Delhi HC: Press Can Be Sued Under Article 226 for Violating Privacy

Delhi High Court Extends the Right to Privacy Against the Press: A Landmark Horizontal Application

The Delhi High Court has this month delivered a ruling with far-reaching implications for how constitutional rights operate in India — not just against the government, but against powerful private actors such as media houses. A two-judge bench comprising Justices C Hari Shankar and O P Shukla upheld a single-judge order that had directed TV Today Network (which runs the news channel Aaj Tak) to pay Rs 5 lakh in compensation for broadcasting details that identified a minor victim of sexual assault. For CLAT aspirants, this case is a masterclass in constitutional law, media law, and the evolving doctrine of “horizontal application” of Fundamental Rights — concepts that appear again and again in Legal Reasoning passages.

The Origin of the Case: A 2005 Broadcast

The dispute traces back to 2005. A woman had complained that her husband sexually assaulted their minor daughter. When a television crew from Aaj Tak approached the family for a story, the woman refused to speak to them or allow her family’s identity to be disclosed. Despite this refusal, the channel went ahead and aired a segment that disclosed identifying details — including the child’s name and visuals of the family home — effectively making the identity of a minor sexual assault survivor public. The woman subsequently filed a writ petition challenging this broadcast as a violation of her family’s right to privacy and dignity.

A single judge of the Delhi High Court ruled in her favour, directing the channel to pay compensation. TV Today Network appealed this order, arguing among other things that as a private broadcaster, it could not be subjected to a writ under Article 226, which is traditionally understood to apply against the State or bodies performing State-like functions. The two-judge bench has now rejected this argument and upheld the compensation.

The Core Holding: A Television Channel Performs a “Public Function”

The heart of the judgment lies in how the Court characterised the nature of a television news channel’s activity. The bench held that broadcasting news to the public is a “public function” — even though the entity performing it, TV Today Network, is a privately-owned company. Because the channel discharges a public function, it can be made amenable to the writ jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, and can be held accountable for violating an individual’s Fundamental Right to privacy.

This is a significant doctrinal move. Ordinarily, writs are associated with actions against “the State” as defined under Article 12, or against authorities discharging public duties. By classifying media broadcasting as a public function, the Court effectively opened the door for private media entities to be hauled before a constitutional court for rights violations — something that would otherwise require an ordinary civil suit for damages (e.g., in tort or defamation law), a process that is typically slower and procedurally heavier.

Understanding Article 226 and Writ Jurisdiction

Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue directions, orders, or writs — including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari — “for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III [Fundamental Rights] and for any other purpose.” The phrase “for any other purpose” gives High Courts wider writ jurisdiction than the Supreme Court has under Article 32, which is confined to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. This wider language is part of why High Courts have more room to extend writ remedies to non-traditional respondents, including entities that are not, strictly speaking, “the State.”

Horizontal Versus Vertical Application of Rights — The Key Doctrine

To understand why this judgment matters so much, aspirants must grasp the distinction between two models of how Fundamental Rights operate:

Vertical Application

Under the traditional, “vertical” model, Fundamental Rights are enforceable only against the State — the government and instrumentalities of the State as defined in Article 12. A private individual or company violating your privacy would ordinarily not be sued through a writ petition; you would have to rely on ordinary law such as tort, contract, or specific statutes. The relationship is “vertical” because it runs between the citizen (below) and the State (above).

Horizontal Application

The “horizontal” model allows a Fundamental Right to be enforced directly against another private person or entity, not just the State. This is a more expansive and, historically, more contested idea, because Fundamental Rights were originally conceived as a shield against governmental overreach, not as a general private-law remedy. Over time, however, Indian constitutional jurisprudence has increasingly recognised limited horizontal application — particularly in matters involving human dignity and privacy — because private entities today, especially large corporations and media houses, can wield power comparable to the State in the way they affect citizens’ lives.

The Delhi High Court’s ruling is a direct and vivid application of horizontal enforcement: an individual’s Article 21 right to privacy is here enforced against a private broadcaster, not the government.

