.5 squared) x 14 = 22/7 x (196 minus 12.25) x 14 = 22/7 x 183.75 x 14 = 8085 cubic cm. Packing: along 84 cm, 84 / 28 = 3; along 63 cm, only 2 fit, since 63 / 28 = 2.25; height still gives 3 layers. So a carton now holds 3 x 2 x 3 = 18 packages, with 18 x 8085 = 145530 cubic cm of yarn. The old carton held 36 x 4312 = 155232 cubic cm. Change = (145530 minus 155232) / 155232 = minus 9702 / 155232 = minus 0.0625, a fall of 6.25 per cent, which is option D. Option A, a rise of 87.5 per cent, is the increase in yarn per package and ignores the fact that fewer packages fit. Option B, a fall of 50 per cent, looks only at the number of packages. Option C, 12.5 per cent, doubles the correct change.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A tempts because each bigger package holds 87.5 per cent more yarn, but wasted width in the 63 cm side halves the count, so the carton holds less.

Q26 **B** *Total surface area of a closed cuboid* MED

A closed carton is a cuboid with six faces, so the board needed, ignoring overlaps and thickness, equals its total surface area: 2 x (lb + bh + lh). With l = 84 cm, b = 63 cm and h = 42 cm: lb = 84 x 63 = 5292, bh = 63 x 42 = 2646, and lh = 84 x 42 = 3528. Their sum is

5292 + 2646 + 3528 = 11466, and twice this is 22932 square cm, which is option B, about 2.29 square metres. Option A, 11466 square cm, is the sum of three faces only and forgets that each face has an opposite partner. Option C, 17640 square cm, leaves out the lid, giving the area of an open-topped box, although the passage says the carton is closed. Option D, 12348 square cm, is the lateral surface area, 2 x (84 + 63) x 42, which omits both the top and the bottom. The question also says to ignore thickness, so the inside dimensions can be used directly.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A tempts students who forget the factor of 2, adding one face of each pair instead of all six faces.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Which principle lets a State try an offence begun abroad but completed on its territory? — **Objective territoriality**

2. Which principle lets a State try an offence begun on its territory but completed abroad? — **Subjective territoriality**

3. Another name for the nationality principle of criminal jurisdiction? — **Active personality principle**

4. Which basis lets a State try a foreigner for harming its national abroad? — **Passive personality principle**

5. Which basis does the passage call more contested than the others? — **Passive personality**

6. Which basis covers counterfeiting a State's currency abroad? — **Protective principle**

7. Name the classic offence of universal jurisdiction. — **Piracy on the high seas**

8. Which court decided the Lotus case in 1927? — **The Permanent Court of International Justice**

9. Which two States were parties to the Lotus case? — **France and Turkey**

10. In Lotus, where did Turkey prosecute the French officer? — **Constantinople**

11. What did Lotus say about restrictions on the independence of States? — **They cannot be presumed**

12. Which UNCLOS article governs penal jurisdiction after a high-seas collision? — **Article 97**

13. Under Art 97 UNCLOS, which States may prosecute after a collision? — **The ship's flag State or the accused's State of nationality**

14. Did the treaty rule on collisions confirm or reverse Lotus? — **It reversed it**

15. May a State arrest a person in another State's territory without consent? — **No**

16. Can more than one State have a valid basis over the same conduct? — **Yes**

17. Which territorial limb did Lotus rely on when it treated the vessel as territory? — **Effects felt on the Turkish vessel (objective territoriality)**

18. Which BNS chapter contains the general exceptions? — **Chapter III**

19. Which BNS section covers a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law? — **Section 14**

20. Which BNS section covers a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law? — **Section 17**

21. Which BNS section deals with accident or misfortune? — **Section 18**

22. Which BNS section covers intoxication administered against one's will? — **Section 23**

23. Which BNS section deals with voluntary intoxication and knowledge? — **Section 24**

24. Under ss 14 and 17, must the mistake be of fact or of law? — **Of fact**

25. What does good faith require, as the passage puts it? — **Due care and attention**

26. Is an honest but careless belief held in good faith? — **No**

27. Does ignorance of the law excuse an offence? — **No**

28. Name the four 'lawful' conditions of the accident exception. — **Lawful act, lawful manner, lawful means, proper care and caution**

29. Is an accident during an unlawful act excused under s 18? — **No**

30. What incapacity must s 23 intoxication produce? — **Incapable of knowing the act's nature, or that it is wrong or illegal**

31. Under s 24, what is imputed to a voluntarily intoxicated person? — **The knowledge he would have had if sober**

32. Does s 24 presume intention? — **No; intention must still be proved**

33. What share of drip-kit cost did the district department pay? — **70 per cent**

34. Average cane yield of drip adopters by 2024? — **92 tonnes per hectare**

35. Average cane yield of flood-irrigating growers by 2024? — **71 tonnes per hectare**

36. How many farmers had installed drip kits by 2024? — **1,200**

37. Which mechanism did the drip report credit for the extra cane? — **A steadier supply of water to the root zone**

38. What is fertiliser dissolved in irrigation water and fed through drip lines called? — **Fertigation**

39. When was Ward 9 relit with LED streetlights? — **January 2024**

40. Ward 9 night-time crimes before and after the LED lamps? — **480 before, 360 after**

41. What did the lighting committee's citywide plan cost? — **Rs 60 crore**

42. Crime moving to neighbouring areas instead of stopping is called what? — **Displacement**

43. Milk van's driving time for the full route? — **130 minutes**

44. Time the milk van gets back to the chilling centre? — **7:40 am**

45. Milk van's average speed over the round trip, halts included? — **30 km/h**

46. If speed falls 20%, by what percentage does travel time rise? — **25 per cent**

47. Volume of yarn in one 21 cm x 14 cm package with a 7 cm core? — **4312 cubic cm**

48. How many upright yarn packages fit in an 84 x 63 x 42 cm carton? — **36**

49. Inside volume of the 84 x 63 x 42 cm carton? — **222264 cubic cm**

50. Board needed for one closed 84 x 63 x 42 cm carton? — **22932 square cm**

51. Which BNS section covers acts of a child under seven? — **Section 20**

52. Under BNS s 21, a child of 7-12 is excused only if lacking what? — **Sufficient maturity of understanding**