ANSWER KEY — 24 NOVEMBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
A	B	D	C	D	A	C	B	A	D
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
C	D	B	A	C	C	B	D	C	D
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**				
A	A	B	A	B	B				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 **A** ***Right to information under Art 19(1)(a)*** MED

The passage states the first holding plainly: 'the voter's right to information under Article 19(1)(a) extends to information about the funding of political parties', because that information is essential to an informed choice at the ballot box and because large contributions can buy access and influence. A law that lets parties keep every donor secret strikes directly at that right, so option A names the strongest ground. Option B misplaces the injury: the complaint is not that donors are treated alike but that voters are kept in the dark, and nothing in the ruling rests on equality among donors. Option C invents a right of party members to know all funders; the passage says nothing about freedom of association. Option D stretches Article 21 to a claim of physical danger to voters, which the ruling never makes. The skill tested is locating the right the judgment actually relied on, and identifying the voter, not the donor or the party, as the holder of that right.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B tempts because Article 14 featured in the judgment through manifest arbitrariness, but that reasoning concerned the corporate-donation amendment, not voters' access to funding information.

Q2 **B** ***Permissible grounds under Art 19(2)*** HARD

The passage says that a restriction on the right to information 'must be justified by one of the grounds listed in Article 19(2)', and then states that 'curbing black money, the Government's main justification, is not such a ground'. A new scheme defended on exactly that justification therefore fails at the threshold, which is option B. Option A states the opposite rule, that a weighty public interest can restrict any fundamental right; under Article 19 the permissible restrictions are confined to the listed grounds, and the Court applied that limit. Option C wrongly narrows the right to the funding of governments; the holding is expressly about the funding of political parties. Option D overreaches: the Court did not hold that parties may receive no private donations at all; it objected to the secrecy of the scheme and to unlimited corporate giving. The answer turns on reading the two linked sentences together: the right can be restricted only on Article 19(2) grounds, and the black-money aim is not one of them.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D tempts because it also says the defence fails, but its reason, a total ban on private donations, appears nowhere in the judgment as described.

Q3 **D** ***Manifest arbitrariness, s 182 Companies Act*** HARD

The second holding is that removing the ceiling on corporate contributions was 'manifestly arbitrary' because it 'allowed even loss-making companies to make unlimited contributions' and treated a company's donation, 'essentially a business transaction made to secure benefits', on the same footing as an individual's political support. The hypothetical amendment repeats both defects: a company with losses in each of the last three years may give any sum. Option D therefore applies the Court's reasoning. Option A treats board approval as a cure, but the Court's objection was not about who inside the company decides; it was that unlimited giving by loss-making firms invites quid pro quo. Option B adopts the very equation of corporate and individual support that the Court rejected. Option C invents a constitutional veto for shareholders that the passage never mentions. The skill is carrying a stated ground of arbitrariness to fresh facts and noticing that a procedural safeguard such as a board resolution does not remove the substantive defect the Court identified.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A tempts because a board resolution sounds like a safeguard, but the Court's objection to unlimited giving by loss-making companies has nothing to do with internal approval.

Q4 **C** ***Remedy and directions to SBI*** MED

The final paragraph records the Court's directions: SBI was to stop issuing bonds and 'to submit to the Election Commission of India the details of bonds purchased and encashed since its interim order of 12 April 2019', and the Commission was to publish them. Disclosure therefore reached back to bonds bought well before the final judgment of 15 February 2024, and Arjun is wrong for the reason given in option C. Option A states a theory of purely forward-looking effect that the directions themselves contradict. Option B describes only half of the order, the instruction to stop issuing bonds, and ignores the disclosure direction. Option D overstates the remedy: the order was addressed to SBI and the Election Commission and covered bonds since the 2019 interim order, not every donation to every party since 1951, a date that does not appear in the passage. A careful reader checks both the addressee and the starting date of a court's direction before accepting a claim about its reach.

NAME: _____ ROLL NO: _____ BATCH: _____

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D tempts because it also says Arjun is wrong, but it inflates the direction to all donations since 1951, which the passage nowhere states.

