ANSWER KEY — 26 NOVEMBER 2026

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
A	B	B	A	A	C	D	C	A	D
Q11	**Q12**	**Q13**	**Q14**	**Q15**	**Q16**	**Q17**	**Q18**	**Q19**	**Q20**
D	C	B	D	C	D	D	A	C	B
Q21	**Q22**	**Q23**	**Q24**	**Q25**	**Q26**				
A	C	B	B	A	B				

LEGAL REASONING

Q1 **A** *Service for a fee: contract for services* MED

The passage states that in V.P. Shantha the Supreme Court held that 'medical services rendered by doctors and hospitals for a fee are a service'. Dr Rao charges Rs 800 a consultation, so her treatment is neither free of charge nor rendered under a contract of personal service, and a careless misdiagnosis is a fault in the manner of performance, which is a 'deficiency'. The complaint is therefore maintainable, as the first option says. The second option uses the right words in the wrong place: the Court explained that a contract of personal service is a master-and-servant relationship such as employment, whereas a patient who engages a doctor enters a contract for services. The third option misreads section 2(42): its list of examples is illustrative, since the definition covers 'service of any description'. The fourth option borrows the cross-subsidy rule, which matters only when the complainant was treated free; a fee-paying patient needs no such showing. The skill tested is applying the two exclusions precisely, and recognising that neither applies to an ordinary paid consultation.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The second option tempts because 'personal service' sounds like a doctor's personal attention, but the passage defines it as a master-and-servant relationship, which a patient's engagement of a doctor is not.

Q2 **B** *Free service in a hospital that charges others* HARD

On its face Kamla's case falls within the exclusion for service 'free of charge', which is why the first option looks right. But the passage states a specific rule from V.P. Shantha: 'where a hospital charges those who can pay and treats the poor free, the free treatment is also a service'. The trust hospital is exactly such a hospital, since it charges patients who can afford to pay and treats those below an income limit free, so Kamla's treatment is a 'service' and her complaint lies, as the second option says. The first option applies the general exclusion and ignores the qualification the Court attached to it. The third option invents a limitation: nothing in section 2(42) removes charitable bodies, and the trust plainly makes its treatment available to potential users. The fourth option confuses two rules; the token-registration point concerns hospitals that charge no one, and it says that such a payment does not create a service, not that it is required for one. The skill tested is spotting the specific rule that overrides the general one.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The first option is the trap: it quotes the free-of-charge exclusion correctly but misses that V.P. Shantha treats free care in a hospital that charges others as a service.

Q3 **B** *Advocate's services: D.K. Gandhi* HARD

The passage reports that in Bar of Indian Lawyers v D.K. Gandhi (May 2024) the Supreme Court held that 'a complaint alleging deficient service by an advocate is not maintainable under the Act'. Its reason was that the client exercises considerable direct control over how the advocate conducts the brief, so the engagement is a contract of personal service, which section 2(42) excludes. Arjun's complaint therefore fails for the reason given in the second option. The first option is correct that the service was not free, but that removes only one of the two exclusions; the personal-service exclusion still applies. The third option overstates V.P. Shantha, which concerned doctors and hospitals; it did not hold that every fee-charging professional renders a 'service', and D.K. Gandhi expressly declined to extend the Act to advocates. The fourth option is wrong on the facts: missing a filing deadline is plainly a shortcoming in the manner of performance, so the complaint fails on maintainability, not because there was no fault. The skill tested is identifying which exclusion the Court relied on.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The first option tempts because a fee was paid, but paying a fee answers only the free-of-charge exclusion, not the contract-of-personal-service exclusion that D.K. Gandhi applied to advocates.

Q4 **A** *Employer-paid treatment and personal service* ELITE

The hospital raises two defences, and the passage answers both. First, it says Neha paid nothing. But V.P. Shantha held that treatment 'whose cost is borne by an insurer or, as a condition of service, by the patient's employer' is a 'service'; the factory pays her bills under her terms of employment, so the treatment is not free of charge. Second, it says she is an employee. Her contract of employment is indeed a contract of personal service, but it is a contract with the factory, not with the hospital. The hospital is not her master, and her relationship with it is a contract for services. Both defences fail, as the first option says. The second option repeats the first defence and ignores the employer-pays rule. The third option attaches the personal-service exclusion to the wrong relationship. The fourth option reaches the right result for the wrong reason: the cross-subsidy rule concerns patients treated free because they are poor, and 'only because' discards the actual ground. The skill tested is matching each exclusion to the correct pair of parties.