The Foundation: Kaushal Kishor and Puttaswamy

This ruling builds on two significant Supreme Court precedents that every CLAT aspirant should know:

Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023)

A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that Fundamental Rights under Articles 19 (freedom of speech and expression, among other freedoms) and Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) can, in certain circumstances, be enforced horizontally — that is, against private persons and not merely the State. This was a departure from the strictly vertical understanding that had dominated Indian constitutional law for decades, and it opened the conceptual door for cases exactly like the present one, where a private media company is held to the same standard of respecting privacy that the State itself would be bound by.

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

The nine-judge bench in Puttaswamy unanimously declared that the right to privacy is a Fundamental Right, protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, and also flowing from the freedoms guaranteed under Part III more broadly. Without this foundational recognition, there would be no privacy right for the Delhi High Court to horizontally extend against the press in the first place. Puttaswamy is the bedrock; Kaushal Kishor is the bridge that lets that bedrock right be asserted against private parties; and the present Delhi High Court ruling is a concrete, real-world application of that bridge to the media industry specifically.

Why the Press Is Singled Out: The “Public Function” Test

Not every private actor automatically becomes subject to writ jurisdiction merely because Kaushal Kishor permits horizontal enforcement in principle. Courts still look for some special characteristic that brings the private entity within the reach of public law remedies. Here, the “public function” test did that work: broadcasting news to a mass audience is treated as functionally public in nature, similar to how courts have, in other contexts, treated bodies performing statutory or quasi-governmental functions as amenable to writs even if not formally part of “the State.” A television channel does not merely conduct a private business transaction with its viewers — it disseminates information that shapes public discourse, and with that role comes a corresponding public responsibility, including the responsibility not to violate the dignity and privacy of vulnerable individuals such as minor victims of sexual assault.

The Debate: Chilling Effect Versus Accountability

This expansion of horizontal privacy rights against the press is not without controversy, and CLAT aspirants should be able to engage with both sides of the argument, since Legal Reasoning passages often test the ability to see counter-arguments.

The concern — “weaponisation” and chilling effect: Critics worry that if privacy claims against media houses become easier to bring through writ petitions rather than ordinary civil suits, aggrieved parties (including powerful or influential individuals) might repackage what are essentially reputational or defamation-style grievances as “privacy” or “dignity” violations to obtain a faster, more favourable forum. This could have a chilling effect on investigative journalism, discouraging media houses from reporting on matters of genuine public interest for fear of expansive liability.

The counter-argument — accountability for genuine harm: On the other hand, this case does not involve investigative journalism exposing wrongdoing; it involves the gratuitous disclosure of a minor sexual assault survivor’s identity, against the express wishes of the family, serving no legitimate public interest. Genuine public-interest journalism — reporting on corruption, government failures, or matters of public concern — remains protected under the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a), subject only to the reasonable restrictions in Article 19(2). The horizontal privacy doctrine, properly applied, targets only the narrow zone where private dignity is violated without any corresponding public interest justification, and is not intended to shield those who defame or embarrass public figures from legitimate scrutiny.

The CLAT Angle

This case is exceptionally rich for CLAT preparation because it weaves together several high-frequency constitutional law doctrines:

• Article 226 — writ jurisdiction of High Courts, including the wider “for any other purpose” clause compared to Article 32.
• Horizontal application of Fundamental Rights — enforcing rights against private persons/entities, not just the State, as distinguished from the traditional vertical model.
• Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023) — Constitution Bench recognising horizontal enforceability of Articles 19 and 21.
• Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) — right to privacy as a Fundamental Right under Article 21.
• “Public function” test — how courts determine whether a private entity can be subjected to writ jurisdiction.
• Article 12 (“State”) — the traditional boundary of who Fundamental Rights bind, and how this ruling stretches that boundary.
• Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2) — freedom of the press as an aspect of free speech, and its reasonable restrictions, relevant to balancing privacy against press freedom.

A well-prepared aspirant should be able to explain, in a single crisp paragraph, why this case is doctrinally significant: it is not merely about compensation for a media house’s misconduct, but about the Indian judiciary formally recognising that a private broadcaster performing a public function can be compelled — through the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of a High Court — to answer for violating a citizen’s Fundamental Right to privacy. That sentence alone captures Article 226, the horizontal/vertical distinction, Kaushal Kishor, Puttaswamy, and the public function test — precisely the kind of layered, multi-doctrine reasoning that CLAT Legal Reasoning and GK sections are designed to test.

Test Yourself — Daily Quiz