Q5 **D** ***Least restrictive means, donor privacy*** HARD

The passage says the Court 'accepted that the privacy of a donor's political affiliation is a legitimate interest', yet held that the scheme 'was not the least restrictive means of protecting it, because it shielded every donation, however large, from disclosure'. That is option D: privacy was given weight, but total secrecy went further than necessary. Option A contradicts the passage by saying privacy carries no weight. Option B reverses the outcome: the Court did not hold that privacy outweighs the right to know, and the scheme did not fall for want of a statute; it was struck down on substantive grounds. Option C is the most attractive error, because the black-money aim was indeed rejected, but it wrongly says that privacy justified the scheme; the passage says the opposite, that even the privacy interest could not justify blanket anonymity. The question tests whether a reader keeps apart the two justifications the Government offered and remembers which test each one failed: black money failed the Article 19(2) test, privacy failed the least-restrictive-means test.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C tempts because it correctly recalls that the black-money aim failed, but it wrongly treats donor privacy as having justified the scheme.

Q6 **A** ***Art 123(2): six weeks from the later reassembly*** HARD

The passage states two linked rules. An ordinance 'ceases to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament', and 'where the Houses are summoned to reassemble on different dates, the six weeks are reckoned from the later of those dates'. Lok Sabha reassembled on 31 January and Rajya Sabha on 7 February, so the later date is 7 February, and with no disapproving resolutions the ordinance lapses six weeks after that date. Option A applies both rules. Option B counts from the earlier date, which is the natural first instinct but is exactly what the Explanation to Article 123 rules out. Option C invents a six-month period running from promulgation; six months is the maximum gap between sessions, not the life of an ordinance. Option D confuses the condition for making an ordinance, that both Houses are not in session, with the condition for its lapse; an ordinance survives the reassembly and runs for six weeks after it. The skill is reading the counting rule in full rather than stopping at the first clause.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B tempts because Lok Sabha meets first and feels decisive, but the passage expressly measures the six weeks from the later of the two dates of reassembly.

Q7 **C** ***Re-promulgation: Krishna Kumar Singh (2017)*** MED

Krishna Kumar Singh v State of Bihar (2017), as the passage records, held that 'the requirement to lay an ordinance before the legislature is mandatory' and that 're-promulgating an ordinance again and again without placing it before the legislature is a fraud on the Constitution'. The Governor never laid the ordinance and re-promulgated it three times over four years, which is the very practice condemned, so option C is correct. Option A relies on the fact that each promulgation happened when the Assembly was not sitting; that satisfies the timing condition for each act but does nothing to excuse the evasion of the laying requirement, which is the defect. Option B contradicts the second holding of the case: the Governor's satisfaction is 'not immune from judicial review'. Option D misstates the Constitution, since the passage says Article 213 confers a parallel power on the Governor; the power exists, and the problem lies in how it was used. The question rewards separating the existence of a power from the abuse of it.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because each separate promulgation looks technically valid, but the Court looked at the pattern of evading the legislature, not at each act in isolation.

Q8 **B** ***Art 123(2)(a): disapproval by both Houses*** HARD

The lapse rule has two limbs. An ordinance ceases at the end of six weeks from reassembly 'or, if before that period resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the second of those resolutions'. Both Houses reassembled on 1 March, so the six weeks run to mid-April. Before then, Lok Sabha disapproved on 5 March and Rajya Sabha on 12 March. The second resolution was passed on 12 March, and the ordinance ceases on that day, which is option B. Option A gives the Lok Sabha resolution independent effect, but the text requires resolutions by both Houses; one House's disapproval alone does not end the ordinance. Option C ignores the second limb altogether and treats the six-week period as fixed. Option D confuses reassembly, which starts the six-week clock, with lapse. The skill is identifying which event in a sequence triggers the rule, here the later of the two resolutions, and checking that it falls inside the six-week window so that the early-lapse limb applies.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because the directly elected House acted first, but the passage requires disapproval by both Houses and fixes lapse at the second resolution.