NAME: _____ ROLL NO: _____ BATCH: _____

Examiner's note — the trap: The third option is the trap: Neha's employment really is a contract of personal service, but it binds her to the factory, not to the hospital whose treatment she complains of.

Q5 A *Free-for-all government hospital; token fee* HARD

The passage states that 'treatment at a government hospital where no one, rich or poor, is charged anything falls outside the Act, and payment of a token amount for registration alone does not alter that position'. The dispensary charges no patient for treatment, and Ravi's Rs 10 is exactly such a token registration payment. His treatment therefore remains a service rendered free of charge, and the complaint is not maintainable, as the first option says. The second option treats the slip fee as consideration for the treatment, which is the very argument the Court rejected. The third option gives the right result for a wrong reason: nothing in the passage says that the Act never applies to public bodies. Indeed, a government hospital that charges some patients would render a 'service' to all of them, so government status is not the test. The fourth option inverts V.P. Shantha, which placed free-for-all government hospitals outside the definition. The skill tested is applying the token-fee rule and choosing the option whose reason, and not merely whose result, follows from the passage.

Examiner's note — the trap: The third option tempts because it reaches the correct result, but its reason, that the Act never applies to government bodies, is not in the passage and is wrong.

Q6 C *Trespass actionable per se; mistake no defence* MED

Three rules in the passage settle Leela's case. First, trespass is 'actionable per se: the possessor may sue without proving any damage', so the fact that she damaged nothing does not help her. Second, the entry must be voluntary, and Leela chose to walk across the meadow; nobody carried her there. Third, 'mistake is no defence': a person who enters believing the land to be public land is liable, as the man in Basely v Clarkson was liable for mowing his neighbour's grass in the honest belief that it was his own. Leela is therefore liable, as the third option states. The first option denies the per se rule. The second option makes honest and reasonable belief a defence, which the passage expressly rejects. The fourth option adds a knowledge requirement that the passage never imposes; what matters is that the act of entry was voluntary, not that she knew whose land it was. The skill tested is separating a voluntary act, which is required, from an intention to do wrong, which is not.

Examiner's note — the trap: The second option tempts because honest belief usually feels like a good excuse, but the passage, citing Basely v Clarkson, says plainly that mistake is no defence to trespass.

Q7 D *Revocation of licence* HARD

Sunil entered as a licensee, because Raghav invited him, and the passage says that a licensee 'is not a trespasser'. It then adds the rule that decides this case: 'if the licence is revoked, however, he becomes a trespasser if he does not leave within a reasonable time'. Raghav revoked the licence at 10 pm, and Sunil stayed in the drawing room for two hours. A reasonable time to collect oneself and leave is plainly shorter than that, so from the end of that period Sunil was a trespasser, as the fourth option says. The first option backdates the trespass to the original entry; revocation operates from the time it is made, and the entry itself was lawful. The second option ignores revocation altogether, as if lawful entry protected him for ever. The third option misapplies trespass ab initio, which the passage confines to a person who enters 'under an authority given by law, rather than by the possessor's permission'. Sunil entered by permission, so the doctrine has no application. The skill tested is timing the moment a lawful visitor becomes a trespasser.

Examiner's note — the trap: The third option tempts because Sunil did abuse his welcome, but trespass ab initio applies only to entry under authority of law, not to entry by the possessor's permission.

Q8 C *Involuntary entry* EASY

The passage says that the entry 'must be voluntary' and that 'a person who is carried or thrown onto land by others commits no trespass, since the entry is not his own act', citing Smith v Stone (1647). Imran was shoved through the hedge by a stampeding crowd. He did not choose to enter Kavita's garden, so his entry was not his act at all, and he is not liable, as the third option says. The first option relies on the per se rule, but that rule only removes the need to prove damage; it cannot turn an involuntary movement into a trespass, and damage to the flower bed does not supply the missing voluntary act. The second option relies on the rule that mistake is no defence, but mistake concerns a person who chooses to enter while wrong about whose land it is, not a person who did not choose to enter. The fourth option invents an implied licence to enter private gardens during a public fair, which nothing in the passage supports. The skill tested is the threshold requirement of a voluntary act.

Examiner's note — the trap: The first option tempts because the flower bed really was damaged, but damage cannot make up for the absence of a voluntary entry, which is the foundation of the tort.

Q9 A *Trespass ab initio: misfeasance vs nonfeasance* ELITE

The inspector enters 'under an authority given by law', a statutory power to take samples, so the doctrine of trespass ab initio is available against him. The passage, however, requires 'a positive wrongful act' and says that 'a mere omission is not enough'. In Case 1 he drinks the juice and refuses to pay. That mirrors the Six Carpenters' Case almost exactly, where refusing to pay for wine already drunk was held to be 'a failure to act, not an act of misuse'. Case 1 therefore does not make him a trespasser from the start, though the shop may still sue him for the price. In Case 2 he smashes the cabinet, which is a positive act abusing his authority, so he becomes a trespasser ab initio. The answer is Case 2 only, as the first option says. The second option reverses the Six Carpenters' rule. The third option treats every later wrong as enough, ignoring the act and omission distinction. The fourth option reverses the doctrine, which applies to entry by law and not to entry by private licence. The skill tested is classifying conduct as misfeasance or nonfeasance.

Examiner's note — the trap: The third option tempts because the inspector behaved badly in both cases, but the Six Carpenters' Case holds that refusing to pay is an omission and cannot make an entry wrongful from the start.

LOGICAL REASONING

Q10 D *Affirming the consequent* HARD

Argument I has the form: if P (the well runs dry), then Q (a tanker is sent); Q happened; therefore P. This is the fallacy of affirming the consequent. The rule says that a dry well always brings a tanker, but not that a tanker is sent only when a well runs dry; the panchayat may also send one for a wedding, a fire or a burst pipe. The fourth option copies the structure exactly: if the river crosses the danger mark, the school closes; the school closed; so the river must have crossed it. The school might have closed for a holiday, an election or a strike. The first option is valid modus ponens, since it affirms the antecedent. The second option denies the antecedent, which is a different fallacy, because it reasons from the absence of P. The third option is valid modus tollens, reasoning from the absence of Q to the absence of P. Only the fourth option moves, as Argument I does, from the consequent occurring to the antecedent having occurred. The skill tested is identifying the direction of the conditional.

Examiner's note — the trap: The second option tempts because it is also invalid, but it denies the antecedent, while Argument I affirms the consequent; matching the flaw alone is not enough, the structure must match too.

Q11 D *Valid categorical syllogism* HARD

Argument II is valid. Its form is: all A (night-roster nurses) are B (course completers); no B is C (on probation); therefore no A is C. If every A falls inside B, and B shares nothing with C, then A cannot share anything with C either. The fourth option has exactly this form: all choir members (A) sing at the assembly (B); no one who sings at the assembly (B) is shy (C); so no choir member (A) is shy (C). The first option reasons from 'some B are C' to 'some A are C', which is invalid, because the shy singers may all be outside the choir. The second option reasons from 'all A are B' and 'no A is C' to 'no B is C', which is invalid, since non-members who sing at the assembly may be shy. The third option draws a positive conclusion from two negative premises, which can never be valid. Only the fourth option preserves both the order of the terms and the validity of Argument II. The skill tested is mapping the terms of a syllogism and checking which conclusions actually follow.

Examiner's note — the trap: The second option tempts because it uses the same three terms and the words 'every' and 'no', but it swaps the terms and so draws a conclusion that does not follow.