Q9 **A** ***Art 123(1): 'except when both Houses are in session'*** ELITE

Article 123, as quoted, allows the President to promulgate an ordinance 'except when both Houses of Parliament are in session'. The bar operates only when both Houses are sitting at the same time. Here Rajya Sabha had been prorogued, so both Houses were not in session and the timing condition for the power was met. The petitioner's ground, that Parliament was sitting, therefore fails, which is option A. Option B reverses the text by requiring both Houses to be prorogued together; the words of the Article require only that they are not both in session. Option C invents a special rule for the directly elected House that the text does not contain. Option D reaches the right outcome for a wrong and false reason: the passage says that, after Krishna Kumar Singh, the President's satisfaction is 'not immune from judicial review'. The question is a close-reading test of a negative condition, 'except when both', and also checks whether the solver can reject a correct outcome that rests on a misstated rule.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D is the trap: it agrees that the claim fails, but its reason, that satisfaction can never be examined by a court, contradicts the passage's statement of the 2017 ruling.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q10 **D** ***Rule application: interval rule for women*** HARD

Check Meena against each rule in turn. Rule 1: she is 62, within the 18 to 65 range, and the 'not older than 60' limit applies only to 'a person donating for the first time'; Meena has donated four times, so the limit does not touch her. Rule 2: 58 kg exceeds the 50 kg whole-blood minimum. Rule 3: 13.1 g/dL exceeds 12.5. Rule 5: no deferral is mentioned. Rule 4, however, requires a woman to wait 'at least 120 days' after a whole-blood donation before giving whole blood again, and only 100 days have passed. She fails Rule 4, so option D is correct. Option A wrongly applies the first-time age limit to a regular donor and then suggests a waiver she does not need. Option B overlooks the interval rule entirely. Option C invents a ban on whole-blood donation above 60 that no rule contains. The method is a full sweep of every rule, because one failure is enough, and the rule that bites here is the gender-specific interval, not the eye-catching age.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because 62 looks too old at a glance, but the over-60 limit binds only first-time donors, and Meena is a regular one.

Q11 **C** ***Rule application: weight thresholds by donation type*** MED

Rule 2 sets two different weight floors: 'a whole-blood donor must weigh at least 50 kg; a platelet donor must weigh at least 55 kg'. Arjun weighs 53 kg, so he falls short of the platelet floor but clears the whole-blood floor. He is 19 and first-time, which is permitted because the first-time limit only caps age at 60; his haemoglobin of 14 g/dL clears 12.5; Rule 4 does not apply because he has never donated; and he has no deferral. He therefore cannot give platelets but can give whole blood, which is option C. Option A ignores the platelet weight floor. Option B invents a 55 kg rule for all first-time donors; the 55 kg figure is tied to the type of donation, not to first-time status. Option D misuses Rule 6, which permits the medical officer to waive only 'the first-time donor limit in Rule 1, and no other rule', and only for a person aged 61 to 65; the weight rule cannot be waived for anyone.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D tempts because a waiver exists in the rules, but Rule 6 is confined to the first-time age limit and cannot relax the weight rule.

Q12 **D** ***Scope of a limited waiver*** HARD

Kabir is 63 and has never donated, so Rule 1's first-time limit of 60 would bar him. Rule 6 lets the medical officer waive that limit for a person aged 61 to 65 holding a physician's fitness certificate, and Kabir qualifies, so the age problem can be cured. But Rule 6 waives 'the first-time donor limit in Rule 1, and no other rule'. Kabir got a tattoo ten months ago, and Rule 5 defers anyone who has had a tattoo 'within the previous 12 months'. That deferral cannot be waived, so he cannot donate today, which is option D. Weight (70 kg) and haemoglobin (14.2 g/dL) are fine and are not the problem. Option A stops at the waiver and forgets the tattoo. Option B ignores Rule 6 altogether, treating 60 as an absolute ceiling for first-time donors. Option C reads the waiver as a general dispensation, the exact opposite of its words. The skill is fixing the precise scope of an exception and then applying every rule it leaves untouched.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because Kabir's certificate fully satisfies Rule 6, but the waiver reaches only the age limit, and the tattoo deferral under Rule 5 still applies.