Q12 C *Fallacy of composition* MED

Argument III reasons that because each part has a property (each film is under fifteen minutes), the whole has it too (the programme will be short). This is the fallacy of composition. Twelve films of fourteen minutes each make a programme of nearly three hours, so the conclusion does not follow from the premise. The third option commits the same error: each brick is light, so the wall built from them will be light. A wall made of thousands of light bricks can be very heavy indeed. The second option reverses the direction, reasoning from the whole to each of its parts; that is the fallacy of division, which is a different error. The first option is a reasonable statistical inference, hedged with the word 'probably', and it reasons from a group to one member, not from parts to a whole. The fourth option is a hasty inductive generalisation from past results to future ones; it is flawed, but it is not an error about parts and wholes. The skill tested is telling composition apart from division and from simple induction.

Examiner's note — the trap: The second option tempts because it uses the same festival setting and the same two ideas, but it reasons from the whole to the parts, which is division, not composition.

Q13 B *Confusing 'only' with 'all'* ELITE

'Only donations of more than Rs 10,000 are listed' means that being listed requires a large donation: if listed, then more than Rs 10,000. It does not say that every large donation is listed; a donor may ask to stay anonymous, or the board may be full. The argument reasons from 'not listed' to 'not a large donation', which treats 'only large donations are listed' as if it meant 'all large donations are listed'. The second option makes exactly this mistake: only those above 90 get the badge; Asha has no badge; so she scored 90 or below. A student who scored 95 but missed the ceremony would also have no badge. The first option is valid, because having the badge does guarantee a score above 90 under an 'only' rule. The third option is also valid, because its first premise says 'every' student above 90 gets the badge, so the absence of a badge rules such a score out. The fourth option has a different flaw, turning 'most' into certainty. The skill tested is translating 'only' into a necessary condition before comparing structures.

Examiner's note — the trap: The third option tempts because its conclusion is word for word the same, but its premise says 'every', which makes the inference valid; the original argument's flaw lies precisely in having only 'only'.

Q14 D *Bold-face roles: opposed view and supporting evidence* HARD

The main conclusion is the last sentence: 'The government should therefore adopt the tax.' The first boldface reports what 'opponents argue', namely that the tax will make no difference because children say price does not matter. The author immediately replies that the survey 'asked the wrong people', so the first boldface is a position the author opposes. The second boldface reports what happened in a neighbouring state, where canteen purchases of soft drinks fell by a quarter after a similar tax. The author uses that result to show that the tax 'changes what children are given to drink', which is the ground of the conclusion, so the second is evidence for the author's conclusion, as the fourth option says. The first option wrongly treats the opponents' evidence as decisive; the author says only that the survey is probably accurate, not that it settles anything. The second option makes the opponents' claim the main conclusion. The third option reverses the roles: the author relies on the second portion and opposes the first. The skill tested is locating the conclusion first and then asking whose side each boldface serves.

Examiner's note — the trap: The first option tempts because the author does accept that the survey is probably accurate, but accepting the figure is not treating it as decisive; the author argues that it measures the wrong buyers.

Q15 **C** *Method: accept the evidence, reject its relevance* MED

The author's reply to the opponents is explicit: 'The survey is probably accurate, but it asked the wrong people.' The author then explains why: 'Schoolchildren pay for only a small share of the soft drinks they drink; most are bought by parents for the home and by school canteens, and both buy with an eye on price.' So the author accepts what the survey found, that children say price does not affect their choice, but argues that children are not the people whose choices mostly determine purchases. That is the third option. The first option is wrong because the author does not dispute the survey's accuracy or offer a different count. The second option misdescribes the argument, which rests precisely on the claim that the tax will change what children drink; the author never argues for adopting the tax regardless. The fourth option invents an attack on the opponents' motives, an ad hominem move that appears nowhere in the passage. The skill tested is describing the method of a rebuttal, here conceding a premise while denying that it supports the opponents' conclusion.

Examiner's note — the trap: The first option tempts because the author does criticise the survey, but the criticism is about whom it asked, not whether its figure is accurate.