Q13 **B** ***Multi-rule screening with exact thresholds*** ELITE

Screen each man against every rule, watching the exact thresholds. Ravi: age, weight (52 kg against 50) and interval (200 days against 90) are fine, but his haemoglobin is 12.4 g/dL, below the 12.5 floor in Rule 3, so he fails. Sohan: a first-time donor aged 58 is within the 60 limit; 60 kg and 13.0 g/dL pass; Rule 4 does not apply to a first donation; and his antibiotics ended 8 days ago, while Rule 5 defers only a person who finished them 'less than 7 days earlier', so he is not deferred. Sohan passes. Imran is 66, outside the 18 to 65 range in Rule 1; Rule 6 helps only persons aged 61 to 65, and only with the first-time limit, so he fails. Dev weighs 49 kg, under the 50 kg floor, and fails. Only Sohan may donate, which is option B. Each failure turns on a margin of a single unit, which is why every figure must be checked rather than estimated.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because Ravi's 12.4 g/dL looks close enough to 12.5, but the rule sets a strict floor and he falls just below it.

Q14 **A** ***Ordering: could-be-true sequence*** MED

Test each order against the three ordering conditions, then confirm that teams can be assigned. Option B, P, T, R, S, Q, puts Q on Friday after R on Wednesday, breaking condition 2. Option C, S, Q, P, T, R, puts S on Monday, breaking condition 3. Option D, Q, P, S, T, R, places S between P and T, so T is not on the day immediately after P, breaking condition 1. Option A, Q, S, P, T, R, keeps P and T adjacent (Wednesday and Thursday), Q before R, and S on Tuesday. Teams can also be fitted: Wednesday's camp, P, must be Red under condition 6; R must then be Blue under condition 5; the second Red camp cannot be Tuesday or Thursday, which are adjacent to Wednesday, and cannot be Friday because R there is Blue, so it must be Monday's Q. Red runs Q and P on Monday and Wednesday, which are not consecutive. Every condition holds, so A is possible.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D tempts because Q comes first and R last as required, but it separates P from T, and condition 1 needs T on the very next day after P.

Q15 **C** ***Ordering + grouping: conditional must-be-true*** HARD

With R on Wednesday, R is Red under condition 6, so P is Blue under condition 5. Q must come before R, so Q is on Monday or Tuesday. P and T need two consecutive days; Monday-Tuesday would leave Q no earlier day than Wednesday, so P and T take Thursday and Friday, P on Thursday and T on Friday. Q and S fill Monday and Tuesday, and S cannot be on Monday, so Q is Monday and S is Tuesday. For teams, the second Red camp cannot be Tuesday or Thursday, which are adjacent to Wednesday, so it is either Monday (Q) or Friday (T); S on Tuesday is Blue. Two schedules remain: Red on Q and R, or Red on R and T. In both, P is on Thursday and Blue, which is option C. Option A and option B each hold in only one schedule. Option D fails when Q is Blue, because then both Q and S, two Blue camps, come before R.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option B tempts because T is certainly on Friday, but T's team is not fixed: it is Red whenever Q is Blue.

Q16 **C** ***Ordering + grouping: cannot-be-true (EXCEPT)*** HARD

Find a valid schedule for each option except one. Option A: Q on Wednesday works in the schedule P, T, Q, S, R with Red on P and Q. Option B: R as a Red camp on Friday works in P, T, S, Q, R with Red on S and R. Option D: P as a Red camp on Monday works in P, T, Q, S, R with Red on P and Q. Option C cannot happen. If T is on Tuesday, P is on Monday. Wednesday's camp is Red under condition 6, so Tuesday's camp, T, cannot also be Red, because condition 4 forbids two Red camps on consecutive days. T on Tuesday is therefore always Blue, and the pairing in option C is impossible. The quickest route to the exception is to notice that any Tuesday or Thursday camp is adjacent to the compulsory Red Wednesday camp and so must be Blue. Options that place a Red camp on Tuesday or Thursday can be eliminated without building the whole schedule.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option D tempts because Monday Red next to Tuesday seems risky, but Tuesday's T is Blue, so a Red P on Monday breaks no condition.