Q16 **D** *Function of a concession* HARD

The sentence admits that 'a fall in purchases does not, by itself, show that children have become healthier; that will take years to measure'. That is a concession about the limits of the author's own evidence. The next two sentences then narrow the claim: 'the case for the tax does not need to be proved on that point today. It needs only to show that the tax changes what children are given to drink.' So the sentence acknowledges a limitation while reducing what the argument has to establish, which is the fourth option. The first option overstates the concession: the author does not grant that the tax will make no difference to health, only that the health effect cannot yet be measured, and the opponents' claim concerned what children drink, not their health. The second option is wrong because the principal evidence is the neighbouring state's purchase data, not this admission. The third option says the objection is left unanswered and undermines the conclusion, but the author answers it at once by redefining what must be shown. The skill tested is recognising a concede-and-narrow move in an argument.

Examiner's note — the trap: The first option tempts because the sentence does begin with 'It is true that', the language of concession, but the author concedes only that health effects are unmeasured, not that the tax will fail.

Q17 **D** *Weakening evidence by an alternative cause* ELITE

The second boldface supports the conclusion by implying that the neighbouring state's tax caused the fall in canteen purchases of soft drinks. The strongest weakener supplies another cause for the same fall. The fourth option does exactly that: if, in the very month the tax took effect, the neighbouring state also banned soft-drink sales in primary-school canteens, the quarter-fall in canteen purchases could be explained by the ban rather than by price. The evidence would then no longer show that a tax, by itself, changes what children are given to drink. The first option is consistent with the author's case; a tax need not stop every purchase to reduce purchases, and some continued buying is expected. The second option concerns the level of milk drinking before the tax; it does not touch the change after it, which is what the evidence relies on. The third option tells us only that the earlier prediction of no effect was wrong, which if anything strengthens the author. The skill tested is attacking a causal inference by offering a simultaneous alternative explanation.

Examiner's note — the trap: The first option tempts because it shows the tax did not work completely, but the argument needs only a shift in purchases, and continued buying by some parents is consistent with that.

QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

Q18 **A** *Percentage change between two values* MED

Percentage change = (new value - old value) / old value x 100. The customers at the end of Q1 were 4,600 and at the end of Q4 were 7,004. The increase is 7,004 - 4,600 = 2,404. Dividing by the base, 2,404 / 4,600 = 0.5226, so the rise is about 52.3%, which is the first option. Each distractor comes from a common slip. Using 4,000, the customers at the start of Q1, as the base gives (7,004 - 4,000) / 4,000 = 75.1%; but the question compares end-of-quarter figures, so the start-of-Q1 figure is the wrong old value. Dividing the increase by the new value instead of the old one gives 2,404 / 7,004 = 34.3%, which is the classic base error. The figure of 62.5% is the rise in new customers signed up, from 800 in Q1 to 1,300 in Q4, which measures sign-ups, not the stock of paying customers. Check: 4,600 x 1.5226 = 7,004. The skill tested is choosing the correct column and the correct base before computing a percentage change.

Examiner's note — the trap: The second option tempts solvers who read 'from Q1' as the start of Q1 and use 4,000, but the question asks about customers at the end of each quarter.

Q19 **C** *Rate versus absolute number* HARD

The churn rate is customers churned divided by customers at the start of the quarter. Q1: 200 / 4,000 = 5.00%. Q2: 276 / 4,600 = 6.00%. Q3: 370 / 5,324 = 6.95%. Q4: 400 / 6,104 = 6.55%. The highest rate is 6.95% in Q3, so the answer is the third option. The trap is that Q4 has the largest number of customers churned, 400, and a solver who reads only the churned column will pick Q4. But Q4's 400 is spread over a larger base of 6,104 customers, so its rate falls back to 6.55%, below Q3's. Q2 has a round 6.00%, which looks high but is still lower than Q3's. Q1 is the lowest at 5.00%. To compare 370 / 5,324 with 400 / 6,104 quickly, cross-multiply: 370 x 6,104 = 2,258,480 and 400 x 5,324 = 2,129,600; the first product is larger, so 370 / 5,324 is the larger fraction. The skill tested is comparing rates rather than raw counts, using the correct base for each quarter.

Examiner's note — the trap: The first option tempts because Q4 lost the most customers in absolute terms, but its churn rate of 6.55% is lower than Q3's 6.95% because of its larger base.

Q20 **B** *Successive percentage change* HARD

Revenue = customers at end x monthly fee x 3, so the ratio of revenues is the product of the ratio of customers and the ratio of fees; the factor 3 cancels. Customers: 7,004 / 6,104 = 1.14744, a rise of 14.74%. Fee: 1,125 / 1,140 = 0.98684, a fall of 1.32%. Revenue ratio = 1.14744 x 0.98684 = 1.13235. In rupees, Q3 revenue = 6,104 x 1,140 x 3 = Rs 2,08,75,680 and Q4 revenue = 7,004 x 1,125 x 3 = Rs 2,36,38,500, and 2,36,38,500 / 2,08,75,680 = 1.1323. The rise is about 13.2%, the second option. The figure of 14.7% counts only the growth in customers and ignores the lower fee. The figure of 13.4% adds the two percentages, 14.74 - 1.32, which ignores the cross term; successive changes combine as (1 + a)(1 + b) - 1 = a + b + ab, and here ab = 0.1474 x (-0.0132), about -0.19 points. The figure of 16.1% adds the fee fall instead of subtracting it. The skill tested is combining two percentage changes multiplicatively.

Examiner's note — the trap: The third option tempts because 14.7 minus 1.3 is the quick mental answer, but percentage changes multiply rather than add, and the cross term lowers the result to 13.2%.

Q21 **A** *Working backwards with a churn rate* ELITE

Start of Q5 = end of Q4 = 7,004. The target end of Q5 is 10% higher: 7,004 x 1.10 = 7,704.4. The Q4 churn rate is 400 / 6,104 = 6.553%, and applying it to the start of Q5 gives churned customers = 7,004 x 0.06553 = 459 (459.0 to one decimal place). End = start + new - churned, so new = end - start + churned = 7,704.4 - 7,004 + 459.0 = 1,159.4, or about 1,160, the first option. Check: 7,004 + 1,160 - 459 = 7,705, just above the 10% target. The figure of 1,100 uses Q4's absolute churn of 400 instead of applying Q4's rate to the larger Q5 base, giving 700 + 400. The figure of about 1,205 applies the churn rate to the target end figure, 7,704.4 x 0.06553 = 505, instead of to the start figure, which the definition requires. The figure of 700 ignores churn altogether, as if no customer would cancel. The skill tested is carrying a rate, not a count, into a new period and using the defined base.

Examiner's note — the trap: The second option tempts because it adds back Q4's 400 cancellations, but an equal churn rate on a larger base of 7,004 means about 459 cancellations, not 400.

Q22 **C** *Combined percentage change over several periods* HARD

Q1 revenue = 4,600 x 1,200 x 3 = Rs 1,65,60,000. Q4 revenue = 7,004 x 1,125 x 3 = Rs 2,36,38,500. Ratio = 2,36,38,500 / 1,65,60,000 = 1.42746, so revenue rose by about 42.7%, the third option. The same answer comes from multiplying the two ratios: customers rose by 7,004 / 4,600 = 1.52261 and the fee fell by 1,125 / 1,200 = 0.9375, a fall of 6.25%, and 1.52261 x 0.9375 = 1.42745. The figure of 52.3% is the growth in customers alone and ignores the falling fee. The figure of 46.0% subtracts the percentages, 52.26 - 6.25, which overlooks the cross term: 0.5226 x (-0.0625) = -0.0327, or about -3.3 points, which brings 46.0% down to 42.7%. The figure of 58.5% adds the fee fall instead of subtracting it. Note that the fee fell in every quarter, so revenue growth always lags customer growth. The skill tested is combining a rise and a fall multiplicatively over a longer span.

Examiner's note — the trap: The second option tempts because 52.3% minus 6.25% looks like the natural shortcut, but the cross term of about 3.3 points is too large to ignore over a 52% rise.