Q17 **B** ***Ordering + grouping: conditional with team inference*** ELITE

Red runs Wednesday's camp and, by hypothesis, Friday's; with exactly two Red camps, Monday, Tuesday and Thursday are all Blue. Now list the orders that satisfy conditions 1 to 3: P, T, Q, S, R; P, T, S, Q, R; Q, P, T, S, R; Q, S, P, T, R; and Q, S, R, P, T. In the fourth, P is on Wednesday and R on Friday, both Red, which breaks condition 5, so it is ruled out. In each of the other four, P falls on Monday, Tuesday or Thursday, all Blue days, so P is always Blue: option B. Check the others. Option A fails in Q, S, R, P, T, where T is on Friday. Option C fails in P, T, Q, S, R, where Q is on Wednesday and therefore Red. Option D fails in P, T, S, Q, R and Q, S, R, P, T, where S is on Wednesday or Tuesday. The decisive step is converting the two fixed Red days into a list of Blue days and then tracking where P can fall.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A tempts because R is on Friday in three of the four schedules, but in Q, S, R, P, T the Friday camp is T, so R on Friday is not forced.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q18 **D** ***Year-on-year percentage change*** HARD

Year-on-year percentage increase = (this year minus last year) / last year x 100. For girls: 2021-22, (9,100 - 8,400) / 8,400 = 700 / 8,400 = 8.33%. 2022-23, (9,800 - 9,100) / 9,100 = 700 / 9,100 = 7.69%. 2023-24, 840 / 9,800 = 8.57%. 2024-25, 910 / 10,640 = 8.55%. 2025-26, 1,050 / 11,550 = 9.09%. The lowest is 7.69% in 2022-23, which is option D. The trap is that 2021-22 and 2022-23 show the same absolute increase of 700, so a solver reading the graph's slope might treat them as equal or pick the earlier year. The same absolute rise on a larger base is a smaller percentage, so 2022-23 is lower. Note also that 2023-24 (8.57%) and 2024-25 (8.55%) are almost identical, which is why the figures must be computed rather than judged by eye from the steepness of the line. A line graph shows absolute change; percentage change has to be calculated against the base year.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A tempts because 2021-22 has the same 700 increase, but on the smaller base of 8,400 that is 8.33%, above 2022-23's 7.69%.

Q19 **C** ***Ratio threshold with an exact boundary*** HARD

The parity ratio is girls per 100 boys = girls / boys x 100. 2020-21: 8,400 / 10,500 x 100 = 80. 2021-22: 9,100 / 10,400 x 100 = 87.5. 2022-23: 9,800 / 10,780 x 100 = 90.9. 2023-24: 10,640 / 11,200 x 100 = 95.0 exactly. 2024-25: 11,550 / 11,000 x 100 = 105. 2025-26: 12,600 / 11,340 x 100 = 111.1. The question asks for 'at least 95' girls per 100 boys, so a year with exactly 95 counts. The qualifying years are 2023-24, 2024-25 and 2025-26: three years, option C. Option A, two, is the answer of a solver who treats 'at least' as 'more than' and drops 2023-24, or who counts only the years in which girls outnumbered boys. Option B, four, would wrongly add 2022-23 at 90.9. Option D, all six, ignores the threshold altogether. Boundary cases decide many DI questions, so a value that lands exactly on the threshold should always be checked against the wording.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A tempts because 2023-24 sits exactly on 95, and a solver reading 'at least' as 'above' leaves it out.

Q20 **D** ***Share in percentage points vs percent change*** ELITE

Girls' share of total = girls / (girls + boys) x 100. In 2020-21: 8,400 / 18,900 x 100 = 44.44%. In 2025-26: 12,600 / 23,940 x 100 = 52.63%. The rise in share is 52.63 - 44.44 = 8.19, about 8.2 percentage points, which is option D. Option A, 18.4, is the percentage change in the share, (52.63 - 44.44) / 44.44 x 100 = 18.4%, a correct number answering a different question; the stem asks for percentage points, which is a simple difference between two percentages. Option B, 50, is the percentage growth in the number of girls enrolled, (12,600 - 8,400) / 8,400 = 50%, which says nothing directly about share. Option C, 6.7, does not correspond to the share in either year. The question rewards keeping three ideas apart: growth of a count, change of a share in points, and relative change of a share in percent. Many DI errors come from computing the right numbers and then reporting the wrong one.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because 18.4 is a genuine figure from the data, but it is the percentage change in the share, not the change in percentage points that the stem asks for.

Q21 **A** ***Percentage increase of totals*** EASY

Total enrolment in 2020-21 = 8,400 + 10,500 = 18,900. Total in 2025-26 = 12,600 + 11,340 = 23,940. Increase = 23,940 - 18,900 = 5,040. Percentage increase = 5,040 / 18,900 x 100 = 26.67%, about 26.7%, which is option A. A quick check: 18,900 x 4/3 = 25,200, which is too high, and 18,900 x 1.25 = 23,625, slightly below 23,940, so the answer lies a little above 25%. Option B, 29%, is the simple average of the girls' growth (50%) and the boys' growth (8%); averaging two growth rates ignores that the two groups started from different bases. Option C, 21.1%, divides the increase by the later total, 5,040 / 23,940, which gives the fall needed to return to 2020-21, not the rise from it. Option D, 58%, simply adds the two growth rates. The base for 'what percentage more than' is always the earlier, reference value.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C tempts because it uses the right increase of 5,040, but it divides by the 2025-26 total instead of the 2020-21 base.

Q22 **A** ***Projection with mixed absolute and percentage growth*** ELITE

In 2025-26 girls rose by 12,600 - 11,550 = 1,050, so girls grow by 1,050 a year, while boys grow by 3% a year compounded. 2026-27: girls = 12,600 + 1,050 = 13,650; boys = 11,340 x 1.03 = 11,680.2; gap = 1,969.8, just under 2,000. 2027-28: girls = 14,700; boys = 11,680.2 x 1.03 = 12,030.6; gap = 2,669.4, above 2,000. The first year in which girls exceed boys by more than 2,000 is therefore 2027-28, option A. Option B, 2026-27, is the trap for a solver who rounds the boys' figure carelessly or estimates the gap at about 2,000 and accepts it; the gap there is 1,969.8, which does not exceed 2,000. Options C and D are later years in which the condition holds, but not for the first time. When two series grow by different rules, one absolute and one percentage, compute each year step by step rather than projecting the gap by a constant amount, because the percentage series speeds up as its base grows.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option B tempts because the 2026-27 gap of 1,969.8 is very close to 2,000, but the stem requires the gap to exceed 2,000, which first happens in 2027-28.

Q23 **B** ***Successive percentage stages*** MED

Apply each percentage to the quantity entering that stage. Sorting: 120 x (1 - 0.10) = 108 tonnes sorted. Composting: 108 x (1 - 0.60) = 43.2 tonnes of raw compost. Screening: 43.2 x (1 - 0.20) = 34.56 tonnes of saleable compost a day, which is option B. Equivalently, 120 x 0.9 x 0.4 x 0.8 = 34.56. Option A, 43.20 tonnes, stops before screening and reports raw compost as if all of it were saleable. Option C, 38.40 tonnes, skips the sorting stage: 120 x 0.4 x 0.8 = 38.4, as though no contamination were rejected. Option D, 28.80 tonnes, adds the sorting and composting losses as 10% + 60% = 70% of the original 120 tonnes, giving 120 x 0.3 x 0.8 = 28.8; that is wrong because the 60% loss applies only to the 108 tonnes that enter composting, as the passage states. The instruction that 'all percentages at each stage apply to the quantity entering that stage' means the factors multiply; they do not add.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option D tempts because adding 10% and 60% feels natural, but successive stage losses multiply, since each percentage acts on a smaller quantity.

Q24 **A** ***Revenue-cost reconciliation*** HARD

Per day: sales = 34.56 x 4,000 = Rs 1,38,240. Municipal fee = 120 x 500 = Rs 60,000. Operating cost = 120 x 1,200 = Rs 1,44,000. Landfill charge = 12 tonnes of rejects x 600 = Rs 7,200. Net surplus per day = 1,38,240 + 60,000 - 1,44,000 - 7,200 = Rs 47,040. For 30 days: 47,040 x 30 = Rs 14,11,200, or about Rs 14.11 lakh, option A. Option B, Rs 41.47 lakh, is sales revenue alone (1,38,240 x 30), ignoring every cost and the fee. Option C, Rs 16.27 lakh, forgets the landfill charge: (1,38,240 + 60,000 - 1,44,000) x 30 = Rs 16,27,200. Option D, a deficit of Rs 3.89 lakh, leaves out the municipal fee: (1,38,240 - 1,44,000 - 7,200) x 30 = minus Rs 3,88,800. The plant makes a surplus only because the municipal fee covers the gap between sales and operating cost, a useful reading of why such plants depend on tipping fees.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option C tempts because it handles sales, the fee and operating cost correctly, but it omits the Rs 600 per tonne landfill charge on the 12 tonnes of daily rejects.