Q23 **B** *Simple versus compound interest* HARD

Truck P's loan is 75% of Rs 24,00,000 = Rs 18,00,000 at 10% simple interest for 3 years. Simple interest = P x R x T / 100 = 18,00,000 x 10 x 3 / 100 = Rs 5,40,000. Truck Q's loan is 75% of Rs 18,00,000 = Rs 13,50,000 at 10% compounded annually for 3 years. Amount = 13,50,000 x (1.1)^3 = 13,50,000 x 1.331 = Rs 17,96,850, so compound interest = 17,96,850 - 13,50,000 = Rs 4,46,850. P's interest exceeds Q's by 5,40,000 - 4,46,850 = Rs 93,150, the second option. The figure of Rs 1,24,200 computes both interests on the full truck prices instead of on the loans: 7,20,000 - 5,95,800. The figure of Rs 1,35,000 treats both loans as simple interest, 5,40,000 - 4,05,000, and so ignores compounding on Q's loan. The figure of Rs 41,850 is the extra that compounding adds on Q's loan, 4,46,850 - 4,05,000, which answers a different question. The skill tested is applying each interest rule to the correct principal, the borrowed 75% rather than the price.

Examiner's note — the trap: The first option tempts solvers who compute interest on the truck prices, but only 75% of each price was borrowed, and interest runs on the loan alone.

Q24 **B** *Profit percentage after a discount* MED

The full freight charge is Rs 40,000. A 10% cut gives 40,000 x 0.90 = Rs 36,000. The operating cost is unchanged at Rs 28,000, so the profit on such a trip is 36,000 - 28,000 = Rs 8,000. The passage says profit percentage is calculated on the operating cost, so the profit percentage = 8,000 / 28,000 x 100 = 28.57%, or about 28.6%, the second option. At the full rate, the profit is Rs 12,000, or 42.86% of cost, and the figure of 32.9% simply subtracts 10 points from 42.86%, as if a 10% discount on the charge cut the profit percentage by 10 points. In fact a Rs 4,000 discount removes a third of the Rs 12,000 profit. The figure of 22.2% divides the profit by the discounted charge, 8,000 / 36,000, which is profit on the selling price, not on cost. The figure of 20.0% divides by the full charge, 8,000 / 40,000. The skill tested is using the base the passage defines, here the cost, and applying a discount to the charge before computing profit.

Examiner's note — the trap: The third option tempts because 8,000 / 36,000 uses the right profit, but it divides by the selling price, while the passage defines profit percentage on the operating cost.

Q25 **A** *Break-even from profit, interest and depreciation* HARD

Truck P must cover two costs over the three years. First, the interest on its loan, which is simple interest of 18,00,000 x 10 x 3 / 100 = Rs 5,40,000. Second, its loss in value: it was bought for Rs 24,00,000 and sold for Rs 14,40,000, a loss of Rs 9,60,000. The total to be covered is 5,40,000 + 9,60,000 = Rs 15,00,000. Each full-rate trip earns a profit of 40,000 - 28,000 = Rs 12,000. Trips needed = 15,00,000 / 12,000 = 125, the first option. The figure of 80 covers only the loss in value, 9,60,000 / 12,000, and ignores the interest. The figure of 45 covers only the interest, 5,40,000 / 12,000, and ignores the fall in value. The figure of 200 divides the whole price, 24,00,000, by the profit per trip, as if the truck had been scrapped for nothing and the resale value did not count. The repayment of the loan principal itself is not a cost here, because the truck's purchase price is already counted through its loss in value. The skill tested is listing every cost exactly once.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The second option tempts because the loss in value is the obvious cost of owning the truck, but the loan interest of Rs 5,40,000 must also be covered from trip profits.

Q26 B *Marked price, discount and profit on cost* ELITE

Let the operating cost be C = Rs 30,000 and the listed freight charge be L. After the 10% discount, the charge actually received is 0.9L. The firm wants that to give a 26% profit on cost, so 0.9L = 1.26C. Hence L = 1.26C / 0.9 = 1.4C, which means the listed charge must be 40% above cost, the second option. In rupees, L = 1.4 x 30,000 = Rs 42,000; after the discount the firm receives 42,000 x 0.9 = Rs 37,800, and the profit is 37,800 - 30,000 = Rs 7,800, which is exactly 26% of Rs 30,000. The figure of 36% adds the two percentages, 26 + 10; but a 10% discount is taken off the higher listed charge, so the mark-up must exceed 36%. The figure of 38.6% multiplies 1.26 by 1.1, which wrongly treats a 10% discount as the reverse of a 10% mark-up. The figure of 13.4% multiplies 1.26 by 0.9. The cost of Rs 30,000 does not affect the percentage at all. The skill tested is setting up the discount equation correctly.

> **Examiner's note — the trap:** The third option tempts because multiplying by 1.1 looks like undoing a 10% discount, but the reverse of a 10% cut is dividing by 0.9, which is an 11.1% rise.

RAPID FIRE — ANSWERS

1. Which section of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines 'service'? — **Section 2(42)**

2. Which two things does the definition of 'service' expressly exclude? — **Service free of charge and service under a contract of personal service**

3. What is a 'deficiency' in service under the 2019 Act? — **Any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in quality, nature or manner of performance**

4. In which year was Indian Medical Association v V.P. Shantha decided? — **1995**

5. Under which Act was V.P. Shantha decided? — **The Consumer Protection Act, 1986**

6. Did V.P. Shantha treat medical services for a fee as a 'service'? — **Yes**

7. Per V.P. Shantha, what is a contract of personal service? — **A master-and-servant relationship, such as employment**

8. Is a patient's engagement of a doctor a contract of personal service? — **No, it is a contract for services**

9. Is treatment at a government hospital that charges no one a 'service'? — **No, it falls outside the Act**

10. Does a token registration fee make free-for-all treatment a 'service'? — **No**

11. Is free treatment of the poor at a hospital that charges others a 'service'? — **Yes**

12. Is treatment paid for by an insurer a service rendered free of charge? — **No**

13. Is treatment paid for by the employer as a condition of service free of charge? — **No**

14. Which 2024 case held advocates' services outside the Consumer Protection Act? — **Bar of Indian Lawyers v D.K. Gandhi**

15. In which month of 2024 was D.K. Gandhi decided? — **May 2024**

16. Per D.K. Gandhi, an advocate's engagement is what kind of contract? — **A contract of personal service**

17. What feature of the client-advocate relationship did D.K. Gandhi stress? — **The client's considerable direct control over the conduct of the brief**

18. Per D.K. Gandhi, did the legislature intend to include professionals in the Act? — **No**

19. What did the D.K. Gandhi Bench suggest about V.P. Shantha? — **That a larger Bench should reconsider it**

20. Is V.P. Shantha still binding after D.K. Gandhi? — **Yes, until a larger Bench decides otherwise**

21. Name two services listed as examples in section 2(42). — **E.g. banking and insurance (also transport, housing construction, entertainment)**

22. Is the list of examples in section 2(42) exhaustive? — **No, it covers service of any description**

23. Does paying a fee alone make an advocate's work a 'service' under the Act? — **No, the personal-service exclusion still applies**

24. A doctor who treats every patient free renders what under the Act? — **No 'service' (free-of-charge exclusion)**

25. What is the tort of trespass to land? — **Direct, unjustified interference with land in another's possession**

26. Name three ways of committing trespass to land. — **Entering, remaining on, or placing something on the land**

27. What does 'actionable per se' mean? — **Suable without proof of damage**

28. Is trespass to land actionable per se? — **Yes**

29. What right does trespass to land protect? — **The right to exclusive possession**

30. Is mistake a defence to trespass to land? — **No**

31. Which 1681 case held a man liable for mowing his neighbour's grass by mistake? — **Basely v Clarkson**

32. Which case held a person carried onto land by others not liable for trespass? — **Smith v Stone (1647)**

33. Must the entry in trespass be voluntary? — **Yes**

34. Must a trespasser intend to commit a wrong? — **No**

35. What is a licensee? — **A person who enters land with the possessor's permission**

36. When does a licensee whose licence is revoked become a trespasser? — **If he does not leave within a reasonable time**

37. What does 'ab initio' mean? — **From the beginning**

38. Trespass ab initio applies to entry under what kind of authority? — **Authority given by law, not the possessor's permission**

39. What kind of act makes an entrant a trespasser ab initio? — **A positive wrongful act abusing the authority (misfeasance)**