Q25 **B** ***Proportional change through a chain*** HARD

Saleable compost = 120 x 0.9 x (1 - loss) x 0.8. Every factor except (1 - loss) stays the same, so saleable compost changes in proportion to the retained share. At a 60% loss the retained share is 40%; at a 55% loss it is 45%. The increase is (45 - 40) / 40 x 100 = 12.5%, option B. Check with figures: at 55% loss, 108 x 0.45 x 0.8 = 38.88 tonnes, against 34.56 tonnes before; 38.88 / 34.56 = 1.125, a 12.5% rise. Option A, 5.0%, takes the five-point fall in the loss rate as the percentage change in output. Option C, 9.1%, divides 5 by 55, measuring against the new loss rate rather than the retained mass. Option D, 11.11%, divides 5 by 45, measuring against the new retained share rather than the old one. The principle is that output depends on what is retained, so the change must be measured on the retained share and against its original value of 40%.

Examiner's note — the trap: Option A tempts because the loss rate falls by 5 points, but output depends on the retained share, which rises from 40% to 45%, an increase of one-eighth.

Q26 **B** ***Multi-channel effect of one change*** ELITE

Cutting rejects from 10% to 4% affects two items; the municipal fee and operating cost are charged per tonne received, and receipts stay at 120 tonnes, so neither changes. First, more waste is composted: sorted waste rises from 108 to 120 x 0.96 = 115.2 tonnes, and

saleable compost from 34.56 to 115.2 x 0.4 x 0.8 = 36.864 tonnes, an extra 2.304 tonnes a day. Extra sales a month = 2.304 x 4,000 x 30 = Rs 2,76,480. Second, rejects fall from 12 to 4.8 tonnes a day, saving 7.2 x 600 x 30 = Rs 1,29,600 a month in landfill charges. The total rise is 2,76,480 + 1,29,600 = Rs 4,06,080, about Rs 4.06 lakh, option B. Option A counts only the extra sales, and option C only the landfill saving. Option D, Rs 4.75 lakh, forgets screening when valuing the extra compost (7.2 x 0.4 x 4,000 x 30 = Rs 3,45,600) and adds the landfill saving. A single operational change can move several lines at once, and each must be traced.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** Option A tempts because extra compost sales are the obvious gain, but fewer rejects also cut the landfill bill, and the question asks for the change in the whole surplus.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. On what date did the Supreme Court strike down the Electoral Bond Scheme? — **15 February 2024**

2. Which case struck down the Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018? — **Association for Democratic Reforms v Union of India**

3. How many judges sat on the Bench in the electoral bonds case? — **Five (a Constitution Bench)**

4. Was the electoral bonds verdict unanimous? — **Yes**

5. Which bank sold electoral bonds? — **State Bank of India (SBI)**

6. Electoral bonds were what kind of instrument? — **Bearer instruments**

7. Which Finance Act amended statutes to enable electoral bonds? — **The Finance Act, 2017**

8. Which fundamental right covers the voter's right to know party funding? — **Article 19(1)(a)**

9. On which grounds alone may the right under Art 19(1)(a) be restricted? — **The grounds listed in Article 19(2)**

10. Is curbing black money an Article 19(2) ground, per the ruling? — **No**

11. Which test did the scheme fail on donor privacy? — **Least restrictive means**

12. Which Companies Act section governs corporate political contributions? — **Section 182**

13. What was the old ceiling on corporate donations? — **7.5% of average net profits of the three preceding years**

14. Why was removing that ceiling held invalid? — **Manifestly arbitrary**

15. Since which date did SBI have to disclose bond details? — **12 April 2019, the interim order**

16. To which body did SBI submit the bond details? — **The Election Commission of India**

17. Who was to publish the bond details on its website? — **The Election Commission of India**

18. Which Article lets the President promulgate ordinances? — **Article 123**

19. Which Article gives the Governor the ordinance power? — **Article 213**

20. When is the President barred from promulgating an ordinance? — **When both Houses of Parliament are in session**

21. An ordinance lapses how long after Parliament reassembles? — **Six weeks**

22. If Houses reassemble on different dates, six weeks run from? — **The later of the two dates**